Vacatur-and-Resentencing Triggers First Step Act § 403 Relief; Unauthorized Successive § 2255 Amendments Exceed District Court Jurisdiction

I. Introduction

United States v. Michael Shane Ragland (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026) arises from a 2009 federal prosecution in the Southern District of Florida involving a string of armed robberies of convenience stores. A jury convicted Michael Shane Ragland of 18 counts, including eight firearm counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He originally received a 196-year sentence driven almost entirely by then-mandatory “stacked” § 924(c) penalties.

After intervening Supreme Court decisions invalidated certain uses of § 924(c), Ragland obtained partial collateral relief: the District Court vacated one § 924(c) count (Count Sixteen) predicated on attempted Hobbs Act robbery. The court then conducted a resentencing and imposed a new sentence of 173 years, declining to apply the 2018 First Step Act (“FSA”) changes to § 924(c) stacking.

The central issues on rehearing were:

  • FSA retroactivity at resentencing: whether, after a post-FSA vacatur and resentencing, the defendant must receive the FSA’s non-stacking § 924(c) penalties.
  • Scope of jurisdiction in successive § 2255 litigation: whether the District Court could entertain new challenges to Ragland’s other § 924(c) counts beyond the single count for which the Eleventh Circuit had authorized a successive petition.

Critically, two days after the Eleventh Circuit’s original 2025 decision affirming the sentence, the Supreme Court decided Hewitt v. United States, squarely rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s then-controlling interpretation of the FSA’s applicability after vacatur.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit granted panel rehearing in part. It:

  • Vacated and remanded for resentencing under the FSA, concluding that Hewitt v. United States abrogated the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier rule in United States v. Hernandez and required application of the FSA’s revised § 924(c) penalties at Ragland’s resentencing.
  • Reaffirmed its prior holding that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Ragland’s attempted amendments adding challenges to other counts, because the Eleventh Circuit had authorized a successive § 2255 motion only as to Count Sixteen.
  • Highlighted a potential circuit split, expressly disagreeing with approaches reflected in Reyes v. United States (Seventh Circuit) and United States v. MacDonald (Fourth Circuit).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Supreme Court decisions reshaping § 924(c)

  • Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015): Held the ACCA “residual clause” unconstitutionally vague. The Eleventh Circuit uses Johnson as the starting point for the “void-for-vagueness” line of cases later applied to § 924(c).
  • United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 470, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019): Held § 924(c)(3)(B) (the “residual clause”) unconstitutionally vague. This decision supplied the constitutional basis enabling many § 2255 challenges to § 924(c) predicates not qualifying under the “elements clause.”
  • United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 824, 860, 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2025 (2022): Held attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A). This was decisive for Ragland because Count Sixteen uniquely rested on attempted Hobbs Act robbery.
  • Hewitt v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2165 (2025): The pivotal new authority. The Supreme Court held that “offenders who appear for sentencing after the First Step Act’s enactment date—including those whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who thus need to be resentenced—are subject to the Act’s revised penalties.” The Eleventh Circuit treated Hewitt as controlling and remanded for FSA sentencing.

2. Eleventh Circuit law on FSA retroactivity before Hewitt

  • United States v. Hernandez, 107 F.4th 965 (11th Cir. 2024): The now-abrogated Eleventh Circuit precedent. Hernandez held that a sentence “has been imposed” for FSA § 403(b) purposes even if it is later vacated, thus denying FSA § 403 relief at resentencing for defendants originally sentenced pre-FSA. Ragland’s rehearing succeeds because Hewitt rejects Hernandez’s interpretation.

3. Resentencing mechanics and the “sentencing package doctrine”

  • United States v. Brown, 879 F.3d 1231, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2018): Cited for the propriety of a full resentencing hearing after § 2255 relief in relevant circumstances (i.e., an opportunity to be heard, objections considered, etc.).
  • United States v. Stinson, 97 F.3d 466, 469 (11th Cir. 1996): Articulates the concept that a multi-count sentence is a “package” of sanctions reflecting a unified sentencing intent.
  • United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010, 1017 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Watkins, 147 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 1998)): Explains that when the package is “unbundled,” a court may “recalculate and reconsider” the entire sentence to conform to its original sentencing intent.

4. Successive § 2255 gatekeeping and jurisdiction

  • Boyd v. United States, 754 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2014): Emphasizes the limitation that generally only one § 2255 motion is authorized and later attempts are restricted.
  • Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003): Establishes that without appellate authorization, district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over successive § 2255 claims; also notes procedural rules may apply in § 2255 proceedings but cannot expand statutory jurisdiction.
  • Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994): Cited for the foundational principle that federal courts possess only the jurisdiction granted by Constitution and statute—supporting the Eleventh Circuit’s refusal to let Rule 15 “amendment” practice override § 2255(h) limits.
  • United States v. Pearson, 940 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2019): Eleventh Circuit precedent rejecting the notion that district courts may entertain unauthorized challenges to counts beyond the authorization granted for a successive § 2255 motion.

5. Circuit split authorities (Fourth and Seventh Circuits)

  • Reyes v. United States, 998 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2021): Held that once an appellate panel authorizes a successive § 2255 “application,” amendments adding new claims need not be separately screened; district court discretion under Rule 15 is the check against abuse. The Eleventh Circuit rejects this as incompatible with § 2255(h)’s gatekeeping and jurisdictional limits.
  • United States v. MacDonald, 641 F.3d 596, 616 (4th Cir. 2011): Adopted a Rule 15-centered view allowing addition of new claims without further appellate screening. The Eleventh Circuit expressly disagrees “to the extent” this permits unscreened claims exceeding the authorization.

6. Hobbs Act robbery as a § 924(c) predicate (background to the amendment dispute)

  • United States v. Wiley, 78 F.4th 1355, 1365 (11th Cir. 2023): Reaffirms completed Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence” in the Eleventh Circuit.
  • In re Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016): Earlier Eleventh Circuit authority to similar effect.
  • United States v. Solomon, 136 F.4th 1310, 1321 (11th Cir. 2025): Continues the Eleventh Circuit’s view post-Taylor that completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a valid predicate.
  • United States v. Louis, 146 F.4th 1328 (11th Cir. 2025): Not decided on the merits (voluntary dismissal), but part of the procedural narrative around whether to delay resentencing.

7. Standard of review and interpretive framing

  • Regueiro v. American Airlines, Inc., 147 F.4th 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2025): Cited for de novo review of statutory interpretation.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why Hewitt required First Step Act sentencing here

The FSA’s § 403(a) eliminated the pre-2018 “stacking” rule under which multiple § 924(c) counts in a single prosecution triggered escalating 25-year mandatory minimums for “second or subsequent” convictions. Section 403(b) makes that reform applicable to pre-enactment conduct only if “a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of the date of enactment.”

Before Hewitt v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Hernandez interpreted “has been imposed” to include sentences imposed pre-FSA even if later vacated, thereby denying § 403 relief at resentencing. Hewitt rejected that approach and held that defendants who return for sentencing after the FSA—because their prior § 924(c) sentences were vacated—must be sentenced under the revised penalties.

Applying Hewitt, the panel identified a key factual/legal feature: although the District Court’s § 2255 order formally dismissed only Count Sixteen, it then conducted a genuinely package-based resentencing on all counts. The Government itself invoked the sentencing package doctrine, and the District Court increased some non-§ 924(c) terms (e.g., the robbery/conspiracy portion) as part of reassembling the overall sentence. Because the original sentence was effectively “unbundled,” Ragland was “appear[ing] for sentencing” after the FSA within Hewitt’s rule and therefore must receive the FSA’s non-stacking § 924(c) framework.

The panel also added an important limitation: it left open whether Hewitt necessarily entitles a successful § 2255 movant to full FSA application when a district court vacates only discrete parts of a sentence and does not conduct a full resentencing. It cited Justice Alito’s Hewitt dissent for the proposition that district courts “may instead choose to vacate only those parts of the sentence related to an intervening change in law,” suggesting that the remedial form of vacatur/resentencing can control whether § 403 becomes relevant.

2. Why the District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Ragland’s new § 2255 challenges

For successive collateral attacks, § 2255(h) requires appellate certification before a district court may entertain the motion. The Eleventh Circuit’s authorization order permitted Ragland to bring a successive claim only as to Count Sixteen, relying on the intersection of United States v. Davis (residual clause invalid) and United States v. Taylor (attempted Hobbs Act robbery not a crime of violence).

Ragland later sought to amend to attack his other § 924(c) convictions. The panel treated that effort as an attempt to expand the successive collateral proceeding beyond the authorized claim, and thus beyond statutory jurisdiction. It reasoned:

  • Jurisdiction is claim-bounded by the authorization: the district court’s power “emanated from the relief our Court granted,” which was limited to the Davis/Taylor-based Count Sixteen claim.
  • Rule 15 cannot enlarge statutory jurisdiction: while civil rules can apply in § 2255 proceedings, they cannot be used to bypass Congress’s gatekeeping design. The panel invoked Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. to underscore that jurisdiction must come from statute, not procedural discretion.
  • Anti-circumvention principle: allowing unscreened amendments under Rule 15 would let movants evade § 2255(h)(2)’s “new rule of constitutional law” requirement and the appellate prima facie screening.

The panel acknowledged that Reyes v. United States and United States v. MacDonald would permit broader amendments once any one claim is authorized. But it expressly rejected that approach, reaffirming its own precedent in United States v. Pearson, and explaining that a movant who wishes to expand claims must seek a new authorization from the court of appeals (with the statutory clock restarting as applicable under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) when the Supreme Court recognizes new rights).

C. Impact

1. Immediate sentencing consequences in § 924(c) “stacking” cases

The most concrete effect is remedial: Ragland must be resentenced under the FSA’s § 403 regime, which eliminates the draconian single-indictment stacking that produced decades-long mandatory consecutive terms. The opinion signals that in the Eleventh Circuit, where a vacatur triggers a de novo resentencing or a sentence-package reassembly, Hewitt compels FSA § 403 application.

2. Litigation strategy: remedies matter (partial vs. full vacatur)

By emphasizing that the District Court conducted a package resentencing—and by noting Hewitt did not decide every “partial vacatur” permutation—the opinion places new weight on remedial posture. Parties may now litigate (or negotiate) whether the court should “unbundle” the entire sentence or vacate only discrete parts, because that choice may determine whether FSA § 403 applies.

3. Entrenchment of a circuit split on successive § 2255 amendments

The panel sharpened an acknowledged divergence between circuits. The Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdictional approach conflicts with the Seventh Circuit’s Reyes v. United States and the Fourth Circuit’s United States v. MacDonald. This increases the likelihood of further en banc activity or Supreme Court review on the question whether appellate authorization is application-wide (as in Reyes) or claim-specific (as in Ragland/Pearson).

4. Practical effect on Hobbs Act robbery challenges

The court’s refusal to allow amendments also reinforces, at a procedural level, the Eleventh Circuit’s substantive position that completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a § 924(c) “crime of violence” (see United States v. Solomon, United States v. Wiley, and In re Fleur), limiting post-Taylor collateral expansion to those predicates actually affected by new Supreme Court constitutional rules.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “§ 924(c) stacking”: Before the FSA, multiple § 924(c) counts in the same case triggered escalating mandatory minimums (e.g., 7 years for the first brandishing count, then 25 years for each additional count), all consecutive—producing extremely long sentences.
  • “Crime of violence” elements clause vs. residual clause: The “elements clause” (§ 924(c)(3)(A)) asks whether the offense’s legal elements require force (or attempted/threatened force). The “residual clause” (§ 924(c)(3)(B)) asked whether the offense, by its nature, carries a substantial risk of force; Davis invalidated that clause as vague.
  • Vacatur: When a conviction/sentence is vacated, it is set aside. The legal consequence can affect whether a defendant is considered to be “appearing for sentencing” anew, which matters for whether newer penalty statutes apply.
  • Sentencing package doctrine: In multi-count cases, courts often treat the sentence as a unified “package.” If one count drops out, the court may revisit the whole package to reach an overall sentence consistent with its original intent (within legal limits).
  • Successive § 2255 and “gatekeeping”: After one § 2255 motion, a later one generally requires permission from the court of appeals, which screens whether the new claim rests on a qualifying new Supreme Court rule of constitutional law made retroactive.
  • Subject-matter jurisdiction: The court’s legal power to decide a type of dispute. The Eleventh Circuit treats unauthorized successive § 2255 claims as outside the district court’s power, regardless of fairness or efficiency arguments.
  • Rule 15 amendments: A civil rule that normally allows pleadings to be amended freely. This opinion holds it cannot be used to add unauthorized claims in a successive § 2255 case because procedure cannot override statutory jurisdictional limits.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s rehearing decision in United States v. Michael Shane Ragland does two significant things. First, it aligns Eleventh Circuit sentencing practice with the Supreme Court’s mandate in Hewitt v. United States, requiring application of the FSA’s § 403 non-stacking penalties where a post-FSA resentencing follows vacatur and the sentence is effectively reassembled as a package. Second, it fortifies the circuit’s strict jurisdictional gatekeeping for successive § 2255 litigation, holding that district courts may not use Rule 15 to entertain new, unauthorized collateral claims—explicitly rejecting the more permissive approaches of Reyes v. United States and United States v. MacDonald.

In the broader legal landscape, the opinion both narrows the longevity of pre-FSA stacked § 924(c) sentences after resentencing (as Hewitt requires) and heightens the importance of authorization boundaries in successive habeas practice—setting up a clearer conflict among the circuits on how far appellate authorization must extend.