United States v. Yousef: A Fence Can Be Sentenced for Armed-Robbery Relevant Conduct When Robberies Fall Within the Defendant’s Jointly Undertaken Activity

1. Introduction

In United States v. Tayseer Yousef (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2026), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 109-month sentence imposed on a Chicago-area cell-phone store owner who acted as a professional “fence” for cell phones stolen in armed robberies of retail stores in western Michigan. Although Yousef did not personally commit the robberies, the district court applied multiple Sentencing Guidelines enhancements based on his coconspirators’ conduct during those robberies, as well as an enhancement for “sophisticated means.”

The appeal presented two procedural-reasonableness questions centered on Guidelines calculation: (1) whether armed-robbery conduct by coconspirators (weapon display, victim restraint, theft from a person) was attributable to Yousef as “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); and (2) whether Yousef’s practices for making stolen phones usable and profitable—plus his multi-jurisdiction and overseas sales—qualified as “sophisticated means” under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that the district court correctly treated the robbers’ conduct as Yousef’s relevant conduct because the robberies (and the predictable violence inherent in them) were within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity that Yousef agreed to and actively supported. Applying the Sixth Circuit’s scope framework (the Donadeo factors), the panel concluded that most factors supported attribution.

The court also held the sophisticated-means enhancement was warranted because Yousef used technical expertise to “clean” devices, advised thieves on evading tracking, and trafficked goods across jurisdictions and into overseas markets—conduct that, in the totality, was “especially complex or especially intricate” in execution and concealment.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Supplied the procedural-reasonableness framework and abuse-of-discretion standard, including what constitutes procedural error (e.g., incorrect Guidelines calculation). The panel uses Gall to define the appellate lens: the dispute is about Guidelines computation, not substantive reasonableness.
  • United States v. Donadeo, 910 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 2018): The core authority for relevant-conduct attribution in “jointly undertaken criminal activity.” The opinion draws from Donadeo in two key ways: (i) scope of jointly undertaken activity is narrower than conspiracy scope; and (ii) the six-factor test (single scheme, modus operandi, coordination, pooling, knowledge, length/degree of participation) used to determine whether others’ conduct falls within the defendant’s agreement.
  • United States v. Smith, 79 F.4th 790 (6th Cir. 2023): Provided the standard of review for factual findings underpinning relevant-conduct determinations (clear error), reinforcing the panel’s deference to the district court’s supported findings.
  • United States v. Amerson, 886 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2018): Confirmed the government’s burden to prove the enhancement-qualifying conduct is relevant conduct—important because the panel emphasizes the government met that burden through texts, travel data, and evidence of operational integration.
  • United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2002): Required “particularized findings” about the scope of the defendant’s agreement before attributing coconspirator acts. The opinion signals compliance by walking through the Donadeo factors and tying them to record evidence (texts, same-day pickups, advice, and operational dependency).
  • United States v. Moody, 787 F. App’x 857 (6th Cir. 2019): Used to reject any rigid “all factors must support attribution” approach. The panel relies on Moody to explain that a majority of factors suffices, even if some (like pooling profits) weigh for the defendant.
  • United States v. Cowley, 800 F. App’x 402 (6th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Love, 392 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2010): Both support the inference of a single jointly undertaken scheme where the defendant performs “critical tasks” or provides “logistical support.” The panel analogizes Yousef’s role—technical “cleaning,” market access, transportation, and rapid pickup—to those forms of enabling participation.
  • United States v. McReynolds, 69 F.4th 326 (6th Cir. 2023): A limiting precedent on scope attribution: a street-level dealer who occasionally buys from a supplier is not automatically responsible for the supplier’s wider conspiracy quantities absent coordination or service to the conspiracy. The panel distinguishes McReynolds by emphasizing Yousef’s timing, direction, and specialized services integrated with the robberies.
  • United States v. Nicolescu, 17 F.4th 706 (6th Cir. 2021): Cited by Yousef for the proposition that a defendant cannot be both fence and thief for purposes of applying a fence enhancement. The panel rejects the attempted extension: Nicolescu addresses when a fence enhancement applies; it does not immunize a fence from other enhancements tied to jointly undertaken conduct (here, robbery-related enhancements).
  • United States v. Nunley, 29 F.4th 824 (6th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Karasarides, 159 F.4th 972 (6th Cir. 2025): These frame the standard-of-review discussion for sophisticated-means questions (legal issues de novo; factual findings clear error; uncertainty remains regarding the final application step). The panel avoids resolving the open question identified in Karasarides because the enhancement stands under either standard.
  • United States v. Simmerman, 850 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2017): Supplies the definition of “sophisticated means” and the important proposition that even simple underlying conduct can trigger the enhancement if concealment methods are sophisticated. The panel analogizes Yousef’s use of specialized industry knowledge to the bank-employee concealment in Simmerman.
  • United States v. Chappelle, 78 F.4th 854 (6th Cir. 2023): Provides the “totality of the defendant’s conduct” approach to assessing sophistication. This supports the panel’s aggregation of technical device-cleaning, evasion advice, cross-jurisdiction sales, and overseas placement.
  • United States v. Woodson, 960 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2020): Cited for the proposition that using multiple jurisdictions can be a “signature example” of sophisticated means, reinforcing that the Illinois–Michigan pipeline and international outlets support the enhancement.
  • U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.4(B): The panel’s “getaway driver” analogy is anchored in the Guidelines commentary. It is used to characterize Yousef as operationally integrated into robbery execution, rather than a detached downstream purchaser.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Relevant conduct and the “scope” inquiry under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)

The panel isolates the dispositive issue: Yousef did not dispute foreseeability, furtherance, or the underlying robbery facts; he disputed only whether the robberies fell within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity he agreed to. That narrowing mattered because § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) requires all three: scope, furtherance, and foreseeability.

Applying United States v. Donadeo, the court treats scope as an agreement-based question: what “specific conduct and objectives” were embraced by Yousef’s agreement—expressly or implicitly inferred from conduct. The court then uses the six factors to test whether the robbery conduct was part of Yousef’s jointly undertaken activity.

  • Single scheme: The court defines the scheme with precision: not merely “profiting from stolen phones,” but profiting from phones sourced through armed robberies that Yousef knew of, encouraged, and sometimes directed. The scheme’s success depended on that supply chain and on Yousef’s ability to monetize it.
  • Modus operandi: A recurring pattern—robbery, immediate contact, rapid pickup, payment, resale—supported a unified operational plan despite minor variations (direct versus intermediary meeting; occasional improvisation during police pursuit).
  • Coordination: The court treats Yousef’s directives and logistical conversations as coordination, citing Donadeo for the proposition that discussions about execution or concealment count. Same-day pickups after robberies and extensive messaging evidenced synchronization.
  • Pooling resources/profits: The only factor favoring Yousef—no proof of profit pooling—did not defeat attribution given the weight of other indicators.
  • Knowledge of scope: Texts and shared news coverage established knowledge of the robberies’ violent nature and scope.
  • Length and degree of participation: Travel data and attributed robbery volume showed sustained participation and substantial benefit, which the court links to indispensability: the scheme’s reliability and profitability depended on Yousef’s skills and market access.

Two important doctrinal clarifications flow from this reasoning. First, the opinion reinforces that “fence” status does not itself make robbery conduct categorically “out of scope”; scope turns on the defendant’s agreement and functional integration. Second, the panel’s “getaway driver” analogy underscores a practical dividing line: a downstream buyer who merely purchases contraband is different from an actor who times, guides, and operationally supports predicate crimes.

The court also rejects Yousef’s attempted reliance on United States v. McReynolds. In McReynolds, the defendant was a loosely connected street dealer who did not coordinate sales or provide a specific service to the broader conspiracy; here, Yousef’s conduct showed tight coupling to robbery schedules and specialized services that enhanced the conspiracy’s success.

Finally, the court rejects the argument drawn from United States v. Nicolescu that application of a fence enhancement somehow prevents attribution of theft-related conduct. Nicolescu is treated as a fence-enhancement eligibility case, not a general limitation on relevant-conduct enhancements.

B. Sophisticated means under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)

On sophistication, the court uses United States v. Simmerman and United States v. Chappelle to adopt an aggregated, practical view: sophistication can lie in concealment; and the “totality” of conduct matters. It then identifies multiple sophistication features:

  • Technical circumvention (“cleaning”): Yousef claimed he could remove identifying information to defeat carrier/manufacturer anti-theft mechanisms, and he monetized that expertise (charging $75 per phone). The court treats this as specialized knowledge aimed at avoiding detection for multiple actors (himself, coconspirators, and downstream buyers).
  • Evasion guidance: Advising robbers to avoid older models because they were easier to track is treated as sophistication in concealment and operational security.
  • Multi-jurisdiction and global markets: The Michigan-to-Illinois trafficking and overseas resale in places where blacklisting had no effect supported sophistication. The court invokes United States v. Woodson for the proposition that use of multiple jurisdictions is a signature indicator of sophisticated means.

The court then addresses a common defense theme: “this is ordinary for my line of illicit work.” It rejects “industry normality” as a legal rebuttal. The relevant standard is not whether a practice is common among sophisticated criminals; it is whether the conduct is “especially complex or especially intricate” in execution or concealment. If sophistication is necessary to sustain the scheme, that supports—rather than undermines—application of the enhancement.

3.3. Impact

1) Clearer attribution pathway for fences integrated into violent sourcing. This opinion strengthens the government’s ability to treat violent predicate conduct as relevant conduct for sentencing even when the defendant is not the hands-on perpetrator, provided the record shows functional integration: direction, timing, logistical support, and mutual dependency.

2) Reinforcement of agreement-based “scope,” not mere conspiracy membership. By rigorously applying the Donadeo factors and distinguishing McReynolds, the court signals that attribution disputes will turn on specific evidence of coordination and services—not labels like “buyer,” “fence,” or “middleman.”

3) Sophisticated means encompasses technical anti-theft circumvention and market placement. The reasoning encourages district courts to treat device “unlocking/cleaning,” anti-tracking know-how, cross-jurisdiction pipelines, and overseas market arbitrage as sophistication—especially when they materially increase profitability and reduce detectability.

4) Practical sentencing consequences in organized retail theft cases. Prosecutors will likely cite this case in organized retail theft and electronics trafficking matters to justify (i) robbery-related enhancements through relevant conduct and (ii) sophisticated means based on technical laundering of goods and multi-market distribution.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Procedural reasonableness: Whether the sentencing process was done correctly—especially whether the Guidelines range was calculated correctly and the court explained the sentence.
  • Relevant conduct (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3): Conduct considered at sentencing beyond the exact elements of the conviction—sometimes including acts of other people—if the guideline’s conditions are met.
  • Jointly undertaken criminal activity: A smaller subset of a conspiracy: what this defendant specifically agreed to do with others. A defendant can be in a conspiracy yet not be responsible for everything every conspirator did.
  • “Scope” vs. “foreseeability”: Foreseeability asks “could the defendant have expected this might happen?” Scope asks “did the defendant agree to a criminal plan in which this conduct was part of what was undertaken?” You generally need both for coconspirator attribution.
  • Clear error vs. de novo review: Clear error is highly deferential to the district court’s factfinding; de novo is a fresh look at legal questions. The opinion applies these standards to different components of the sentencing decision.
  • Sophisticated means: Not necessarily “Hollywood” complexity. It can be specialized know-how or layered steps that make crime harder to detect or easier to profit from—especially when taken as a whole.
  • Fence: A person who buys and resells stolen goods, creating a market for thieves. Being a “fence” does not automatically limit relevant-conduct attribution; what matters is how closely the fence is integrated into the upstream theft activity.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Yousef affirms a robust, evidence-driven approach to sentencing attribution and sophistication in organized retail robbery and trafficking schemes. The Sixth Circuit holds that a professional fence may be sentenced based on robbery conduct committed by others when the record shows the robberies were within the scope of the defendant’s jointly undertaken activity—demonstrated through coordination, knowledge, operational dependency, and sustained participation under the Donadeo factors. The court also confirms that technical device “cleaning,” anti-tracking guidance, and multi-jurisdiction (including overseas) sales can constitute “sophisticated means,” even if such practices are commonplace within that criminal ecosystem.