Date: May 19, 2026

Wet-Concrete Cleaning Hazards and Slip-and-Fall Causation: “Open and Obvious” and Expert-Testimony Limits in Fourth Circuit Diversity Cases

Introduction

In Jonathan Lewis v. Circle K Stores Inc. (4th Cir. May 13, 2026), the Fourth Circuit reviewed a summary-judgment victory obtained by Circle K in a South Carolina premises-liability suit arising from a slip-and-fall outside a convenience store. Jonathan Lewis alleged that Circle K, through its employee, created a slippery condition by washing the entrance area with water and a powdered concrete cleaner but failed to warn patrons with cones, signs, or similar alerts. Lewis slipped on a painted parking-lot stripe and suffered a severe right-leg injury (a patellar tendon rupture), incurring substantial medical expenses and a permanent impairment rating.

The district court granted summary judgment to Circle K on three grounds: (1) the hazard was “open and obvious”; (2) Circle K lacked notice that the cleaning posed a “specific danger”; and (3) Lewis failed to offer expert testimony proving the slip caused the tendon rupture. The district court also denied Lewis’s motions related to expert admissibility (Daubert) and alleged spoliation stemming from post-incident repainting of the parking-lot stripes. The Fourth Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, emphasizing that key questions of breach and causation belonged to a jury on this record.

Summary of the Opinion

Breach / “Open and obvious”: The court held that visible wetness on concrete does not necessarily make the danger “open and obvious” as a matter of law, especially where the true hazard may be a chemical cleaner mixed with water and where ordinary warning measures (signs, cones, high-visibility apparel) were absent.
Causation / Expert testimony: The court held that expert testimony is not categorically required to prove causation in a slip-and-fall causing a patellar tendon rupture; jurors may infer causation from ordinary experience and circumstantial evidence (including immediate onset of pain and a “pop”).
Daubert and spoliation rulings: Because the district court resolved all motions in a single order alongside summary judgment, the Fourth Circuit vacated the Daubert and spoliation determinations and remanded, directing particular attention to Silvestri v. General Motors Corp. and Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for spoliation analysis.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Summary judgment posture and inference-drawing

The court began by reaffirming the Rule 56 lens: evidence and inferences must be drawn for the nonmovant. It cited Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 139 F.4th 356 (4th Cir. 2025), for de novo review and the requirement to credit the nonmoving party’s version where factual disputes exist. That framing was outcome-determinative: the panel repeatedly identified genuine disputes (whether chemicals were apparent; whether warnings were adequate; whether causation could be inferred) that should be resolved by a jury rather than on summary judgment.

2) Erie and the governing negligence elements

Applying South Carolina substantive law under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the court addressed the South Carolina negligence elements (duty, breach, causation, damages) as summarized in Savannah Bank, N.A. v. Stalliard, 734 S.E.2d 161 (S.C. 2012). Circle K contested breach and causation, not duty or damages.

3) Invitee status and the merchant’s duty of reasonable care

The court relied on Fountain v. Fred's, Inc., 871 S.E.2d 166 (S.C. 2022), to classify Lewis as a “public invitee.” It emphasized the general duty described in Graham v. Whitaker, 321 S.E.2d 40 (S.C. 1984): merchants must exercise reasonable or ordinary care for invitee safety and may be liable for injuries from breach.

For the duty to keep premises safe or warn of hazards, the court cited Henderson v. St. Francis Cmty. Hosp., 399 S.E.2d 767 (S.C. 1990), and Sims v. Giles, 541 S.E.2d 857 (S.C. 2001), aligning with the principle (also echoed in Brown) that liability typically depends on actual or constructive knowledge of hazardous conditions.

Importantly, the opinion stressed that “reasonableness” varies with context and foreseeable invitees, quoting Graham on care “commensurate with the particular circumstances,” and comparing Larimore v. Carolina Power & Light, 531 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000), with Henderson to illustrate how premises types affect the standard. The panel highlighted that a gasoline-and-convenience business serving the general public must foresee a wide range of patrons, including vulnerable individuals, and it cited Callander v. Charleston Doughnut Corp., 406 S.E.2d 361 (1991), and Lowrimore v. Fast Fare Stores, Inc., 385 S.E.2d 218 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989), to underscore that premise owners must account for such foreseeability in implementing safety measures.

4) “Open and obvious” doctrine and latent hazards

The court treated Callander v. Charleston Doughnut Corp. as the key South Carolina adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343(a), limiting duties where a danger is open and obvious such that a reasonable invitee would notice and avoid it. But it found the “open and obvious” label contested here because the visible fact of wetness did not necessarily reveal the alleged hazard: a chemical cleaner reducing friction.

The opinion also relied on Lowrimore v. Fast Fare Stores, Inc. to support the proposition that wet concrete alone does not automatically equate to an open-and-obvious danger as a matter of law. The court emphasized that many people routinely traverse wet concrete without perceiving abnormal danger; thus, the decisive question is whether this wetness was ordinary (water) or unusually slippery (water plus chemical cleaner)—a question the jury should decide on this record.

Using Fountain v. Fred's, Inc. (particularly its discussion of what a “reasonable inspection” would reveal), the court framed the chemical nature of the hazard as potentially “latent,” requiring warning measures if it would not be discernible through ordinary observation.

5) Causation and when expert testimony is required

For causation, the court anchored its analysis in Bramlette v. Charter-Med.-Columbia, 393 S.E.2d 914 (S.C. 1990), which states that expert testimony is unnecessary where laypersons’ common knowledge suffices to determine causation, but is generally required in medically complex settings (e.g., malpractice). The panel distinguished complex causation examples by citing cases involving scientific or medical complexity: Goewey v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 1268 (D.S.C. 1995) (chemical exposure), Smith v. Michelin Tire Corp., 465 S.E.2d 96 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995), and In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 227 F. Supp. 3d 452 (D.S.C. 2017), aff'd, 892 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 2018) (pharmaceutical/medical causation).

To show that circumstantial evidence and timing can support causation in ordinary-experience cases, the court invoked Miller v. Atl. Bottling Corp., 191 S.E.2d 518 (S.C. 1972) (immediate onset after consuming contaminated beverage) and cited Swink v. S. Health Partners Inc., 160 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2025) (Richardson, J., concurring), discussing temporal proximity where events have an “established causal relationship.” The panel concluded that a slip, loss of control, a pop, immediate pain, and immediate functional impairment are within jurors’ everyday inferential competence—making expert testimony permissible but not mandatory.

6) Daubert, spoliation, and discretionary rulings on remand

The panel reiterated that expert-admission rulings and spoliation sanctions are discretionary, citing Nease v. Ford Motor Co., 848 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2017), and Wall v. Rasnick, 42 F.4th 214 (4th Cir. 2022). But it vacated both determinations because they were issued together with the erroneous summary-judgment disposition.

For spoliation, the court specifically instructed the district court to evaluate and apply Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2001), and Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2004), which frame factors such as the duty to preserve, the degree of fault, the prejudice to the opposing party, and the proportionality of sanctions. The repainting of the stripes—occurring after Circle K knew Lewis sought inspection—sets up factual questions about preservation duties and prejudice that the district court must reassess under those standards.

Legal Reasoning

1) Duty informs breach: the “reasonable care” baseline is contextual and invitee-inclusive

The opinion treated duty and breach as “intertwined,” using South Carolina’s “reasonable care” standard as a sliding measure informed by the foreseeability of diverse patrons. A key move in the panel’s reasoning is its insistence that a mass-market, general-public business like Circle K must anticipate patrons with varying mobility, acuity, and attentiveness—making basic warnings (cones, signs, high-visibility apparel) more central to the reasonableness inquiry. This does not create strict liability for falls; rather, it narrows the circumstances where a merchant can win as a matter of law based on minimal cues (mere wetness; an employee’s presence) when the alleged danger is atypically slippery due to chemical application.

2) “Open and obvious” cannot be declared as a matter of law when the salient risk is chemical and potentially latent

The court did not reject the “open and obvious” doctrine; it rejected its mechanical application. It reasoned that the open-and-obvious inquiry must match the actual alleged hazard: not “wet concrete” in the abstract, but chemically altered wet concrete that may reduce traction. It then identified record-supported reasons a reasonable invitee might not recognize that risk: brooms are commonly associated with ordinary sweeping (not chemical application), wet concrete is ubiquitous, and there were no additional warning devices despite apparent company policy suggesting a “yellow reflective vest.” The panel thus held that a jury must decide whether the condition was truly open and obvious and whether Circle K’s warning efforts were reasonable under the circumstances.

3) Lay causation is allowed where jurors can connect the mechanics of a fall to an acute musculoskeletal injury

The opinion drew a clear boundary: expert testimony is required when causation depends on specialized science beyond common experience, but not when ordinary experience suffices. The panel acknowledged that jurors may not know anatomical terminology, yet found that they can understand (and infer) that a sudden slip with twisting or buckling can tear connective tissue, especially where a “pop” and immediate pain occur. The court also noted that both sides remain free to offer experts (including on alternative causation such as a spontaneous rupture related to prior injury), but it refused to make expert testimony a prerequisite for reaching the jury.

4) Remand management: evidentiary and spoliation issues must be reconsidered with the merits restored

By vacating the Daubert and spoliation decisions, the panel recognized that trial-court evidentiary rulings can be intertwined with the disposition of merits. The instruction to apply Silvestri and Hodge signals that repainting after notice of inspection may warrant closer scrutiny for duty-to-preserve and prejudice, even if a party characterizes the alteration as “routine maintenance.”

Impact

Narrower path to summary judgment in cleaning-related slip cases: In Fourth Circuit diversity cases applying South Carolina law, defendants will have a harder time obtaining judgment as a matter of law by characterizing conditions as merely “wet” and “visible” where the plaintiff alleges an atypical slickness caused by cleaners.
Warning measures matter more when the hazard is chemically enhanced: The opinion elevates the evidentiary significance of basic warnings (signage, cones, high-visibility gear), especially where a business serves the general public. While not declaring these measures legally mandatory, the court treats their absence as powerful evidence against finding openness/obviousness or reasonableness as a matter of law.
Expert-testimony gatekeeping clarified for non-technical causation: The decision reinforces that South Carolina’s causation framework (as understood by the Fourth Circuit) does not automatically demand medical experts for acute, immediately symptomatic injuries following a fall. This lowers the litigation barrier for plaintiffs in “everyday mechanics” injury cases, while preserving defendants’ opportunity to rebut with experts.
Evidence preservation pressure in premises cases: The repainting episode, coupled with the remand instruction to apply Silvestri and Hodge, encourages premises defendants to implement litigation holds and preservation protocols for accident sites once on notice of inspection—particularly when surface conditions (paint, coatings, friction) are central to liability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Open and obvious” hazard: A condition is “open and obvious” when a reasonable person would notice it and avoid it. If it is truly open and obvious, the property owner may have no duty to warn. This case clarifies that the analysis must focus on the real danger alleged (here, potentially chemically slick concrete), not just what is superficially visible (wetness).
Invitee: An invitee is someone invited onto property for the owner’s benefit (e.g., a customer). Businesses generally owe invitees reasonable care to keep premises reasonably safe and to warn of hidden dangers they know or should know about.
Summary judgment (Rule 56): A pretrial ruling that ends a case if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Appellate courts require that disputed facts and reasonable inferences be viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.
Proximate cause and expert testimony: Proximate cause asks whether the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s injury in a legally meaningful way. Expert testimony is required only when the causal link is too technical for ordinary jurors to evaluate without specialized knowledge.
Daubert / Rule 702: The framework governing whether expert testimony is reliable and helpful enough to be admitted. The panel did not decide the merits of the Daubert dispute; it vacated and remanded for reconsideration after restoring the case for trial.
Spoliation: The loss or alteration of evidence that should have been preserved for litigation. Courts may impose sanctions if a party had a duty to preserve evidence and the loss prejudiced the other side. On remand, the district court must apply Fourth Circuit spoliation standards from Silvestri and Hodge.

Conclusion

Lewis v. Circle K strengthens two practical guardrails in premises-liability litigation under South Carolina law as applied in federal court: (1) “open and obvious” cannot be resolved as a matter of law where the alleged hazard is not mere visible wetness but potentially latent chemical slickness and the defendant used no ordinary warnings; and (2) expert medical testimony is not automatically required to prove causation for an acute, immediately symptomatic injury following a slip-and-fall. By returning breach and causation to the jury and vacating related evidentiary and spoliation rulings for reconsideration, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the jury’s central role in resolving fact-bound negligence disputes while signaling heightened attention to reasonable warnings and evidence preservation once litigation is foreseeable.