Full Civil-Rights Restoration (Including Jury Service) Is Required to Escape § 922(g)(1); Suppression Errors Are Harmless Where Challenged Digital Evidence Does Not Enter the Case-in-Chief

I. Introduction

In United States v. Warner (10th Cir. Mar. 18, 2025), the Tenth Circuit affirmed Charles Warner’s federal convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and dealing in firearms without a license. The prosecution arose after ATF repeatedly warned Warner—who had two South Carolina felony convictions for breach of trust with fraudulent intent—that he could not possess or access firearms, yet he continued manufacturing, handling, and selling firearms through “Elite Warrior Armament” (EWA), including after EWA’s FFL was revoked.

On appeal, Warner raised four principal issues: (1) whether he was a “prohibited person” under § 922(g)(1) and whether the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him; (2) whether evidence from computers seized from his home should have been suppressed due to warrant overbreadth and an eight-month search delay; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict him of unlicensed dealing; and (4) whether the district court correctly counted firearms for a sentencing enhancement.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • § 922(g)(1) status: Warner remained a prohibited person because his South Carolina felonies were punishable by more than one year and he had not had all civil rights restored—most notably, he lacked restoration of the right to serve on a jury, which in South Carolina required a pardon.
  • As-applied Second Amendment challenge: Foreclosed by Tenth Circuit precedent, particularly Vincent v. Bondi.
  • Suppression: Any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the challenged computer evidence did not come in during the government’s case-in-chief; the lone admitted text message was used only for impeachment and could be used even if obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
  • Unlicensed dealing: Sufficient evidence showed Warner was “engaged in the business” and acted willfully, including Facebook sales activity, invoices, and recorded dealings with an undercover agent.
  • Firearm count: The district court did not clearly err in finding 80 “firearms” (including frames/receivers) and applying the six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Standards of review and preservation/waiver

  • United States v. Berres: supplied the baseline for reviewing denial of a motion to dismiss—abuse of discretion generally, but de novo for statutory interpretation.
  • Havens v. Colo. Dep't of Corrs.: framed forfeiture principles when arguments are not presented below.
  • United States v. Herrera (quoting United States v. Bowline): emphasized that “untimely Rule 12” arguments are not reviewed for plain error absent good cause, reinforcing the procedural rigor for pretrial indictment challenges.
  • United States v. Thornton: stated the four-part plain-error test.
  • United States v. Leffler: critical to the panel’s handling of Warner’s United States v. Hisey argument; failure to argue plain error on appeal ordinarily results in waiver and no review.

2. Civil-rights restoration under § 921(a)(20)(B)

  • United States v. Flower: controlling authority for the panel’s conclusion that “the rights to vote, serve on a jury, and hold public office, as well as the right to possess firearms, must all be restored” before a conviction is excluded under § 921(a)(20). Warner’s inability to show restoration of jury service (absent a pardon) defeated the defense.

3. “Business practices” exception under § 921(a)(20)(A)

  • The panel relied on South Carolina case law to characterize Warner’s predicate offense as theft-like rather than business-regulatory: State v. Scott (quoting State v. Owings) and State v. Keith. The court also cited State v. Parris to show that a “trust relationship” is not inherently tied to regulation of business practices.

4. Second Amendment framework and felon-dispossession laws

  • District of Columbia v. Heller: supplied the “presumptively lawful” and “longstanding prohibitions” language about felon firearm bans.
  • United States v. McCane: Tenth Circuit precedent rejecting a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) based on Heller.
  • McDonald v. City of Chicago: reiterated Heller’s assurances regarding felon prohibitions.
  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen: identified as changing the methodological landscape, while concurrences noted the decision did not “decide nothing about who may lawfully possess a firearm.”
  • Vincent v. Garland and then United States v. Rahimi: described the evolving terrain; Rahimi again referenced “presumptively lawful” felon-dispossession laws.
  • Vincent v. Garland (vacatur) and Vincent v. Bondi: the decisive authorities for this appeal—on remand, the Tenth Circuit concluded Rahimi did not abrogate McCane and reaffirmed constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to non-violent felons.
  • The opinion also situates the circuit split post-Rahimi by citing: United States v. Hunt, United States v. Jackson, United States v. Hester, Range v. Att'y Gen. U.S., United States v. Diaz, and United States v. Williams.

5. Fourth Amendment suppression and harmlessness

  • United States v. Finnigin and United States v. Biglow: furnished standards of review for suppression rulings and probable-cause determinations.
  • United States v. Leon: central to the harmlessness conclusion; even if evidence is inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief due to a Fourth Amendment violation, it may be used to impeach a defendant’s direct testimony.
  • United States v. Mullikin: supported the conclusion that suppression error is harmless where the challenged evidence is not meaningfully used at trial.
  • The government’s mootness theory was rejected with reference to Smith v. Plati and Church of Scientology v. United States, clarifying that mootness requires an intervening event making relief impossible, not merely a lack of prejudice.

6. Sufficiency and evidentiary scope in sufficiency review

  • United States v. Gregory and United States v. Sparks: set the de novo sufficiency standard and the obligation to view evidence in the government’s favor.
  • United States v. Fernandez: reinforced that sufficiency review considers all evidence admitted at trial, even if improperly admitted—important to Warner’s attempt to discount pre-indictment-date evidence.

7. Sentencing factfinding and firearm counting

  • United States v. McDonald: supplied the mixed standard of review for guideline issues (clear error for facts; de novo for law).
  • United States v. Hoyle: supported deference to district court findings that have a “basis in the record,” viewed in the light most favorable to the court’s determination.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Warner’s predicate felonies and the “civil rights restored” defense

The court treated Warner’s § 922(g)(1) status as a statutory question. It declined to reach the merits of his United States v. Hisey-based claim (that probationary sentences should not count) because he did not raise it below and then did not properly invoke and argue plain-error review on appeal, triggering waiver under United States v. Leffler (and reinforced by United States v. Herrera).

On civil-rights restoration, the court applied United States v. Flower to hold that partial restoration is insufficient. Warner’s admission that South Carolina restores jury service only by pardon—and his lack of any such pardon—was dispositive: without restoration of jury service, his convictions remained valid predicates.

2. Rejecting the “business practices” exception

Warner attempted to fit “breach of trust with fraudulent intent” within § 921(a)(20)(A)’s “other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices.” The court reasoned that the offense is theft-like (embezzlement/larceny analog), not a business-regulation measure like antitrust or unfair-trade-practices laws. The South Carolina authorities (State v. Scott, State v. Owings, State v. Keith, State v. Parris) were used to ground that characterization in state law.

3. As-applied Second Amendment challenge foreclosed

The court acknowledged doctrinal developments after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, but treated Vincent v. Bondi as controlling within the circuit. Under that authority, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to non-violent felons, foreclosing Warner’s argument that non-dangerous, decades-old, non-custodial felony convictions cannot justify disarmament.

4. Suppression: harmlessness driven by trial use

Although Warner challenged warrant scope and the eight-month delay in searching seized computers, the court resolved the issue on harmless-error grounds. Nearly all computer-derived evidence was excluded at trial on non-Fourth Amendment grounds; the single admitted exhibit (a text message) was admitted only to impeach Warner. Citing United States v. Leon, the court explained that even unlawfully obtained evidence may be used for impeachment. Therefore, reversal on suppression would yield no meaningful relief; any error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” consistent with United States v. Mullikin.

5. Unlicensed dealing: “engaged in the business” and willfulness

Applying the elements instruction and § 921(a)(11), the panel concluded the evidence showed more than an isolated transaction. Facebook communications offering direct orders, statements that guns were “made from scratch,” and invoices/receipts after the FFL revocation supported a finding that Warner was engaged in the business. Willfulness was supported by evidence of concealment (omitting his name from the FFL application), repeated ATF warnings, and Warner’s acknowledgements of felony status.

6. Firearm counting for § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C)

The court upheld the 25–99 enhancement because expert testimony and reports supported classifying 66 items as frames/receivers plus 14 operable firearms (80 total). Warner’s attack on the expert’s methodology failed because the expert testified ATF applied the regulatory definition and the report identified qualifying components. Under United States v. Hoyle, the district court’s finding had a basis in the record and was not clearly erroneous.

C. Impact

  • Civil-rights restoration defenses remain demanding in the Tenth Circuit: Warner reinforces that defendants must show restoration of the full set of “core” rights identified in United States v. Flower, not merely firearm rights under state law. This is especially consequential in states where jury service restoration depends on a pardon.
  • Second Amendment as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed in this circuit: The opinion operationalizes Vincent v. Bondi as the controlling post-Rahimi answer—at least until further Supreme Court guidance.
  • Suppression appeals must show trial prejudice: Warner illustrates an appellate “dead end” where challenged evidence does not enter the case-in-chief and where impeachment use is independently permissible under United States v. Leon.
  • Unlicensed-dealing prosecutions can rely on surrounding course-of-conduct evidence: The court’s analysis confirms that communications, invoices, and a history of builds/sales can establish “engaged in the business” and willfulness, even if the charged date is specific.
  • Frames/receivers remain central to guideline firearm counts: The decision underscores that expert application of the statutory/regulatory definitions can substantially increase guideline exposure under § 2K2.1(b)(1).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” (§ 922(g)(1)): Focuses on the maximum authorized punishment, not necessarily the sentence actually imposed (Warner tried to invoke United States v. Hisey, but the court did not reach the merits).
  • “Civil rights restored” (§ 921(a)(20)(B)): A narrow escape hatch. In this circuit, per United States v. Flower, restoration must include voting, jury service, holding office, and firearms possession. Missing any one keeps the conviction usable as a predicate.
  • “Business practices” exception (§ 921(a)(20)(A)): Excludes certain economic-regulation crimes (e.g., antitrust). Theft-like offenses do not qualify even if they arise in business contexts.
  • As-applied constitutional challenge: The defendant concedes a statute can be constitutional generally but argues it is unconstitutional when applied to his particular circumstances (e.g., “non-violent felon”).
  • Plain error vs. waiver: A forfeited issue may be reviewed for plain error if properly argued; failing to request and argue plain-error review on appeal can result in waiver and no review (per United States v. Leffler).
  • Harmless error: Even if a legal mistake occurred (e.g., denial of suppression), reversal is not warranted if the mistake did not affect the outcome. Here, the challenged evidence did not enter the case-in-chief and impeachment use was permitted under United States v. Leon.
  • “Frame or receiver” as a firearm: Federal law and the guidelines treat certain core components as “firearms” even if not assembled into a working gun, which can drive firearm-count enhancements.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Warner is a consolidating decision rather than a doctrinal revolution, but it is precedential in how it applies—and tightly enforces— existing rules across four domains: (1) strict civil-rights restoration requirements under United States v. Flower to avoid § 922(g)(1); (2) continued foreclosure of non-violent-felon as-applied Second Amendment challenges under Vincent v. Bondi; (3) suppression appellate outcomes driven by harmlessness where the challenged evidence does not enter the government’s case-in-chief and impeachment remains available under United States v. Leon; and (4) deference to well-supported expert determinations of frames/receivers for guideline firearm counts.