Upward Variance May Rest on § 3553(a) Factors Despite a Rejected Guideline Enhancement; “Coincidental” Alignment with the Rejected Range Does Not Show Reliance on Improper Facts

I. Introduction

In United States v. Coroy Dontavia Flournoy (11th Cir. Mar. 3, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed both (1) a felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (2) a sentence that varied upward from the recalculated advisory Guidelines range after the district court removed a contested enhancement.

The case arose from state allegations that Flournoy, a convicted felon, forcibly entered his ex-girlfriend’s home and possessed a firearm with an extended magazine. After his arrest, a search of his mother’s home uncovered multiple firearms and ammunition, and analysts found his DNA on one firearm with an extended magazine. Later deposition testimony by the ex-girlfriend and the couple’s son contradicted the original police account. State charges were dismissed (though a probation-violation proceeding continued), and the federal government then charged Flournoy with being a felon in possession, alleging the offense occurred “on or about February 21, 2023.” Flournoy pleaded guilty.

On appeal, Flournoy raised two principal issues: (a) whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment; and (b) whether his 41-month sentence—an upward variance from an advisory range of 27–33 months—was substantively unreasonable, particularly given that the district court had sustained his objection to a four-level “in connection with another felony” enhancement.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Conviction affirmed: The court held § 922(g)(1) constitutional both facially and as applied under existing Eleventh Circuit precedent, rejecting challenges under the Commerce Clause and Second Amendment.
  • Sentence affirmed: The court held the upward variance substantively reasonable. The district court permissibly emphasized the seriousness of the firearm conduct (including the extended magazine), Flournoy’s long criminal history, and the fact he committed the offense while on probation for the same type of crime (felon in possession). The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the inference that the district court secretly relied on the removed enhancement merely because the final sentence fell within the range that the enhancement would have produced.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review and appellate constraints

  • United States v. Clark, 274 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2001): Established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for plain error.
  • United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249 (11th Cir. 2021): Provided the four-part plain-error framework (error; obviousness; effect on substantial rights; effect on the fairness/integrity/public reputation of proceedings).
  • United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008): Restated the Eleventh Circuit’s strict prior-precedent rule: panels must follow prior binding precedent unless overruled by the en banc court or the Supreme Court.
  • United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2009): Clarified that later decisions must be “clearly on point” and “clearly contrary” to abrogate prior precedent; merely “weakening” is insufficient.
  • Edwards v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 97 F.4th 725 (11th Cir. 2024), and Del Castillo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Health, 26 F.4th 1214 (11th Cir. 2022): Quoted for the demanding standard to escape prior panel precedent (new authority must “demolish and eviscerate” the earlier decision’s “fundamental props”).

2. Commerce Clause constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)

  • United States v. Longoria, 874 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2017): Held § 922(g) is facially constitutional under the Commerce Clause. This foreclosed Flournoy’s facial attack.
  • United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010): Explained the “minimal nexus” requirement for as-applied challenges: the government satisfies it by showing the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

3. Second Amendment constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)

  • United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024): Quoted for the proposition that prohibitions on possession of firearms by felons are “presumptively lawful.”
  • United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010): Held § 922(g) does not violate the Second Amendment; cited as binding authority that bars both facial and motive-based attacks in this circuit.
  • United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025): Held that Rozier remains good law after Rahimi, reinforcing that Eleventh Circuit panels must continue to reject Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1).

4. Substantive reasonableness, variances, and permissible sentencing considerations

  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Set the abuse-of-discretion standard for substantive reasonableness and required that the variance justification be “sufficiently compelling,” while rejecting rigid rules (no “extraordinary justification” requirement).
  • United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2018): Emphasized “due deference” to the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors.
  • United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009): Confirmed deference to a district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance.
  • United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610 (11th Cir. 2015): Allowed upward variances based on criminal conduct already factored into the Guidelines; central to rejecting Flournoy’s claim that the district court relied on “double-counted” factors.
  • United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010): Provided the formulation for substantive unreasonableness (failure to consider relevant factors, reliance on improper factors, or clear error of judgment).
  • United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Recognized that district courts may give greater weight to § 3553(a) factors than to the Guidelines range, and may attach great weight to one factor over others.
  • United States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2006): A sentence is not unreasonable merely because it exceeds what a party requests.

5. Inferring reliance on improper material

  • United States v. Masri, 547 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1977): The court relied on Masri to reject speculation that the district court considered improper information simply because the sentence aligned with a recommendation the court said it would not follow—calling that alignment a “coincidence” and refusing to “import such an evil design.”
  • Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981): Explained why Masri (a pre-1981 Fifth Circuit case) is binding in the Eleventh Circuit.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)

The panel treated Flournoy’s constitutional challenges as foreclosed by binding precedent. On the Commerce Clause issue, United States v. Longoria foreclosed a facial challenge, and United States v. Wright supplied the “minimal nexus” test for an as-applied challenge. Flournoy’s admission that the firearm was manufactured outside Florida satisfied that test.

On the Second Amendment issue, the panel relied on United States v. Rozier and United States v. Dubois, with United States v. Rahimi reinforcing that felon-dispossession laws remain “presumptively lawful.” Given the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-precedent rule (United States v. Archer) and its strict abrogation standard (United States v. Kaley; Edwards v. U.S. Att’y Gen.; Del Castillo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Health), the panel concluded there was no error—plain or otherwise—in the conviction.

2. Substantive reasonableness of the upward variance

The Guidelines range dropped to 27–33 months after the district court sustained objections and removed the four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony.” Nonetheless, the district court imposed 41 months (a variance upward), consecutive to any state sentence for the probation violation.

Applying Gall v. United States and Eleventh Circuit variance jurisprudence (United States v. Shabazz; United States v. Shaw; United States v. Rosales-Bruno), the panel held that the district court’s explanation tied to proper § 3553(a) considerations:

  • Nature and circumstances / seriousness: possession of a firearm with an extended magazine was deemed “extremely serious,” “concerning and problematic.”
  • History and characteristics: a criminal history dating back to 2002.
  • Deterrence and recidivism: commission of the instant felon-in-possession offense while on probation for the same conduct.
  • Other conduct as history/characteristics: concern about Flournoy having kicked in the door of his residence, treated as contextual information rather than an element of the federal offense.

The panel rejected the argument that the district court could not rely on factors already incorporated into the Guidelines. Citing United States v. Johnson, it reiterated that a sentencing court may vary upward based on criminal conduct already considered in the advisory range.

Finally, the panel addressed a recurring appellate claim: that the district court must have implicitly relied on the removed enhancement because the imposed sentence matched what the range would have been with the enhancement. Invoking United States v. Masri, the panel refused to presume bad faith or hidden reliance where the district court expressly stated it was not sentencing Flournoy for the disputed conduct. The numerical overlap was treated as insufficient—standing alone—to establish reliance on improper facts.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision reflects and reinforces several durable Eleventh Circuit themes likely to shape future sentencing disputes:

  • Variance resilience after Guideline corrections: Even when an enhancement is removed (here, due to evidentiary weakness), the district court may still impose an above-range sentence if it anchors the decision in § 3553(a) factors and provides a reasoned explanation.
  • Numerical “overlap” is not proof of improper reliance: A sentence falling within a hypothetical, enhancement-included range does not, without more, demonstrate that the court relied on the enhancement’s factual predicate—especially where the court disavows doing so.
  • Continued foreclosure of § 922(g)(1) constitutional challenges in the Eleventh Circuit: By reaffirming Longoria, Wright, Rozier, and Dubois, the opinion underscores that most facial/as-applied attacks remain nonstarters absent en banc or Supreme Court change.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge argues a law is invalid in all its applications; an as-applied challenge argues it is unconstitutional in the defendant’s particular circumstances.
  • “Minimal nexus” to interstate commerce: For § 922(g)(1), the government typically meets this by showing the gun crossed state lines at some point (e.g., manufactured out of state, later found in-state).
  • Prior-precedent rule: Eleventh Circuit panels must follow earlier binding panel decisions unless the Supreme Court or the en banc Eleventh Circuit clearly overrules them.
  • Guidelines “enhancement” vs. “variance”: An enhancement changes the advisory Guidelines calculation; a variance is a discretionary departure from that advisory range based on the statutory sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
  • Substantive reasonableness: The appellate court asks whether the sentence is reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and § 3553(a), giving deference to the district court’s weighing of factors.
  • Consecutive sentence: A federal sentence “consecutive” to a state sentence starts after the state sentence ends (rather than running at the same time).

V. Conclusion

United States v. Coroy Dontavia Flournoy affirms two core propositions in Eleventh Circuit practice: (1) § 922(g)(1) remains constitutionally secure in this circuit under binding Commerce Clause and Second Amendment precedent; and (2) a district court may impose an upward variance grounded in § 3553(a)—even after rejecting a contested enhancement—without an appellate court inferring improper reliance merely because the chosen sentence coincides with the range that the enhancement would have produced. The decision highlights the breadth of sentencing discretion where the record reflects an articulated, factor-based rationale and an express disavowal of sentencing on disputed conduct.