Vertical Glock-Switch Trafficking: Relevant-Conduct Aggregation and “Reason to Believe” for §2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

I. Introduction

In United States v. Denico Hudson (6th Cir. Mar. 10, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 108-month sentence imposed on Denico N. Hudson for firearms offenses involving “machinegun conversion devices” (Glock switches). Hudson, a member of the “Button Boys” gang, served as the retail-facing seller in a three-person distribution chain: Isaiah Smith manufactured 3D-printed switches, Demarco Sturgeon operated as a wholesaler, and Hudson sold to end users and facilitated additional sales. The record also tied the gang’s modified firearms to drug trafficking and a series of shootings in the Cincinnati area.

The appeal presented three sentencing issues under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: (1) whether Hudson was properly attributed at least 25 switches for the six-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C); (2) whether the four-level “in connection with another felony offense” enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applied based on drug trafficking and shootings; and (3) whether Hudson deserved a mitigating-role reduction as a “minor participant” under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that the district court committed no procedural error in calculating Hudson’s Guidelines range. It affirmed:

  • The § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) enhancement because Hudson’s conduct—viewed through relevant conduct principles—supported attributing at least 25 switches to him, including quantities involved in the jointly undertaken, vertically integrated trafficking operation.
  • The § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement because Hudson transferred switches with at least “reason to believe” they would be used in connection with other felonies, supported independently by (a) Hudson’s own drug trafficking intertwined with switch sales and (b) the gang’s shootings using switch-equipped guns.
  • The denial of a minor-role adjustment because Hudson functioned as the “fulcrum” of the operation, not a low-level courier.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of procedural reasonableness and review

  • United States v. Snelling, 768 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2014): Provided the procedural-reasonableness framework—proper Guidelines calculation, advisory treatment, consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and adequate explanation. Hudson’s appeal was framed as a Guidelines-calculation challenge within that procedural inquiry.
  • United States v. Parkey, 142 F.4th 866 (6th Cir. 2025): Supplied two key points. First, the government bears the burden to prove enhancements by a preponderance. Second, the panel noted uncertainty over the standard for “mixed questions” in this context, but followed Parkey’s practical approach: where the enhancement satisfies either possible standard, no resolution is needed.
  • United States v. Sands, 948 F.3d 709 (6th Cir. 2020): Reinforced the bifurcated review model—factual findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo—used to assess the challenged enhancements and adjustment.
  • United States v. Roberts, 223 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2000): Anchored the burden for mitigating-role reductions on the defendant by a preponderance, critical to rejecting Hudson’s minor-role request.

2. Relevant conduct and aggregation for the “25+” enhancement

  • United States v. Gales, 137 F. App'x 875 (6th Cir. 2005): Supported a flexible finding of a “course of conduct” or “common scheme or plan” even where conduct appears episodic; the panel used Gales to show that repeated, similar transactions involving overlapping actors and methods can qualify as relevant conduct under § 1B1.3.
  • United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 1998): Illustrated that defendants can be held responsible for quantities attributable to co-participants if reasonably foreseeable within jointly undertaken activity. Although it involved drug quantities, the court used it by analogy to justify attributing switch quantities that fit the venture’s foreseeable distribution.
  • United States v. Kish, 424 F. App'x 398 (6th Cir. 2011): Reinforced that the relevant number of firearms can include those “distributed and made available for sale” by the jointly operating defendants, not only items personally sold in hand-to-hand transactions by the appellant.

3. “In connection with another felony” under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

  • United States v. Seymour, 739 F.3d 923 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Angel, 576 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2009)): Provided the limiting principle—enhancement does not apply where firearm possession is “merely coincidental” to the other felony—against which Hudson’s conduct was measured and found to be more than coincidental.
  • United States v. Shanklin, 924 F.3d 905 (6th Cir. 2019): Referenced as a typical “fortress theory” example, i.e., inference from proximity of firearms to drugs. The Hudson panel distinguished the present case as stronger because switches and drugs were marketed and sold together, rather than merely co-located.
  • United States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 2016): Used for the proposition that a joint sale of firearm-related items and drugs suggests facilitation of the drug offense, supporting application of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
  • United States v. Harrison, 2020 WL 8921413 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2020): Supported that social-media depictions of guns, drugs, and cash, and trades involving guns and drugs, may evidence the facilitative nexus required for § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
  • United States v. Turner, 2025 WL 976380 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2025): Noted as a “typical” scenario where the defendant personally uses a gun in another felony. The panel emphasized Hudson fits the guideline’s distinct “transfer” prong—selling with reason to believe the weapon would be used in another felony.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The “25+” enhancement and vertical-chain relevant conduct

The core doctrinal move is the court’s use of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 relevant-conduct principles to treat a vertically integrated trafficking chain as a single jointly undertaken criminal activity for quantity attribution. The panel relied on multiple routes within § 1B1.3:

  • Aiding and abetting / jointly undertaken activity: relevant conduct includes acts a defendant aided or abetted, and acts within the scope of jointly undertaken activity that were in furtherance of it and reasonably foreseeable.
  • “Common scheme or plan” / “same course of conduct”: even where counts are “closely related,” conduct qualifies if part of a common plan (common accomplices, purpose, or modus operandi) or the same course (similarity, regularity, time interval).

Factually, the panel characterized the operation as “one machine”: Smith (manufacturer), Sturgeon (wholesaler), Hudson (retailer), plus shared customer base (the Button Boys) and a common locus (Hudson’s apartment as a sales hub). On that view, Hudson was not merely a buyer of isolated items; he was a demand-driver who also facilitated Sturgeon’s sales. This supported attributing “the entire inventory” to Hudson for guideline-quantity purposes, not just the two switches he admitted aiding in selling during the plea.

Importantly, the panel treated the quantity finding as comfortably above the threshold even under more demanding review, emphasizing testimony that Hudson was Sturgeon’s “primary buyer” and likely supplied “the entire group.”

2. The “in connection with another felony” enhancement—two independent predicates

The panel applied § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) through its “transfer” clause: Hudson transferred switches with “knowledge, intent, or reason to believe” they would be used or possessed in connection with another felony. It then applied the guideline’s facilitation requirement (the firearm facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the felony) and the commentary’s instruction to assess the relationship consistent with relevant-conduct principles.

a. Drug trafficking nexus

The court found a tight functional link between Hudson’s switch trafficking and drug trafficking. It did not rely merely on co-location (the “fortress theory” archetype). Rather, it emphasized:

  • Hudson’s own dealing in fentanyl, heroin, and crack cocaine;
  • barter of drugs for switches;
  • overlapping customer base;
  • combined marketing and “bundles” (pills and switches from one supplier);
  • social-media posts depicting guns/switches, drugs, and cash as part of the operation’s identity.

These facts supported that the switches “facilitated” drug trafficking by increasing lethality and intimidation, and by serving as a commodity integrated into the trafficking enterprise itself. The court also underscored that “another felony offense” includes uncharged conduct punishable by more than one year, citing the guideline commentary and 21 U.S.C. § 841.

b. Shootings nexus

Separately, the enhancement was supported by the gang’s shootings linked to switch-equipped firearms. The panel rejected any implicit limitation to cases where the defendant personally fires the weapon. The text of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) expressly covers transferring a firearm with reason to believe it would be used in connection with another felony.

The court also referenced Ohio’s felonious-assault statute (Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.11(A)(2)) to illustrate the felony status of attempts to cause physical harm with a deadly weapon. The decisive inference was relational and contextual: Hudson sold conversion devices to his own gang associates, amid an environment of retaliatory violence and drug-protection imperatives, giving him ample “reason to believe” the switches would be used in shootings.

3. Denial of minor-role reduction—Hudson as operational “fulcrum”

Applying the § 3B1.2 commentary factors (understanding of scope/structure, planning, decision-making authority, participation, expected benefit), the panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Hudson was not a “mule” but a business partner and middleman who:

  • understood the enterprise’s structure and purpose;
  • participated in planning and execution of sales;
  • served as a principal retailer and facilitator for the wholesaler;
  • had a proprietary stake in the operation’s success.

With Roberts placing the burden on Hudson, the court found he failed to show he was “substantially less culpable than the average participant.”

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision signals several practical guideposts for Sixth Circuit sentencing litigation in conversion-device and firearms-trafficking cases:

  • Vertical-chain quantity attribution: Defendants occupying “retail” roles can be held responsible for broader inventory when evidence shows an integrated pipeline with shared purpose, customers, and coordinated conduct. The opinion reinforces that courts may aggregate quantities through § 1B1.3 even when the defendant disputes personal hand-to-hand sales totals.
  • Expanded evidentiary basis for § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B): The panel treated social-media marketing, bundle-selling, and bartering as strong evidence that firearms (or switches) facilitated drug trafficking—often stronger than mere physical proximity.
  • “Transfer” prong emphasized: The decision underscores that the enhancement is not confined to personal use in another felony; knowingly arming (or equipping) others within a violent/drug-trafficking context can suffice.
  • Role reductions face headwinds for “connectors”: A defendant who bridges supply and demand—facilitating sales and serving as a hub—will struggle to qualify as a minor participant even if someone else manufactures or wholesales the devices.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Relevant conduct (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3)
Sentencing can consider more than the specific acts named in the conviction. If the defendant joined a shared criminal undertaking, the court may count reasonably foreseeable acts of partners that further the joint plan (e.g., total inventory distributed through a coordinated trafficking pipeline).
Common scheme/plan vs. same course of conduct
A common scheme or plan involves shared accomplices, purpose, victims, or methods. A same course of conduct is broader and asks whether conduct is similar, repeated, and close in time. Either can allow aggregation.
Preponderance of the evidence
The party bearing the burden must show something is more likely than not (just over 50%), a lower threshold than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
“In connection with” (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B))
The firearm (or here, a conversion device treated as a machinegun) must facilitate—or have the potential to facilitate— another felony. If the relationship is merely accidental or coincidental, the enhancement should not apply.
“Fortress theory”
A common inference that guns found near drugs protect the drugs, cash, or trafficking operation. The Hudson court found an even stronger linkage because switches and drugs were marketed and transacted together.
Minor participant (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b))
A defendant qualifies only if substantially less culpable than the average participant. Being “less senior” than others is not enough when the defendant plays a central operational role.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Denico Hudson affirms robust application of the Guidelines to modern firearms trafficking involving Glock switches. The court treated a manufacturer–wholesaler–retailer chain as a unified venture for quantity attribution under relevant-conduct principles, endorsed § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) where switch transfers are intertwined with drug trafficking and foreseeable gang violence, and rejected a minor-role reduction for a defendant who functioned as the operation’s hub. The decision’s central takeaway is that defendants who operationally connect supply to end-user demand— particularly in a gang and drug context—can face aggregated quantities and “other felony” enhancements even without personally committing every downstream offense.