Vasquez v. CIMA Services, L.P.: Rule 6(b) Discretion to Reject Late Summary-Judgment Responses and Chapter 95’s “Actual Knowledge” Bar on Constructive-Risk Theories

I. Introduction

Vasquez v. CIMA Services, L.P. (5th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026) arose from a chlorine-gas exposure incident at Lubrizol’s chemical plant in Deer Park, Texas. Plaintiff Mark Vasquez, a CIMA Services employee, sued both his employer (CIMA) and the plant owner/affiliates (The Lubrizol Corporation and Lubrizol Advanced Materials, collectively “Lubrizol”), asserting Texas negligence theories tied to allegedly unsafe pipeline preparation and deficient protective measures.

The appeal centered on two interlocking issues:

  • Procedure: Whether the district court abused its discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) by denying Vasquez leave to file an untimely summary-judgment response (after multiple continuances and an explicit “no further extensions” warning).
  • Merits: Whether, even with an unopposed motion (and even considering Vasquez’s late-submitted material), Lubrizol was entitled to summary judgment—principally under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 95.

Although “not designated for publication,” the opinion is a detailed, practice-shaping application of Fifth Circuit standards on late filings, unopposed summary judgment, and Chapter 95’s control/actual-knowledge requirements.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. It held:

  • The district court acted within its “exceedingly wide discretion in scheduling” by refusing to accept Vasquez’s late opposition, especially after repeated extensions and a clear final warning.
  • Even if Vasquez’s late evidence were considered, Lubrizol was still entitled to summary judgment because Vasquez failed to raise a genuine dispute on the two Chapter 95 prerequisites: (1) owner control over the manner of work and (2) actual knowledge of the specific dangerous condition at the time of injury.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Outcome)

1. Scheduling discretion and late filings under Rule 6(b)

  • Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 465 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2006): The panel relied on Adams for the abuse-of-discretion standard and for the proposition that even short delays (there, one day) may be rejected without abusing discretion—supporting the court’s strict view of deadline compliance here.
  • Doe v. Columbia-Brazoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 855 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 2017): Quoted for the “exceedingly wide discretion” language, framing deadline control as a core district-court management function (not a mere technicality).
  • Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 1995) and Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990): These anchor the key doctrinal point that Rule 6(b) is permissive; even where the legal standard could be met, the district court is not compelled to extend time.
  • McCarty v. Thaler, 376 F. App'x 442 (5th Cir. 2010) and Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1990): Reinforced that extensions “fall to the district court’s discretion,” and that discretionary case-management rulings are difficult to overturn absent clear unreasonableness.
  • Versai Mgmt. Corp. v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 597 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 2010) and Hunt v. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 54 F. App'x 799, 2002 WL 31845832 (5th Cir. 2002): Supported the view that after “lengthy continuances,” a trial court may insist on compliance and expect litigants to follow court-imposed deadlines.
  • Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380 (1993) and Salts v. Epps, 676 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2012): The court used Pioneer to define “excusable neglect” as an elastic, equitable inquiry, and Salts to provide the four-factor framework (prejudice, length/impact, reason/control, good faith). The “reason for delay” factor carried the day.
  • Draper v. KK Ford, L.P., 196 F. App'x 264 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Bernhardt v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 892 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1990)): Used to reject ordinary workload/office mishaps as “excusable neglect,” aligning Vasquez’s assistant’s clerical mistake with non-excusable inattentiveness.
  • Broussard v. Johnson, 254 F.3d 71, 2001 WL 502799 (5th Cir. 2001): Distinguished situations where confusion might be excusable (e.g., contradictory court orders) from the present record, where the operative deadlines were clearly set by court order.

2. Unopposed summary judgment is not a default—but can succeed on a prima facie showing

  • Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766 (5th Cir. 2001) and Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1989): Vasquez cited these “default judgment” cases, but the panel treated them as inapposite because this was not a Rule 55 default scenario.
  • Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1985): Provided the controlling caution: summary judgment cannot be granted “solely because there is no opposition.”
  • Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1988) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2): Supplied the reconciliation: when the nonmovant fails to respond, the court may treat properly supported facts as undisputed and grant summary judgment if the movant makes a “prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment.” The panel emphasized that the district court followed this model.
  • Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2001), Clark v. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 141 F.4th 653 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986): These framed the de novo review and the basic summary-judgment burden structure.

3. Excluding late evidence and the “no duty to sift” principle

  • Lopez v. Laborers Int'l Union, Loc. No. 18, 987 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Geiserman v. MacDonald): Supported the district court’s authority to refuse late-filed summary-judgment evidence.
  • Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455 (5th Cir. 1998): Reinforced that the court need not “sift through the record in search of evidence” for the nonmovant—especially salient where the nonmovant failed timely to marshal record proof.

4. Chapter 95: control + actual knowledge

  • Dyall v. Simpson Pasadena Paper Co., 152 S.W.3d 688 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied): Used for the allocation of burden: plaintiff must raise a fact issue on both prongs (control and actual knowledge).
  • Hoechst-Celanese Corp. v. Mendez, 967 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam): Vasquez invoked Mendez to argue Lubrizol’s safety requirements constituted “actual control,” particularly if safety rules increase injury probability/severity. The panel treated the cited facts (permit system and PPE access) as insufficient under later Texas guidance.
  • Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. 2002): Central to rejecting the “permit system = control” theory; a safety permit system is not evidence the contractor was not free to do the work in its own way.
  • Fitz v. Days Inn Worldwide, Inc., 147 S.W.3d 467 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) and Ellwood Tex. Forge Corp. v. Jones, 214 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied): Cited to show that general recommendations about safe work methods do not amount to Chapter 95 “control.”
  • Union Carbide Corp. v. Smith, 313 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied): Supported distinguishing “general control of the facilities” from control over the contractor’s “manner” or operative details.
  • Ineos USA, L.L.C. v. Elmgren, 505 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. 2016): Provided the decisive “actual knowledge” definition: knowledge the dangerous condition existed at the time of the accident; constructive knowledge that a condition could develop is insufficient.

5. Appellate affirmance on any supported ground

  • Milton v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 707 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2013): Cited for the principle that summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record, allowing the panel to bypass Vasquez’s alternative common-law negligence arguments once Chapter 95 barred liability.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 6(b): “Excusable neglect” is necessary, but not sufficient

The opinion underscores two steps often conflated in practice:

  • Gatekeeping: After a deadline passes, Rule 6(b)(1)(B) permits an extension only upon “excusable neglect.”
  • Discretion: Even if excusable neglect could be shown, Rule 6(b) still leaves the extension to the court’s discretion.

Applying Pioneer/Salts, the panel assumed arguendo that prejudice, delay, and good faith favored Vasquez, but found the stated reason—an assistant’s reliance on an auto-calculated minute entry rather than the court’s explicit order and an attorney’s correcting email—was not “excusable.” The decision places weight on the clarity of the operative scheduling order and the district court’s repeated extensions coupled with an explicit “no further extensions” warning.

2. Unopposed summary judgment: not automatic, but can be record-driven

The panel reaffirmed the Fifth Circuit’s line between impermissible “summary judgment by default” (Hibernia Nat'l Bank) and permissible summary judgment on an unopposed motion when the movant’s evidence makes a prima facie case (Eversley; Rule 56(e)(2)). Here, once Vasquez missed the deadline, the district court could accept Lubrizol’s supported facts as undisputed and ask whether those facts satisfied Chapter 95.

3. Chapter 95 application: permit systems and generalized safety oversight rarely equal “control”

On the control prong (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 95.003), Lubrizol’s contract disclaimed control over “the manner, method or operative details” of CIMA’s work, and the undisputed testimony indicated CIMA—not Lubrizol—directed Vasquez’s work and PPE. Vasquez’s attempt to recast Lubrizol’s safe-work permit and PPE access protocols as control failed under Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright and related Texas authorities distinguishing:

  • general premises/safety oversight and permit issuance, from
  • directive control over how the contractor performs the operative details of the work.

4. Chapter 95 actual knowledge: “possible chlorine risk” ≠ knowledge of the condition at the time

On actual knowledge, the court treated Lubrizol’s permit acknowledgement of chlorine in the plant generally as, at most, awareness of a risk, not proof that Lubrizol actually knew toxic gas was present in the specific line at the time of Vasquez’s work. Under Ineos USA, L.L.C. v. Elmgren, constructive theories (“they should have tested differently” / “it could build up”) do not satisfy § 95.003.

C. Impact

  • Case-management signal (federal practice): The opinion reinforces that in the Fifth Circuit, repeated extensions and a clear “final” scheduling order will be strictly enforced; clerical or calendaring errors—especially where the order is clear—are unlikely to qualify as excusable neglect.
  • Unopposed summary judgment practice: Litigants should expect district courts to treat supported facts as undisputed under Rule 56(e)(2); the absence of an opposition does not guarantee loss, but it shifts the contest to whether the movant’s evidentiary presentation is prima facie sufficient.
  • Texas industrial/premises litigation (Chapter 95): Plaintiffs will face continued difficulty establishing “control” from permit systems, general safety guidance, and controlled access to owner PPE; and “actual knowledge” remains a high bar that cannot be met with “should have known” or “could develop” proof.
  • Strategic takeaway: Where Chapter 95 applies, plaintiffs must develop early, admissible evidence aimed specifically at (i) operational control over how work is done and (ii) contemporaneous, actual awareness of the hazard—not merely knowledge of a general process risk.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Excusable neglect” (Rule 6(b)(1)(B)): A post-deadline extension requires more than a mistake; courts look at fairness factors (prejudice, delay, reason, good faith), but ordinary office inattentiveness typically fails—especially when a court order clearly sets the deadline.
  • “Unopposed” summary judgment: Not the same as default judgment. The moving party still must show it is entitled to judgment based on evidence and law. But if the nonmovant does not respond, the court may treat the movant’s properly supported facts as undisputed.
  • Chapter 95 “control”: It is not enough that the owner has rules or a permit system. The question is whether the owner controlled how the contractor did the work’s operative details.
  • Chapter 95 “actual knowledge”: Knowing an activity is risky (or that a hazard could arise) is “constructive knowledge.” Chapter 95 generally requires proof the owner actually knew the dangerous condition existed at the time of the accident.
  • “No duty to sift the record”: Judges are not required to hunt through filings to find support for a party’s position; the party must timely present the evidence and pinpoint it.

V. Conclusion

Vasquez v. CIMA Services, L.P. delivers two practical rules with significant downstream effect: (1) district courts in the Fifth Circuit have broad discretion to deny late summary-judgment responses even where the delay is short and arguably innocent, particularly after repeated continuances and clear warnings; and (2) in Chapter 95 cases, plaintiffs must clear two demanding hurdles—proof of owner control over the manner of work and proof of actual knowledge of the dangerous condition at the time—neither of which is satisfied by generalized safety permitting, access protocols, or constructive-risk arguments.