Villa-Loja v. Bondi: Harassment and Non-Deliberate Economic Hardship Do Not Meet the “Persecution” Threshold (and BIA Affirmance Is Read Narrowly to the Ground Actually Adopted)

1. Introduction

In Villa-Loja v. Bondi (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2026) (summary order), petitioners Doris Michelle Villa-Loja and her minor child, natives and citizens of Ecuador, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief.

The central issue, as the Second Circuit read the BIA’s decision, was whether the harms Villa-Loja described— school bullying and discrimination, and exploitative/discriminatory treatment by an employer—rose to the level of “persecution” (including whether her economic circumstances could qualify as economic persecution). The court also addressed issue waiver (CAT) and the scope of judicial review when the BIA affirms only part of an IJ’s decision.

Important procedural note: The disposition is a summary order and thus “do[es] not have precedential effect” under the Second Circuit’s rules. Nonetheless, it is instructive for how the court applies established persecution and economic-persecution standards and how it construes the BIA’s reasoning for purposes of review.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit denied the petition for review. It held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that the mistreatment Villa-Loja experienced and feared did not rise to the level of persecution.

  • CAT claim: The court did not reach the merits because the BIA found the CAT claim waived and Villa-Loja did not meaningfully challenge that waiver finding.
  • Scope of review / what the BIA affirmed: The court reviewed the IJ decision only “as modified by” the BIA, concluding the BIA affirmed the IJ’s severity-of-harm analysis (not nexus).
  • Persecution: Bullying and discriminatory insults, combined with exploitative labor conditions without alleged physical injury, amounted at most to harassment, not persecution.
  • Economic persecution: Although the record suggested hardship, Villa-Loja did not show the hardship was a deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage on a protected ground, as required by circuit and BIA precedent.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

Waiver and issue preservation

  • Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023) and Prabhudial v. Holder, 780 F.3d 553, 555-56 (2d Cir. 2015): The court relied on these cases for a strict appellate principle: claims not adequately briefed are treated as abandoned, and when the BIA deems an issue waived and does not consider it, judicial review is limited to the waiver finding. This foreclosed CAT relief without any need to address torture standards.

Scope of review when the BIA affirms only part of the IJ’s reasoning

  • Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005): The court applied the “as modified by the BIA” framework—reviewing the IJ’s decision only to the extent the BIA adopted it. Here, that meant focusing on severity of harm.
  • INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976): Used to justify that agencies need not decide issues unnecessary to the result. The Second Circuit invoked this to explain why the BIA’s reliance on severity made any separate nexus finding unnecessary for disposition.
  • Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005): Supports that the BIA may affirm IJ reasoning without restating it, reinforcing that a terse BIA decision can still be adequate if the underlying affirmed reasoning is discernible.

Standards of review

  • Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013): Restates the standard: legal conclusions de novo; factual findings under substantial evidence. This framed the court’s posture of deference on the agency’s harm-severity determination.
  • KC v. Garland, 108 F.4th 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2024): The court cited KC for the proposition that it remains “unsettled” in the Second Circuit what standard applies to the determination that undisputed facts do not amount to “persecution.” As in KC, the panel declined to resolve the doctrinal question because the agency’s decision would stand even under de novo review—an approach that preserves flexibility while avoiding an unnecessary pronouncement.

The “persecution” threshold and the harassment/persecution line

  • Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011): Anchors the foundational point that persecution is an “extreme concept” and does not include every offensive act.
  • Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006): Defines persecution as more severe than “mere harassment” and recognizes that non-life-threatening violence may qualify in appropriate circumstances—setting the baseline that severity is essential.
  • Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2006): Emphasizes the harassment/persecution difference is “one of degree” assessed in context, giving the court a context-sensitive framework while still requiring severity.
  • Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir. 2011): Provided a comparator illustrating that even a beating and detention can fall short of persecution where injuries are minor and non-lasting. The court used this to support the conclusion that Villa-Loja’s non-physical harms were insufficient to meet the persecution threshold.

Economic persecution

  • Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2002): Requires proof of a “deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage.” The court treated “deliberateness” as critical and found the record did not establish it.
  • Huo Qiang Chen v. Holder, 773 F.3d 396, 405 (2d Cir. 2014): Supplies the two-part articulation: an economic sanction constitutes persecution if it (1) deprives essentials of life or (2) deliberately imposes severe economic disadvantage.
  • Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 173 (B.I.A. 2007): Elaborates that persecution requires more than economic discrimination; hardships must be above those generally shared and be deliberate, severe, and condemned by civilized governments. The court cited it to reinforce the high threshold and to show Villa-Loja did not meet it on the record presented.

Requirement of reasoned consideration (not exhaustive discussion)

  • Zhi Yun Gao v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 2007): The agency need not parse every argument or piece of evidence so long as it gives “reasoned consideration” and makes adequate findings. This undercut Villa-Loja’s criticism that the agency did not discuss severity in greater detail.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Framing the dispositive issue: severity of harm. The panel interpreted the BIA’s decision as affirming the IJ’s finding that the harm did not rise to persecution. Although the parties thought the BIA affirmed nexus too, the court disagreed, emphasizing that it would not infer affirmance of additional grounds without clearer adoption. This reading narrowed review to the point the BIA actually relied on.
  2. Rejecting the “nexus cures severity” approach. Villa-Loja “appear[ed] to concede” the harm might be “mere harassment” but argued it could be treated as persecution if sufficiently connected to a protected ground. The court rejected that premise by applying the settled rule that persecution is defined by severity (and not merely by motive or nexus). In other words, even perfectly discriminatory harassment is not automatically persecution.
  3. Assessing the alleged harms cumulatively. The court considered the harms together (school bullying and discriminatory insults; exploitative employment demands and insults tied to indigenous race) but found they still did not meet the “extreme” persecution threshold, stressing the absence of alleged physical harm or injury.
  4. Economic persecution analysis required deliberateness and severity. While acknowledging the allegations suggested financial deprivation, the court applied the “deliberate imposition” requirement from Guan Shan Liao, the essentials-of-life/severe-disadvantage framework from Huo Qiang Chen, and the “more than economic discrimination” elaboration from Matter of T-Z-. The panel emphasized two gaps: (a) Villa-Loja did not argue on appeal that her deprivation reached the doctrinal threshold, and (b) the record indicated her difficulty finding better work was tied to limited education rather than deliberate persecution.
  5. Adequacy of agency explanation. Relying on Zhi Yun Gao and related scope-of-review principles, the court held that neither the IJ nor the BIA was required to provide the more granular discussion Villa-Loja demanded.

3.3 Impact

Although nonprecedential, the order underscores several practical lessons likely to influence briefing and agency adjudication in future Second Circuit immigration cases:

  • Severity is a gatekeeper: Applicants cannot treat a strong nexus showing as a substitute for proving harm severe enough to qualify as persecution. The decision reaffirms that the “persecution” inquiry is independently demanding.
  • Non-physical mistreatment faces a steep climb: Discriminatory insults, bullying, and exploitative labor conditions—without more—will often be characterized as harassment absent aggravating features (e.g., serious threats, physical violence, detention, or concrete proof of severe deprivation).
  • Economic persecution requires proof of deliberateness and exceptional severity: General poverty or hardship—especially when attributable to education or structural conditions rather than targeted imposition—will not satisfy the standard without evidence of intentional, severe deprivation tied to a protected ground.
  • Appellate discipline matters: The CAT portion illustrates the cost of waiver/abandonment. Even potentially viable claims can be lost when not properly preserved and argued.
  • Reading BIA decisions narrowly can focus (and limit) review: The panel’s refusal to infer that the BIA adopted nexus findings absent explicit language may shape litigants’ strategies—prompting closer attention to what the BIA actually said it affirmed and more targeted petitions for review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Persecution
A high threshold of harm in asylum law—more than offensiveness, discrimination, or harassment. It typically involves serious physical harm, severe threats, detention, or similarly grave mistreatment; context matters, but severity remains essential.
Harassment vs. persecution
Harassment includes hostile or unfair treatment that is harmful but not extreme. The line is “one of degree,” meaning adjudicators look at intensity, frequency, duration, and consequences. Not every discriminatory act is persecution.
Nexus
The requirement that persecution (if proven) be “on account of” a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group). This case illustrates that nexus does not eliminate the need to show sufficiently severe harm.
Economic persecution
Economic harm can qualify as persecution only when it is deliberately imposed and severe—such as intentionally depriving someone of essentials of life or inflicting a truly severe, targeted economic disadvantage. Ordinary poverty or generalized economic difficulty is not enough.
Substantial evidence review
A deferential appellate standard for factual findings: the court upholds the agency unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise.
“As modified by the BIA” review
When the BIA affirms only certain parts of an IJ decision, the court reviews only those affirmed grounds (and the IJ reasoning supporting them), not everything the IJ said.

5. Conclusion

Villa-Loja v. Bondi denies relief because the alleged mistreatment—school bullying and discriminatory insults, plus exploitative workplace conditions—did not cross the legal threshold from harassment to persecution, and because the record did not establish deliberate and severe economic harm amounting to economic persecution. The decision also highlights two procedural pillars: (1) claims can be lost through waiver (as with CAT), and (2) appellate courts will confine review to the specific ground the BIA actually adopted, particularly where one dispositive finding (here, lack of persecution-level harm) makes other issues unnecessary to reach.