Legal Reasoning
1) Appeal Waiver and Consideration
The panel flagged, sua sponte, a foundational contract-law concern: whether an appeal waiver in a plea agreement must be supported by consideration to be enforceable. Plea agreements are construed under ordinary contract principles, and an appeal waiver is a bargained-for term. After ordering supplemental briefing, the Government conceded that Simpson’s appeal waiver lacked consideration and asked the court to decide the appeal on the merits. The court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss and proceeded to adjudicate Simpson’s claims.
Importantly, the panel did not issue a precedential holding resolving whether consideration is categorically required for appeal waivers; rather, it accepted the Government’s concession and moved forward. Still, the episode is instructive: where the Government acknowledges that no consideration supports a waiver, the Fourth Circuit is prepared to decline enforcement and reach the merits. Practically, prosecutors should ensure that an appeal waiver is anchored by demonstrable concessions (e.g., charge dismissals, recommendations, or other promises).
2) Due Process at Sentencing: Reliability of PSR and Testimony
Simpson asserted that the district court promised he could challenge witnesses’ statements at sentencing but then denied him a meaningful opportunity to do so, violating due process. He targeted two determinations: (a) drug quantity driving the base offense level, which he claimed relied on unverified PSR statements from coconspirators about meth distribution and money transport; and (b) the enhancement for use of a minor under § 2D1.1(b)(16)(B)(i).
The panel held there was no due process violation and no abuse of discretion:
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Opportunity to be heard: Simpson had multiple avenues to object—PSR objections, a sentencing memorandum, and argument at the hearing. This satisfied due process’s notice-and-opportunity-to-respond baseline.
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Reliability standard: Sentencing courts may rely on hearsay, including coconspirator statements, if the information bears sufficient indicia of reliability (Mondragon; Powell). The defendant bears an affirmative duty to show unreliability and explain why the PSR is incorrect (Mondragon).
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Corroboration and seizures: The district court expressly found that coconspirator statements were corroborated by law enforcement and led to seizure of drugs and proceeds. Those findings supplied the necessary reliability and met the Government’s preponderance burden on drug quantity (Bell).
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Use-of-a-minor enhancement: The court likewise found the testimony supporting § 2D1.1(b)(16)(B)(i) reliable. Given the same reliability framework and Simpson’s opportunity to contest, due process was satisfied.
3) Firearm Enhancement (§ 2D1.1(b)(1))
Simpson argued there was no sufficient nexus between him and the firearm. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, applying well-settled principles:
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Standard: The enhancement applies if a weapon was present during the drug offense unless it is clearly improbable it was connected to the offense (USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A)). The Government need only show presence via a temporal and spatial relation among the weapon, drug activity, and defendant; it need not prove simultaneous handling (Mondragon).
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Facts here: The firearm was readily accessible under the driver’s seat as Simpson drove to a drug transaction (Manigan). That accessibility and timing established the requisite nexus. The district court’s finding that the firearm was possessed in connection with drug activity in the same course of conduct as the conviction offense (Slade) was not clearly erroneous.
4) Sentencing Explanation and Disparity (§ 3553(a)(6))
Simpson contended that the district court failed to address his nonfrivolous argument for a downward variance based on JSIN statistics showing purported disparities for similarly situated defendants. The panel affirmed the adequacy of the explanation:
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Individualized assessment: The district court thoroughly discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense (quantity, firearm, central role), Simpson’s history (including a prior nearly nine-year sentence for armed robbery and recidivism concerns), and the need for deterrence, protection of the public, and just punishment.
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JSIN-based argument: The court acknowledged but rejected the JSIN argument because defense counsel did not explain how the cited statistics were relevant or comparable to Simpson’s case. It noted the “apples-to-apples” challenge and found no unwarranted disparities. Under Lozano, the court’s brief, responsive explanation sufficed when the defense presentation lacked specificity and comparators.
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Consistency with § 3553(a): The court explicitly found that a below-Guidelines sentence would undercut the statutory goals, especially in light of offense seriousness and public protection.