Waiver of INA § 1252(f)(1) and Limits on Classwide Release Remedies Under an ICE Warrantless-Arrest Consent Decree

1. Introduction

In Margarito Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (7th Cir. May 5, 2026), a certified class of noncitizens arrested in the ICE Chicago Field Office’s area sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for allegedly violating 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), which permits warrantless civil immigration arrests only when officers have reason to believe both (i) the person is removable and (ii) the person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.

The litigation settled via a Consent Decree (approved in 2022) requiring ICE to comply with § 1357(a)(2) for warrantless arrests, issue a broadcast policy statement, update training materials, and keep arrest records. As the decree neared expiration, plaintiffs moved to enforce and to modify (extend) it, asserting systemic noncompliance. The district court (i) extended the decree by 118 days under Rule 60(b)(5) due to substantial noncompliance and (ii) later ordered release of 13 agreed-upon class members plus hundreds of additional “potential” class members on alternatives to detention.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reviewed two post-judgment orders: the October 7, 2025 extension order and the November 13, 2025 release order. The panel affirmed the 118-day extension, and affirmed in part / reversed in part the release order—approving release of the 13 individuals whose arrests were determined to violate the decree, but rejecting release of “potential” class members and release tied to arrests executed with I-200 warrants.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Consent Decree extension affirmed: The court held the district court did not abuse discretion in extending the decree by 118 days because defendants substantially failed to comply and purported (via a DHS official email) to terminate obligations despite a pending enforcement motion.
  • INA § 1252(f)(1) treated as waivable: The panel concluded defendants waived reliance on § 1252(f)(1) by abandoning the argument during settlement and by not raising it timely in opposing modification.
  • Scope of permissible classwide relief clarified: § 1252(f)(1) does not bar classwide equitable relief addressing § 1357(a)(2) (not within Part IV, §§ 1221–1232), even if collateral effects touch covered provisions; but classwide relief cannot “enjoin or restrain” operations under § 1226 (covered) as to I-200 warrants.
  • November release order narrowed: Release of the 13 class members (with adjudicated warrantless-arrest violations) was affirmed; release of hundreds of “potential class members” without individualized determinations was reversed as contrary to the decree’s remedial framework.
  • I-200 arrests excluded: The decree was construed not to cover individuals arrested pursuant to an I-200 warrant (even if defective), and classwide relief impacting § 1226 operations was impermissible.
  • Contested statutory interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A): Judge Lee’s opinion reached and rejected DHS’s new position that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates detention of noncitizens encountered in the interior; Judge Pryor concurred in the judgment but declined to reach that merits question; Judge Kirsch dissented and would have vacated/remanded and read § 1225(b)(2)(A) broadly.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Appellate jurisdiction and standards of review

  • Motorola, Inc. v. Comput. Displays Int'l, Inc. — Used to confirm appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) for orders that effectively modify or interpret injunctive relief (a consent decree functioning as an injunction).
  • Shakman v. Clerk of Cook Cnty. — Provided the abuse-of-discretion framework for reviewing modification of institutional decrees and the “clearly erroneous” constraint for factual findings.
  • Tsareff v. ManWeb Servs., Inc. and Est. of Enoch ex rel. Enoch v. Tienor — Reinforced that legal errors are necessarily abuses of discretion.

B. Waiver and the character of § 1252(f)(1)

  • Miller v. Willow Creek Homes, Inc. — Supplied the classic definition of waiver as intentional relinquishment of a known right, central to rejecting DHS’s late reliance on § 1252(f)(1).
  • United States v. Armour & Co. — Framed consent decrees as products of careful negotiation and precise terms, supporting the inference that DHS knowingly traded litigation positions (including remedial objections) for settlement finality.
  • Biden v. Texas — Critical to the holding that § 1252(f)(1), despite using “jurisdiction,” is best understood as a limit on injunctive relief rather than a constraint on subject-matter jurisdiction; this undercut the claim that § 1252(f)(1) is unwaivable.
  • United States v. Cotton — Distinguished as addressing nonwaivable subject-matter jurisdiction; the court used it to explain why “jurisdiction” in § 1252(f)(1) does not automatically make the limitation unwaivable.
  • Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen and Am. Mills Co. v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. — Analogized § 1252(f)(1) to waivable limits on equitable remedial power (“equitable jurisdiction”), supporting waiver treatment.
  • Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. and Hoffman v. Blaski — Used by analogy to show that even significant “court power” doctrines (personal jurisdiction, venue) can be waived.

C. The INA injunction bar and its contours

  • Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez — Central to limiting classwide relief that interferes with the “operation of” covered provisions (e.g., § 1226). The Seventh Circuit applied it to reject classwide relief predicated on how ICE uses I-200 warrants under § 1226, even if the district court deemed ICE’s practice unlawful.
  • Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez (footnote on collateral effects) — Supported the distinction between direct restraints on covered provisions and permissible injunctions aimed at non-covered provisions that only have collateral effects.
  • Texas v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Al Otro Lado v. Exec. Office for Immigr. Rev., and Gonzalez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't — Reinforced the collateral-effects principle and the “Part IV coverage” boundary: § 1252(f)(1) restricts only injunctions restraining §§ 1221–1232, not enforcement of non-Part-IV authorities like § 1357.
  • N.S. v. Dixon — Distinguished because the injunction there directly barred arrests/detention tied to I-200 warrants and thus directly affected § 1226 operations.

D. Rule 60(b)(5) modification standards

  • Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail — Provided the core two-step: (1) significant change in circumstances (including substantial noncompliance) and (2) modification must be suitably tailored.
  • Kelly v. Wengler — Cited for the proposition that substantial violation of a court order can constitute a significant factual change warranting modification.

E. Remedies for unlawful immigration detention

  • Arias v. Rogers — Supported the proposition that release (including via habeas) is an appropriate remedy for detention resulting from arrests violating § 1357(a)(2) and the Fourth Amendment.

F. Party presentation and issue preservation

  • Wheeler v. Hronopoulos — Reinforced waiver for failure to raise arguments below.
  • Clark v. Sweeney, United States v. Page, and United States v. Sineneng-Smith — Used to reject the notion that the district court must sua sponte develop unraised separation-of-powers theories.

G. The contested merits issue: § 1225(b)(2)(A) reach

Judge Lee’s opinion engaged extensive statutory-interpretation precedent (e.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez, Nielsen v. Preap, Leng May Ma v. Barber, Zadvydas v. Davis, Stenberg v. Carhart, Yates v. United States, TRW Inc. v. Andrews, and others) to support a reading of § 1225(b)(2)(A) as border/port-of-entry oriented, while acknowledging contrary circuit authority (Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi; Avila v. Bondi) and noting a then-recent Second Circuit disagreement (Cunha v. Freden).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Extending the Consent Decree: Rule 60(b)(5) plus narrow tailoring

The Seventh Circuit treated the decree as ongoing (because a motion to enforce was pending) and upheld the extension under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. The decisive features were:

  • Significant change in circumstances: The district court found systemic noncompliance with decree obligations governing warrantless arrests under § 1357(a)(2), coupled with DHS’s unilateral email declaring the decree terminated despite pending enforcement proceedings.
  • Tailoring: Rather than a full three-year extension (requested by plaintiffs), the court approved a 118-day extension keyed to the period of asserted unilateral noncompliance (June 11 to October 7), a proportional remedy intended to restore the status quo ante and preserve the bargained-for compliance period.

B. § 1252(f)(1): waiver, scope, and collateral effects

The opinion’s remedial-architecture holding is twofold:

  • Waiver: Because § 1252(f)(1) limits remedies rather than subject-matter jurisdiction (per Biden v. Texas), it can be waived; DHS waived by dropping the argument to obtain settlement and (again) by not timely raising it against Rule 60(b)(5) modification.
  • Merits boundary: Even absent waiver, classwide relief enforcing § 1357(a)(2) does not “enjoin or restrain” the operation of Part IV provisions because § 1357 is not within §§ 1221–1232. Injunctions aimed at non-covered provisions may be allowed despite collateral effects on covered provisions (citing Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez n.4).

At the same time, the court corrected the district court’s overreach: classwide relief predicated on condemning ICE’s use of I-200 warrants implicates § 1226 operations and is therefore foreclosed under Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez. This produced a key interpretive constraint: the decree is understood as governing warrantless arrests under § 1357(a)(2), not arrests “with a warrant,” including I-200 warrants even if allegedly defective.

C. November order: individualized release vs. “potential class members”

The decree’s remedial clause required release “upon a determination by the Parties or the Court” that a detained class member was arrested contrary to the agreement. The Seventh Circuit treated this as an individualized gatekeeping requirement. Thus:

  • Affirmed: release of the 13 individuals as to whom the parties had confirmed decree-violative warrantless arrests.
  • Reversed: release (or ATD placement) of hundreds of “potential class members” because no individualized violation determinations had been made.

D. The panel split: whether to reach § 1225(b)(2)(A)

Judge Lee’s opinion reached the merits of DHS’s newly asserted mandatory-detention theory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and rejected it (reading it as aimed at those seeking admission at the border/ports, not interior residents). Judge Pryor concurred in the judgment but would have resolved the issue on waiver and on the parties’ shared understanding when contracting, warning that Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez would otherwise bar classwide relief affecting a covered provision. Judge Kirsch dissented, arguing (among other things) § 1252(f)(1) barred the November classwide release order and that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies broadly, advocating vacatur and remand of both orders.

3.3 Impact

  • Consent-decree enforcement in immigration class actions: The decision strengthens the enforceability of negotiated compliance regimes governing non-Part-IV authorities (like § 1357(a)(2)) while simultaneously policing the boundary against decree interpretation that would regulate Part-IV detention mechanics (like § 1226) through classwide injunctions.
  • Waiver doctrine in INA injunction-bar disputes: Treating § 1252(f)(1) as waivable (because it limits remedies, not subject-matter jurisdiction) will likely shape government litigation strategy: agencies that settle may not later resurrect § 1252(f)(1) to resist bargained-for classwide equitable mechanisms.
  • Remedial restraint: “potential class members” cannot be released en masse: Even under an enforceable consent decree, class counsel and district courts must follow decree-specified procedures—especially individualized determinations where the decree cabins the release remedy.
  • Developing circuit conflict on § 1225(b)(2)(A): Although not joined by all panel members, the opinion’s statutory analysis deepens an emerging split (noted in the opinion among the Fifth, Eighth, and Second Circuits). Litigants may cite the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning to challenge interior mandatory-detention policies, while opponents will emphasize concurrence/dissent and § 1252(f)(1) limits on classwide remedies.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Consent Decree: A court-approved settlement that functions like an injunction; it is enforceable through the court’s contempt/enforcement powers and interpreted like a contract within its “four corners.”
  • Rule 60(b)(5): Allows a court to modify a decree when ongoing enforcement becomes inequitable due to changed circumstances (including substantial noncompliance). The change must be significant, and the modification must be narrowly tailored.
  • 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1): A statutory limit on classwide injunctive relief that would “enjoin or restrain” the operation of certain immigration detention/removal provisions (Part IV, §§ 1221–1232). It does not erase federal courts’ power to hear cases; it constrains certain remedies.
  • Warrantless arrest vs. I-200 “warrant”: The decree targeted § 1357(a)(2) warrantless arrests. An I-200 is an administrative arrest warrant associated with INA detention authority; classwide relief that effectively regulates how ICE uses such warrants can trigger § 1252(f)(1) limits.
  • “Potential class members”: People who might be within the class definition, but for whom no determination has been made that their arrest violated the decree. The court held they cannot receive the decree’s release remedy without the decree-required individualized finding.
  • Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is intentional relinquishment of a known right; forfeiture is mere failure to timely raise an argument. The court treated the government’s conduct as waiver in multiple respects.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision draws a practical, enforcement-oriented line for immigration consent decrees: the government may settle and be held to classwide equitable commitments enforcing non-Part-IV constraints like § 1357(a)(2), and courts may narrowly extend such decrees under Rule 60(b)(5) when substantial noncompliance undermines the bargain. But decree enforcement has limits: courts may not use a § 1357-focused decree to impose classwide restraints on covered detention provisions (e.g., § 1226) and may not order mass releases of “potential class members” without the individualized determinations the decree requires.