Date: Jan 19, 2026

When Standing Is Raised First on Appeal, the Fourth Circuit Will Remand for a Fact-Built Record on Informational Injury Under the NVRA

I. Introduction

In Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Jenny Wooten (4th Cir. Jan. 16, 2026), the Public Interest Legal Foundation (PILF), a Virginia-based nonprofit focused on election integrity, sought access to South Carolina’s statewide voter registration list under the disclosure provision of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). The South Carolina Election Commission, led (for purposes of the appeal) by Interim Executive Director Jenny Wooten, refused—relying on a state-law limitation that allegedly restricts access to South Carolina registered voters.

The district court granted PILF summary judgment and ordered disclosure, concluding the NVRA compelled production and preempted any contrary state restriction. On appeal, however, the Election Commission raised a new threshold challenge: PILF’s lack of Article III standing. The Fourth Circuit did not decide standing on the existing record; instead, it remanded for the district court to address standing first.

The key issue is procedural and jurisdictional: when standing is raised for the first time on appeal—particularly at the summary judgment stage— and the record is underdeveloped as to a claimed “informational injury,” the appellate court will not make first-instance factual findings and will remand for the district court to decide whether the plaintiff has Article III standing.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit held that Article III standing is a threshold jurisdictional requirement that may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal.
PILF’s asserted injury theory was “informational injury” based on an alleged statutory right under the NVRA to obtain the voter list.
At the summary judgment stage, allegations in the complaint are insufficient; the plaintiff must produce evidence of specific facts showing a concrete injury.
Because standing was raised for the first time on appeal, the record lacked factual development on informational injury; deciding standing would require factfinding.
The Fourth Circuit therefore remanded for the district court to determine, on an appropriately developed record, whether PILF has standing.
Because the case was remanded on jurisdictional grounds, the Fourth Circuit expressly did not reach the merits (including NVRA preemption and statutory interpretation) and left those issues available for a later appeal if standing is found.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. NVRA disclosure purpose

Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331, 339 (4th Cir. 2012), is cited for the purpose of § 20507(i)(1): facilitating identification of “errors and fraud” in voter-roll maintenance. The Fourth Circuit did not apply Long to resolve whether South Carolina must disclose the list, but the citation situates PILF’s request within the NVRA’s transparency rationale—background relevant to why plaintiffs frame denial of access as an “informational injury.”

2. Standing can be raised at any time; jurisdiction first

Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994), supplies the rule that standing may be raised at any time. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998), reinforces that courts must resolve jurisdiction (including standing) before merits. These cases anchor the panel’s willingness to entertain a standing argument newly raised on appeal and its refusal to reach NVRA merits without first confirming Article III power.

3. The Fourth Circuit’s own standing framework and organizational standing

Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2001), is used to describe standing as ensuring a proper “case or controversy.” For organizational standing, the court relies on Republican Nat'l Comm. v. N. Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 120 F.4th 390, 395 (4th Cir. 2024), which in turn cites Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982). These authorities establish that an organization may sue for injury to itself but must still show injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.

4. Concrete injury requirements and informational injury

The opinion ties informational injury to the requirement of concrete harm:

Food & Drug Admin v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 393-94 (2024), is cited (via RNC) for the modern formulation of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.
Maryland v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 151 F.4th 197, 208 (4th Cir. 2025), and Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2017), provide the key informational-injury standard: denial of information must cause “a real harm with an adverse effect.”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016), reinforces that a concrete injury must be “real,” not “abstract,” even when a statute grants a procedural or informational entitlement.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992), supplies both the classic standing elements and the procedural point that, at summary judgment, standing must be supported by evidence of “specific facts,” not pleadings alone.

These cases collectively drove the panel’s conclusion that it could not simply accept PILF’s pleaded informational injury at the summary judgment stage; it needed an evidentiary showing of concrete harm and a record enabling fact-based evaluation.

5. Remand rather than appellate factfinding

DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 & n.* (1974) (per curiam), is cited for the proposition that factfinding is for the district court, not the court of appeals. Roberts v. Carter-Young, Inc., 131 F.4th 241, 252 (4th Cir. 2025), supplies the “court of review, not of first view” principle. Together, they justify remand: resolving standing would require factual determinations about what PILF does with the requested information, what concrete harms the denial caused, and whether those harms are redressable by disclosure.

6. Persuasive developments in other circuits

The panel flags two “nearly identical” PILF suits dismissed for lack of standing: Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Sec'y Commonwealth of Pa., 136 F.4th 456, 469 (3d Cir. 2025), and Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Benson, 136 F.4th 613, 632 (6th Cir. 2025). While the Fourth Circuit did not adopt their holdings, it recognized their relevance—particularly because, in those cases, standing had been litigated and adjudicated below, producing a record fit for review. That contrast supported remand here rather than an appellate ruling on an undeveloped record.

B. Legal Reasoning

Standing is jurisdictional and precedes merits. Because Article III limits federal courts to “cases” and “controversies,” the panel treated standing as an obligatory first step and declined to address statutory interpretation or preemption while jurisdiction remained uncertain.
Informational injury is not automatic upon a statutory violation. Even if the NVRA creates a right to inspect/copy certain records, the opinion underscores that the plaintiff must show concrete harm from being denied that information—i.e., a “real harm with an adverse effect,” not merely a generalized interest in government compliance.
Procedural posture matters: summary judgment requires evidence. The panel emphasized Lujan’s requirement that, at summary judgment, standing must be supported by “specific facts” in evidence. PILF’s request to decide standing based only on complaint allegations was incompatible with that standard.
Appellate courts avoid first-instance factfinding. Because the standing challenge came late, the district court had made no findings and the record was not built to test informational injury. The panel therefore refused to decide standing on appeal and remanded for evidentiary development and a district-court ruling.

C. Impact

Procedural roadmap in NVRA disclosure cases. The opinion signals that NVRA § 20507(i) disclosure suits—especially by organizations—should anticipate a standing challenge and develop evidence of concrete informational harm early (including at the summary judgment stage).
Appellate discipline: jurisdiction first, merits later. Even where the district court has resolved substantive NVRA preemption and disclosure issues, a late-raised standing challenge can halt merits review and force remand, delaying enforcement and increasing litigation costs.
Convergence with post-Spokeo informational-injury scrutiny. By emphasizing “real harm with an adverse effect” and the need for evidence, the Fourth Circuit aligns its approach with a more demanding informational-injury analysis seen in recent standing doctrine—without yet deciding whether PILF can satisfy it on a developed record.
Limited precedential reach on NVRA merits. The opinion creates no new Fourth Circuit merits rule about the scope of NVRA disclosure or preemption of state voter-list restrictions; it preserves those questions for later, contingent on standing.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III standing: A constitutional requirement that a plaintiff show (1) a concrete injury, (2) caused by the defendant, (3) likely to be fixed by a court order. Without it, federal courts lack power to decide the case.
Injury-in-fact: The “injury” must be real and personal to the plaintiff (not a general grievance) and sufficiently concrete—more than an abstract interest in seeing the law followed.
Informational injury: A type of injury claimed when the plaintiff is denied information it says a statute entitles it to receive. Under Fourth Circuit precedent cited here, the plaintiff must show that the denial caused real-world harm or an adverse effect, not just that information was withheld.
Summary judgment stage: A point in the case where the court decides issues based on evidence (declarations, documents, admissions). At this stage, a plaintiff cannot rely solely on allegations; it must come forward with proof of specific facts supporting standing.
Remand: The appellate court sends the case back to the district court for further proceedings—here, to develop the record and decide standing before any merits rulings can stand.

V. Conclusion

Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Jenny Wooten establishes (and reinforces) a practical jurisdictional rule in the Fourth Circuit: when Article III standing—particularly an asserted informational injury—is raised for the first time on appeal and the record is not developed with evidence (as required at summary judgment), the court of appeals will not decide standing through appellate factfinding. Instead, it will remand for the district court to take evidence and rule on standing in the first instance. The decision leaves the NVRA disclosure and federal preemption issues unresolved, but it meaningfully shapes how NVRA transparency litigation must be litigated: standing must be proven with concrete, evidentiary facts, not assumed from a claimed statutory right alone.