Voter-Engagement “Solicitation” Is Core Political Speech Under Missouri’s Constitution; Broad Registration/Compensation Limits and Absentee-Solicitation Ban Are Facially Unconstitutional

1. Introduction

This decision addresses whether Missouri’s 2022 amendments to chapter 115 may criminalize or heavily burden civic organizations’ efforts to encourage voter registration and absentee voting. The Appellants—the State of Missouri, the Secretary of State, and a representative prosecuting attorney—appealed a Cole County judgment that permanently enjoined enforcement of key portions of two statutes: section 115.205.1 (restrictions on “soliciting voter registration applications”) and section 115.279.2 (a ban on “solicit[ing] a voter into obtaining an absentee ballot application”).

The Respondents—League of Women Voters of Missouri and the Missouri NAACP—argued these provisions violate the Missouri Constitution’s speech guarantee (article I, section 8), as well as association (article I, section 9) and due process/vagueness (article I, section 10). The Supreme Court of Missouri resolved the appeal on free-speech grounds, holding the provisions facially unconstitutional because they restrict core political speech and fail strict scrutiny.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. It held the plain language of sections 115.205.1 and 115.279.2 “expansively restricts” speech by (i) prohibiting compensation for “soliciting voter registration applications,” (ii) requiring any person who “solicits” more than ten voter registration applications to register with the state, (iii) restricting who may solicit (must be 18 and a registered Missouri voter), and (iv) “completely” prohibiting soliciting a voter to obtain an absentee ballot application.

Central to the Court’s holding, “solicit” is undefined in chapter 115, so the Court adopted its ordinary dictionary meaning: to “entreat,” “importune,” “move to action,” or “strongly urge.” With that meaning, the statutes reach “mere speech” advocating voter registration and absentee voting—activity the Court treated as “core political speech” entitled to the “zenith” of constitutional protection under Meyer v. Grant. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held the State failed to show the provisions are narrowly tailored to any compelling interest (election integrity, fraud prevention, privacy, etc.).

The Court also rejected (i) a narrowing construction grounded in constitutional avoidance because the statutes are unambiguous, and (ii) the dissent’s position that the Secretary of State’s enforcement interpretation of “solicit” deserved special weight.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and how they shaped the decision)

• Standards of review; facial challenges
  • Ramirez v. Mo. Prosecuting Att'ys' & Cir. Att'ys' Ret. Sys. and City of St. Louis v. State supplied the de novo standard for constitutional review and the presumption of validity.
  • Donaldson v. Mo. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts anchored the demanding facial-challenge rule: Respondents had to show “no set of circumstances” in which the statutes would be valid. The Court concluded that burden was met because the statutes’ plain meaning regulates protected speech across the board rather than in a narrow subset of situations.
• Textualism and limits on interpretive “saving” moves
  • C.S. v. Mo. State Highway Patrol Crim. Just. Info. Serv. and State ex rel. Bailey v. Fulton were used to justify resort to ordinary meaning via dictionaries when statutes leave key terms undefined.
  • Goodman v. Saline Cnty. Comm'n, State ex rel. Hillman v. Beger, and Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Nixon supported the proposition that constitutional avoidance (or any narrowing construction) is permissible only if the statute is genuinely susceptible to multiple constructions—and not if narrowing would rewrite plain text.
  • Boland v. Saint Luke's Health Sys., Inc. reinforced the separation-of-powers theme: if the statute’s “cold, clear words” are unconstitutional, the remedy is legislative, not judicial.
• No special deference to executive enforcement interpretations
  • The Court confronted the dissent’s reliance on older “weight to administrative interpretation” cases and rejected it on modern Missouri authority: Mo. State Conf. of NAACP v. State, Treasurer of State v. Penney, Coleman v. Ashcroft, Walmart Starco LLC v. Dir. of Revenue, and State ex rel. Fitz-James v. Bailey. The through-line: statutory meaning is a judicial question; executive gloss cannot render unambiguous text ambiguous.
  • Wolff Shoe Co. v. Dir. of Revenue provided the explicit rule that clear statutory language cannot be made ambiguous by an official’s interpretation.
• Consistent-usage canon within a statutory chapter
  • To rebut the State’s attempt to narrow “solicit” to mean “hand out and collect,” the Court used Cook v. Newman (word presumed to have the same meaning throughout a chapter) and State v. Knapp (reinforcing consistent usage), emphasizing that “solicit” appears in both sections 115.205.1 and 115.279.2.
• Core political speech and strict scrutiny
  • Meyer v. Grant supplied the controlling definition—“interactive communication concerning political change”—and the “zenith” protection. Missouri’s Court analogized voter-engagement advocacy to petition circulation: it is persuasion about democratic participation and political change.
  • Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. reinforced that severe burdens on core political speech are subject to “exacting scrutiny” (treated here as strict scrutiny) and that restrictions shrinking the pool of speakers (such as a registered-voter requirement) can be constitutionally fatal.
  • Karney v. Dep't of Lab. & Indus. Rels. justified using federal First Amendment analysis as “strongly persuasive” when construing Missouri’s parallel speech guarantee.
  • The Court also relied on supportive lower-court speech cases as persuasive authority, including Lichtenstein v. Hargett (recognizing get-out-the-vote absentee advocacy as core political speech).
  • Henry v. Halliburton provided Missouri-specific rhetorical and doctrinal support for robust protection of public-affairs speech.
• Strict scrutiny mechanics
  • Geier v. Mo. Ethics Comm'n supplied Missouri’s strict-scrutiny test: compelling interest + narrow tailoring; burden on the government.
  • Clark v. Martinez was cited to describe constitutional avoidance generally (even though the Court refused to apply it here due to lack of ambiguity).
• Rejecting Anderson-Burdick for these provisions
  • The Court treated Anderson v. Celebrezze and Burdick v. Takushi as the “election mechanics” test, but concluded it does not govern where the law targets persuasion speech far from the ballot.
  • Mazo v. N.J. Sec'y of State supplied a structured way to decide whether Anderson-Burdick applies: (1) location/timing (near ballot vs. remote) and (2) nature/character (interactive persuasion vs. administrative mechanics).
  • The Court cited Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen as a contrast: it distinguished nonexpressive handling/delivery of forms from the protected activity of “urging citizens to register.” Missouri’s statutes, by using “solicit,” directly regulate the “urging” itself.
  • Walden v. Kosinski was cited for the proposition that courts may employ statutory-interpretation tools first, then determine the appropriate constitutional framework.
• Miscellaneous authorities shaping the Court’s posture
  • Salamun v. Camden Cnty. Clerk was used to rebut the dissent’s “age of statute” argument: long-standing laws can still be unconstitutional.
  • City of Harrisonville v. Mo. Dep't of Nat. Res. was invoked to explain the Court’s refusal to act as advocate by inventing unraised arguments (in discussing preservation of an age-based scrutiny theory).
  • Nicholson v. State was cited for judicial restraint: once one constitutional violation resolves the case, other theories need not be reached.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The meaning of “solicit” is ordinary, broad, and speech-inclusive

The Court’s threshold move was textual: because chapter 115 does not define “solicit,” it looked to ordinary meaning and adopted Webster’s broad definition (“entreat,” “importune,” “move to action,” “strongly urge”). It then rejected the State’s litigation-driven narrowing definition (hand out and collect forms), finding it inconsistent with (i) the dictionary meaning, (ii) the legislature’s failure to define the term, and (iii) section 115.279.2’s phrasing— “solicit a voter into obtaining an absentee ballot application”—which the Court read as capturing persuasion rather than mere form-handling.

Crucially, the Court refused to use the canon of constitutional avoidance to “save” the statute because, under Goodman v. Saline Cnty. Comm'n, avoidance operates only where the text is susceptible to multiple constructions. Here, the Court declared there was “only one possible construction” and that narrowing would be improper judicial rewriting.

B. Voter-engagement solicitation is “core political speech”

With “solicit” defined broadly, the Court treated the regulated activity as interactive persuasion about political participation. It analogized to Meyer v. Grant and Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.: the statutes reduce the number of voices and the reach of civic messaging by criminalizing compensated solicitation, by requiring state registration, and by restricting who may solicit (age/voter-registration status), while section 115.279.2 “completely” silences absentee-ballot-application solicitation.

The Court emphasized the severity of burdens by pointing to the criminal penalties attached to violations, including felony exposure for the absentee-solicitation ban (imprisonment, large fines, and disenfranchisement). This severity supported the conclusion that the laws meaningfully chill speech and are not “de minimis.”

C. Strict scrutiny applies, and the provisions fail narrow tailoring

Applying strict scrutiny per Geier v. Mo. Ethics Comm'n, the Court accepted that interests such as election integrity, fraud prevention, and privacy can be compelling in the abstract, but found the State failed narrow tailoring:

• Compensation ban: Overinclusive because it prohibits paying people to merely “urge” registration, not just those collecting sensitive data or forms. The Court also noted “bounty hunting” was already illegal (sec. 115.203, RSMo 2016), echoing Meyer v. Grant’s skepticism toward bans where narrower anti-fraud tools already exist.
• Registration requirement: Overinclusive because it requires registration by anyone who “solicits” ten or more people—capturing pure advocacy untethered to fraud risks related to processing applications.
• 18+ and registered-Missouri-voter requirement: Not shown necessary, and overinclusive compared to less restrictive means (the Court analogized to Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.’s treatment of registered-voter requirements). The Court also separately held the State’s attempt to argue a lower scrutiny theory for the age requirement was not preserved.
• Absentee-solicitation ban: Sweeps far beyond fraud prevention because it criminalizes persuasion to apply, not merely misconduct in application handling.

D. Anderson-Burdick does not govern because the statutes target persuasion speech, not election mechanics

Using Mazo v. N.J. Sec'y of State’s framing, the Court treated these restrictions as distant from the ballot and early in time (registration advocacy and absentee-application persuasion), and as inherently interactive (person-to-person urging). Therefore, traditional free-speech strict scrutiny applies rather than Anderson-Burdick’s sliding scale.

3.3 Impact

• Missouri constitutional speech law: The decision cements a state-constitutional rule that voter-engagement persuasion—encouraging registration and absentee voting— is “core political speech” under article I, section 8, and that broad criminal restrictions on such speech are presumptively subject to strict scrutiny.
• Statutory drafting constraint: Legislators cannot rely on undefined, broad verbs like “solicit” to regulate election-related activity without triggering speech scrutiny when that verb naturally includes advocacy and urging. If the State intends to regulate form-handling conduct (collection, pre-filling, submission), the drafting must target those mechanics explicitly rather than persuasion.
• Enforcement and chilling effects: The Court’s emphasis on harsh penalties, including potential disenfranchisement consequences tied to election offenses, signals that criminal sanctions will heavily influence the “burden” analysis in future election-speech disputes.
• Framework selection: By limiting Anderson-Burdick to laws primarily regulating election “mechanics,” the Court provides a roadmap for litigants: characterize the regulated activity as interactive advocacy remote from polling/ballot processes to obtain strict scrutiny.
• Administrative deference: The Court’s refusal to give “special weight” to the Secretary of State’s interpretation reinforces separation-of-powers in Missouri: executive enforcement guidance will not save unambiguous statutory text from constitutional invalidation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Facial challenge: A claim a law is unconstitutional in all its applications. The challenger must show there is no scenario where it can be valid. The Court held the statutes’ plain language reaches protected persuasion speech across the board.
• Core political speech: Person-to-person, interactive advocacy about political participation or political change. Under Meyer v. Grant, it receives the highest constitutional protection.
• Strict scrutiny: The toughest constitutional test. The government must show (1) a compelling interest and (2) the law is narrowly tailored—no broader than necessary. The Court held Missouri’s provisions were far broader than needed to address fraud, integrity, or privacy.
• Anderson-Burdick test: A flexible balancing test for election “mechanics” rules (e.g., ballot-access procedures). The Court held it does not apply when the law primarily targets persuasive advocacy rather than administrative mechanics.
• Constitutional avoidance: A doctrine allowing courts to choose a plausible interpretation that avoids unconstitutionality. Here it was rejected because, under Goodman v. Saline Cnty. Comm'n, avoidance applies only if the text is genuinely ambiguous.
• Vagueness / overbreadth (raised below but not reached here): “Vagueness” concerns unclear laws that invite arbitrary enforcement; “overbreadth” concerns laws that sweep in substantial protected speech. The Court affirmed on core-speech/strict-scrutiny grounds and did not need to decide the other theories.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Missouri’s central doctrinal move is textual and constitutional at once: by giving “solicit” its ordinary meaning, the Court treated Missouri’s voter-registration and absentee-application “solicitation” restrictions as direct regulation of persuasive civic advocacy. That advocacy is “core political speech” under article I, section 8, triggering strict scrutiny. Because the State did not demonstrate narrow tailoring, the Court held sections 115.205.1 and 115.279.2 facially unconstitutional and affirmed a permanent injunction.

As precedent, the decision strengthens Missouri’s constitutional protection for voter-engagement speech, narrows the domain of Anderson-Burdick in state litigation, and warns lawmakers that broad election-related restrictions framed in speech-inclusive terms will be tested—and often struck—at the highest level of scrutiny.