USSG § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B): “In Connection With” Requires Facilitation Findings, Not Mere Proximity

I. Introduction

United States v. Zerion Franklin (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2026) addresses a recurring sentencing problem: when may a theft/fraud defendant receive a firearm-related Guidelines increase based on a gun found near contraband, and what must the district court say on the record to justify it?

Zerion Marcos Franklin, a U.S. Postal Service employee in Fayetteville, North Carolina, was stopped during a traffic stop that led to the discovery of dozens of U.S. Treasury checks (many in the trunk; one altered check in a backpack). In that backpack officers also found marijuana, over $22,000 in cash, and a loaded firearm. Franklin later faced additional stops and a home search, yielding more altered Treasury checks. He pleaded guilty to theft of mail matter by a postal service employee (18 U.S.C. § 1709) and possession of stolen mail (18 U.S.C. § 1708).

The central issue on appeal was whether the district court procedurally erred by applying the two-level firearm enhancement under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B)—which requires possession of a dangerous weapon “in connection with the offense”—without making factual findings that the firearm facilitated (or could have facilitated) either mail-theft or possession of stolen mail.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit vacated Franklin’s sentence and remanded with instructions for resentencing. The court held:

  • For USSG § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B), “in connection with” means the same as in the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of a similar phrase in USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B): the firearm must have “facilitated or had the potential to facilitate” the offense.
  • The district court committed plain procedural error by imposing the enhancement without making “express findings” linking the firearm to either offense.
  • Proximity alone (the gun and a check being in the same backpack) cannot substitute for the required nexus.
  • The error affected substantial rights because the record did not show the court would have imposed the same sentence under a lower, correct Guidelines range; a bare “alternative variant sentence” statement without a cogent explanation was insufficient.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards for sentencing review and correct Guidelines calculation

  • United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005): established appellate “reasonableness” review of sentences; the court uses Booker as the entry point for the procedural/substantive framework.
  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): requires courts to begin by correctly calculating the Guidelines and to explain sentences sufficiently for appellate review, especially variances.
  • United States v. Elboghdady, 117 F.4th 224 (4th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2012): define procedural error (including miscalculation) and frame harmlessness concepts.
  • United States v. Henderson, 159 F.4th 213 (4th Cir. 2025): critical to the holding—failure to object does not relieve the court of its “independent obligation” to calculate the correct range and evaluate enhancements.
  • United States v. Mitchell, 78 F.4th 661 (4th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Hampton, 628 F.3d 654 (4th Cir. 2010): set the de novo/clear-error standard for Guidelines issues and factual findings.

2. Plain error, substantial rights, and correction discretion

  • United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) and United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2020): provide the four-part plain-error test, including the “fairness, integrity or public reputation” prong.
  • Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016) and Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018): support the proposition that Guidelines miscalculations often affect substantial rights because the range anchors the sentencing decision.
  • United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006)): supplies the two-part harmlessness/substantial-rights inquiry used here—same result anyway, and reasonableness anyway.
  • United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985): quoted through Olano for the fourth prong’s integrity-of-proceedings standard.
  • United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2010), United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Maxwell, 285 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 2002): used to define when an error is “plain” (clear or obvious under settled law).

3. Defining “in connection with” by analogy to § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

  • United States v. Blount, 337 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Garnett, 243 F.3d 824 (4th Cir. 2001)): supplies the key definition: “in connection with” is synonymous with “in relation to,” requiring that the weapon “facilitates or has a tendency to facilitate” the offense.
  • Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993): supports the “purpose or effect” formulation.
  • United States v. Bolden, 964 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Mitchell, 78 F.4th 661 (4th Cir. 2023): emphasize that proximity alone is insufficient for drug-possession contexts and require “express findings” linking the gun to facilitation.
  • United States v. Jenkins, 566 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2009): illustrates what adequate findings look like—contextual facts (public street, late night, recent gunfire) supporting protection/emboldening.
  • United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649 (4th Cir. 1997)): supplies the “protection or embolden the actor” formulation.
  • United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2009): the court may not assume the sentencing judge “silently adopted” a party’s arguments in lieu of findings.

4. “Alternative variant sentence” and harmlessness limits

  • United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2014): the opinion distinguishes these cases because, there, the district courts addressed objections and thoroughly explained § 3553(a) reasoning before announcing an alternative sentence.
  • United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2013) and United States v. Peña-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2008): cited to reinforce that an unexplained “same sentence anyway” statement undermines meaningful appellate review.
  • United States v. Montes-Flores, 736 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2013): the appellate court is not “omniscient” and cannot assume identical outcomes absent an adequate record.
  • Simmons, 143 F.4th at 208: cited for the proposition that where the record does not show the district court would have reached the same result, substantial rights are impacted.

5. The dissent’s reliance on “obviousness” from the record

Judge Agee’s dissent invoked United States v. Bolden’s “so obvious from the record” concept to affirm without remand, analogizing stolen Treasury checks to drugs and emphasizing the firearm’s accessibility. The dissent also cited United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2010), United States v. Hampton, 628 F.3d 654 (4th Cir. 2010), United States v. Blount, 337 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Alvarado Perez, 609 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 2010) to argue the gun plausibly protected/emboldened Franklin while transporting highly valuable contraband.

The majority rejected that approach as inconsistent with its own “proximity is not enough” cases and emphasized the need for express district-court findings rather than appellate inference—especially where multiple plausible explanations exist for firearm possession.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Interpretive move: importing a definition. Because § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B) does not define “in connection with,” the court looked to its settled interpretation of the same phrase in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). It held the phrase means “in relation to,” requiring facilitation or potential facilitation (not accident or coincidence).
  2. Application requirement: “express findings.” The court treated the enhancement as fact-dependent. It faulted the district court for adopting the PSR without findings explaining how the firearm facilitated theft of mail or possession of stolen mail.
  3. Rejecting proximity-only reasoning. Although the firearm and one altered check were in the same backpack, the majority deemed that insufficient, relying on Bolden and Mitchell (proximity alone does not establish facilitation in possession contexts).
  4. Independent duty despite no objection. The opinion reinforces Henderson: even when the defendant does not object, the sentencing court must independently verify enhancement applicability and make the findings needed to support it.
  5. Plainness and prejudice. The error was “plain” because Fourth Circuit law requires courts to evaluate whether evidence supports the facilitation nexus and to make individualized assessments. On substantial rights, the panel found no reliable indication the same 48-month sentence would have been imposed under a lower range, and the district court’s conclusory alternative-variant statement lacked the explanation required for meaningful review.

C. Impact

  • Rule for § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B) in the Fourth Circuit. This published decision supplies circuit authority that “in connection with” in § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B) requires facilitation or potential facilitation—aligning theft/fraud firearm analysis with the established § 2K2.1 framework.
  • Record-building obligation. District courts may not rely on PSR conclusions or firearm-check proximity alone; they must articulate facts showing how the firearm furthered or could have furthered the underlying theft/possession conduct.
  • Limits on “alternative variant sentence” boilerplate. The decision signals heightened scrutiny of alternative-variant pronouncements not accompanied by an explanation tethered to § 3553(a), especially when the corrected range would be materially lower.
  • Practical consequence. Sentencing litigation in theft/fraud cases involving weapons will likely focus on concrete facilitation facts (e.g., statements, threats, use for protection during transactions, particular risks, or offense circumstances), not merely contemporaneous possession.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “In connection with” (Guidelines nexus). It is not enough that a gun is nearby. The court requires a functional relationship: the gun must help the crime succeed (or be possessed in a way that could help)—for example, protection, intimidation, or emboldening.
  • “Express findings.” The sentencing judge must state, on the record, what facts show the facilitation nexus. Appellate courts generally cannot fill in missing findings by guessing what the judge meant.
  • Plain error review. When there was no objection at sentencing, reversal requires (1) error, (2) that is clear/obvious, (3) that likely mattered to the outcome, and (4) that undermines the fairness/integrity of judicial proceedings.
  • Harmlessness vs. substantial rights. Both ask whether the same sentence would have occurred anyway. Under plain error, the defendant bears the burden. Here, the court found the record did not show the same sentence would have been imposed under a lower range.
  • “Alternative variant sentence.” A district judge may say: “Even if the Guidelines are wrong, I’d impose the same sentence under § 3553(a).” This case holds that such a statement, without a meaningful explanation, will not reliably cure a Guidelines error.
  • Actual loss vs. intended loss. “Actual loss” is money truly paid out ($3,947). “Intended loss” reflects what the scheme aimed to obtain (over $767,000), driving the Guidelines’ seriousness assessment even if most losses did not materialize.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Zerion Franklin establishes two interlocking procedural safeguards in the Fourth Circuit’s theft/fraud sentencing practice: (1) USSG § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B) requires a facilitation (or potential facilitation) nexus between firearm possession and the offense, and (2) district courts must make express, individualized factual findings to support that nexus—something neither PSR adoption nor proximity alone can supply. The decision also cautions that a conclusory “alternative variant sentence” does not insulate an otherwise prejudicial Guidelines miscalculation from meaningful appellate review.