Unsubmitted Divorce Judgment Deemed Abandonment of Property Award—Mortgagee Cannot Rely on Unentered Inquest Allocation

1. Introduction

Lewis v Reeves (2025 NY Slip Op 01362 [App Div 2d Dept Mar. 12, 2025]) is a consolidated quiet-title and declaratory-judgment dispute over a residential property whose chain of title and mortgage history became entangled with (i) an alleged forged deed, (ii) a prior divorce inquest in which the court indicated the property would be awarded to one spouse, and (iii) a lender’s attempt to preserve an interest through title-based defenses and an adverse-possession counterclaim.

The principal parties were the plaintiffs (including Roland Lewis) and the defendant mortgagee of record, U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”). The litigation’s procedural posture reflects multiple related actions: the 2013 action seeking to void a deed as forged; the 2016 action seeking to invalidate a mortgage; and an ejection action.

The core issues on appeal and cross-appeal were:

  • whether U.S. Bank was entitled to summary judgment based on a purported divorce-based property award to Lewis’s former wife;
  • whether plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that U.S. Bank had no interest in the property (primarily by proving the 2003 deed was forged);
  • whether U.S. Bank’s affirmative defense premised on the divorce award should be dismissed as a matter of law;
  • whether U.S. Bank’s adverse-possession counterclaim could be summarily dismissed, and whether the 2008 adverse-possession amendments applied.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Department modified the order appealed from in a targeted way: it held that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment dismissing U.S. Bank’s third affirmative defense (that Holliman was awarded the property in the divorce action), because the purported award never ripened into a final divorce judgment and the relief was deemed abandoned under 22 NYCRR 202.48.

Otherwise, the court affirmed:

  • Denial of U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (U.S. Bank failed to prove Holliman actually obtained title via the divorce action).
  • Denial of plaintiffs’ request for a declaration that U.S. Bank has no right or interest in the property (plaintiffs failed to prove forgery on summary judgment, largely due to inadequate authentication of handwriting exemplars and credibility issues from Lewis’s testimony).
  • Denial of plaintiffs’ request to dismiss U.S. Bank’s adverse-possession counterclaim (triable issues existed; pre-2008 adverse-possession law governed because the claimed rights allegedly vested before the amendments).

The court also held that a post-order discovery sanction striking Reeves’s answer (treated as a default) did not render U.S. Bank’s appeal academic and did not collaterally estop U.S. Bank.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Holding)

1) Necessary-party and procedural history anchors

  • Lewis v Holliman, 176 AD3d 1048, 1048-1050: The court relied on its earlier ruling to frame why the prior 2015 order declaring the deed forged could not bind U.S. Bank: U.S. Bank was a necessary party as mortgagee of record, and the earlier judgment was reversed/vacated for nonjoinder. This mattered again when plaintiffs argued the vacated October 2015 order should bar U.S. Bank from disputing forgery; the court rejected that attempt, citing Lewis v Holliman.
  • Lewis v US Bank N.A., 186 AD3d 694, 697-698: The decision supplies context for U.S. Bank’s adverse-possession counterclaim—specifically, that the Second Department had already permitted U.S. Bank to amend to assert it. That history underscored that adverse possession was a live theory in the consolidated actions and not a late-breaking, facially improper claim.

2) Academicness, defaults, and lack of preclusive effect

  • Flushing AV Laundromat, Inc. v Dekao Qu, 229 AD3d 516, 520: Cited for the proposition that the appellate court may take judicial notice of subsequent Supreme Court orders—here, an order striking Reeves’s answer under CPLR 3126(2).
  • Matter of East End Hangars, Inc. v Town of E. Hampton, N.Y., 225 AD3d 861, 864: Used to support the conclusion that a subsequent event does not automatically moot (“render academic”) an appeal.
  • Holt v Holt, 262 AD2d 530, 530: Central to the court’s non-mootness analysis: a judgment against a defaulting defendant lacks collateral-estoppel effect against nondefaulting defendants. This principle prevented plaintiffs from leveraging Reeves’s discovery-default posture to defeat U.S. Bank.
  • Freeport Plaza Realty, LLC v Freeport Moon, Inc., 205 AD3d 685, 686; and Jones v Corley, 35 AD3d 381, 381: These cases establish that striking an answer under CPLR 3126 is equivalent to a default. That equivalence connects directly back to Holt—no collateral estoppel against U.S. Bank.

3) Divorce property dispositions and abandonment under 22 NYCRR 202.48

  • Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][a]: The statutory baseline: the divorce court must determine and dispose of marital/separate property in the final judgment. The Second Department used this to emphasize that an inquest transcript reflecting an intended award is not itself a dispositive transfer of title absent a final judgment.
  • Lola Roberts Beauty Salon, Inc. v Able Motor Cars Corp., 213 AD3d 751, 752; and Bove v Bove, 189 AD3d 1151, 1152: These authorities support the “prevailing party must settle/submit the order or judgment” rule and the consequence of not doing so—abandonment, absent good cause.
  • 22 NYCRR 202.48: Though a rule rather than a case, it is the operative doctrinal lever in this decision. The Second Department treated Holliman’s failure to submit the divorce judgment within the directed time as abandonment of the relief, defeating U.S. Bank’s “divorce award” defense and also defeating U.S. Bank’s attempt to win summary judgment on that theory.
  • Cruz v Pierce, 211 AD3d 807, 808-809: Cited as analogous authority supporting summary dismissal of an affirmative defense where the purported underlying entitlement (here, a divorce award) fails as a matter of law.

4) Proof of forgery at summary judgment (handwriting proof and exemplar authentication)

  • Knight v New York & Presbyterian Hosp., _____ NY3d _____, _____, 2024 NY Slip Op 05870, *3; quoting Banco Popular N. Am. v Victory Taxi Mgt., 1 NY3d 381, 384: The “something more than a bald assertion” rule: conclusory/self-serving statements are insufficient to establish forgery on summary judgment. The court used this to reject plaintiffs’ attempt to win a declaration that U.S. Bank had no interest based on claimed forgery.
  • Riccio v Genworth Fin., 184 AD3d 590, 592: Reinforces the insufficiency of conclusory submissions when a party bears the burden of proving invalidity/forgery.
  • CPLR 4536 and Kanterakis v Minos Realty I, LLC, 151 AD3d 950, 952: The critical evidentiary point: if a handwriting expert relies on exemplars, the proponent must authenticate those exemplars. Because plaintiffs failed to authenticate the exemplars their expert “primarily relied” on, the court held the Supreme Court was not required to consider the expert opinion at all.
  • Smith-Joyner v Barahona, 227 AD3d 924, 926-927; and Margiotta v Rock & Roll Livery, 302 AD2d 500, 501: These cases were used to highlight credibility/triable-issue problems: Lewis’s deposition disavowing signatures on notarized affidavits created factual disputes that preclude summary judgment.

5) Adverse possession: choice of law (pre-2008) and hostility evidence

  • Salzberg v Sena, 204 AD3d 853, 856: The court relied on this to hold the 2008 amendments to adverse possession do not apply where the claimant’s rights allegedly vested pre-amendment.
  • Walling v Przybylo, 7 NY3d 228, 232-233; and Buckheit v Aiken, 232 AD3d 842, 843: These cases supply the traditional, pre-amendment elements requiring clear and convincing evidence: hostile/claim of right, actual, open and notorious, exclusive, continuous.
  • Estate of Becker v Murtagh, 19 NY3d 75, 81-82: Used both for the definition of hostility and for the practical inference of hostility from conduct consistent with an ownership claim (exclusive rent collection, maintenance responsibility, exclusion of the record owner).
  • Green Hills [USA], LLC v Marjam of Rewe St., Inc., 208 AD3d 1156, 1157: Cited to support the conclusion that plaintiffs did not meet their prima facie burden to negate hostility—meaning they could not summarily dismiss the adverse-possession counterclaim.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Why U.S. Bank could not win summary judgment based on the divorce inquest

U.S. Bank attempted to show Holliman obtained ownership through the divorce action, relying on an inquest transcript indicating the court “awarded” the property to her. The Second Department treated this as insufficient as a matter of law because the divorce court’s direction required Holliman to submit a judgment (with the transcript) within 60 days, and the record showed she did not do so and contained no evidence that a final divorce judgment issued.

By tying Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][a] to 22 NYCRR 202.48, the court effectively required a completed procedural act (entry of a final judgment disposing of property) before a purported divorce “award” can be used as a title-conferring fact in later, third-party litigation. The failure to settle/submit constituted abandonment, defeating U.S. Bank’s prima facie case.

2) Why U.S. Bank’s “divorce award” affirmative defense was dismissed

For the same reason U.S. Bank could not win on summary judgment, its third affirmative defense could not stand: it asserted as fact that Holliman was awarded the property during the divorce. With abandonment established under 22 NYCRR 202.48, that defense lacked a legally viable factual predicate and was dismissed on plaintiffs’ cross-motion.

3) Why plaintiffs could not obtain a declaration eliminating U.S. Bank’s interest (forgery proof failures)

Plaintiffs’ theory required showing the 2003 deed was forged (and, by implication, that subsequent interests, including the mortgage, were invalid). The court held plaintiffs did not meet their summary-judgment burden because:

  • Their handwriting expert’s opinion could be disregarded where plaintiffs failed to authenticate the exemplars on which the expert relied (anchored in CPLR 4536 and Kanterakis v Minos Realty I, LLC).
  • Without admissible expert support, plaintiffs were left with Lewis’s “conclusory or self-serving” statements, which are inadequate to prove forgery on summary judgment (per Knight v New York & Presbyterian Hosp. and Banco Popular N. Am. v Victory Taxi Mgt.).
  • Lewis’s own deposition testimony disavowing signatures on notarized affidavits created credibility problems and triable issues of fact (per Smith-Joyner v Barahona and Margiotta v Rock & Roll Livery).

The court also rejected any attempt to use the vacated October 2015 order as a binding determination of forgery against U.S. Bank, relying on Lewis v Holliman.

4) Why plaintiffs could not summarily defeat adverse possession

The court first determined the governing adverse-possession framework: because Reeves’s alleged rights vested prior to the 2008 amendments, the pre-amendment rules applied (per Salzberg v Sena).

Under the pre-amendment standard, hostility can be inferred from facts showing possession adverse to the record owner’s rights. Plaintiffs failed to negate hostility as a matter of law where evidence indicated that after Lewis left (1994/1995):

  • Holliman exclusively collected rental income;
  • Holliman handled repairs;
  • Lewis lacked a key and did not visit without express permission.

Those facts aligned with hostility principles in Estate of Becker v Murtagh, and therefore plaintiffs could not make a prima facie showing warranting dismissal of the adverse-possession counterclaim (also supported by Green Hills [USA], LLC v Marjam of Rewe St., Inc.).

C. Impact

1) Title and mortgage litigation involving divorce proceedings

The decision strengthens a practical rule for real property and lending disputes: a party cannot rely on a divorce inquest transcript or an “intended award” as a substitute for an entered divorce judgment that actually disposes of property. Where a party fails to settle/submit the judgment as directed, abandonment under 22 NYCRR 202.48 can defeat title-based defenses premised on the unentered disposition.

2) Summary-judgment discipline in forgery cases

The court’s approach underscores that forgery claims, even in quiet-title actions, demand admissible, nonconclusory proof. When a handwriting expert is used, litigants should expect strict scrutiny of exemplar authentication; otherwise the expert opinion may be effectively unusable at the dispositive-motion stage.

3) Adverse possession: vesting date remains pivotal

The opinion reiterates that the 2008 amendments are not universally applicable; litigants must focus on when the adverse-possession claim allegedly vested. For older possession histories, the pre-amendment elements and inferences—particularly around hostility—remain outcome-determinative.

4) Defaults and nondefaulting defendants

By linking CPLR 3126 striking orders to default principles and rejecting collateral estoppel against nondefaulting defendants, the decision cautions plaintiffs against assuming that procedural victories against one defendant will automatically narrow issues as to others with independent defenses (notably institutional defendants like mortgagees).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • RPAPL article 15 (quiet title): A lawsuit used to determine who owns real property and to remove “clouds” on title (e.g., allegedly forged deeds, disputed mortgages).
  • Necessary party: Someone whose rights would be affected by the judgment must be joined; otherwise, judgments can be vacated/reversed for nonjoinder (as occurred earlier in this litigation).
  • Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling granted only if there are no material factual disputes. If credibility is in doubt or evidence is inadmissible, summary judgment is typically denied.
  • 22 NYCRR 202.48 “abandonment”: If a court directs a party to submit/settle an order or judgment by a deadline and the party fails to do so, the relief can be deemed abandoned unless good cause is shown. Here, that meant the divorce “award” never became an operative judgment disposing of the property.
  • Collateral estoppel: A doctrine preventing relitigation of an issue already decided. The court emphasized that a determination against a defaulting party generally does not bind a nondefaulting party.
  • CPLR 3126(2) (striking pleadings): A sanction for discovery noncompliance that can strike an answer—treated like a default—which limits preclusive use against other parties.
  • Authentication of handwriting exemplars: If an expert compares signatures, the “known genuine” samples must be proven genuine through admissible proof; otherwise the expert’s comparison rests on an unreliable foundation.
  • Adverse possession (pre-2008): A way to obtain ownership by long-term possession meeting strict elements (hostile, actual, open/notorious, exclusive, continuous) proven by clear and convincing evidence.

5. Conclusion

Lewis v Reeves delivers a targeted but significant clarification for real-property disputes intersecting with matrimonial proceedings: an unentered divorce inquest allocation does not establish ownership where the prevailing party fails to submit the required judgment—such relief is deemed abandoned under 22 NYCRR 202.48. As a result, a mortgagee cannot rely on that incomplete divorce disposition to obtain summary judgment or to sustain an affirmative defense premised on a claimed award.

At the same time, the court reaffirmed demanding evidentiary standards for forgery-based quiet-title relief (including authentication prerequisites for handwriting exemplars) and emphasized that older adverse-possession claims may proceed under pre-2008 law where rights allegedly vested before the statutory amendments. The decision thus operates as both a procedural-warning case (finish the judgment) and an evidentiary-warning case (prove forgery with admissible, well-founded evidence).