Warrant Checks Remain “Ordinary Inquiries” During a Traffic Stop; ACCA Enhancement Vacated Where Conceded Predicates Leave Only Two Violent Felonies

I. Introduction

In United States v. Wiggins (10th Cir. May 21, 2026) (Order and Judgment), the Tenth Circuit reviewed: (1) a Fourth Amendment suppression challenge arising from a late-night traffic stop initiated after 911 reports of erratic driving, and (2) a sentencing challenge to an enhanced penalty under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

Police encountered Ronnie Gerald Wiggins in a McDonald’s drive-thru line, performed a brief sobriety-related inquiry, and—while awaiting the result of a dispatch warrant check—learned he had a Texas warrant for a probation violation on a murder conviction. After arresting him, officers conducted an impound search and found a firearm. Wiggins was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 240 months based on ACCA.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of suppression (holding the warrant check did not unlawfully prolong the stop) but vacated the ACCA-enhanced sentence and remanded because, after the Government’s concessions, only two qualifying ACCA predicates remained—making the 240-month sentence illegal under the 15-year statutory maximum absent ACCA.

Note: The panel emphasized that the disposition is “not binding precedent,” except under law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel, though it may be cited for persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  1. Suppression: No Fourth Amendment violation occurred. Even assuming DUI suspicion dissipated after the HGN test, checking for outstanding warrants is an “ordinary inquiry incident to [the traffic] stop” under Rodriguez v. United States. The officers initiated the warrant check early and did not “divert” into an unrelated criminal investigation in a manner that prolonged the stop.
  2. ACCA: Applying plain-error review, the court vacated the ACCA sentence because the Government conceded that Oklahoma robbery with a firearm (in light of United States v. Campbell) and Texas first degree murder (in light of the post-Borden analysis in Vickers v. United States) were not categorically “violent felon[ies].” With only two qualifying predicates remaining, ACCA could not apply. The resulting 240-month sentence exceeded the non-ACCA statutory maximum (180 months), constituting an illegal sentence and “per se, reversible, plain error” under United States v. Titties.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Decision)

1. Traffic stop scope and “ordinary inquiries”

  • Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015):
    The backbone of the suppression analysis. Rodriguez holds that a stop becomes unlawful when officers extend it beyond the time needed to handle the traffic mission, but it also identifies permissible “ordinary inquiries,” expressly including warrant checks. Wiggins turns on this carve-out: once the stop was lawful at inception, the warrant check remained within the stop’s mission.
  • United States v. Dawson, 90 F.4th 1286 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165 (10th Cir. 2022)):
    Provided the Tenth Circuit’s operational test: a stop becomes unreasonable when an officer diverts from the traffic mission, the diversion prolongs the stop, and the detour lacks independent reasonable suspicion. The panel used Dawson/Frazier to frame why waiting for the already-initiated warrant check was not a “detour.”
  • United States v. Young, 99 F.4th 1136 (10th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2009):
    Used for the “common sense” totality evaluation of scope and diligence, and for the proposition (cited in Young) that officers may check whether a detainee is wanted even absent objective safety concerns.
  • United States v. Ramdial, No. 24-6213, 2025 WL 2682624 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 2025) (unpublished):
    Cited persuasively to reinforce that “ordinary inquiries” (including warrant checks) do not violate the Fourth Amendment even absent reasonable suspicion beyond the basis for the stop.
  • United States v. Campbell, 156 F.4th 1019 (2025):
    Cited in the suppression section for general Fourth Amendment standards of review and reasonable-suspicion principles. (Separately, Campbell becomes decisive in the ACCA analysis on Oklahoma robbery with a firearm.)

2. ACCA, categorical approach, and plain error

  • Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021) (plurality opinion):
    Used to state ACCA’s elements clause and to emphasize that the categorical approach asks whether the statute of conviction always requires the requisite “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Borden’s framework underlies the panel’s acceptance of the Government’s concession on Texas first degree murder.
  • United States v. Deiter, 890 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2018):
    Cited (via Campbell) for the core formulation of the categorical approach: focus on statutory elements, not underlying facts.
  • United States v. Campbell, 156 F.4th 1019 (2025):
    Directly controlling (at least persuasively in the panel’s view and conceded by the Government) on the conclusion that Oklahoma robbery with a firearm is not categorically a violent felony under a plain-error posture. Campbell supplies the decisive predicate analysis.
  • Vickers v. United States, No. 3:15-cv-3912, 2024 WL 1863114 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2024), and United States v. Vickers, No. 18-10940, 2022 WL 780421 (5th Cir. 2022):
    The panel referenced Vickers as the post-remand, post-Borden decision concluding Texas first degree murder is not categorically a violent felony. Notably, the Government did not appeal the N.D. Tex. ruling and likewise conceded plain error here.
  • United States v. Venjohn, 104 F.4th 179 (10th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Moore, 30 F.4th 1021 (10th Cir. 2022):
    Provided the four-part plain-error test the panel applied to the ACCA challenge.
  • United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2017):
    Critical to the remedy. The panel invoked Titties for the proposition that an illegal sentence exceeding the statutory maximum constitutes “per se, reversible, plain error,” satisfying the latter plain-error prongs and requiring correction.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why the continued detention for a warrant check was lawful

Wiggins tried to narrow the stop’s purpose to a DUI investigation, arguing that once he “passed” the modified HGN test and officers believed he was not intoxicated, further detention was unlawful. The panel rejected this both factually and doctrinally:

  • Factual framing of the mission: The stop began from 911 reports of erratic driving (speed changes and poor driving), which could indicate multiple traffic or criminal issues. The court declined to “artificially narrow” the mission to DUI alone.
  • Doctrinal framing under Rodriguez: Even if DUI suspicion dissipated, the “mission” includes ordinary incident tasks—specifically, determining whether there are outstanding warrants. Here, the officer initiated the warrant check very early (about a minute into contact), and the result arrived within minutes. Because the officers did not divert into an unrelated investigative detour that added time, the detention remained within constitutional bounds.

The panel therefore affirmed without reaching the district court’s alternative “inevitable discovery” rationale.

2. Why the ACCA enhancement could not stand

ACCA requires three prior convictions for “violent felon[ies]” (predicate offenses). The district court had counted four. On appeal (under plain-error review), the Government conceded two do not qualify categorically:

  • Oklahoma robbery with a firearm: Under United States v. Campbell, it is not categorically a violent felony on plain-error analysis.
  • Texas first degree murder: The Government conceded it is not categorically a violent felony, with the opinion citing Vickers v. United States as support in the post-Borden landscape.

With those two predicates removed, only two qualifying predicates remained—insufficient for ACCA. That made the 240-month sentence unlawful because, without ACCA, the felon-in-possession maximum is 15 years (180 months) under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8). Under United States v. Titties, exceeding the statutory maximum is an illegal sentence constituting reversible plain error. The panel therefore vacated and remanded for resentencing without ACCA.

C. Impact

1. Fourth Amendment traffic-stop practice (Tenth Circuit)

Wiggins reinforces a practical, officer-friendly proposition already embedded in Rodriguez and Tenth Circuit precedent: where a stop is lawful at inception, a promptly initiated warrant check is part of the stop’s ordinary mission and may be awaited even if one line of suspicion (e.g., DUI) appears to dissipate—so long as officers do not undertake a time-adding detour into unrelated investigations.

2. ACCA litigation and sentencing exposure

The sentencing portion highlights two recurring ACCA dynamics:

  • Predicate volatility under the categorical approach: The opinion underscores that seemingly “violent” labels (e.g., robbery “with a firearm,” murder) can fail categorically depending on statutory breadth and mens rea/force requirements as interpreted post-Borden.
  • Plain-error leverage when the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum: By relying on Titties, the panel signals that once ACCA falls away and the imposed term exceeds the non-ACCA maximum, appellate correction is strongly favored—even absent preservation.

Although the disposition is nonprecedential, its reasoning (and the Government’s concessions) may influence charging, plea negotiations, and predicate selection—particularly with respect to Oklahoma robbery with a firearm and Texas first degree murder—until binding circuit authority squarely resolves those classifications.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop”: Routine administrative checks tied to the stop’s mission—driver’s license, registration, insurance, and outstanding warrants. Under Rodriguez v. United States, these checks are generally permissible without extra suspicion.
  • “Prolongs the stop”: Adds time beyond what is reasonably necessary to complete the stop’s mission. The key question is whether police conduct extended the stop for an unrelated investigation.
  • HGN test: A field sobriety test (horizontal gaze nystagmus) used to detect signs of impairment by observing involuntary eye movements.
  • Inevitable discovery doctrine: A Fourth Amendment exception allowing evidence if the government proves it would have been discovered lawfully anyway. The panel did not reach it because it found no constitutional violation.
  • ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)): A sentencing enhancement for § 922(g) defendants with three prior “violent felony” (or serious drug) convictions, triggering a 15-year mandatory minimum and higher exposure.
  • Elements clause and categorical approach: Courts ask whether the statute of conviction—by its elements, not the defendant’s actual conduct—necessarily involves “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” If the statute covers any non-qualifying conduct, it fails categorically.
  • Plain error: A demanding appellate standard for unpreserved issues requiring (1) error, (2) plainness, (3) effect on substantial rights, and (4) serious effect on the fairness/integrity of proceedings.
  • Illegal sentence and “per se” reversible plain error: A sentence exceeding the statutory maximum (absent a valid enhancement) is unlawful; under United States v. Titties, that typically warrants correction on plain-error review.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Wiggins delivers two core holdings with practical consequences: (1) a warrant check is a constitutionally permissible, “ordinary” component of a lawful traffic stop and awaiting its return—when promptly initiated—does not unlawfully prolong the detention; and (2) an ACCA-enhanced sentence cannot stand when conceded non-qualifying predicates reduce the defendant below three violent felonies, particularly where the imposed term exceeds the non-ACCA statutory maximum, producing an illegal sentence requiring vacatur and resentencing.