Courts Must Set Parenting Time—No Delegation to Therapists or the Child Without Detailed Endangerment Findings
Vetter v. Vetter, 2026 ND 36 (N.D. Feb. 12, 2026)

1. Introduction

In Vetter v. Vetter, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the limits of a district court’s discretion when crafting parenting time for the non-primary parent after a change in primary residential responsibility. Kyle Vetter (plaintiff/appellee) and Michelle Vetter (defendant/appellant, self-represented) share one minor child. After the 2019 divorce judgment awarded Michelle primary residential responsibility (affirmed in Vetter v. Vetter, 2020 ND 40, 938 N.W.2d 417), Kyle moved in 2024–2025 to modify the judgment. The district court ultimately awarded Kyle primary residential responsibility and imposed a “phased” parenting plan that made Michelle’s contact contingent on the child’s wishes and decisions by the child’s therapist.

On appeal, the central issue that produced a merits reversal was whether the district court unlawfully delegated the judicial function of determining parenting time to a counselor and to the minor child, and whether the court made sufficient findings to justify effectively conditioning (and potentially denying) all parenting time.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court:

  • Affirmed the modification awarding Kyle Vetter primary residential responsibility, concluding the district court’s findings on material change and best interests were not clearly erroneous.
  • Summarily affirmed most of Michelle Vetter’s remaining claims because they were inadequately briefed under N.D.R.App.P. 28, invoking N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2), (4), and (8).
  • Reversed and remanded the parenting time provisions because the district court (1) improperly delegated parenting time decisions to the child and therapist, and (2) made inadequate findings to support conditioning all parenting time on the child’s choice (i.e., insufficient detail and nexus showing endangerment under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-22(2)).

The remand was limited to parenting time, with discretion for the district court to proceed on the existing record or hold additional evidentiary hearings.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Parenting time as a child-centered inquiry; presumption favoring contact

  • Taylor v. Taylor, 2022 ND 39, 970 N.W.2d 209 (quoting Curtiss v. Curtiss, 2017 ND 60, 891 N.W.2d 358): confirms that parenting time turns on the best interests of the child, not parental preferences.
  • Seibold v. Leverington, 2013 ND 173, 837 N.W.2d 342 (quoting Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 2000 ND 1, 603 N.W.2d 896): emphasizes the presumption that parenting time is generally in the child’s best interests and is “a right of the child,” not merely a parental privilege.

These cases framed the Court’s starting point: parenting time should not be treated as optional or contingent without a legally supported reason tied to the child’s welfare.

2) Restricting or eliminating parenting time requires a demonstrated endangerment basis

  • Taylor v. Taylor, 2022 ND 39 (quoting Wilson v. Ibarra, 2006 ND 151, 718 N.W.2d 568): parenting time “may be curtailed or eliminated entirely” only when it is likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health; restrictions must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and complete denial is a “drastic measure” reserved for compelling circumstances.
  • Wilson v. Ibarra, 2006 ND 151: used here for its insistence on detailed findings demonstrating harm and a nexus between past conduct and present endangerment, not “surmise or conjecture.”

The Court relied on this line of authority to fault the district court’s lack of detail about what harm would arise from “any form” of parenting time and why making all contact dependent on the child’s preferences was necessary.

3) Non-delegation: the court must decide parenting time and related issues

  • Cnty. of Sargent v. Faber, 2022 ND 155, 978 N.W.2d 652: a court “generally cannot delegate to anyone” decisions on residential responsibility or related issues; a court may not rely solely on a child’s wishes.
  • Krueger v. Krueger, 2011 ND 134, 800 N.W.2d 296; Marquette v. Marquette, 2006 ND 154, 719 N.W.2d 321; Paulson v. Paulson, 2005 ND 72, 694 N.W.2d 681: collectively warn against parenting time provisions that effectively give another person “total control” or “carte blanche” over visitation decisions.
  • Martodam v. Martodam, 2020 ND 70, 940 N.W.2d 664, overruled on other grounds by Kinden v. Kinden, 2025 ND 68, 19 N.W.3d 811; and Sisk v. Sisk, 2006 ND 55, 711 N.W.2d 203: stand for the specific proposition that a court may not permit a minor child to decide parenting time.
  • Boyda v. Boyda, 2025 ND 193, 27 N.W.3d 706: disapproves delegating “extensive decision-making authority” to a therapist, especially where the therapist determines criteria and timing for step-ups without court-controlled standards and review—likened to the improper delegation condemned in Paulson v. Paulson, 2005 ND 72.

These precedents directly drove the outcome: the parenting plan’s “Phase” structure left the existence, timing, and frequency of contact to the child and therapist, which the Court treated as an impermissible transfer of the judicial function.

4) Appellate waiver for inadequate briefing

  • State v. Noack, 2007 ND 82, 732 N.W.2d 389: compliance with N.D.R.App.P. 28 is “absolutely imperative.”
  • Hoff v. State, 2024 ND 235, 14 N.W.3d 892; State v. Gomez, 2025 ND 60, 18 N.W.3d 829; State v. Glaum, 2024 ND 47, 4 N.W.3d 540; Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Behm, 2020 ND 234, 951 N.W.2d 208: reiterate that inadequately supported arguments are waived and will not be addressed.

These cases explain why most of Michelle Vetter’s non-parenting-time claims were disposed of via summary affirmance.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in three connected steps:

  1. Statutory framework: After awarding primary residential responsibility, N.D.C.C. § 14-05-22(2) requires the court, upon request, to grant parenting time sufficient to maintain a beneficial parent-child relationship unless the court finds after hearing that parenting time is likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health.
  2. Non-delegation principle applied to the plan’s structure: The plan did not merely incorporate therapeutic support; it made parenting time contingent on:
    • the child deciding “if and when” phone contact occurs,
    • the child and therapist deciding when in-person contact begins and its frequency, and
    • the child deciding holiday time.
    Under Faber, Sisk, Martodam, and Boyda, this is a prohibited delegation because it transfers the court’s duty to set enforceable terms and standards for parenting time.
  3. Insufficient findings to justify broad restriction: Even if the district court believed restriction was necessary, Wilson v. Ibarra, 2006 ND 151 requires detailed findings demonstrating (a) the specific harm likely to occur and (b) a link between the parent’s conduct and that harm at the time of decision. The Supreme Court found the district court’s findings did not “demonstrate in detail” the endangerment from “any form” of parenting time and lacked a “nexus or link,” rendering the parenting time determination clearly erroneous.

C. Impact

Vetter reinforces and sharpens North Dakota law in three practical ways:

  • Reunification/therapeutic models must remain court-controlled: Courts may order therapy and may design step-up or supervised parenting time structures, but they must retain ultimate authority over whether contact occurs and define objective, judicially enforceable criteria rather than letting a therapist or the child decide the gateway question.
  • Child preference cannot become child control: The opinion underscores that while a child’s views may be considered, parenting time cannot be made contingent on the child’s unilateral decision—particularly where the effect is to deny contact indefinitely.
  • Restriction requires record-based specificity: If parenting time is to be meaningfully curtailed, district courts must make detailed findings explaining the nature of likely endangerment and why less restrictive alternatives (e.g., supervised time, structured exchanges, limited-duration visits) would be inadequate.

The decision will likely be cited in future disputes where parenting time orders hinge on therapist approval, child “readiness,” or open-ended gating language that makes enforcement impossible and shifts decision-making away from the court.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Primary residential responsibility: North Dakota’s term for the parent with primary day-to-day responsibility; often analogous to “primary custody” in other jurisdictions.
  • Parenting time: The schedule and conditions under which the non-primary parent spends time (including calls/virtual contact) with the child.
  • Delegation (improper): When a court lets someone else (a therapist, the other parent, or the child) decide essential parts of a parenting time order—like whether visits happen or when they start—rather than the court making that decision in an order that can be enforced and reviewed.
  • Endangerment standard (N.D.C.C. § 14-05-22(2)): Parenting time should be granted unless it is likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health; significant restrictions require evidence and specific findings.
  • Clearly erroneous: The appellate standard for reviewing factual findings (including parenting time): reversal is warranted when findings lack evidentiary support, are influenced by an incorrect legal view, or leave the reviewing court firmly convinced a mistake was made.
  • Waiver for inadequate briefing: On appeal, arguments must be supported with record citations and legal analysis (N.D.R.App.P. 28). Conclusory assertions risk summary affirmance (N.D.R.App.P. 35.1).

5. Conclusion

Vetter v. Vetter, 2026 ND 36 affirms that North Dakota district courts retain broad discretion over parenting time, but not the power to surrender that discretion. When an order makes parenting time dependent on a child’s choice or a therapist’s unilateral determinations—especially without detailed, evidence-based findings showing likely endangerment—the order is vulnerable to reversal. The opinion’s core takeaway is institutional: parenting time decisions must remain judicial decisions, supported by specific findings and expressed in enforceable terms.