Unpublished Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms: ALJ Need Not Cite Every Record Entry and VA Disability Ratings Are Non-Binding Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504

1. Introduction

In Stephanie Rovegno v. Commissioner of Social Security (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026) (per curiam, not for publication), Stephanie Ann Rovegno, proceeding pro se, appealed the district court’s affirmance of an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ’s) denial of Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). Rovegno alleged disability based primarily on knee osteoarthritis and mental-health conditions (PTSD and depressive disorder), including allegations that her symptoms prevented standing, sitting, walking, focusing, and leaving the house reliably.

The appeal presented three core issues: (1) whether the ALJ failed to review all submitted medical evidence; (2) whether the ALJ failed to consider (or improperly discounted) the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) determination that Rovegno was “100 percent disabled”; and (3) whether the ALJ failed to consider evidence of PTSD. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the ALJ’s review was adequate and that substantial evidence supported the non-disability finding.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court applied its standard Social Security review framework: whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence. Citing Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., the court reiterated that substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla” and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The court rejected each of Rovegno’s claimed errors:

  • Record review: The ALJ stated he considered the “entire record,” discussed and cited many records, and the law does not require discussion of every piece of evidence; thus the ALJ satisfied his duty.
  • VA disability rating: The ALJ did consider the rating and permissibly found it unpersuasive because VA disability determinations are not binding on Social Security under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504.
  • PTSD evidence: The court found the ALJ did not ignore PTSD evidence; the decision cited multiple records documenting PTSD and depressive symptoms, and Rovegno did not identify specific overlooked evidence.

The court also addressed forfeiture: although the Commissioner argued Rovegno forfeited arguments by insufficient citation, the court liberally construed her pro se brief and found she adequately raised a substantial-evidence challenge.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2011)

Role in this opinion: Winschel supplies the governing definition of “substantial evidence” and frames the limited nature of appellate review in Social Security cases. The panel used Winschel to underscore that the question is not whether the claimant can point to contrary evidence, but whether the ALJ’s conclusion is within a reasonable evidentiary range.

Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014)

Role in this opinion: Campbell supports the principle that courts liberally construe pro se pleadings. The panel invoked this to reject the Commissioner’s forfeiture argument, treating Rovegno’s briefing as sufficiently raising a substantial-evidence challenge even if not artfully presented.

Harner v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 38 F.4th 892 (11th Cir. 2022)

Role in this opinion: Harner is cited for forfeiture principles—issues can be forfeited by failing to raise them or failing to cite relevant parts of the record. The panel used Harner as a yardstick but concluded Rovegno cleared the threshold: she referenced the VA rating, her impairments, and the ALJ’s RFC and findings, which the court deemed enough (especially given pro se status).

Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2015)

Role in this opinion: Henry stands for the ALJ’s duty to consider evidence “as a whole.” The panel acknowledged the duty but treated it as compatible with practical decision-writing: the ALJ must consider the whole record, but need not catalogue every document.

Buckwalter v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2021)

Role in this opinion: Buckwalter is cited for the proposition that an ALJ’s decision need not cite every piece of evidence. This citation is central to rejecting Rovegno’s “not all evidence was reviewed” argument: the legal standard focuses on meaningful consideration and adequate explanation, not exhaustive citation.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Standard of review controls outcome: By foregrounding Winschel, the panel emphasized that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence. Once the record contains adequate evidence supporting the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm even if other evidence could support a different result.
  2. “Whole record” consideration vs. “every piece” citation: The panel reconciled Henry and Buckwalter in a practical rule: an ALJ must consider the full record, but is not required to mention every exhibit. Here, the ALJ discussed multiple medical records, claimant reports, consultant opinions, and the vocational evidence, and expressly stated he considered the entire record—sufficient under the cited precedent.
  3. Credibility/consistency assessment grounded in record facts: The ALJ found Rovegno’s symptoms “could be expected” from impairments, but her statements about intensity and limiting effects were only “partially consistent” with the medical evidence. The panel highlighted record facts supporting that assessment: reports of a notably active lifestyle (walking significant distances, attending college, frequent trips to Disney World), refusal/declination of some additional treatments (including mental health consult), and consultant opinions supporting light work capacity.
  4. VA rating evidence properly handled under regulation: The panel did not treat the VA rating as ignored; it emphasized the ALJ “repeatedly cited” it and found it unpersuasive. The regulation 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 was decisive: other agencies’ disability determinations are not binding for SSA purposes. The legal move is important: the ALJ may consider the underlying evidence but need not adopt the other agency’s ultimate conclusion.
  5. PTSD evidence claim fails without specificity and contradicts the decision’s citations: The panel faulted Rovegno for not identifying what PTSD evidence was overlooked and noted the ALJ did cite records reflecting PTSD and depressive symptoms. Given that the ALJ found PTSD/depressive disorder to be “severe” at step two, the decision itself undermined the claim that PTSD was not considered.

C. Impact

Although labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and thus not precedential in the same way as published opinions, the decision is significant as a practical reaffirmation of governing Eleventh Circuit themes likely to recur in DIB litigation:

  • Record-citation disputes: Claimants frequently argue the ALJ “didn’t review everything.” This case reinforces that courts look for a reasoned discussion and an indication of whole-record consideration, not exhaustive citation—especially when the ALJ’s narrative engages with the major categories of evidence.
  • Other-agency disability findings: The opinion reinforces the operational effect of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504: VA ratings may be relevant background but are not binding. Future litigants must focus on medical and functional evidence within the SSA framework rather than the VA’s ultimate rating.
  • Pro se briefing and forfeiture: The panel’s willingness to construe Rovegno’s brief as raising a substantial-evidence challenge illustrates a claimant-friendly application of liberal construction. Practically, this suggests the Eleventh Circuit may reach the merits more often than dismissing pro se appeals on technical briefing grounds—so long as the issues are reasonably identifiable.
  • Functioning evidence matters: The opinion highlights that activities of daily living and treatment decisions (including declining recommended treatment) can materially support an ALJ’s RFC and symptom-consistency findings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial evidence
A deferential evidentiary standard. The court asks whether enough relevant evidence exists that a reasonable person could agree with the ALJ—not whether the court would decide the case the same way.
Five-step sequential evaluation (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a))
The SSA’s ordered decision process: (1) working at substantial gainful activity? (2) severe impairment? (3) meets a listed impairment? (4) can do past relevant work? (5) can do other work in the national economy?
RFC (Residual Functional Capacity)
The most a claimant can still do in a work setting despite impairments. Here, the ALJ found capacity for “simple and unskilled work with routine and repetitive tasks,” and (as to exertion) light work capacity was supported by consultants.
Step two “severe” impairment
A threshold screening: an impairment is “severe” if it significantly limits basic work activities. Importantly, a step-two “severe” finding does not establish disability; it simply moves the analysis forward.
Listings (20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1)
A catalog of medical criteria that, if met or equaled, results in presumptive disability at step three. The ALJ found none of Rovegno’s impairments met a listing.
VA disability rating vs. SSA disability
The VA and SSA use different statutory and regulatory schemes. Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504, SSA is not bound by another agency’s disability conclusion, even if SSA may consider the evidence underlying that conclusion.
Forfeiture on appeal
A party can lose an argument by failing to raise it adequately. Here, the court relied on liberal construction principles for pro se litigants and held Rovegno did not forfeit her substantial-evidence challenge.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits because the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and substantial evidence supported the finding of non-disability. The opinion’s practical takeaways are clear: (1) an ALJ must consider the record as a whole but need not cite every piece of evidence; (2) VA disability ratings are not binding in SSA proceedings under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504, though they may be discussed and weighed; and (3) generalized claims that evidence was ignored—especially without identifying what was omitted—are unlikely to prevail when the ALJ’s decision shows engagement with the relevant medical and functional evidence. In the broader Social Security context, the decision reinforces the deference embedded in substantial-evidence review and the importance of connecting alleged errors to specific, material record omissions or misapplications of law.