Willfulness Under 18 U.S.C. § 242 May Be Inferred from Use-of-Force Training Violations and Concealment; § 1519 Applies to False Reports Made in Contemplation of Federal Review

I. Introduction

In United States v. Delgado (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2026), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Miguel Angel Delgado, Jr., a U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer, after a three-day bench trial. Delgado was convicted of two counts of depriving individuals of constitutional rights under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (excessive force in two separate incidents) and one count of falsifying records in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (a false use-of-force report).

The appeal centered on sufficiency of the evidence. Delgado argued that the evidence did not permit a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) his force was objectively unreasonable and willful under § 242, or (2) his report was knowingly false and written with obstructive intent under § 1519. The Fifth Circuit, applying a highly deferential standard, held the evidence was sufficient and affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit held that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Delgado:

  • Acted under color of law in both force incidents (on duty, in uniform, invoking official authority);
  • Willfully used force in reckless disregard of clearly established constitutional requirements, supported by evidence of (i) violation of training, (ii) aggressive demeanor inconsistent with lawful enforcement needs, and (iii) concealment through false accounts; and
  • Deprived the victims of Fourth Amendment rights by using objectively unreasonable excessive force, causing injury.

On the § 1519 count, the court held the evidence supported that Delgado knowingly falsified a report and did so with intent to impede a matter within federal jurisdiction. Critically, the court reiterated that § 1519 does not require knowledge of a pending or imminent investigation.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Framework: Deference to the Verdict

  • United States v. Cervantes, 107 F.4th 459 (5th Cir. 2024): Supplied the core articulation of the deferential standard— reviewing evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution and asking whether any rational trier could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Delgado panel repeatedly anchored its approach in Cervantes.
  • United States v. Rodriguez, 136 F.4th 258 (5th Cir. 2025): Reinforced that a defendant “swims upstream” on sufficiency review and that appellate courts do not re-try the case. Delgado used Rodriguez to reject invitations to reweigh testimony or reinterpret ambiguous facts in the defendant’s favor.
  • United States v. Waguespack, 935 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2019): Cited for the defendant’s burden to show that no rational factfinder could have found guilt—an allocation that matters in close factual disputes.
  • United States v. Cabello, 33 F.4th 281 (5th Cir. 2022): Provided the opinion’s memorable instruction that the court places “a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the verdict,” underscoring extreme appellate restraint.
  • United States v. Fields, 977 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Scott, 70 F.4th 846 (5th Cir. 2023): Together supported two propositions central to the outcome: (i) appellate courts do not reassess credibility and weight of evidence, and (ii) courts accept credibility choices and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.
  • United States v. Lott, 53 F.4th 319 (5th Cir. 2022): Reiterated deference to the factfinder and refusal to weigh evidence, especially relevant where video evidence was interpreted through expert testimony.

2. 18 U.S.C. § 242: Elements, Willfulness, and Excessive Force

  • United States v. Brugman, 364 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2004): The controlling Fifth Circuit framework for § 242. Brugman supplied (i) the three elements—willfully, deprivation of a federal right, under color of law—and (ii) the excessive-force test requiring injury, clearly excessive force relative to need, and objective unreasonableness. Brugman also provided the “at most passively resistant” reference point used to assess objective unreasonableness.
  • Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945): Provided the canonical definition of § 242 “willfully”— acting in open defiance or reckless disregard of a specific and definite constitutional requirement. Delgado applied Screws (via Brugman) to emphasize that willfulness may be inferred from circumstances, not just explicit admissions.
  • United States v. Sertich, 879 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 2018): Supported two key moves in the reasoning: willfulness is often proven circumstantially, and it may be established by “any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal.”
  • United States v. Diaz, 498 F. App'x 407 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam): Used to support that evidence of an officer being angry/yelling in an otherwise secure setting can support an inference of willful misconduct.
  • United States v. Hill, 99 F.4th 1289 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2698 (2025): Cited for the proposition that obvious violations of use-of-force training can support an inference of willfulness, especially if repeated. While non-binding, Hill was persuasive authority supporting the Fifth Circuit’s inference-based approach.
  • United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019): Cited to reinforce that attempts to conceal misconduct through false statements and reports can support a finding of willfulness.

3. 18 U.S.C. § 1519: False Records and Obstructive Intent Without a Pending Investigation

  • United States v. Plezia, 115 F.4th 379 (5th Cir. 2024): The primary Fifth Circuit authority structuring § 1519 analysis. Plezia supplied two key rules adopted and applied here: (i) no requirement that an investigation be ongoing or imminent, and (ii) § 1519 reaches acts aimed at obstructing pending matters, matters “in contemplation,” or acts “in relation to” such matters.
  • United States v. Moore, 708 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. 2013): Reinforced that a defendant need not know his conduct is impeding a pending investigation—useful for rejecting arguments premised on lack of awareness of a specific inquiry.
  • United States v. Kernell, 667 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2012): Cited for the “in contemplation” prong—belief that a federal investigation might begin at some point in the future can satisfy § 1519’s contemplation requirement.
  • United States v. Maggitt, 784 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1986): Cited for the general principle that intent is commonly proven circumstantially.
  • United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 2008): Used to support drawing an inference from immediate post-incident false statements to later false statements in a report—suggesting consciousness of wrongdoing and a desire for a consistent cover story.
  • United States v. Elashi, 554 F.3d 480 (5th Cir. 2008): Supported the inference of guilty knowledge from false statements and attempted coverups.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Court’s Method: “Heavy Thumb” Deference and Factfinder Primacy

Delgado is a textbook application of the Fifth Circuit’s sufficiency doctrine: the appellate court does not resolve competing narratives, decide which witnesses were more credible, or decide whether it would have convicted. Instead, it asks whether the trial judge, as factfinder, could rationally draw guilt-supporting inferences from the record. This mattered because key proof came from (i) video interpreted by an expert, (ii) eyewitness officers, and (iii) supervisor testimony about training and proper techniques.

2. § 242: Under Color of Law Was Straightforward

The “under color of law” element was essentially undisputed: Delgado acted while on duty, in uniform, and asserting federal officer authority. The opinion treats this as satisfied for both incidents.

3. § 242 Willfulness: Training, Demeanor, and Concealment as Circumstantial Proof

The opinion’s most consequential reasoning is its aggregation of three categories of proof to support a finding of willfulness under Screws v. United States (as operationalized through United States v. Brugman and United States v. Sertich):

  1. Use-of-force training violations: The court emphasized evidence that Delgado was trained not to use force to gain compliance from a non-resisting person and that “slamming” tactics were outside permissible uses of force. The inference is not merely that he acted unreasonably, but that he acted in reckless disregard of a specific constitutional limitation made concrete by training—supported by United States v. Hill.
  2. Demeanor inconsistent with legitimate law-enforcement necessity: The court pointed to yelling, cursing, and banging objects in a secure facility. Under United States v. Diaz, such anger evidence can support willfulness because it suggests punitive or ego-driven force rather than a measured response to threat.
  3. Concealment and false accounts: Relying on United States v. Sertich and United States v. Brown, the court treated misleading statements and concealment efforts as probative of willfulness—i.e., a consciousness that the conduct was unlawful.
    Commentary note: The opinion states that, regarding the Espinosa incident, Delgado lied to his supervisor and in a written report. Separately, the § 1519 count and detailed falsification discussion concern a report about the Estrada incident. The Fifth Circuit did not treat this as a sufficiency problem; rather, it used falsity and concealment as circumstantial evidence of culpable state of mind and separately upheld the § 1519 conviction based on the Estrada report.

4. § 242 Excessive Force: Injury + Clear Excess + Objective Unreasonableness

Applying United States v. Brugman, the court affirmed both § 242 convictions through a structured assessment:

  • Injury: For both Espinosa and Estrada, the opinion emphasizes undisputed injuries (lightheadedness/head pain/dizziness symptoms for Espinosa; nose laceration/bleeding for Estrada), tying them directly to Delgado’s physical actions.
  • Clearly excessive relative to need: The court credited supervisor and expert testimony that the force used was not reasonable or necessary, including evidence that the victims were not resisting at the moment of the higher-force conduct (notably, the “door” contact for Espinosa and the chair/arm-twist force for Estrada).
  • Objective unreasonableness: The court emphasized that even if there was some earlier noncompliance or verbal exchange, later escalations could still be objectively unreasonable. The analysis highlights contradictions in Delgado’s claimed threat perception: if Estrada posed a “direct threat,” Delgado’s decision to open a secured door, bring him into a secure area, and fail to summon backup or conduct a pat-down undermined the credibility of the asserted safety justification—an inference the appellate court was required to view in the government’s favor.

5. § 1519: False Report “In Contemplation” of Federal Review

The § 1519 holding is grounded in the statute’s breadth as explained by United States v. Plezia and United States v. Moore: no pending investigation is required, and no knowledge of an imminent investigation is required. The court’s reasoning relies on several linked inferences:

  • Temporal proximity and consistency motive: Minutes after the incident, Delgado gave a false verbal account to his supervisor. The court treated this as probative that the later written report carried forward a “consistent” (but false) narrative—an inference supported by United States v. Hunt.
  • Institutional context makes federal review foreseeable: The opinion underscores training that officers must document excessive force before the end of the shift. From that, the court inferred Delgado could foresee official scrutiny and thus had reason to shape the record in anticipation— aligning with United States v. Kernell’s “in contemplation” concept.
  • Specific falsities corroborated by video/expert comparison: The expert testimony contrasted the report’s claims (Estrada seated and “pushing back”) with footage indicating Estrada was on his knees with his head against chairs/wall and not resisting. Those discrepancies supported “knowingly” false entries and obstructive intent.

C. Impact

  • Reinforced evidentiary pathway for § 242 willfulness: Delgado strengthens the practical prosecution model in officer civil-rights cases: willfulness can be inferred from (i) clear divergence from training, (ii) anger/punitiveness in a controlled environment, and (iii) concealment behavior. This is especially significant where direct evidence of subjective intent is unavailable.
  • Video + expert testimony as a sufficiency anchor: The opinion signals that where video exists but is ambiguous, expert interpretation—paired with supervisor testimony—can supply rational inferences sufficient to sustain convictions.
  • Expansive, compliance-driven reading of § 1519 in internal-force documentation: By emphasizing training to document force and the plausibility of future review, the decision supports applying § 1519 to false narratives crafted in anticipation of administrative or inspector-general scrutiny, even absent a known investigation.
  • Appellate posture matters: Delgado illustrates that sufficiency challenges are structurally disadvantaged in the Fifth Circuit; arguments that depend on reweighing credibility, second-guessing the factfinder’s interpretation of events, or proposing innocence-consistent narratives are unlikely to succeed under the “heavy thumb” standard.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Sufficiency of the evidence
An appellate court does not decide whether it would convict. It asks whether any rational factfinder, viewing the record most favorably to the government, could convict beyond a reasonable doubt.
Bench trial
A trial without a jury; the judge finds facts and determines guilt. On appeal, the judge’s credibility calls receive the same deference as a jury’s.
Under color of law
Misuse of official power—acting with authority made possible by one’s government position (here: on-duty, uniformed CBP enforcement actions).
Willfully (18 U.S.C. § 242)
Not mere negligence. Under Screws v. United States, it includes acting in reckless disregard of a clearly defined constitutional rule. Because direct proof is rare, courts allow circumstantial evidence—training violations, anger, and concealment—to establish it.
Objectively unreasonable (Fourth Amendment force)
The question is whether the force was excessive from the standpoint of a reasonable officer on the scene, not whether the officer later claims a subjective fear.
18 U.S.C. § 1519 “in contemplation”
A false record can violate § 1519 even if no investigation has started. It is enough that the defendant acts anticipating that the matter might be reviewed by federal authorities.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Delgado affirms that, in the Fifth Circuit, § 242 convictions can rest on a factfinder’s rational inferences drawn from training, demeanor, and concealment—especially when supported by video and expert comparison—without appellate reweighing. It also reinforces a broad, forward-looking application of § 1519: knowingly false use-of-force reporting can satisfy obstructive intent when written in anticipation of foreseeable federal review, even if no investigation is pending. The decision thus fortifies both the evidentiary playbook for proving officer willfulness under § 242 and the government’s ability to charge false force documentation under § 1519.