Unpublished Fifth Circuit: Under Lindke, a Legislator’s Social-Media Blocking Is Not “State Action” Absent Written Law or Force-of-Law Custom Authorizing Speech for the State

I. Introduction

Case: Detiege v. Jackson, No. 25-30514 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2026) (per curiam) (not designated for publication).
Parties: Maya Detiege and Dayne Sherman (Plaintiffs–Appellants) vs. Louisiana State Senator Katrina R. Jackson (Defendant–Appellee).
Core dispute: Whether Senator Jackson’s decision to block Twitter (X) users after contentious exchanges constituted action “under color of state law” so as to trigger First Amendment constraints enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The appeal centered on the threshold element of a § 1983 claim: state action. Plaintiffs argued that Jackson’s use of a public Twitter account—mixing personal posts with legislative updates—made her blocking decisions attributable to the State. The district court rejected that premise at summary judgment, holding Plaintiffs failed to show state action. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, applying the Supreme Court’s modern framework for public-official social-media conduct.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Senator Jackson because Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first prong of Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187 (2024): they did not identify any “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” granting Jackson actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf via Twitter when engaging the public about legislative issues. Without such authority, her blocking could not be “traceable to the State’s power or authority,” and thus was not state action under § 1983.

Procedurally, the court dismissed Sherman from the appeal because he acknowledged being unblocked and joined the action only after that; the opinion then addressed only Detiege’s claim arising from a 2022 exchange following Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187 (2024)
    Role in the opinion: This is the controlling test for when “a public official’s social-media activity constitutes state action under § 1983.” The Fifth Circuit treated Lindke as dispositive and “begin[s] and end[s]” with its first step: whether the official has actual authority, rooted in written law or force-of-law custom, to speak for the State on the topic at issue.
  • Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)
    Role in the opinion: Cited via Lindke to define “custom” and “usage” for § 1983 purposes: “persistent practices of state officials” that are “so permanent and well settled” they carry “the force of law.” The Fifth Circuit used this definition to reject Plaintiffs’ reliance on widespread (but legally unanchored) legislative communication practices.
  • Garnier v. O'Connor-Ratcliff, 136 F.4 th 1181 (9th Cir. 2025)
    Role in the opinion: Offered as a contrast case where Lindke step one was satisfied because there was written law (a state statute and school board bylaws) authorizing official announcements. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that Plaintiffs cited “no analogous written law” for Louisiana state senators here.
  • Williams v. United States, 71 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 1995)
    Role in the opinion: Plaintiffs invoked general legislative “duties” to inform the public. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged Williams for the proposition that legislative duties can include informing constituents and the public. But it limited Williams to its context (scope-of-employment analysis) and held that acting within “scope of employment” is not the same as having Lindke-type authority to speak “on the State’s behalf.”
  • First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 555 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2009) and Discover Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc., 73 F.4th 322 (5th Cir. 2023)
    Role in the opinion: These cases supply the standard of review and summary judgment framework (de novo review; no genuine dispute of material fact; entitlement to judgment as a matter of law).
  • Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022)
    Role in the opinion: Provides factual context for the Detiege–Jackson exchange, not a governing legal rule for the state-action issue.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. The court frames the dispositive question as state action under § 1983.
    Detiege sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires that the deprivation of a federal right be committed “under color of” state law. The court treats this as a gatekeeping issue: without state action, the First Amendment claim cannot proceed.
  2. The court applies Lindke and stops at step one (actual authority).
    Under Lindke, social-media conduct is state action “only if the official (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when she spoke on social media.” The Fifth Circuit resolves the case solely on step one, holding Plaintiffs never established the prerequisite authority.
  3. “Looks official” is not enough; authority must be “traceable to the State’s power.”
    The court adopts Lindke’s warning that “private action—no matter how ‘official’ it looks—lacks the necessary lineage” if it is not grounded in state-conferred authority. The mixed personal/official content of Jackson’s account and her status as a senator do not substitute for an actual delegation to speak for the State.
  4. No written law grants an individual Louisiana senator authority to speak for the State via Twitter.
    Plaintiffs cited Louisiana constitutional provisions recognizing legislative power (e.g., proposing, debating, voting) and duties of faithful discharge, plus Senate rules requiring committees to provide public information and solicit input. The court held these sources do not authorize an individual senator to “speak on behalf of the state when engaging the public on legislative issues.”
  5. No “custom or usage” with force of law was shown.
    Plaintiffs pointed to a “long and well-established history” of legislators informing the public, including social-media posts by various legislators. The court rejected this as insufficient under Adickes/Lindke, because common practice is not necessarily a “persistent practice” that is “so permanent and well settled” as to carry “the force of law,” nor did it demonstrate that legislators “purported to speak on [the State’s] behalf.”
  6. The court distinguishes “scope of employment” from speaking “on the State’s behalf.”
    Relying on Williams v. United States, the court accepts that informing the public may fall within a legislator’s job in a general sense. But it emphasizes Lindke’s narrower inquiry: whether “making official announcements is actually part of the job that the State entrusted the official to do.” In other words, the fact that speech is job-related does not itself make it sovereign speech attributable to the State.
  7. Institutional context matters: the legislature acts as a body.
    The court notes the Louisiana legislature “acts as a body,” and an individual legislator cannot take official legislative action alone. While the panel carefully declines to hold that legislators can never speak for the State individually, it treats this institutional reality as reinforcing the need for a specific delegation (written law or force-of-law custom) before attributing personal social-media choices to the State.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision illustrates a rigorous, defendant-protective application of Lindke in the legislative context:

  • Higher pleading/proof burden for plaintiffs suing legislators over social-media blocking. Plaintiffs must do more than show the account mixes official content with personal use or that the official routinely engages constituents. They must identify a concrete source—statute, ordinance, regulation, or force-of-law custom/usage—granting authority to speak for the State in that context.
  • Common political practice ≠ “custom” with force of law. The opinion narrows the set of “custom or usage” arguments likely to succeed: widespread habits of officeholders posting updates, by themselves, may not satisfy Adickes/Lindke absent evidence the State has adopted or entrenched the practice as effectively lawlike authorization.
  • Legislative defendants may emphasize “collective-body” structure. Future suits against legislators may face additional headwinds where courts view individual statements as political communication rather than state-delegated “official announcements,” unless plaintiffs can tie speech authority to formal legislative rules, bylaws, or statutory schemes (as in Garnier v. O'Connor-Ratcliff).
  • Litigation strategy consequence: focus discovery on formal authorizations. Post-Lindke, successful plaintiffs will likely need targeted evidence—official social-media policies, legislative communications offices’ mandates, formally delegated spokesperson roles, committee rules empowering individual members to make official announcements, or documented, binding practices treated as mandatory by the institution.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“under color of state law”)
A statute allowing lawsuits against persons who, using state authority, violate federal rights. If the defendant acted as a private person rather than wielding state power, § 1983 does not apply.
State action
The requirement that the challenged conduct be attributable to the State. Many constitutional limits (including the First Amendment) constrain government actors, not private individuals.
Lindke’s two-step test
(1) Did the official have actual authority (from written law or force-of-law custom) to speak for the State on that subject? (2) Did the official purport to use that authority in the social-media activity? Failing step one ends the case.
“Custom” and “usage” with “the force of law”
Longstanding, persistent practices that are so entrenched they function like law. Merely common behavior is not enough; the practice must be effectively binding or institutionally adopted in a lawlike way.
Scope of employment vs. speaking “on the State’s behalf”
An act can be work-related (within one’s job) without being an act undertaken with delegated sovereign authority. Detiege treats Lindke as requiring the latter.
Summary judgment
A procedural ruling entered when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to win as a matter of law—here, because the state-action element failed.

V. Conclusion

Detiege v. Jackson applies Lindke v. Freed to a state legislator’s Twitter blocking decision and holds that, absent a specific delegation of authority (by written law or force-of-law custom/usage) empowering the legislator to speak on the State’s behalf, the conduct is not state action under § 1983. The opinion underscores that “official-looking” social-media accounts, and even work-related public communication, do not automatically become constitutionally constrained governmental action without a legally traceable grant of state authority.