United States v. Terrence Peoples: Mislabeling an Upward-Variance Challenge as “Procedural” Fails Without a Real Guidelines-Calculation Error

1. Introduction

In United States v. Terrence Peoples (11th Cir. Feb. 12, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 60-month total sentence imposed on Terrence Peoples after he pleaded guilty to (1) conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count One), and (2) aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (Count Two).

The scheme involved recruiting bank accountholders and others to deposit counterfeit checks, then withdrawing funds using the accountholder’s debit card and PIN. The intended loss was $9,305.57. The Guidelines range for Count One was 8–14 months, while Count Two carried a mandatory 24-month consecutive sentence.

The district court imposed an upward variance on Count One (36 months), plus the mandatory consecutive 24 months on Count Two, for a 60-month total. On appeal, Peoples argued procedural and substantive unreasonableness, focusing primarily on the court’s reliance on criminal history, disparity with co-conspirators’ sentences, and his mental health and substance issues.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It rejected Peoples’s procedural-reasonableness challenge because he did not identify any actual Guidelines-calculation error; instead, he attacked the upward variance while labeling it a miscalculation. It then rejected his substantive-reasonableness challenge, holding the district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and permissibly placed heavy weight on his repeated, similar fraud conduct and supervision failures to justify the variance.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010) and United States v. Arguedas, 86 F.3d 1054, 1059 (11th Cir. 1996): The panel used these cases to state the standard of review for procedural reasonableness—de novo for legal issues (including Guidelines application), and clear error for factual findings. This framing mattered because Peoples did not actually contest a Guidelines application or factual finding; he contested the reason for the variance.
  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007): Gall supplied the canonical procedural/substantive framework. The court relied on Gall’s distinction to explain that Peoples’s complaint (criminal history used to vary upward) is typically a substantive reasonableness inquiry “including the extent of any variance,” not a Guidelines-calculation (procedural) issue.
  • Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014): The court invoked Sapuppo to conclude Peoples abandoned any challenge to the two-level leadership enhancement, because he only mentioned it without developing an argument or citing authority.
  • United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018) and United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009): These cases reinforced appellate deference to the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors and its decision that those factors justify a variance. Shaw also supported the point that no “extraordinary justification” is required for a variance.
  • United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 619 (11th Cir. 2015): Central to Peoples’s core objection, Johnson squarely permits an upward variance based on criminal history even if that history is already incorporated in the advisory Guidelines range. This undercut any argument that “double consideration” of criminal history is categorically improper.
  • United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2010): Irey provided the Eleventh Circuit’s articulation of substantive unreasonableness—vacatur is appropriate only when the appellate court has a “definite and firm conviction” that the sentencing court made a clear error of judgment, placing the sentence outside the range of reasonable sentences under the facts.
  • United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015): Rosales-Bruno supplied two key principles the panel applied: (1) a sentencing court may give “great weight” to one factor over others, and (2) the weight given to a factor is committed to the district court’s sound discretion.
  • United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310, 1330 (11th Cir. 2024): The panel relied on Al Jaberi to hold that a court need not explicitly discuss each § 3553(a) factor; an acknowledgment that it considered the factors and the defendant’s arguments can suffice—important here because Peoples argued the court failed to consider specific mitigating points.
  • United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 885 (11th Cir. 2011): These cases shaped the court’s treatment of Peoples’s disparity argument under § 3553(a)(6). The panel emphasized that a disparity claim requires “apples to apples” comparisons and enough record detail to “gauge” whether co-conspirators are similarly situated.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Procedural vs. substantive framing (and why labeling matters). The panel treated Peoples’s “procedural” claim as defective because it did not identify any error in the Guidelines calculation itself (base offense level, enhancements, deductions, criminal history scoring, etc.). His argument—that the court varied upward based on criminal history already reflected in the Guidelines—goes to whether the sentence is reasonable in light of § 3553(a), not whether the range was miscomputed. With no cognizable procedural issue presented, the court rejected the procedural challenge.
  2. Abandonment of the leadership-enhancement issue. Although Peoples referenced the two-level leadership enhancement, the court held he did not actually argue it was error. Under Sapuppo, undeveloped, perfunctory references do not preserve an appellate claim.
  3. Substantive reasonableness and deference to sentencing discretion. The panel emphasized that the district court:
    • identified recurring, similar check-fraud conduct,
    • highlighted repeated supervision/parole violations as evidence of poor amenability to supervision, and
    • explicitly relied on specific deterrence (a factor the statute expressly permits).
    Under Gall, Shabazz, Shaw, Irey, and Rosales-Bruno, these are classic § 3553(a) considerations and the district court’s choice to prioritize them is entitled to “due deference,” even when the resulting variance is substantial.
  4. Disparity with co-conspirators. Peoples listed co-conspirators’ shorter sentences, but the court found the argument underdeveloped because he did not show comparable criminal records or otherwise establish similarly situated defendants as required by § 3553(a)(6) and Docampo/Hill.
  5. Mitigation evidence (mental health/substance issues) and the court’s explanation duty. The panel accepted the district court’s statement that it considered “all the factors” and heard Peoples’s arguments as sufficient under Al Jaberi. The district court’s failure to address each mitigating fact expressly did not render the sentence unreasonable.

C. Impact

Although unpublished and “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is instructive in three recurring appellate-sentencing contexts in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • Issue-framing discipline on appeal: If an appellant argues only that the district court’s variance rationale was improper, characterizing it as a Guidelines “miscalculation” is unlikely to succeed. Peoples underscores that appellate courts may reject a procedural challenge outright when it does not engage the actual Guidelines computation.
  • Criminal history and supervision failures as variance drivers: Consistent with United States v. Johnson, the case reinforces that recidivism and repeated supervision violations can justify significant upward variances even when criminal history is already scored in the Guidelines.
  • Disparity arguments require comparator detail: Mere sentence-length comparisons to co-conspirators, without facts showing similar records and conduct, are unlikely to carry weight under § 3553(a)(6) as interpreted in Docampo and Hill.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Procedural reasonableness: Whether the judge followed the correct steps—properly calculated the Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as advisory, considered § 3553(a), relied on accurate facts, and explained the sentence.
  • Substantive reasonableness: Whether the sentence length is reasonable given the whole case and § 3553(a). This includes whether the reasons given justify the extent of a variance.
  • Variance: A sentence above or below the advisory Guidelines range based on § 3553(a) factors (as opposed to a Guidelines “departure,” which is a within-Guidelines mechanism).
  • Mandatory consecutive sentence (18 U.S.C. § 1028A): Aggravated identity theft requires a 24-month prison term that must run consecutive to other sentences—so it is “stacked” on top of the fraud term.
  • “Apples to apples” disparity (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)): To claim unfair disparity, a defendant must show comparators had similar records and were guilty of similar conduct; otherwise, different sentences may be warranted.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance in United States v. Terrence Peoples rests on a practical appellate lesson: courts will not treat a disagreement with an upward variance as a Guidelines-calculation error, and they will defer substantially to a sentencing judge who ties an above-range sentence to recidivism, repeated supervision failures, and deterrence under § 3553(a). The opinion also reiterates two recurrent pitfalls for appellants: undeveloped arguments are abandoned (Sapuppo), and co-conspirator disparity claims require concrete, comparable record detail (Docampo; Hill).