Unsafe-Distance High-Velocity Pepper Spray to a Restrained Detainee Violates Clearly Established Fourth Amendment Law

1. Introduction

Sanchez v. Nunemaker (5th Cir. June 23, 2026) arises from a roadside detention in Castroville, Texas. Branden Sanchez, a 17-year-old motorist, sued Medina County Deputy Sheriff Jonathan Bates Nunemaker under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth Amendment excessive force while Sanchez was handcuffed in the back of the deputy’s cruiser.

The central issues on appeal were (1) whether Sanchez plausibly alleged a constitutional violation given the circumstances and incorporated video, and (2) whether the alleged unlawfulness was clearly established such that qualified immunity could not justify dismissal at the pleadings stage.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of Deputy Nunemaker’s motion to dismiss (or for judgment on the pleadings) on qualified-immunity grounds. Accepting Sanchez’s well-pleaded facts (and the incorporated videos) in the light most favorable to Sanchez, the court held Sanchez stated a plausible excessive-force claim where the deputy fired a high-velocity pepper-spray jet from about 3.6 feet—approximately half the manufacturer’s stated minimum safe distance of seven feet—directly into Sanchez’s face, permanently blinding one eye, while Sanchez was handcuffed, seat-belted, and surrounded by multiple officers.

The court further held that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, Sanchez plausibly alleged the force violated clearly established law, relying primarily on Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2013), and distinguishing Brothers v. Zoss, 837 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 2016), and Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 1998).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116 (5th Cir. 1996)
    Provided the standard of review: denial of the qualified-immunity-based motion is reviewed de novo.
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
    Anchored the pleading requirement: the complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face. The court used this framework to assess whether Sanchez’s allegations, taken as true, plausibly described objectively unreasonable force.
  • Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159 (5th Cir. 2021) and Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
    Governed how the court treats videos incorporated into pleadings: the court views evidence in the plaintiff’s favor, but will credit video over allegations if the video blatantly contradicts them. This is significant because excessive-force cases often turn on recordings; here, the panel treated the videos as consistent with Sanchez’s pleaded account for purposes of dismissal.
  • McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2017)
    Heightened the practical pleading burden in qualified-immunity motions: the plaintiff must plead specific facts both (i) supporting liability and (ii) defeating qualified immunity with comparable specificity. The court concluded Sanchez met that burden by alleging the close-range, high-velocity facial deployment and the restraint conditions.
  • Surratt v. McClarin, 851 F.3d 389 (5th Cir. 2017)
    Reiterated § 1983’s function as a vehicle to seek redress for constitutional deprivations by state actors.
  • Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
    Supplied the governing excessive-force standard: objective reasonableness under the totality of circumstances, focusing on (1) severity of the crime, (2) immediate threat, and (3) active resistance/flight. The court treated “immediate threat” and the degree of resistance as dispositive given Sanchez’s restrained condition.
  • Estate of Parker v. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 140 F.4th 226 (5th Cir. 2025)
    Restated the two elements of a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim: a seizure and unreasonable force. Because injury from pepper spray was undisputed, the case turned on unreasonableness.
  • Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 2009)
    Discussed the deadly-force lens (threat of serious harm). The panel noted Sanchez’s “deadly force” characterization but did not decide it, holding qualified immunity failed even if the spray was not deadly force.
  • Jones v. Lowndes County, 678 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2012) and Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278 (5th Cir. 2022)
    Framed “clearly established law”: whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer the conduct was unlawful, and how a plaintiff can show notice through sufficiently similar precedent.
  • Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2013)
    The court’s principal “clearly established” comparator: it was unconstitutional to use a taser on a suspect including once he was handcuffed, on the ground, and surrounded by officers; minimal resistance (“pulling his arm away”) did not create an immediate threat. The panel treated Ramirez as placing reasonable officers on notice that deploying significant force against a restrained, outnumbered suspect who is not an immediate threat is unlawful—here applied to a high-velocity pepper-spray jet at unsafe distance into the face/eye.
  • Brothers v. Zoss, 837 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 2016)
    Cited by Nunemaker to justify the force as “moderate” and escalatory. The panel distinguished it because the suspect in Brothers was still in an elevated truck with potential access to a weapon or ability to drive into officers—whereas Sanchez was already removed, handcuffed, seat-belted, and unarmed, presenting at most a risk to the cruiser.
  • Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 1998)
    Also distinguished: pepper spray used to quell a volatile bus disturbance involving 19 inmates near an armory (escape/firearm risk) differed dramatically from a controlled scene with five officers and one restrained detainee. The level/manner of force also differed: Baldwin involved spraying down the middle of a bus, not close-range facial/eye deployment.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Constitutional violation (objective reasonableness): Applying Graham v. Connor, the court weighed the seriousness of the suspected crimes against the immediate circumstances at the moment of force. While the suspected offenses were severe (reported stolen vehicle tied to aggravated robbery; discovery of drugs and a pellet gun), the panel emphasized that severity alone does not justify escalating to severe force when the detainee is restrained and not an immediate threat.

The court treated the following pleaded facts as central: Sanchez was physically slight, 17 years old, handcuffed, seat-belted, and surrounded by five officers. He was disruptive—yelling, kicking, and not sitting as ordered—but he was not attempting to flee and repeatedly demanded to be taken to jail. On those facts, firing a high-velocity pepper-spray jet from half the manufacturer’s minimum safe distance directly at the face/eye was plausibly disproportionate and unreasonable.

(b) Clearly established law (qualified immunity): The panel did not require a prior case involving the same brand device or the same injury mechanism. Instead, it asked whether existing precedent put reasonable officers on notice that the type and degree of force used against a restrained, outnumbered, nonthreatening suspect was unlawful. It held Ramirez v. Martinez provided that notice: significant force (tasing) after restraint and control is unconstitutional absent an immediate threat.

The opinion also signals that manufacturer safety guidance—here, a minimum safe deployment distance—matters to the constitutional “quantum of force” analysis. By crediting the pleaded distance differential (3.6 feet vs. a stated safe seven feet) and the resulting permanent injury, the court treated unsafe-range facial deployment as a meaningful aggravator, not a minor detail.

3.3 Impact

  • Operational constraints on “less-lethal” weapons: The decision reinforces that pepper spray (and especially high-velocity delivery systems) can constitute constitutionally excessive force when used at close range against a fully restrained detainee, even if the detainee is disruptive.
  • Device instructions as reasonableness evidence: By focusing on the manufacturer’s minimum safe distance, the opinion encourages litigants and courts to treat training materials and product guidance as relevant to whether force was excessive and to the foreseeability of severe injury.
  • Strengthening notice through analogy: The panel’s reliance on Ramirez v. Martinez indicates that clearly established law may be shown through functional similarity (significant force used on a restrained person absent immediate threat), not only through weapon-identical precedent.
  • Pleading-stage qualified immunity: The case underscores that where the complaint (and incorporated video) plausibly depicts severe, disproportionate force against a controlled suspect, dismissal on qualified-immunity grounds is unlikely—pushing such disputes toward discovery and merits adjudication.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

42 U.S.C. § 1983
A statute allowing individuals to sue state or local officials for violating federal constitutional rights.
Fourth Amendment excessive force
When police use more force than is objectively reasonable under the circumstances during a seizure (like an arrest or detention). Courts apply the Graham v. Connor factors and evaluate the totality of the circumstances.
Qualified immunity
A doctrine shielding officials from damages unless (1) they violated the Constitution and (2) the unlawfulness was clearly established at the time. “Clearly established” means a reasonable officer would have known the conduct was unlawful in that situation.
Rule 12(b)(6) / “plausibility”
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court does not decide who ultimately wins; it decides whether the complaint plausibly alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle the plaintiff to relief.
Video evidence at the pleadings stage
If a video incorporated into the complaint flatly contradicts the plaintiff’s account, courts may rely on the video. Otherwise, courts view the facts in the plaintiff’s favor.

5. Conclusion

Sanchez v. Nunemaker stands for a practical and consequential rule in Fourth Amendment litigation: a plaintiff plausibly alleges excessive force—and can defeat qualified immunity at the pleadings stage—by alleging that an officer deployed high-velocity pepper spray at unsafe close range directly into the face/eye of a handcuffed, seat-belted, outnumbered detainee who was disruptive but posed no immediate threat and was not attempting to flee. By grounding “clearly established” notice in Ramirez v. Martinez and distinguishing more dangerous, less-controlled contexts in Brothers v. Zoss and Baldwin v. Stalder, the Fifth Circuit clarifies that “less-lethal” tools can become constitutionally excessive when used in a manner and circumstance that foreseeably inflicts grave injury on an already-controlled person.