Vacatur-and-Amended-Judgment Rule: A First § 2255 Challenge to the Intervening Judgment Is Not “Second or Successive,” Even After a Mere Sentence Correction

I. Introduction

In In re: Abraham A. Augustin (Sixth Cir. Sept. 15, 2026), the Sixth Circuit addressed a recurring postconviction jurisdictional question under 28 U.S.C. § 2255: when does a later-in-time § 2255 motion count as a barred “second or successive” motion requiring prior authorization from the court of appeals?

The movant, Abraham A. Augustin (pro se), sought to pursue another § 2255 motion after he had already obtained partial collateral relief based on United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019). In the earlier Davis-based litigation, the district court vacated Augustin’s 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction, reduced his sentence accordingly, and entered an amended judgment. Augustin later filed a new § 2255 motion challenging the remaining five convictions. The district court transferred that motion to the Sixth Circuit as “second or successive.”

The key issue was whether the amended judgment constituted a new, intervening judgment such that Augustin’s first § 2255 challenge to that amended judgment was not “second or successive”—even though the district court had corrected the sentence rather than conducting a full resentencing.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit (Griffin, J.) held that Augustin’s latest § 2255 motion is not “second or successive” because it is the first motion to challenge the amended judgment entered after the district court granted partial § 2255 relief in 2020. The court emphasized that once the district court granted the prior § 2255 motion, it necessarily vacated and set aside the original judgment under § 2255(b), rendering the prior judgment a legal nullity and replacing it with a new intervening judgment.

Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit granted the motion to remand for the district court to adjudicate the § 2255 motion in the first instance (without requiring authorization under § 2255(h)). The court denied Augustin’s request to reassign the matter to a different district judge.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The “second or successive” gatekeeping framework

  • In re Sims, 111 F.3d 45, 46-47 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam): Cited for the basic procedural rule that a prisoner must obtain appellate certification before filing a “second or successive” § 2255 motion that falls within the statute’s bar. Sims supplies the gatekeeping baseline against which the court defines the relevant exception.
  • Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 511 (2020): Used to underscore that “second or successive” is a term of art, not merely a chronological label. This framing supports the court’s willingness to treat some later filings as non-successive where the relevant judgment has changed.
  • In re Hill, 81 F.4th 560, 568 (6th Cir. 2023) (en banc): Provides the Sixth Circuit’s modern articulation (in the § 2254 context) that “second or successive” analysis is judgment-focused and that discrete Supreme Court-recognized scenarios exist where later petitions are not successive. Hill is the doctrinal bridge to the “new judgment” rule applied here.
  • Ajan v. United States, 731 F.3d 629, 631 (6th Cir. 2013): Cited to confirm that the judgment-based analysis applies equally to § 2255 as it does to § 2254, allowing the court to rely on Hill/Magwood principles in the federal-prisoner setting.

2. The “new judgment” doctrine (Magwood line) as applied to amended judgments

  • Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 334 (2010): The Supreme Court anchor for the rule that when a prisoner challenges a new judgment, the petition is not “second or successive” as to that judgment—even if the prisoner previously litigated collateral review of an earlier judgment. The Sixth Circuit treats Magwood as controlling logic for Augustin’s amended judgment.
  • King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 2015): Crucial Sixth Circuit elaboration: judgment-based reasoning “applies to all new judgments,” whether they involve new sentences, new convictions, or reinstatement. King supports treating any intervening judgment as resetting the “first petition” opportunity.
  • In re Stansell, 828 F.3d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 2016): Particularly influential because it addresses partial relief: partially vacating a sentence can create an intervening judgment that permits challenges to “undisturbed” components. Stansell closely matches Augustin’s situation (one count vacated; other counts left intact).

3. Vacatur’s legal effect and why “correction” vs. “resentencing” does not matter

  • Hewitt v. United States, 606 U.S. 419, 431 (2025): The linchpin for the court’s “void ab initio” reasoning: once a judgment is vacated, “the law acts as though the vacated [judgment] never occurred.” This enables the court to say the amended judgment necessarily stands in the original judgment’s place for successiveness analysis.
  • In re Johnson, No. 22-3613, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 2267, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2023) (order); In re Daniel, No. 22-5917, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 415, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2023) (order); In re Racey, No. 22-5029, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 9767, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 2022) (order); In re Cain, No. 17-6249, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 6936, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2018) (order): These unpublished orders provide consistent circuit practice: after a new judgment, the first collateral challenge is not “second or successive.” The court relies on them for persuasive uniformity and then makes the opinion’s key move—clarifying that the principle holds even when relief is implemented via a sentence correction rather than full resentencing.

4. The limiting principle: not every sentence change creates a new judgment

  • Freeman v. Wainwright, 959 F.3d 226, 229 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation modified): Freeman supplies the boundary: certain postjudgment modifications—such as sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) or Criminal Rule 35(b)— do not create a new judgment. The Augustin court uses Freeman to avoid overreading its own holding and to preserve a clear doctrinal distinction between (a) changes after a statutory vacatur-and-replacement process under § 2255(b) and (b) limited sentence adjustments that do not vacate the judgment.

5. Prior Augustin litigation and the reassignment standard

  • United States v. Dais, 559 F. App'x 438 (6th Cir. 2014): Cited as the direct appeal affirmance of Augustin’s original convictions and sentence—establishing procedural background.
  • Augustin v. United States, 2019 WL 11892157 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2019) (order): Shows the first § 2255 motion was denied and no certificate of appealability issued, highlighting that the present motion is not an attempt to relitigate that same judgment after an unchanged status quo.
  • United States v. Augustin, 16 F.4th 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2021): Important both factually and analytically: it affirmed the district court’s choice to “correct” the sentence rather than conduct a full resentencing after vacating the § 924(c) count. The 2026 opinion uses this to reject claims of bias/improper motive when denying reassignment.
  • Sagan v. United States, 342 F.3d 493, 501 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Armco, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, Local 169, 280 F.3d 669, 683 (6th Cir. 2002)); Solomon v. United States, 467 F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2006): These cases set the “extraordinary power” and “greatest reluctance” standard for reassignment under 28 U.S.C. § 2106. The court applies that high bar and finds a two-year transfer delay, amid other postconviction activity and long case familiarity, insufficient.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Start with the statutory baseline: Under § 2255(h) (incorporating § 2244), a “second or successive” motion generally requires appellate certification.
  2. Define the operative concept: Drawing on Banister v. Davis and In re Hill, the court reiterates that “second or successive” is not a mere timing rule; it turns on what judgment is being attacked.
  3. Apply the “new judgment” doctrine: Under Magwood v. Patterson, a first collateral challenge to a new judgment is not successive. The Sixth Circuit’s own cases— King v. Morgan and In re Stansell—confirm that an intervening judgment opens the door to a non-successive challenge even to components that were “undisturbed” in the modification.
  4. Explain why Augustin has a new judgment: The opinion relies on § 2255(b), which requires a court granting relief to “vacate and set the judgment aside” before implementing the remedy (resentencing or correcting the sentence). Thus, when the district court granted the Davis-based motion, the original judgment was vacated and replaced by an amended judgment.
  5. Make the key clarification: “correction” vs. “resentencing” is immaterial: Using Hewitt v. United States (“the law acts as though the vacated [judgment] never occurred”), the court concludes that once vacatur occurs, the prior judgment is void and cannot be the relevant benchmark for “successive” analysis. Therefore, whether the district court chose a full resentencing or a narrower sentence correction is irrelevant to whether a new judgment exists for Magwood/King purposes.
  6. Cabin the holding: The court acknowledges limits: per Freeman v. Wainwright, certain sentence modifications (e.g., under § 3582(c) or Rule 35(b)) do not create a new judgment. The distinction is that those mechanisms do not operate through § 2255(b)’s vacatur-and-replacement structure.
  7. Disposition: Because Augustin’s filing is the first challenge to the amended judgment, the district court should adjudicate it without requiring § 2255(h) authorization. Remand is granted. Reassignment is denied under Sagan v. United States/Armco, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, Local 169 and Solomon v. United States.

C. Impact

The decision crystallizes a practical and consequential rule for federal postconviction litigation in the Sixth Circuit: whenever § 2255 relief results in vacatur of the judgment and entry of an amended judgment, the prisoner’s first § 2255 motion targeting that amended judgment is not “second or successive,” even if the district court implemented relief through a sentence correction rather than a full resentencing.

Likely effects include:

  • Broader access to merits review after partial § 2255 wins: Prisoners who succeed on one count (e.g., Davis-based § 924(c) vacaturs) may bring a subsequent § 2255 motion attacking remaining counts without clearing § 2255(h)’s demanding gatekeeping—so long as the new motion is the first to challenge the amended judgment.
  • Reduced litigation over remedy form: By deeming “correction vs. resentencing” irrelevant to the new-judgment question, the court narrows an argument that could otherwise create inconsistent results depending on how the district court structures relief.
  • Clearer boundary with sentence-reduction proceedings: The citation to Freeman v. Wainwright signals that parties should not assume every sentence modification resets collateral-review opportunities; vacatur and entry of a new judgment remain the key triggers.
  • Strategic consequences for defendants and the government: Defendants may see value in bringing additional claims after an amended judgment issues; the government may respond by emphasizing procedural defenses other than successiveness (e.g., timeliness, default, waiver, merits), now that the “second or successive” bar may not apply.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Second or successive” (term of art): It does not simply mean “filed second.” It means a later collateral attack on the same judgment after the prisoner already had one full opportunity to challenge that judgment.
  • “New judgment” / “intervening judgment”: If a court vacates the old judgment and enters an amended one, the amended judgment is treated as a new, legally operative judgment. A first challenge to it is treated like a first petition.
  • Vacatur and “void ab initio”: Vacating a judgment treats it as though it never happened (per Hewitt v. United States). That matters because the successive-petition bar is keyed to what judgment is currently in force.
  • “Correcting” a sentence vs. “resentencing”: A correction adjusts the sentence without a full resentencing hearing; resentencing typically reopens sentencing proceedings more broadly. This opinion holds that once the judgment is vacated under § 2255(b), the choice between these remedies does not affect whether the amended judgment is “new.”
  • Reassignment on remand: Appellate courts can send a case back to a different judge, but under Sagan v. United States and related cases, it is reserved for exceptional circumstances (not routine delay or disagreement with prior discretionary rulings).

V. Conclusion

In re: Abraham A. Augustin strengthens and clarifies the Sixth Circuit’s judgment-centered approach to § 2255 successiveness. The court holds that when § 2255 relief vacates a judgment and results in an amended judgment—even if the district court merely corrects the sentence—the prisoner’s first § 2255 motion challenging that amended judgment is not “second or successive.” This doctrinal clarification is poised to shape the post-Davis landscape and other partial-vacatur cases by directing courts to focus on the existence of a vacatur-and-replacement judgment, not on the procedural form of the remedial sentencing proceeding.