Untimely Reconsideration Motions Do Not Toll Appellate Deadlines; Late Rule 59(e) Motions Are Treated as Rule 60(b)

1. Introduction

Reid v. Mello, No. 24-1551-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 2026) (summary order), arises from Cedric Reid’s pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the City of New York, the New York County District Attorney’s Office, and various officials. Reid alleged (i) a jail policy of monitoring detainee phone calls violated his constitutional rights, and (ii) denial of records requests violated New York’s Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”).

The central issues on appeal were procedural rather than merits-based: (1) what orders were properly before the Second Circuit given the timing of Reid’s notice of appeal, (2) whether Reid’s “second reconsideration” motion could reset (toll) the deadline to appeal an earlier order, and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying reconsideration under the standards governing Rule 60(b).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s April 24, 2024 order denying Reid’s second reconsideration motion. The court held that only that second reconsideration order was timely appealed; Reid’s earlier notice-of-appeal deadline as to the February 23, 2024 order had already expired, and Reid’s later-filed reconsideration motion did not reset the appeal clock.

On the merits of the only appealable order, the court found no abuse of discretion: Reid failed to show the “exceptional circumstances” required for Rule 60(b) relief from the prior post-judgment rulings, and the district court had already addressed his asserted evidence and proposed amendments (including futility).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Lora v. O'Heaney, 602 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2010)
    Role in the opinion: Supplies two critical procedural principles used by the panel: (i) the standard of review—denials of reconsideration are reviewed for abuse of discretion; and (ii) an untimely motion for reconsideration is treated as a Rule 60(b) motion. The court relies on Lora to recharacterize Reid’s late-invoked Rule 59(e) motion as one properly analyzed under Rule 60(b).
  • Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 88 F.4th 353 (2d Cir. 2023)
    Role in the opinion: Provides the abuse-of-discretion formulation: affirm unless the ruling rests on an erroneous view of law or clearly erroneous assessment of evidence. This framing narrows appellate intervention and is important because the appeal targeted reconsideration rather than the original dismissal.
  • Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024)
    Role in the opinion: Reinforces pro se construction—courts interpret pro se filings to raise the strongest claims they suggest. The panel signals it applied this leniency, but emphasizes that leniency does not override inflexible filing deadlines or Rule 60(b)’s demanding standard.
  • Glinka v. Maytag Corp., 90 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1996)
    Role in the opinion: Anchors the panel’s application of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi): only certain post-judgment motions filed within the specified window reset the time to appeal. Glinka is used to explain the “reset” mechanism and the importance of the timing requirement.
  • Malek v. Feigenbaum, 116 F.4th 118 (2d Cir. 2024)
    Role in the opinion: Clarifies the character of Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) as a claim-processing rule (waivable) rather than jurisdictional. But the opinion applies Malek’s companion principle: once properly invoked by an opposing party, the rule is “unalterable.” Here, because defendants raised the timeliness point, the court enforced the limitation and confined review to the April 24, 2024 order.
  • Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2008)
    Role in the opinion: Supplies the substantive threshold for Rule 60(b): it is “extraordinary” relief requiring “exceptional circumstances.” This precedent undergirds the panel’s conclusion that Reid’s complaints about a late response, alleged overlooked evidence, and proposed amendments did not justify reopening prior post-judgment determinations.
  • Reid v. City of New York, No. 20-cv-9243, 2022 WL 2967359 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2022)
    Role in the opinion: The underlying dismissal order that set the stage for Reid’s post-judgment efforts. While not directly reviewed here, it provides context: the appellate dispute is about later attempts to revisit that dismissal.
  • Reid v. City of New York, No. 20-cv-9243, 2024 WL 749620 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2024)
    Role in the opinion: The key post-judgment order Reid tried (too late) to appeal. The Second Circuit references it to show the district court already considered the purported “new” evidence (it had been submitted before dismissal) and found amendment futile.
  • Reid v. City of New York, No. 20-cv-9243, 2024 WL 2925516 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2024)
    Role in the opinion: The only order properly before the Second Circuit. The panel affirms this denial of reconsideration.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Appellate scope is dictated by timing.
    The panel first determines what it can review. Because Reid filed his notice of appeal on May 23, 2024, he missed the 30-day deadline to appeal the February 23, 2024 order. That foreclosed review of the denial of his Rule 60(b)(2) motion and motion to amend—unless a qualifying tolling/reset motion under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) was timely filed.
  2. A later reconsideration motion did not reset the time to appeal.
    Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) can reset the appeal deadline if a Rule 59 motion or certain Rule 60 motions are filed within the period allowed for Rule 59 (28 days). Reid’s second reconsideration motion was dated April 3, 2024—more than 28 days after February 23, 2024—so it did not reset the clock. Applying Malek v. Feigenbaum, the rule is waivable but becomes mandatory when the opposing party raises it, which defendants did. Result: review was limited to the April 24, 2024 order.
  3. The “Rule 59(e)” label did not control; the motion was treated as Rule 60(b).
    Although Reid invoked Rule 59(e), it was filed outside Rule 59(e)’s 28-day deadline. Under Lora v. O'Heaney, an untimely reconsideration motion is treated as a Rule 60(b) motion. This matters because Rule 60(b) requires more than ordinary disagreement with the court’s reasoning.
  4. No “exceptional circumstances” justified Rule 60(b) relief.
    The panel applies the Ruotolo standard and finds Reid’s asserted grounds inadequate: (i) even if defendants’ response was late, Reid had no right to file a reply absent the court’s invitation, and the court declined to order one; and (ii) the district court had already addressed Reid’s evidence and proposed amendments, explaining the evidence pre-dated the dismissal decision and amendment would be futile. With no qualifying Rule 60(b) reason shown, denial of reconsideration was not an abuse of discretion.

3.3. Impact

Although explicitly designated a nonprecedential “summary order,” the decision is practically important for litigants and courts because it illustrates how strict timing rules channel appellate review:

  • Procedural triage on appeal: A late notice of appeal can collapse the case to review of only the last post-judgment order, even where the litigant’s arguments target earlier rulings.
  • Limits of serial reconsideration: Multiple rounds of reconsideration do not keep extending appeal deadlines; only specific, timely motions do.
  • Claim-processing rules still bite: After Malek v. Feigenbaum, parties should recognize that some timing rules are waivable—but once invoked, courts will enforce them and narrow the appeal.
  • High bar for Rule 60(b): The decision underscores that Rule 60(b) is not a “second bite” at the apple; it requires exceptional justification, and courts will not reopen judgments simply because a party reiterates prior arguments or reframes already-considered material.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 59(e) (motion to alter or amend judgment)
A post-judgment motion that must be filed within 28 days. If timely, it can (in many circumstances) reset the time to appeal. If filed late, it generally cannot function as a Rule 59(e) motion.
Rule 60(b) (relief from judgment)
A mechanism for extraordinary relief from a final judgment for specific reasons (mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, void judgment, etc.), plus a catchall for “any other reason.” Courts require exceptional circumstances; it is not a routine reconsideration device.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) deadlines and “tolling/resetting”
The notice of appeal is usually due within 30 days in civil cases. Certain timely post-judgment motions can reset that 30-day clock. An untimely motion typically does not.
Claim-processing rule vs. jurisdictional rule
A jurisdictional rule cannot be waived and must be enforced by courts at any time. A claim-processing rule can be waived by the opposing party, but if the opposing party properly raises it, courts must enforce it. Here, defendants raised the timeliness problem, so the limitation applied.
“Abuse of discretion” review
A deferential appellate standard. The appellate court does not decide the issue anew; it asks whether the district court made a legal error or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.
“Futility” of amendment
A court may deny leave to amend if the proposed changes would not cure the legal defects—i.e., even with the new allegations, the claim would still be dismissed.

5. Conclusion

Reid v. Mello is a procedural reaffirmation: (1) only timely post-judgment motions can reset appellate deadlines; (2) an untimely Rule 59(e) reconsideration request is treated as a Rule 60(b) motion; and (3) Rule 60(b) relief demands exceptional circumstances, not reargument. The decision’s practical message is that litigants—especially pro se parties—must carefully track the 28-day and 30-day post-judgment clocks, because missing them can limit appellate review to the denial of reconsideration rather than the underlying merits.