VA Disability Ratings Are Not Binding on SSA Disability Determinations When Considered and Rejected on Substantial Evidence

I. Introduction

In Steven Thomas Deming v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Social Security disability-insurance benefits to Steven Thomas Deming, a U.S. Air Force veteran with a Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) 100% combined disability rating. Deming argued—proceeding pro se on appeal—that his medical records and VA rating demonstrated disabling physical and mental impairments. The Commissioner defended the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) finding that Deming retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a limited range of light work.

The central issues were (1) whether the ALJ permissibly discounted the VA’s disability determination under Social Security’s distinct standards, and (2) whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s RFC and ultimate nondisability finding under the Social Security Act.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that the ALJ did not err. The court emphasized that a VA disability rating is not binding on the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) and that the ALJ satisfied Eleventh Circuit requirements by explicitly considering the VA rating and explaining why it was unpersuasive in light of the objective medical evidence. Applying deferential substantial-evidence review, the court affirmed the RFC for light work with postural and significant social/cognitive limitations (simple routine tasks; limited workplace changes; occasional interaction with others).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001)
    Cited for the proposition that when the Appeals Council denies review, the court reviews the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision. This frames the posture: the appellate court scrutinizes the ALJ’s written decision, not an independent record-based disability determination.
  • Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2011)
    Anchors the governing standard of review: whether the ALJ applied correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence supports the decision. Winschel also supplies the operative definition of “substantial evidence” and the admonition that the court may not reweigh evidence or substitute judgment for the ALJ—critical to the panel’s rejection of Deming’s invitation to credit his evidence differently.
  • Buckwalter v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2021)
    Reinforces that an ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence even if the evidence could also support the opposite result. This supports affirmance despite conflicting medical opinions in the record.
  • Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005)
    Cited for the claimant’s burden of proving disability. The court uses this to emphasize that pointing to impairments and a VA rating does not, by itself, carry the burden if the SSA record supports functional capacity.
  • Raper v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 89 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 984 (2024)
    Invoked to clarify that the ALJ need not use “magic words” when articulating how medical opinions are evaluated under the post-2017 regulatory framework. This shields the ALJ’s articulation from hypertechnical attacks, focusing review on whether the reasoning is intelligible and supported.
  • Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 2004)
    Used to enforce issue-preservation rules: Deming’s reference to a state-issued disability placard was raised for the first time on appeal and was not considered. The court additionally noted the placard would not change the result given substantial evidence supporting the ALJ.
  • Noble v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 963 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2020)
    The key precedent on inter-agency disability decisions. The panel applied Noble’s two-part principle: an ALJ need not follow a VA disability decision so long as (1) the ALJ’s decision shows the VA decision was considered, and (2) substantial evidence supports departing from it. The court found both conditions satisfied here.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Regulatory separation between VA and SSA disability standards
    The court relied on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504, which provides that another agency’s disability decision “is not binding” on SSA because it is based on different rules. The opinion treats the VA rating as relevant information the ALJ may consider, but not a determinant of SSA disability.
  2. Application of Noble to the VA’s 100% rating
    The panel found the ALJ complied with Noble by expressly acknowledging Deming’s 100% VA rating and explaining that it was not persuasive when compared with the objective medical evidence and treatment history. In other words, the ALJ did not ignore the VA rating; he assessed it and articulated why SSA’s record supported a different functional conclusion.
  3. Post-2017 medical-opinion evaluation rules
    Because Deming’s claim was filed after March 27, 2017, the court highlighted 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, which abolished “controlling weight” and requires evaluation of opinions through factors, chiefly supportability and consistency. The opinion cites Raper v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. to reject any notion that the ALJ had to use formulaic language; the question is whether the ALJ’s reasoning shows consideration of the most important factors.
  4. Substantial evidence supporting the RFC and nondisability finding
    The court pointed to record evidence the ALJ relied on: reports of improvement with conservative care; largely normal physical and mental examinations at “nearly all visits”; increased activity levels (swimming, lifting weights, walking up to four miles); improvement in sleep apnea with CPAP; and a psychiatrist’s note of “significant improvement” in anxiety and sleep-disorder symptoms. Conflicts in the evidence—such as a treating psychiatrist’s more restrictive assessment versus other opinions supporting only moderate limitations—were for the ALJ to resolve.
  5. Appellate restraint under deferential review
    The panel repeatedly returned to the limits imposed by Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.: the court may not reweigh evidence. Deming’s argument effectively asked the court to credit his VA rating and symptom allegations over the ALJ’s synthesis of the longitudinal record. Substantial-evidence review foreclosed that approach.

C. Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision reinforces and operationalizes existing Eleventh Circuit doctrine in several practical ways:

  • Veterans’ VA ratings remain influential but not determinative: Claimants cannot treat a 100% VA rating as a substitute for proving SSA disability. The decisive question remains SSA functional capacity as supported by the medical record and other evidence.
  • Noble compliance is the litigation fulcrum: The key for ALJs is to show the VA decision was considered and to connect the departure to substantial record evidence. For claimants, successful challenges will tend to focus on failures of articulation (ignoring the VA decision) or evidentiary gaps (lack of substantial evidence supporting departure).
  • Post-2017 opinion framework narrows “treating source” leverage: By foregrounding § 404.1520c and Raper, the court signals that treating-source opinions—even from psychiatrists—must win on supportability and consistency, not status.
  • Conservative treatment and improvement narratives matter: The decision illustrates how improvement with treatment, sporadic treatment, and documented activity can substantially support an RFC even amid multiple “severe” impairments.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Substantial evidence”
Not “beyond a reasonable doubt” and not even “more likely than not.” It means enough relevant evidence that a reasonable person could agree with the ALJ. If that threshold is met, the appellate court affirms even if it might have decided differently.
Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)
A practical, work-focused assessment of what a claimant can still do despite impairments (e.g., lifting limits, postural limits, and social/cognitive restrictions). RFC is central at steps four and five of the disability analysis.
Five-step sequential evaluation (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520)
SSA’s required order of decision-making: working or not, severity, listings, RFC/past work, and ability to adjust to other work. Here, the dispute centered on RFC and the downstream conclusion that Deming could do other work within that RFC.
“Severe impairment” vs. “disabled”
An impairment can be “severe” (it significantly limits basic work activities) yet still not result in SSA “disability” if the claimant retains sufficient RFC to perform work available in the national economy.
Why a VA rating doesn’t control SSA
The VA and SSA use different legal standards and methodologies. Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504, SSA is not bound by the VA’s ultimate disability conclusion, though the underlying medical evidence can still be relevant.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed because the ALJ (1) expressly considered Deming’s 100% VA disability rating, (2) explained why SSA’s distinct standards and the objective record supported a different conclusion, and (3) supported the RFC and nondisability determination with substantial evidence, including documented improvement and activity. The case underscores a durable rule for SSA litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: VA disability determinations are not binding, and appellate courts will not reweigh the record where the ALJ’s departure from the VA rating is explained and supported by substantial evidence.