Ward v. Wesley Medical Center: Pretrial-Order Waiver and Strict Rule 56 Compliance (Plus Employer-Knowledge and Temporal-Proximity Limits) in ADA/FMLA Litigation

Introduction

In Ward v. Wesley Medical Center, LLC; HCA Health Care, Inc. (10th Cir. Apr. 27, 2026) (nonprecedential order and judgment), pro se plaintiff William Oscar Ward appealed summary judgment entered for his former employer, Wesley Medical Center and its holding company HCA Health Care, Inc. (collectively, “Wesley”).

Ward’s dispute began with workplace conflict over credit for an alleged invention (a sprinkler-head cleaning tool). After making internal complaints, Ward sought treatment for anxiety and took leave through a third-party leave administrator (“TAFW”). Wesley ultimately terminated Ward after repeated directives from HR (Lisa Clark) to contact HR and/or attend meetings went unanswered.

Ward sued under the ADA for discrimination and retaliation, and under the FMLA for retaliation (with the district court treating his “FMLA Enforcement” theory as the same as retaliation). On appeal, the key issues were (i) case-management discretion (stays/extensions), (ii) whether the pretrial order controlled the claims and evidence considered at summary judgment, (iii) whether Ward met prima facie elements (notably causation/knowledge), and (iv) whether he qualified for in forma pauperis status on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Affirmed summary judgment for Wesley on ADA discrimination and ADA/FMLA retaliation.
  • Upheld the district court’s refusal to consider claims not included in the pretrial order (failure-to-accommodate and FMLA interference).
  • Upheld enforcement of Rule 56 and local summary-judgment rules by deeming Wesley’s facts admitted due to Ward’s noncompliant fact response.
  • Denied Ward’s motion to proceed on appeal IFP due to sufficient financial resources.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Appellate standards and pro se limits

  • United States v. Dep't of Health & Env't, 162 F.4th 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 2025): Provided the de novo standard for summary judgment and the Rule 56(a) framework; also noted how cross-motions require viewing inferences in favor of the nonmovant on the particular motion.
  • Adams v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 168 F.4th 1271, 1275 n.1 (10th Cir. 2026): Reinforced liberal construction of pro se filings while rejecting any duty for courts to act as counsel.
  • Bronson v. Swenson, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007): Supported the panel’s refusal to consider inadequately presented arguments in the opening brief—an important constraint in pro se appeals.

2) Case-management discretion (stays/extensions/discovery)

  • Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1149 (10th Cir. 2006): Confirmed abuse-of-discretion review for discovery extensions.
  • Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 2000): Confirmed abuse-of-discretion review for motions to stay proceedings.
  • Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 661 F.3d 1209, 1227 (10th Cir. 2011): Supplied the “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable” articulation of abuse of discretion, used to validate the district court’s repeated accommodations.

3) Pretrial order as the boundary of claims

  • Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296, 1304 (10th Cir. 2003): The foundational proposition that the pretrial order “measures the dimensions of the lawsuit,” at trial and on appeal.
  • Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000): While pretrial orders are liberally construed, that principle does not save omitted claims.
  • Hullman v. Bd. of Trs. of Pratt Cmty. Coll., 950 F.2d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 1991): Approved excluding issues omitted from the pretrial order.
  • Cortez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 460 F.3d 1268, 1277 (10th Cir. 2006): The bright-line waiver rule—claims/issues/defenses/theories not included in the pretrial order are waived.

4) Enforcing Rule 56 and local summary-judgment procedures

  • Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 894 (10th Cir. 1997): Supported abuse-of-discretion review for excluding evidence at summary judgment when procedural rules are not followed.
  • Cross v. The Home Depot, 390 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004): Emphasized the responding party’s burden to identify factual disputes with record citations; courts need not comb the record to rescue a deficient response.

5) ADA discrimination and hostile work environment requirements

  • Williams v. FedEx Corp. Servs., 849 F.3d 889, 896-98 (10th Cir. 2017): Defined ADA coverage (including mental impairments), explained hostile-work-environment standards, and—critically—stated that ADA liability cannot rest on actions taken when the employer was unaware of the disability.
  • Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc., 740 F.3d 530, 538 (10th Cir. 2014): Anchored use of the McDonnell Douglas framework absent direct evidence.
  • MacKenzie v. City & Cnty. of Denv., 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2018): Supplied the prima facie requirement that discrimination be “because of” disability; the panel then relied on Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co. for the “inference” and “affirmative evidence” framing.
  • Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 2018): Focused the inquiry on whether circumstances permit an inference the adverse action was based on disability; required “some affirmative evidence” that disability was a determining factor.
  • Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323-24 (10th Cir. 1997): Clarified that the prima facie burden is “not onerous” but not “empty or perfunctory.”

6) Retaliation causation and temporal proximity (ADA and FMLA)

  • Edmonds-Radford v. Sw. Airlines Co., 17 F.4th 975, 994 (10th Cir. 2021): Identified causal-connection requirements for ADA retaliation.
  • Dewitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 845 F.3d 1299, 1318 (10th Cir. 2017): Identified causal-connection requirements for FMLA retaliation.
  • Hennagir v. Utah Dep't of Corrs., 587 F.3d 1255, 1266 (10th Cir. 2009): Allowed temporal proximity to support causation (ADA) when “very closely connected in time.”
  • Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 2006): Provided the key timing rule: temporal proximity alone must be “very close,” and three months (standing alone) is insufficient.

7) In forma pauperis standards

  • Lister v. Dep't of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005): Required both inability to pay and a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument.
  • Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 197 (10th Cir. 1996): Characterized IFP as a revocable privilege.
  • Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948): “Not absolutely destitute” standard; focuses on ability to pay while maintaining life necessities.
  • Cosby v. Meadors, 351 F.3d 1324, 1327 (10th Cir. 2003): Explained that litigants may be required to bear marginal filing costs even if they allocate funds elsewhere; supports denying IFP where resources exist.

Legal Reasoning

1) The pretrial order controlled the case—and waived late-added theories

The panel treated the pretrial order as dispositive of the lawsuit’s scope under Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist.. Although pretrial orders are “liberally construed” (Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc.), the court applied the Tenth Circuit’s waiver principle from Cortez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: claims not included are waived. Because Ward raised failure-to-accommodate and FMLA interference only at summary judgment—after discovery closed and after Wesley moved for summary judgment—the district court acted within discretion to exclude them (Hullman v. Bd. of Trs. of Pratt Cmty. Coll.).

2) Noncompliance with Rule 56 justified deeming Wesley’s facts admitted

The panel emphasized the procedural mechanics of summary judgment. Federal Rule 56(c)(1) requires pinpoint record citations for disputed facts, and the District of Kansas requires a separately numbered statement of disputed material facts (D. Kan. Rule 56.1(b)(1)). Ward did not present a proper dispute statement in his response; instead, he attempted to supply it later in a reply. Under Cross v. The Home Depot, the court was not required to search the record to locate disputes, and under Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc. it was within discretion to restrict the evidentiary universe at summary judgment.

3) ADA discrimination failed for lack of employer knowledge and disability-based inference

Even viewing the stipulated facts in Ward’s favor, the panel found no evidentiary basis to infer discrimination “because of” anxiety. Critically, the complained-of conduct about invention credit occurred before Ward sought treatment for anxiety, and his leave request flowed through a third-party administrator rather than being communicated to Wesley in a way showing relevant decisionmakers knew of a disability.

Relying on Williams v. FedEx Corp. Servs., the panel applied the straightforward limit: an employer cannot be liable under the ADA for actions taken while unaware of the employee’s disability. Without knowledge, the Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co. requirement of “affirmative evidence” permitting an inference of disability-based motivation could not be met. Thus, Ward failed to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas approach (Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc.), and Wesley was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

4) ADA and FMLA retaliation failed on causation: temporal proximity was too attenuated

For both retaliation theories, the adverse action was termination on July 15, 2021. Ward attempted to rely on timing to show causation. But under Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, a three-month gap—standing alone—does not create a causation inference. That principle defeated:

  • ADA retaliation (protected activity framed as “disability disclosure”/anxiety treatment around April 15, 2021); and
  • FMLA retaliation (FMLA leave beginning April 12, 2021).

Without additional evidence beyond timing, the causal-connection element required by Edmonds-Radford v. Sw. Airlines Co. (ADA) and Dewitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. (FMLA) was not satisfied.

5) IFP was denied based on demonstrated ability to pay

Applying Lister v. Dep't of Treasury, the panel assessed both the financial showing and the merits. Focusing on finances, it found Ward’s declaration reflected discretionary income and assets sufficient to pay the filing fee while maintaining necessities, consistent with Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.. Cosby v. Meadors supported requiring payment even where a litigant has other financial priorities.

Impact

  • Pretrial-order discipline is case-dispositive. The decision reinforces that late-emerging theories (e.g., failure-to-accommodate, FMLA interference) are vulnerable to waiver if they do not appear in the pretrial order, especially when raised after discovery and dispositive motions.
  • Procedural compliance matters even for pro se litigants. Liberal construction does not relieve the duty to comply with Rule 56 and local rules. The practical effect is that failure to properly dispute facts can collapse a case at summary judgment.
  • ADA discrimination claims hinge on proof of knowledge. The opinion underscores a common evidentiary failure point: if the employer’s relevant actors were not aware of the disability at the time of the challenged conduct, disability-based motive is difficult or impossible to infer.
  • Temporal proximity alone has a narrow window. For retaliation, plaintiffs relying primarily on timing must show a very tight sequence; three months is generally insufficient under circuit law absent additional evidence of retaliatory animus.
  • IFP scrutiny can extend beyond income to assets and discretionary funds. The ruling signals that courts may deny IFP where a filing fee is realistically payable, even if the litigant carries significant debts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Pretrial order”: A roadmap finalized before trial that lists the claims and issues actually in the case. If a claim is not in it, the claim is typically treated as abandoned/waived.
  • “McDonnell Douglas framework”: A three-step method used when there is no direct evidence of discrimination/retaliation. The employee must first establish a prima facie case (including causation); then the employer offers a legitimate reason; then the employee must show that reason is pretext.
  • “Causation” in retaliation: A link between protected activity (e.g., taking FMLA leave) and the adverse action (e.g., termination). Timing can help show causation, but only if the timing is very close or supported by other evidence.
  • Rule 56 “statement of facts” practice: Summary judgment is decided on the record. Courts require parties to cite specific evidence for each disputed fact; otherwise, the court may accept the other side’s facts as undisputed.
  • IFP (in forma pauperis): Permission to appeal without prepaying fees. It requires both inability to pay and a nonfrivolous legal/factual basis.

Conclusion

Ward v. Wesley Medical Center is a procedural-and-proof-driven affirmance: the Tenth Circuit upheld strict reliance on the pretrial order to define the case, enforced Rule 56/local-rule requirements that control what “facts” exist at summary judgment, and rejected ADA/FMLA theories where essential elements—employer knowledge and causation—were not supported by evidence. Even as a nonprecedential disposition, the decision offers a clear caution for employment litigants (including pro se parties): preserve claims in the pretrial order, comply meticulously with summary-judgment briefing rules, and marshal evidence beyond timing to prove discriminatory or retaliatory motive.