USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) Large-Capacity Magazine Enhancement Applies Without Knowledge; Lack of Knowledge Is Only Mitigation for § 3553(a)

I. Introduction

Case: United States v. Travis Lee Morgan (Fourth Circuit, May 29, 2026) (unpublished).
Parties: United States of America (Appellee) v. Travis Lee Morgan (Appellant).
Charge: Felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).

The appeal arose from a violent domestic incident in which Morgan—during an argument at his ex-girlfriend’s house—took a firearm (owned by the ex-girlfriend), pointed it at her as she sat in a car, and fired five shots. A key sentencing fact was that the firearm was equipped with a magazine capable of holding 16 rounds. The opinion emphasizes two points Morgan relied on at sentencing and on appeal: he did not own the firearm, and he did not know it had a “large capacity magazine.”

Central issue on appeal: whether the district court’s within-Guidelines sentence was unreasonable because, although the USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) “large capacity magazine” enhancement applied as a matter of guideline mechanics, Morgan argued the court inadequately accounted for his lack of knowledge and ownership when weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Morgan’s 110-month sentence. It held:

  • Procedural reasonableness: The district court properly calculated the Guidelines, including applying USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3). The enhancement contains no intent/knowledge requirement; it applies whenever the qualifying firearm “is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine” and other criteria are met. Morgan conceded the enhancement applied.
  • Substantive reasonableness: The within-Guidelines sentence carried a presumption of reasonableness. Morgan did not rebut it. The district court considered his mitigation arguments (lack of ownership/knowledge; “opportunistic” possession) but permissibly found the aggravated and dangerous nature of firing at an occupied vehicle outweighed those considerations.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Appellate framework for sentencing review

  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): The court relied on Gall for the “deferential abuse-of-discretion” standard and the two-part reasonableness inquiry (procedural and substantive). This anchors the Fourth Circuit’s posture: it is not deciding what sentence it would impose, but whether the district court’s decision falls within the range of permissible choices.
  • United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905 (4th Cir. 2017)): These cases supply the standard of review for components of sentencing—legal conclusions reviewed de novo and factual findings for clear error—within the overarching abuse-of-discretion framework.
  • United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740 (4th Cir. 2019): The opinion cites Ross for what constitutes procedural reasonableness: correct Guidelines calculation, opportunity to argue, consideration of § 3553(a), and an adequate explanation.
  • United States v. Huskey, 90 F.4th 651 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Gall): Used to describe substantive reasonableness review as totality-of-the-circumstances with “due deference” to the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors.
  • United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2014): Provides the presumption that a within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable, rebuttable only by showing unreasonableness against § 3553(a).

2. Interpretation and operation of the large-capacity magazine enhancement

  • United States v. Seuell, 135 F.4th 480 (6th Cir. 2025): The Fourth Circuit invoked Seuell for the proposition that USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) has no knowledge requirement. Even though it is a Sixth Circuit decision, it served as persuasive authority to support a straightforward reading: if the firearm is of the qualifying type, the enhancement applies regardless of the defendant’s awareness.
  • United States v. Holman, 171 F.4th. 303 (4th Cir. 2026): The panel referenced Holman to confirm that “large capacity” is treated as “accept[ing] more than 15 rounds,” relying on Guidelines commentary. Although Morgan did not dispute whether the magazine qualified, Holman provided the definitional backdrop and signaled the Fourth Circuit’s approach to ambiguity in this guideline term.
  • Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019): Mentioned in connection with interpretive questions about deference to agency commentary. The panel noted it had not addressed the meaning of “capable of accepting” after Kisor, but Morgan did not raise that argument, leaving the phrase’s post-Kisor contours unresolved here.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The enhancement is “strict” as to knowledge

The court’s reasoning begins with the guideline text: USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) assigns a base offense level of 22 if the offense involved a semiautomatic firearm “capable of accepting a large capacity magazine” and the defendant has a qualifying prior conviction. The opinion treats the enhancement as conduct- and weapon-characteristic based, not mens rea based. It expressly rejects any implied knowledge requirement, citing United States v. Seuell as support.

Importantly, this does not mean lack of knowledge is irrelevant to sentencing; it means only that lack of knowledge does not defeat the Guidelines calculation. The district court may still consider it as a mitigating circumstance under § 3553(a), but is not obliged to treat it as dispositive.

2. Procedural reasonableness: the court addressed the mitigation argument

Morgan’s appellate framing sought to repackage a mitigation disagreement as error: he argued the district court “failed to account” for the surrounding facts of his possession of a large-capacity-magazine firearm. The panel’s response was that the record showed the district court:

  • allowed argument and allocution;
  • recognized and summarized the “crime of opportunity/spur-of-the-moment” theory;
  • explained why it found Morgan’s actions (taking the gun outside and firing at the car) to be the “most relevant aspect” of the offense’s seriousness;
  • considered criminal history and mitigating background; and
  • tied its rationale to § 3553(a) purposes (danger, deterrence, public protection).

By emphasizing that the district court did not ignore the argument but disagreed with its weight, the Fourth Circuit treated the claim as a classic “weight-of-factors” challenge, reviewed deferentially.

3. Substantive reasonableness: presumption and deference

Because the sentence was within a properly calculated Guidelines range, United States v. Louthian supplied a presumption of substantive reasonableness. Morgan’s burden was therefore to show the sentence was unreasonable measured against § 3553(a). The panel held he could not do so because the district court:

  • explicitly considered the lack-of-ownership and lack-of-knowledge points; but
  • found the dangerousness of shooting at an occupied vehicle—and the broader context of “ongoing criminal conduct”—more compelling.

This reasoning reflects the “due deference” principle from Gall and United States v. Huskey: appellate courts generally do not reweigh § 3553(a) factors absent a clear error of judgment.

C. Impact

Although the opinion is unpublished and “not binding precedent,” its practical influence is threefold:

  1. Guidelines litigation: It reinforces that, in the Fourth Circuit’s view, USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) functions without a knowledge element. Defendants are unlikely to succeed by arguing the enhancement is inapplicable solely because they did not know the magazine capacity or did not personally select/modify the firearm.
  2. Sentencing strategy shifts to § 3553(a): The decision signals that the most viable route for defendants in similar circumstances is a variance argument—contending lack of knowledge/ownership reduces culpability—even if the enhancement technically applies. But it also signals that district courts retain wide discretion to discount that mitigation when the offense conduct is highly dangerous.
  3. Unresolved interpretive questions remain: By noting but not deciding the post-Kisor meaning of “capable of accepting,” the opinion leaves room for future challenges where a defendant contests (a) what “capable” requires, or (b) the extent to which commentary can define key terms—though United States v. Holman indicates the Fourth Circuit has, at least for “large capacity,” accepted the commentary definition as reasonable.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • USSG (Guidelines) “enhancement” / base offense level: The Guidelines assign numbers to offense seriousness. Certain weapon characteristics (like a magazine over 15 rounds) can increase the base level, raising the recommended sentencing range.
  • “Large capacity magazine” under this guideline: As discussed via United States v. Holman, the commentary definition treats “large capacity” as a magazine that can accept more than 15 rounds.
  • No “mens rea” requirement here: Some rules require proof the defendant knew a fact. The court treated § 2K2.1(a)(3) as not requiring knowledge of capacity—so the enhancement can apply even if the defendant was unaware.
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness:
    • Procedural asks: did the court follow the right steps (correct range, consider arguments and § 3553(a), explain)?
    • Substantive asks: is the length of the sentence reasonable given the total circumstances?
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): The sentencing statute listing factors such as seriousness of offense, deterrence, protection of the public, and the defendant’s history and characteristics.
  • Presumption of reasonableness: In the Fourth Circuit, a within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable on appeal; the defendant must show it is still unreasonable in light of § 3553(a).

V. Conclusion

United States v. Morgan affirms a within-Guidelines sentence where the defendant neither owned the firearm nor knew it had a large capacity magazine, emphasizing two core principles: (1) USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) applies based on the firearm’s qualifying characteristics, not on the defendant’s knowledge; and (2) while lack of knowledge and opportunistic possession can be argued under § 3553(a), district courts have broad discretion to find that dangerous, aggravated conduct outweighs those mitigating considerations. Even as an unpublished decision, the opinion provides a clear roadmap for how such arguments are likely to be evaluated in Fourth Circuit sentencing appeals.