Upward Variance Upheld When District Court Adopts Government’s Sentencing Rationale and Provides Reviewable § 3553(c)(2) Reasons

1. Introduction

In United States v. Salim Mohamed Yehya Alsahqani (11th Cir. Sept. 14, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 60-month prison sentence for conspiracy to commit international money laundering. The sentence represented a 48-month upward variance from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range.

The appeal raised two familiar sentencing questions: (1) whether the sentence was procedurally unreasonable (e.g., based on clearly erroneous facts or inadequate explanation), and (2) whether it was substantively unreasonable (e.g., an abuse of discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors). Alsahqani argued that the district court improperly relied on facts from Facebook Messenger communications referenced in the Government’s sentencing memorandum, misapplied offense “nature and circumstances,” and insufficiently explained such a significant variance.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held:

  • Procedural reasonableness: The district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, did not rely on clearly erroneous facts (given FBI agent testimony attesting to the veracity of the Government’s factual proffer), and adequately explained the upward variance both orally and in a written statement of reasons as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).
  • Substantive reasonableness: The 60-month sentence fell within the “ballpark of permissible outcomes,” the district court permissibly gave weight to deterrence, seriousness, history/characteristics, and Guidelines inadequacy, and the sentence was well below the 240-month statutory maximum—an indicator of reasonableness.

The panel also declined to resolve whether plain error or abuse of discretion review applied because the sentence was affirmed even under abuse-of-discretion review.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion is largely an application of established sentencing-review doctrine. Each cited authority performs a specific role in the panel’s framework:

  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007):
    • Supplies the canonical two-part inquiry into procedural and substantive reasonableness and the abuse-of-discretion standard.
    • Defines procedural error examples (including reliance on clearly erroneous facts and inadequate explanation).
    • The court uses Gall to anchor what must be considered (the § 3553(a) factors) and what constitutes error.
  • United States v. Ortiz-Delgado, 451 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 2006):
    • Stands for the proposition that a district court need not “tick through” each § 3553(a) factor individually in its oral explanation, so long as the record reflects consideration.
    • This case supports rejecting Alsahqani’s “not enough explanation” argument where the court referenced the PSI, memoranda, Guidelines, and § 3553(a).
  • United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2007):
    • Used for the idea that the record can show adequate consideration where the judge hears mitigation and states that § 3553(a) was considered.
    • Helps the panel treat the sentencing hearing as a holistic record rather than requiring formulaic recitations.
  • Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007):
    • Establishes that appellate courts may glean reasoning from “context and the parties’ prior arguments.”
    • Central here: the district court said it varied upward “essentially for the reasons” in the Government’s submission—Rita permits that mode of explanation.
  • United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc):
    • Supplies multiple governing principles: no duty to explain in “great detail,” the substantive unreasonableness abuse-of-discretion test, and the requirement that major variances demand “more significant justification.”
    • The panel uses Irey both to validate the level of explanation and to evaluate the magnitude of the variance.
  • United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2007) and United States v. Newman, 614 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2010):
    • Define the “clearly erroneous” standard and require “reliable and specific evidence” rather than speculation for factfinding.
    • The panel invokes these cases to reject the claim that the district court clearly erred by considering Facebook Messenger firearm-related communications, emphasizing that an FBI agent attested to the factual material’s veracity.
  • United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024):
    • Interprets § 3553(c)’s oral/written statement requirement as primarily enabling a meaningful appeal.
    • The panel uses Steiger to frame the sufficiency inquiry: whether reasons are adequate for appellate review, not whether they are extensive.
  • United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022):
    • Emphasizes deference (“ballpark of permissible outcomes”) and the district court’s discretion in weighting § 3553(a) factors.
    • Key to rejecting Alsahqani’s invitation for the appellate court to reweigh mitigation (e.g., limited responsibility for the $15,000 transactions).
  • United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2012):
    • Requires that justification be “compelling enough” to support the degree of variance.
    • The panel cites Early to conclude the district court gave adequate reasons for a major upward variance.
  • United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2018):
    • Allocates the burden: the challenger must prove unreasonableness based on the record and § 3553(a).
    • The panel uses this to underscore that Alsahqani did not carry that burden.
  • United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008):
    • Treat a sentence “well below” the statutory maximum as an indicator of reasonableness.
    • Here, 60 months versus a 240-month maximum supported affirmance.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Procedural reasonableness

  • Consideration of § 3553(a): The district court stated it considered “all the information” including the PSI, sentencing memorandum, Guidelines, and § 3553(a). It also identified specific factors it relied upon (nature/circumstances, history/characteristics, seriousness, deterrence). Under Gall v. United States, United States v. Ortiz-Delgado, and United States v. Turner, this sufficed.
  • Adoption of Government reasoning: The court’s statement that the Guidelines were insufficient “essentially for the reasons” in the Government’s submission is treated as a legitimate explanatory method. Rita v. United States permits appellate courts to read the explanation in light of context and party submissions.
  • Clearly erroneous facts: Alsahqani challenged reliance on firearm-sale-related Facebook Messenger communications referenced by the Government. The panel held there was no clear error because an FBI agent testified to the veracity of the sentencing memorandum’s factual material. Under United States v. Robertson and United States v. Newman, that provided “reliable and specific evidence,” not speculation.
  • § 3553(c)(2) compliance: Because the variance was outside the Guidelines, the district court needed to provide reasons with specificity in open court and in a written statement of reasons. The panel found both were done. Relying on United States v. Steiger, it framed sufficiency as whether the explanation enabled meaningful appeal, not whether it contained extensive detail; United States v. Irey reinforced that “great detail” is not required.

Substantive reasonableness

  • Deference and weighting: Under United States v. Butler and United States v. Irey, the district court may weigh deterrence, seriousness, and the defendant’s characteristics more heavily than mitigation. The panel specifically noted Alsahqani’s mitigation argument (limited responsibility for the $15,000) but held the judge could weigh other factors more.
  • Justifying a major variance: Because a 48-month increase is significant, United States v. Early and United States v. Irey require a more significant justification. The panel found that justification in the court’s identified factors and its conclusion that the Guidelines range was inadequate.
  • Statutory maximum as a reasonableness signal: The sentence’s distance from the 240-month maximum reinforced reasonableness under United States v. Goldman and United States v. Gonzalez.
  • Burden on appellant: Citing United States v. Shabazz, the panel emphasized that Alsahqani had not shown the sentence fell outside permissible outcomes or was driven by improper considerations.

3.3. Impact

Although designated “Not for Publication” (and therefore not binding precedent in the same way as published Eleventh Circuit opinions), the decision is instructive in several practical respects:

  • Variance explanations can be concise yet sufficient: Sentencing judges may satisfy § 3553(c)(2) without extensive narrative, so long as the record allows meaningful review—especially where the court adopts a party’s written sentencing rationale.
  • “Context” matters on appeal: By leaning on Rita v. United States, the opinion reinforces that appellate review may incorporate the Government’s (or defendant’s) sentencing filings when the judge expressly adopts them.
  • Reliability of contested facts at sentencing: The opinion illustrates how live testimony (here, an FBI agent attesting to factual accuracy) can defeat “clearly erroneous” challenges to disputed sentencing assertions, particularly where the dispute is framed as “speculation” versus “reliable and specific evidence.”
  • Room for substantial upward variances: The case reiterates the Eleventh Circuit’s deferential stance toward sentencing discretion, provided the district court ties the variance to § 3553(a) and articulates why the Guidelines are inadequate in the particular case.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness asks whether the judge followed the right process (considered § 3553(a), relied on accurate facts, adequately explained the sentence). Substantive reasonableness asks whether the sentence length is within a permissible range given the facts and § 3553(a).
  • Upward variance: A sentence above the advisory Guidelines range based on § 3553(a) considerations (distinct from a “departure,” which is a Guidelines-authorized adjustment).
  • “Clearly erroneous” facts: A high bar for reversal: the appellant must show the factual finding lacks substantial evidentiary support. At sentencing, courts may consider a wide range of information, but it must be reliable and specific—not speculation.
  • PSI (Presentence Investigation Report): A report prepared for sentencing that typically includes offense conduct, criminal history, Guidelines calculations, and background information.
  • § 3553(c)(2) requirement: When sentencing outside the Guidelines range, the judge must state reasons in open court and in a written statement of reasons to ensure transparency and enable appeal.
  • Statutory maximum: The highest prison term allowed by statute for the offense of conviction; a sentence well below it is often treated as a sign (not a guarantee) of reasonableness.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Salim Mohamed Yehya Alsahqani reaffirms that a substantial upward variance can withstand appellate review when the district court: (1) links the sentence to concrete § 3553(a) considerations (seriousness, deterrence, nature/circumstances, history/characteristics), (2) avoids reliance on unsupported or speculative facts (here supported by agent testimony), and (3) provides an explanation—oral and written—sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review, even if the court’s reasoning substantially adopts the Government’s submission.