Date: Mar 20, 2026

Unsubstantiated Incompetency Claims Do Not Require Appointed Counsel; Shotgun Pleadings May Be Dismissed Without Prejudice After Repleader Opportunity

1. Introduction

In Curtis Gorham v. Elijah Smiley (11th Cir. Mar. 18, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Northern District of Florida’s dismissal—without prejudice—of a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading.

The appellant, Curtis Gorham, sued a sweeping set of defendants (initially described as “120” unnamed parties and later “100 parties”), including judges, medical providers, hospitals, police departments, and others, alleging broad themes such as conspiracy, malicious prosecution, false arrest, and poisoning, and disputing rulings across multiple Florida state-court matters.

The key issues on appeal were (i) whether the district court erred by declining to appoint counsel for Gorham under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), including based on his assertion of “mental incompetence,” and (ii) whether dismissal for shotgun pleading was an abuse of discretion—an issue Gorham largely did not directly contest in his appellate briefing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Appointment of counsel: The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appointment of counsel. Gorham’s asserted grounds—indigence, alleged mental incompetence (without explanation), and being deemed “vexatious” in state court—did not establish the “exceptional circumstances” required.
Shotgun pleading dismissal: The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the amended complaint as a shotgun pleading, noting Gorham failed to connect specific claims to specific defendants and included conclusory, vague, and immaterial allegations not tied to particular causes of action, contrary to Rules 8 and 10.
Abandonment: Because Gorham did not challenge the shotgun-pleading ruling, the court stated he “arguably abandoned” that issue, independently supporting affirmance.
Without prejudice matters: The district court dismissed without prejudice (rejecting the R&R’s “with prejudice” recommendation), leaving Gorham free to refile a compliant complaint.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Sapuppo v. All- state Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014)

Sapuppo supplies the appellate procedural rule that when an appellant fails to properly challenge one of the grounds supporting the judgment, that ground is deemed abandoned and the judgment is due to be affirmed. Here, the panel invoked Sapuppo to explain that Gorham did not contest the core shotgun-pleading basis for dismissal, making affirmance appropriate on abandonment principles alone.

Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., 487 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2007)

Smith provides the standard of review for denial of appointed counsel in civil cases: abuse of discretion. The panel used Smith to frame the high deference owed to the district court’s decision.

Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999)

Bass states two key propositions: (1) there is no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases, and (2) a court may appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), but only in “exceptional circumstances.” The panel treated Bass as the controlling baseline for Gorham’s argument that counsel was necessary to access the courts.

Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088 (11th Cir. 1990)

Fowler defines “exceptional circumstances” as existing where facts and legal issues are so novel or complex that a trained practitioner is needed. The panel relied on Fowler to hold that Gorham did not identify novelty or complexity warranting appointment; his filings instead remained sprawling and non-specific.

Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018)

Vibe Micro is the central management-of-pleading precedent. It recognizes the district court’s inherent authority to control its docket, including dismissing on shotgun-pleading grounds, and it explains the court should identify defects so the plaintiff can remedy them. The panel applied Vibe Micro to approve dismissal after Gorham was instructed to cure deficiencies yet refiled an amended complaint that still failed to comply.

Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2021)

Barmapov provides a clean definition: a shotgun pleading violates Rule 8(a)(2), Rule 10(b), or both. The panel used Barmapov to anchor the rule-based nature of the dismissal and to underscore that “shotgun pleading” is not merely a stylistic critique but a procedural defect.

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2015)

Weiland catalogues the “approximately four types” of shotgun pleadings. The panel mapped Gorham’s amended complaint onto those categories, emphasizing in particular: (i) conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not connected to any cause of action, and (ii) multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying who did what.

Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2001)

Magluta is cited for the Eleventh Circuit’s repeated condemnation of shotgun pleadings. Its role is reinforcing institutional intolerance for pleadings that obscure claims and defendants’ alleged conduct, justifying dismissal as a routine docket-management tool.

Jackson v. Bank of Am., 898 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2018)

Jackson supports the proposition that district courts should strike and require repleader even if the opposing party does not move to strike. Here, it validated the magistrate judge’s sua sponte intervention during screening to require a compliant amendment.

Woldeab v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2018)

Woldeab highlights that a pro se plaintiff generally should receive at least one opportunity to amend before dismissal with prejudice when a better drafted complaint might state a claim. The district court’s decision to dismiss without prejudice—after allowing amendment and providing guidance—aligned with that remedial approach.

Dynes v. Army Air Force Exch. Serv., 720 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1983)

Dynes is cited for the principle that a dismissal without prejudice is generally not an abuse of discretion. The panel used this to reinforce that Gorham’s ability to refile reduced any claim of undue harshness.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Screening and pleading compliance: Because Gorham proceeded in forma pauperis, the magistrate judge screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and identified pleading and joinder problems. The court emphasized compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (numbered paragraphs; separate counts for clarity).
Failure to cure after instructions: Gorham’s amended complaint again failed to identify defendants with specificity and failed to connect particular legal claims to particular defendants and conduct, instead listing many entities and themes (medical malpractice, personal injury, “42 USC 1983 Civil Rights,” “mass action”) alongside broad grievance narratives. Under Vibe Micro, that failure to correct identified deficiencies supports dismissal.
No exceptional circumstances for counsel: Applying Bass and Fowler, the court reasoned that indigence alone does not justify appointment, and “vexatious” labeling in state court does not itself create exceptional circumstances. As to “mental incompetence,” the court treated it as potentially relevant in principle, but found Gorham provided no basis, explanation, or showing of functional impairment affecting his ability to present his case—so the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining appointment.
Appellate abandonment as an additional basis: The court further noted that because Gorham did not directly challenge the shotgun pleading ruling, Sapuppo supported affirmance on abandonment grounds.

3.3. Impact

Reinforcement of strict pleading discipline in the Eleventh Circuit: Even where a plaintiff asserts many serious-sounding theories (e.g., civil rights, malpractice, conspiracy), courts will require compliance with Rules 8 and 10 and will dismiss pleadings that obscure who is being sued for what.
Clarification on “mental incompetence” assertions in counsel motions: The decision signals that merely stating “incompetence” (without articulating the basis and its effect on litigation capacity) will not satisfy the “exceptional circumstances” threshold under § 1915(e)(1).
Procedural roadmap for district courts: The case exemplifies the preferred sequence: explain defects, allow at least one repleader opportunity, and if deficiencies persist, dismiss—often without prejudice where appropriate—consistent with Vibe Micro and Woldeab.
Appellate briefing consequences: By foregrounding Sapuppo, the panel reiterates that failure to contest an independent ground for judgment is often fatal on appeal, regardless of the appellant’s broader grievances.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Shotgun pleading: A complaint so poorly organized or so vague that the court and defendants cannot tell which factual allegations support which legal claims, and against which defendants. Common problems include conclusory narrative, failure to separate claims into counts, and failure to specify who did what.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (“short and plain statement”): Requires a clear, concise statement showing why the plaintiff is entitled to relief—enough for defendants to understand the claim and respond.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (numbered paragraphs; separate counts): Requires allegations be in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances where practicable, and encourages separate counts for distinct claims to promote clarity.
In forma pauperis screening (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)): When a litigant proceeds without paying filing fees due to indigence, the court may screen the complaint early and dismiss defective pleadings.
Appointment of counsel in civil cases (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)): Courts may request/appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants only in “exceptional circumstances,” typically when issues are unusually complex or the litigant cannot present the case without professional assistance.
Dismissal without prejudice: The case is dismissed but the plaintiff may file again with a corrected complaint; it is not a final determination on the merits of the claims.
Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard: the district court’s decision is upheld unless it was outside the range of reasonable choices.
Abandonment on appeal: If an appellant does not challenge a particular ground that independently supports the judgment, the appellate court may treat that challenge as forfeited and affirm on that basis.

5. Conclusion

Curtis Gorham v. Elijah Smiley underscores two practical rules in Eleventh Circuit practice: (1) courts may dismiss sprawling, non-specific pleadings that fail to comply with Rules 8 and 10—especially after a plaintiff is given guidance and an opportunity to amend—and (2) appointment of counsel under § 1915(e)(1) remains exceptional; conclusory assertions of mental incompetence, without a explained basis and demonstrated litigation impact, do not compel appointment. The opinion also reiterates that appellate success requires directly challenging the dispositive grounds of the district court’s judgment.