Unpaid Leave Can Satisfy the ADA for Disability-Related Training; FMLA Does Not Expand Paid Sick Leave Beyond an Employer’s “Normal” Policy

Introduction

In Andrea Tumbleson v. Lakota Local Sch. Dist. (6th Cir. May 13, 2026), the Sixth Circuit addressed whether a public-school teacher with progressive deafness and blindness (Usher syndrome) could require her employer to treat time off for mandatory guide-dog training as paid sick leave. Andrea Tumbleson, a long-tenured art teacher, sought to use accrued sick leave to attend a three-week training at Leader Dogs for the Blind to obtain a guide dog. Lakota Local School District denied paid sick leave on the ground that the training was not “personal illness” under its sick-leave policy, but it granted unpaid leave as an ADA accommodation. Tumbleson sued, asserting:

  • ADA disparate-treatment discrimination (denial of paid leave allegedly because of disability);
  • ADA failure to accommodate (asserting paid leave was required); and
  • FMLA interference (claiming entitlement to substitute accrued paid sick leave for unpaid FMLA leave).

The district court granted summary judgment to Lakota, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Lakota on all federal claims:

  • ADA disparate treatment: Tumbleson failed to produce evidence that Lakota treated similarly situated non-disabled employees more favorably in comparable sick-leave circumstances.
  • ADA accommodation: Even assuming leave to obtain a guide dog could qualify as work-related accommodation, Lakota’s provision of unpaid leave was a reasonable accommodation; the ADA did not require Tumbleson’s preferred accommodation (paid leave).
  • FMLA substitution of paid leave: The FMLA allows substitution of paid sick leave only when the employer would “normally” provide paid sick leave in that situation. Tumbleson’s appellate argument did not meaningfully rebut the conclusion that guide-dog training was outside “personal illness” under Lakota’s sick-leave policy.

The panel also flagged (without deciding) potentially important interpretive questions about causation under the FMLA (“makes” the employee unable to work) and about the phrase “absence due to personal illness” in the sick-leave policy, noting those theories were not properly developed or were forfeited.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) ADA disparate treatment: what must be shown

  • Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez: The court used Raytheon for the basic definition of disparate treatment—treating someone less favorably “because of” disability. This anchored the court’s insistence that Tumbleson needed evidence that disability was the “basis” of the denial (not merely that the denial burdened a disabled employee).
  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: The opinion applied the classic burden-shifting framework when discrimination is proven by circumstantial evidence: prima facie case, employer’s neutral reason, and pretext.
  • Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC: Cited for how the Sixth Circuit operationalizes burden shifting and, importantly, the panel’s willingness to “jump” to the pretext inquiry once the employer has offered a neutral rationale—an approach that often decides cases where comparator evidence is thin.
  • Rosebrough v. Buckeye Valley High Sch. and Hopkins v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp.: These cases supplied the “similarly situated non-disabled employees” requirement that Tumbleson could not satisfy. The panel emphasized that comparators are not optional when the theory is “you treated me worse than others.”
  • Goldblum v. Univ. of Cincinnati and Miles v. S. Cent. Hum. Res. Agency, Inc.: Used to explain that comparator evidence is relevant not only at the prima facie stage but also at the pretext stage (the ultimate question whether the stated policy reason is a cover for discrimination).
  • Viet v. Le: Supported the proposition that, at summary judgment, a plaintiff must identify specific facts—not general assertions—that comparators exist.

2) “Adverse action” and the shadow of Title VII’s Muldrow standard

  • Talley v. Fam. Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc.: The district court relied on Talley for the “materially adverse change” formulation. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that this may be “open to debate” after the Supreme Court’s recalibration of the standard in Title VII.
  • Muldrow v. City of St. Louis: Muldrow held that Title VII requires “some harm” with respect to an identifiable term or condition, not “significant” harm. The panel noted that because the ADA similarly targets “terms, conditions, and privileges of employment,” other circuits have extended Muldrow to ADA discrimination claims.
  • Scheer v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health Sys., Inc. and Rios v. Centerra Grp. LLC: Cited as examples of courts extending Muldrow to ADA claims.
  • McNeal v. City of Blue Ash: Noted as Sixth Circuit authority relevant by analogy, though the panel did not definitively resolve the adverse-action question here.

Critically, the Sixth Circuit avoided making new law on whether denial of paid leave (offset by unpaid leave) is sufficiently adverse under the ADA post-Muldrow. It decided the case on comparator/pretext grounds instead.

3) ADA failure to accommodate: “reasonable” and employer choice among reasonable options

  • Cooper v. Dolgencorp, LLC and Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc.: Cited for the Sixth Circuit’s accommodation burden-shifting structure: employee must show disability, qualification, and reasonableness of requested accommodation; employer must show essential functions and undue hardship.
  • Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc. and Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc.: Central to the court’s “work-related obstacle” test: a reasonable accommodation must alleviate a barrier to performing essential job functions. If the request is for non-work reasons, it may be unreasonable.
  • Nance v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. and Regan v. Faurecia Auto. Seating, Inc.: Reinforced that burdens existing “outside the work environment” generally do not require workplace accommodation.
  • Trepka v. Bd. of Educ. of the Cleveland City Sch. Dist., Keever v. City of Middletown, Smith v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., and Hankins v. The Gap, Inc.: These cases supplied the key doctrinal lever: an employer need not provide the employee’s preferred accommodation if another reasonable accommodation works. They also support the employer’s discretion to choose the “less expensive” or easier-to-implement reasonable option.
  • Obnamia v. Shinseki and Zaffino v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.: Used to reject the attempt to convert the ADA into a requirement that employers relieve financial hardship not tied to job performance. The court treated the request for paid leave as insufficiently linked to performing the job where unpaid leave already enabled the needed training.
  • Elledge v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC: Cited to reinforce the general principle (from another circuit) that when multiple accommodations are reasonable, the employer may choose among them.

4) FMLA substitution: paid leave depends on the employer’s normal policy

  • Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co.: Provided the rule that FMLA substitution of paid leave requires compliance with the employer’s paid leave policy requirements; the FMLA does not enlarge the paid benefit beyond what the policy allows.
  • Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar and Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.: These were not applied to decide the case but used to frame open questions about what causal standard the FMLA’s word “makes” requires: but-for causation, proximate cause, or something else.
  • Jones v. C & D Techs., Inc.: Cited as an example that FMLA can apply to absences for treatment, while noting related questions about whether the treatment must be medically necessary.
  • Tera, L.L.C. v. Rice Drilling D, L.L.C.: Supported the district court’s use of ordinary meaning rules for undefined contract/policy terms under Ohio law.
  • Blick v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch. Dist.: Used to hold that a potentially stronger theory (that “due to personal illness” might incorporate causation favorable to Tumbleson) was forfeited by not being raised.
  • United States v. Sineneng-Smith: Reinforced the party-presentation principle: courts generally should not raise and decide arguments the parties did not present.
  • Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ.: Cited to explain forfeiture/waiver principles regarding Tumbleson’s abandonment of Ohio-law claims on appeal.

Legal Reasoning

1) ADA disparate treatment: the case failed on proof, not plausibility

The court assumed (without deciding) that denial of paid leave could qualify as an actionable employment harm under the ADA, especially after Muldrow v. City of St. Louis. But it held the claim failed because Tumbleson could not show discriminatory differential treatment. Lakota articulated a neutral reason: guide-dog training did not fit the sick-leave definition in applicable sources (policy, collective bargaining, and Ohio law). The opinion then asked whether Tumbleson could show pretext—evidence that the policy rationale was a cover for disability bias.

She could not. The record showed Lakota often did not “preclear” short absences (under ten days), but reviewed longer absences. Tumbleson herself benefited from this practice when she obtained paid sick leave for a five-day training in 2022. The problem arose only when she requested more than ten days. Without any examples of nondisabled employees receiving paid sick leave for similarly non-qualifying reasons, no reasonable jury could infer disability-based disparate treatment.

The court also rejected the attempt to excuse the lack of comparators by invoking HIPAA, noting that HIPAA does not categorically block discovery and that nothing suggested counsel pursued comparator discovery through available mechanisms.

2) ADA accommodation: unpaid leave was reasonable, and paid leave was not required

The accommodation holding turned on two linked propositions:

  1. Reasonable accommodations are work-functional: They must enable performance of essential job functions by removing a job-related barrier (the Tchankpa/Jakubowski framework).
  2. Employer choice among reasonable options: Even if the employee proposes a reasonable accommodation, the employer may choose an alternative reasonable accommodation (the Hankins/Keever/Trepka line), including a less expensive one.

Applying those rules, the panel did not definitively decide whether guide-dog training leave was itself necessary to perform Tumbleson’s teaching job. Instead, it focused on what Lakota actually did: it granted unpaid leave, allowing her to complete training and return with Henry. The court found no evidence that paid leave (as opposed to leave itself) was linked to job performance. Financial strain from unpaid leave was characterized as an “outside the work environment” consequence that the ADA does not obligate an employer to remedy through wage replacement.

The court also clarified the structure of “undue hardship”: Lakota did not need to prove that paid leave would be an undue hardship because it had already provided a reasonable accommodation (unpaid leave). “Undue hardship” matters when an otherwise required accommodation would be too burdensome—not when the employer has already met its obligation through an alternative reasonable accommodation.

3) FMLA: substitution does not transform an unpaid entitlement into a paid one

The FMLA generally guarantees unpaid leave for covered reasons but permits an employee to “substitute” accrued paid leave. Yet the statute expressly protects employers from being forced to provide paid sick leave “in any situation” where they would not “normally” provide it. The Sixth Circuit avoided deciding whether Tumbleson’s absence qualified as FMLA leave (and highlighted unresolved causation questions under the “makes … unable to perform” language). It assumed coverage and decided the case on substitution:

  • Lakota allowed unpaid leave (consistent with the FMLA baseline).
  • Paid sick leave depended on whether the situation fit Lakota’s sick-leave policy (interpreting “personal illness”).
  • Tumbleson’s appellate briefing did not meaningfully undermine the district court’s conclusion that service-dog training falls outside a reasonable interpretation of “personal illness.”

The panel then issued a careful caution: a potentially important textual route—“absence due to personal illness”—might have supported a causation-based argument (e.g., but-for causation), but it was forfeited. The court refused to decide it sua sponte under United States v. Sineneng-Smith.

Impact

  • ADA accommodation litigation: The opinion strengthens the practical rule that unpaid leave can be a complete, reasonable ADA accommodation for disability-related needs (including training) when it enables the employee to return able to work, and that the ADA does not require an employer to provide paid leave if unpaid leave suffices.
  • Limits on “preferred accommodation” claims: By leaning on Hankins, Keever, and Trepka, the decision reinforces employer discretion where multiple effective accommodations exist—inviting future plaintiffs to focus on whether the offered accommodation actually fails to remove a job-performance barrier, rather than arguing that it is financially disadvantageous.
  • Comparator rigor in ADA disparate treatment: The case underscores that plaintiffs alleging discriminatory denial of benefits must develop comparator evidence (or other strong circumstantial proof). General claims that “others got leave” will not survive summary judgment without specifics.
  • Post-Muldrow adverse-action questions remain open: The panel’s discussion suggests the Sixth Circuit may eventually align ADA “terms and conditions” analysis with Muldrow, but this case does not decide it. Litigants should preserve the issue.
  • FMLA substitution claims: The decision reinforces that the FMLA is not a wage-replacement statute; “substitution” is constrained by the employer’s normal paid-leave rules (per Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co.).
  • Doctrinal breadcrumbs on FMLA causation: The court’s explicit questions about the causal standard under “makes … unable to perform” and about “due to” language signal future litigation terrain, especially for treatment-adjacent activities (training, travel, preparatory programs) that are medically motivated but not obviously “symptom-forced.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Disparate treatment: Classic discrimination—being treated worse because you have a disability (e.g., others get a benefit you are denied for disability-based reasons).
  • McDonnell Douglas framework: A three-step method used when there is no direct admission of discrimination: (1) employee shows an initial inference of discrimination; (2) employer gives a non-discriminatory reason; (3) employee must show that reason is a pretext.
  • Comparator evidence (“similarly situated” employees): Proof that similarly positioned employees outside the protected group were treated better under similar circumstances.
  • Reasonable accommodation: A work-related adjustment that enables a disabled employee to perform essential job functions; the ADA aims at job performance barriers, not all life barriers.
  • Essential functions: The fundamental duties of the job (here, teaching duties), not incidental preferences.
  • Undue hardship: A defense: even if an accommodation is reasonable and necessary, an employer may refuse it if it would significantly burden operations. But it matters only if no other reasonable accommodation is provided.
  • FMLA “substitution” of paid leave: The FMLA gives unpaid leave; an employee can use accrued paid leave if the employer’s normal policy would allow paid leave in that circumstance.
  • Forfeiture/waiver and party presentation: Courts generally decide the arguments the parties actually make. If a party fails to raise a theory, it may be forfeited, and the court will not invent it (as emphasized by United States v. Sineneng-Smith).

Conclusion

Andrea Tumbleson v. Lakota Local Sch. Dist. solidifies two practical limits on disability-related leave claims in the Sixth Circuit. First, where an employer grants unpaid leave that successfully enables an employee to address a disability-related need and return to work, the ADA generally does not require the employer to upgrade that accommodation into paid leave merely to avoid financial hardship. Second, the FMLA’s substitution provision does not compel paid sick leave unless the employer would “normally” provide paid leave under its own policy. At the same time, the opinion leaves open—and explicitly highlights—future interpretive disputes about causation under the FMLA and under “due to personal illness” policy language, signaling that better-developed briefing could yield different outcomes in a case that squarely presents those questions.