Date: Mar 12, 2026

Villeda Chavez v. Bondi: BIA Abuses Discretion by Failing to Apply Newly Effective 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 Factors to Termination and Administrative-Closure Motions

I. Introduction

In Villeda Chavez v. Bondi (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order denying (1) a motion to terminate removal proceedings or, alternatively, (2) a motion for administrative closure. Petitioners Deysi Patricia Villeda Chavez and her minor son (a derivative beneficiary) are Honduran nationals placed in removal proceedings after seeking admission at the Paso Del Norte Port of Entry.

The central issue was not the merits of asylum or other protection (which the Immigration Judge had denied), but whether the BIA abused its discretion by denying termination/closure without applying a newly effective EOIR regulation—8 C.F.R. § 1003.1—that required the BIA to consider enumerated factors for discretionary termination and administrative closure.

The procedural timing mattered: EOIR published a final rule on May 29, 2024, effective July 29, 2024, adding factor-based frameworks for the BIA’s consideration. Chavez filed her motion on July 17, 2024 (before the effective date). The BIA ruled on April 17, 2025 (well after the effective date) but did not address the new factors.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit held that the BIA abused its discretion by making an “unexplained departure[] from regulations” when it denied termination and administrative closure without considering the relevant, newly effective factors in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1. The court:

Vacated the BIA’s denial of termination/administrative closure.
Remanded with instructions that the BIA reconsider Chavez’s motion consistent with the opinion and “in the light of the relevant factors provided in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1.”
Declined to reach Chavez’s additional arguments (due process, arbitrariness, efficiency, etc.) because the regulatory-error holdings were dispositive.

The opinion also addressed threshold briefing/exhaustion problems—Chavez failed to cite the correct regulation in her BIA motion and incorrectly cited another regulation in her Fifth Circuit brief—but the panel still reached the merits because the Government forfeited any exhaustion objection and the briefing deficiencies did not rise to forfeiture on appeal.

Judge Jones dissented.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Standards of review for termination and administrative closure

Velasquez v. Gonzales, 239 F. App'x 68 (5th Cir. 2007): Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of termination denials.
Hernandez-Castillo v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 2017): Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of administrative-closure denials.
Navarrete-Lopez v. Barr, 919 F.3d 951 (5th Cir. 2019): Provided the key abuse-of-discretion principle: the BIA abuses its discretion when its decision is “based on unexplained departures from regulations.” This became the doctrinal hook for vacatur once the panel identified that the BIA did not apply the governing regulatory factors in § 1003.1.

2. Exhaustion, forfeiture, and briefing defaults

Carreon v. Garland, 71 F.4th 247 (5th Cir. 2023): Used to hold that although an issue might ordinarily be unexhausted, the Government’s failure to raise exhaustion forfeits the objection. This allowed the panel to reach Chavez’s regulatory arguments notwithstanding her imperfect presentation below.
Kim v. Bondi, No. 25-60211, 2025 WL 2860642 (5th Cir. 9 Oct. 2025): Cited as a comparator for when briefing deficiencies can amount to forfeiture on appeal. The panel distinguished Chavez’s “substandard” brief from the more severe deficiencies in Kim, concluding that Chavez still articulated contentions and reasons sufficient under Rule 28.

3. The Attorney General/BIA decisions framing termination and closure authority

In re S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462 (A.G. 2018): Quoted for the general concept that termination occurs in “specific circumstances consistent with the law and applicable regulations.” The panel noted it was “overruled on other grounds” by In re Coronado Acevedo, showing the evolving administrative landscape.
In re Coronado Acevedo, 28 I. & N. Dec. 648 (A.G. 2022): This was the authority Chavez invoked in her motion to terminate (arguing USCIS jurisdiction as “arriving aliens”). The Fifth Circuit treated Coronado Acevedo as incomplete for post-2024 purposes: it predated the final rule and itself acknowledged ongoing rulemaking. The BIA erred by treating Coronado Acevedo as the whole analysis, without considering the later, binding regulatory factors.
In re Cruz-Valdez, 28 I. & N. Dec. 326 (A.G. 2021): Cited for the definition of administrative closure as a “docket management tool” that pauses proceedings without terminating them.
In re B-N-K- , 29 I. & N. Dec. 96 (BIA 2025): Used to demonstrate the BIA’s own application of the new administrative-closure factors, particularly § 1003.1(l)(3)(i)(C). The citation underscored that the factor-based framework was not merely theoretical; it was actively being applied in BIA decisions.

4. Applying the “law in effect” at the time of decision

Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974): The court invoked Bradley for the principle that a tribunal applies the law in effect at the time it renders its decision absent “manifest injustice” or contrary direction. This supported applying the July 29, 2024 regulation to the April 17, 2025 BIA decision, even though Chavez’s motion predated the effective date by 12 days.
In re Alarcon, 20 I. & N. Dec. 557 (BIA 1992): Cited to show the agency’s own rule: when the law changes before an administrative decision issues, the agency must apply the new law. The Fifth Circuit used this as a direct administrative-law analogue to Bradley.

5. Agencies are bound by their own regulations

In re Ponce De Leon-Ruiz, 21 I. & N. Dec. 154 (BIA 1996) (en banc): Cited for the proposition that the BIA is bound to uphold agency regulations. This reinforced the conclusion that failing to apply § 1003.1 was not harmless discretion; it was legal error.

6. DHS/USCIS relationship and issue avoidance

Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022): Cited to note USCIS is a component of DHS, relevant to the administrative-closure factor involving DHS adjudications.
Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 2007): Cited for the practice of not reaching additional arguments once a dispositive ground resolves the appeal.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Threshold: the panel reached the merits despite citation errors

Chavez did not cite 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 in her BIA motion and mis-cited 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18 (an IJ-focused regulation) in her Fifth Circuit opening brief. The court nevertheless reached the merits for two reasons:

Exhaustion objection forfeited: Under Carreon v. Garland, the Government’s failure to raise exhaustion forfeited it.
No appellate forfeiture: Though “substandard,” the brief still contained “contentions and the reasons for them” as required by Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). The panel warned counsel but declined to treat the errors as forfeiture (distinguishing Kim v. Bondi).

2. Termination: the BIA had to evaluate the motion under § 1003.1(m)(1)(ii)

The regulatory framework required the BIA, when adjudicating discretionary-termination motions, to consider the reason termination is sought and the basis for any opposition. Critically, § 1003.1(m)(1)(ii) allowed termination where, among other grounds, “[t]he alien is prima facie eligible for . . . lawful status,” § 1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(B), with the limitation that the BIA “shall not grant” on that basis if DHS opposes.

Chavez’s motion was unopposed and asserted a pathway to lawful status through marriage to a U.S. citizen, I-130 petitions, and adjustment applications filed with USCIS. The BIA denied termination by holding that “none of” the “limited circumstances” in In re Coronado Acevedo applied—without engaging with the newly effective factor that directly tracked Chavez’s theory (prima facie eligibility for lawful status).

The Fifth Circuit’s key move was to treat the regulation as governing law at the time of decision (Bradley; In re Alarcon), and to treat the BIA’s silence as an “unexplained departure” from binding regulations (Navarrete-Lopez; In re Ponce De Leon-Ruiz). Because applying the new factor would not cause “manifest injustice” and could benefit Chavez, the BIA’s failure to apply it was an abuse of discretion requiring vacatur.

3. Administrative closure: the BIA had to consider relevant § 1003.1(l)(3) factors

For administrative closure, § 1003.1(l)(3) required consideration of the “totality of the circumstances” and “as many” listed factors as relevant. The panel highlighted one factor as plainly relevant: § 1003.1(l)(3)(i)(C), addressing “[a]ny requirement that a case be administratively closed in order for a petition, application, or other action to be filed with, or granted by, DHS.”

Chavez had pending adjustment-related filings with USCIS (a DHS component, per Patel v. Garland), and the BIA’s denial of closure “for the same reasons” as termination failed to analyze the required factor-based framework at all. The Fifth Circuit again characterized this as an “unexplained departure” from the regulation under Navarrete-Lopez, and reinforced that the factor is actively used in BIA jurisprudence, citing In re B-N-K-.

4. Remedy and scope

The court did not order termination or closure. It ordered reconsideration under the correct legal framework, preserving agency discretion while ensuring that discretion is exercised within regulatory limits. It also declined to reach Chavez’s remaining arguments under Audler v. Astrue.

C. Impact

Regulatory compliance becomes the fulcrum of abuse-of-discretion review: The decision strengthens the principle that, in termination/closure adjudications, the BIA must demonstrate consideration of the governing § 1003.1 factors when relevant—silence risks vacatur as a regulatory departure.
“Law in effect at decision time” has practical bite in immigration procedure: Even if a motion predates a regulation’s effective date, the BIA must apply the regulation if it becomes effective before the BIA decides—absent manifest injustice or contrary direction.
Unopposed motions and prima facie eligibility arguments gain procedural traction: The panel’s focus on § 1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(B) signals that where DHS does not oppose and the noncitizen plausibly shows prima facie eligibility for lawful status, the BIA must explicitly grapple with that factor.
Administrative closure analysis must be individualized: A blanket denial “for the same reasons” as termination is inadequate where closure has distinct regulatory factors (like DHS/USCIS process needs) that must be assessed.
Limits: The opinion is unpublished and therefore not precedential under Fifth Circuit rules, but it is likely to be persuasive in similar procedural postures, particularly where § 1003.1’s factor regime is ignored.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Termination of removal proceedings: Ending the removal case entirely. If proceedings are terminated, the immigration court no longer actively adjudicates removal. Termination may be sought when another process (often with DHS/USCIS) makes continued removal litigation unnecessary or inappropriate, but it is discretionary and rule-bound.
Administrative closure: A temporary pause: the case is taken off the active docket but not dismissed. It can be recalendared later. As In re Cruz-Valdez explains, it is a docket-management tool, often used to allow time for DHS/USCIS to resolve collateral applications.
Prima facie eligible: “Eligible on its face”—based on the basic, initial showing and supporting documents, the person appears to meet the threshold legal requirements for a benefit (here, a potential lawful status path). It does not mean the benefit will be granted; it means there is a plausible legal basis that warrants consideration.
Abuse of discretion: A deferential review standard, but not toothless. A decision can be reversed if it ignores binding rules—here, by departing from governing regulations without explanation (Navarrete-Lopez v. Barr).
Exhaustion vs. forfeiture (in this case): “Exhaustion” usually requires presenting issues to the agency first. But if the Government does not raise exhaustion as a defense, it can be “forfeited,” allowing the court to decide the issue anyway (Carreon v. Garland).
Applying the law in effect at the time of decision: When rules change while a case is pending, the deciding body typically applies the new rule at the time it decides, unless that would be unjust or contrary to instructions (Bradley; In re Alarcon). Here, that meant applying § 1003.1’s new factor tests because they were effective long before the BIA ruled.

V. Conclusion

Villeda Chavez v. Bondi crystallizes a procedural rule with practical consequences: when EOIR’s factor-based regulations in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 govern termination or administrative closure at the time the BIA decides, the BIA must meaningfully consider the relevant factors. Denying relief by relying on older, narrower decisional frameworks—without engaging the now-effective regulatory criteria—constitutes an “unexplained departure” from binding regulations and therefore an abuse of discretion under Navarrete-Lopez v. Barr.

The remand preserves the BIA’s discretion to deny or grant termination/closure, but requires that discretion to be exercised through the mandatory regulatory lens—particularly where a noncitizen asserts prima facie eligibility for lawful status and where administrative closure may be relevant to DHS/USCIS adjudication.