United States v. Xie: Organizational Charts Not Governed by Rule 1006 Absent “Voluminous Records,” and “Organizer” Enhancement Applies to Financial/Logistical Architects Without Hierarchical Control

1. Introduction

In United States v. Xie (10th Cir. Mar. 31, 2026), the Tenth Circuit affirmed Fei Xie’s conviction for a marijuana-trafficking conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A) and affirmed a 120-month sentence. The case arose from a multi-year black-market marijuana operation (the “Lin DTO”), led by Naigang Lin, in which the government alleged Xie functioned as a business partner and financier—funding grow operations, maintaining stash houses, and helping broker distribution.

On appeal, Xie raised three main issues:

1. whether the lead agent’s early testimony constituted improper “overview testimony”;
2. whether the admission of an organizational chart violated Federal Rules of Evidence 611(a) and 1006; and
3. whether the district court clearly erred in applying the U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 organizer/leader enhancement (thereby foreclosing safety-valve relief under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2).

Although the disposition is an “Order and Judgment” designated nonprecedential, it is instructive for how the Tenth Circuit approaches (i) preservation and plain-error review of “overview” challenges, (ii) the boundary between Rule 1006 summaries and Rule 611(a) pedagogical/summary aids, and (iii) the breadth of “organizer” liability under § 3B1.1 even absent classic chain-of-command control.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Overview testimony: The court held Xie did not preserve most of his “overview testimony” objections, so review was for plain error under United States v. Lopez. On the merits, the challenged statements were not improper overview testimony because they were grounded in the agent’s personal surveillance, investigative actions, and review of seized messages and records, consistent with United States v. Brooks and United States v. Marquez.
• Organizational chart: Rule 1006 did not apply because the chart was not offered to prove the contents of “voluminous” writings/recordings/photos. Even assuming the chart’s admission under Rule 611(a) was error (given timing and sourcing concerns identified in United States v. Stiger), Xie failed to show prejudice—no reasonable probability of a different outcome in light of overwhelming evidence, applying United States v. Griffith.
• Organizer/leader enhancement & safety valve: The court upheld the § 3B1.1 enhancement under clear-error review (United States v. Zhou; United States v. Gehrmann), emphasizing that “organizer” status does not require “hierarchical control” over others (United States v. Snow). Evidence that Xie was a 50/50 “partner,” funded operations, managed finances, coordinated property acquisitions to support grows/stash logistics, recruited investors, and influenced operational decisions supported organizer status. Because the enhancement applied, safety-valve relief was unavailable (citing United States v. Juarez- Sanchez).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Result)

A. Standards of review for evidentiary issues

• United States v. Paycer and United States v. Burgess: The panel used these cases to frame abuse-of-discretion review for preserved evidentiary rulings and to define what constitutes an abuse of discretion (legal error, clearly erroneous factfinding, or clear error in judgment).
• United States v. Harper: Provided the harmless-error framework (government must show, by a preponderance, no effect on substantial rights) when an evidentiary objection is properly preserved on evidentiary grounds.
• United States v. Lopez: Supplied the four-part plain-error test governing unpreserved evidentiary challenges—critical here because Xie did not contemporaneously object to the specific testimony and did not object to the chart’s admission.
• United States v. Eddings: Used to enforce waiver principles: arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief (including Rule 704(b), Rule 107, and cumulative-error theories) are waived.

B. “Overview testimony” boundaries

• United States v. Brooks: Defined “overview testimony,” explained why it is permitted in limited form (investigation background) yet improper when it invades the jury’s role (opinions on guilt/credibility) or summarizes evidence not yet admitted. The court relied on Brooks to identify the doctrine and then to reject Xie’s challenge because the agent’s statements were tethered to personal knowledge and investigative review rather than speculative previewing.
• United States v. Banks: Reinforced that courts “generally allow” early testimony explaining how the investigation began, agencies involved, and techniques used—supporting the permissible side of the line.
• United States v. Marquez: Did double work. First, it supported admissibility where an agent’s statements about a defendant’s role are based on personal observations. Second, it undercut any broader argument that unobjected-to overview testimony is categorically condemned—relevant to plain-error “obviousness.”

C. Charts, summaries, and demonstratives (Rule 1006 vs Rule 611(a))

• United States v. Ray: Anchored two key points: (1) Rule 1006 applies to summaries proving the content of voluminous materials; and (2) Rule 611(a) can permit “summary evidence” used to help the jury digest complex admitted evidence. The panel used Ray to reject Rule 1006 applicability outright and to orient the Rule 611(a) inquiry.
• United States v. Stiger: Supplied the caution that charts “constructed by a witness using non-trial sources” are inadmissible under Rule 611(a). This precedent created the main doctrinal tension with admitting an investigative organizational chart early.
• United States v. Renteria: Invoked in the prejudice discussion: failure to seek limiting instructions and the opportunity for cross-examination can weigh against finding reversible harm from an evidentiary problem.

D. Prejudice/substantial-rights analysis for unpreserved errors

• United States v. Griffith: Provided the “reasonable probability of a different outcome” test for whether an unpreserved error affected substantial rights.
• United States v. Milton: Reinforced evaluating claimed error “in the context of the entire trial,” supporting the panel’s holistic “overwhelming evidence” approach.
• United States v. St. Clair: Cited for viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government in assessing the overall case strength.

E. Organizer/leader enhancement jurisprudence

• United States v. Zhou and United States v. Gehrmann: These cases supplied the deferential clear-error lens for § 3B1.1 factual findings, emphasizing affirmance where the district court’s account is “plausible” even if the appellate court might weigh evidence differently.
• United States v. Sallis: Offered Xie’s preferred framing that the “essence” of § 3B1.1 is control/organization/responsibility for others. The panel acknowledged this line but ultimately relied more heavily on the organizer/leader disjunction and the Guidelines commentary.
• United States v. Snow: The pivotal precedent: the roles in § 3B1.1 are disjunctive, and “no control is necessary to qualify as an ‘organizer.’” The panel used Snow to defeat Xie’s principal theory that lack of hierarchical authority precludes § 3B1.1(a).
• United States v. Bernaugh and United States v. Baxter: These cases validated applying the enhancement to a “moneyman/banker” who recruits participants, finances operations, supplies infrastructure, arranges logistics, or installs others in operational roles—analogizing Xie’s financing and property/logistics role to established organizer/leader patterns.
• United States v. Juarez- Sanchez: Used to connect the enhancement to safety-valve ineligibility: once § 3B1.1 applies, § 5C1.2’s organizer/leader exclusion is triggered.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Preservation drives the outcome: plain error vs merits

A throughline in the evidentiary portions is procedural: the court treated Xie’s early, sustained “no basis at this point” objection as insufficient to preserve a broad, continuing objection to later testimony. That choice switched the lens from abuse-of-discretion/harmless error to plain error under United States v. Lopez, raising the defendant’s burden substantially—especially on “obviousness” and “substantial rights.”

B. “Overview testimony” is not a label; it is a function

The panel’s treatment reflects a practical rule: testimony that might sound like a “preview” is less vulnerable when it is demonstrably tied to (i) the agent’s personal surveillance and investigative acts or (ii) the agent’s review of seized communications and records. The court repeatedly characterized the agent’s statements as grounded in admissible investigative knowledge (not speculative narration about what other witnesses will say or direct opinions on ultimate guilt).

Even where a statement included mental-state language (“knowingly”), the court contextualized it as an inference drawn from the content of messages the agent reviewed—thereby framing it as explanatory of evidence rather than a pronouncement on the ultimate issue. (A separate Rule 704(b) theory was deemed waived under United States v. Eddings.)

C. Rule 1006 is narrow: not every “summary-looking” exhibit qualifies

The court’s Rule 1006 holding is crisp: if a chart is not offered to prove the contents of “voluminous” materials that cannot conveniently be examined in court, Rule 1006 simply does not apply. An investigative organizational chart depicting roles and relationships is not, by that fact alone, a Rule 1006 summary.

D. Rule 611(a) concerns: timing and sourcing—then the decisive turn to prejudice

For Rule 611(a), the panel acknowledged doctrine suggesting a problem: summary evidence under Rule 611(a) is typically used near the end to “repackage” already-admitted evidence (United States v. Brooks), while United States v. Stiger warns against charts built from non-trial sources. Here, the chart was created by the lead agent from his investigation and was introduced before the government had introduced evidence establishing Xie’s role.

But the court avoided deciding whether the admission was “clear or obvious” error because it resolved the claim on the third prong of plain error: substantial rights. Applying United States v. Griffith and United States v. Milton, the panel stressed:

• the government’s case was overwhelming (multiple cooperating witnesses including the leader, corroborating photos/texts/records, and extensive agent testimony);
• the chart was used mainly as an identification visual during testimony and was not emphasized in closing;
• defense counsel had cross-examination opportunities and sought no limiting instruction (United States v. Renteria); and
• any arguable inaccuracies or “imprimatur” effects did not create a reasonable probability of a different verdict.

E. “Organizer” under § 3B1.1(a): logistics, capital, and coordination can suffice

The sentencing holding is doctrinally important because it underscores an expansive “organizer” category. The panel treated Xie’s “I had no decision-making authority over growers/participants” argument as non-dispositive under United States v. Snow: “leader” may require control, but “organizer” does not necessarily.

The court then tied the district court’s factual findings to recognized organizer factors in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4: participation nature, recruitment, planning/organizing, scope, and authority. It highlighted evidence that Xie provided substantial funding, partnered with Naigang, structured property acquisitions to facilitate grows/stash operations, suggested concealment tactics (titling property to avoid scrutiny), solicited investors, tracked finances and inventory, and influenced operational property decisions. Analogies to the “moneyman/banker” pattern in United States v. Bernaugh and the infrastructure/logistics role in United States v. Baxter reinforced that these functions can amount to organizing.

Finally, because § 3B1.1 applied, safety-valve relief was unavailable under § 5C1.2(a) as recognized in United States v. Juarez- Sanchez.

3.3 Impact

A. Trial practice: preserving “overview” and demonstrative objections

The decision illustrates how quickly “overview testimony” complaints can collapse under plain-error review. A single early objection—especially one sustained—will not necessarily preserve later, different “overview” problems. Practitioners should expect to object contemporaneously to specific questions/answers that allegedly invade the jury’s role or preview unadmitted evidence.

B. Exhibit strategy: distinguishing Rule 1006 from Rule 611(a)

Xie provides a useful template: organizational charts portraying roles in a conspiracy are often not Rule 1006 summaries unless they truly prove the content of voluminous documents. Parties should instead litigate admissibility through Rule 611(a) (and, in many cases, Rule 403), focusing on timing, foundation, sources, and limiting instructions.

C. Sentencing: broad organizer exposure for financiers and infrastructure coordinators

The most consequential takeaway for future cases is sentencing: defendants who finance operations, recruit investors, provide “wherewithal” (properties, stash locations), and coordinate implementation may face § 3B1.1(a) exposure even without classic command authority. That, in turn, can categorically block safety-valve relief, raising mandatory minimum risk in drug cases.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Overview testimony

Early testimony (often from an agent) that “sets the stage.” It is generally permissible to explain how the investigation started and what agents did. It becomes improper when the witness tells the jury what conclusion to reach (guilt), vouches for credibility, or narrates/“previews” evidence before it is admitted in a way that substitutes for proof.

Plain error vs harmless error

• Harmless error applies when an issue is properly preserved; the government must show the error did not affect substantial rights.
• Plain error applies when the issue was not preserved; the defendant must show an obvious error that likely changed the outcome and seriously undermines the proceedings’ fairness.

Rule 1006 (summaries of voluminous materials)

A narrow rule allowing summaries when underlying admissible documents are too numerous to conveniently review in court. If the exhibit is not proving the contents of such voluminous records, Rule 1006 does not apply.

Rule 611(a) (court control over presentation; pedagogical summaries)

Allows the court to manage how evidence is presented, including permitting aids that help jurors understand complex, already-admitted evidence. But charts based on non-trial sources or offered too early can raise admissibility issues.

Organizer/leader enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1)

Increases offense level when the defendant was an organizer or leader of criminal activity involving 5+ participants or that was otherwise extensive. Under Tenth Circuit law, “leader” tends to imply control over people; “organizer” can be shown by designing/coordinating the scheme and providing the means to carry it out—even without a strict hierarchy.

Safety valve (U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2)

A sentencing provision that can allow relief from mandatory minimums for certain non-violent, low-level drug offenders who meet strict criteria. If the defendant is found to be an organizer/leader under § 3B1.1, safety-valve relief is unavailable.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Xie affirms (1) a strict approach to preservation that often pushes evidentiary complaints into plain-error territory, (2) a clear boundary that Rule 1006 does not cover investigative organizational charts unless they prove the contents of voluminous records, and (3) a robust conception of “organizer” under § 3B1.1(a) that encompasses financiers and logistical architects even without hierarchical control. The decision’s practical message is that the combination of procedural forfeiture and overwhelming-evidence findings can be case-dispositive on appeal, while organizer findings can be outcome-determinative at sentencing by eliminating safety-valve eligibility.