United States v. Alfred Lamar Shavers & Tyrone James Jones
Voluntary Admission of PSR Facts as a Cure for Erlinger Error under the ACCA

1. Introduction

On 20 June 2025 the Eleventh Circuit, sitting on the non-argument calendar, handed down a consolidated opinion in United States v. Alfred Lamar Shavers and United States v. Tyrone James Jones. Although both appeals arose from the same multi-defendant narcotics prosecution in the Middle District of Florida, each raised distinct constitutional issues:

  • Shavers challenged (i) the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement applied to his 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) conviction after Erlinger v. United States, (ii) the constitutionality of §922(g)(1) under the Commerce Clause, and (iii) its validity under the Second Amendment in light of Bruen and Rahimi.
  • Jones asserted a Confrontation Clause violation stemming from Detective Austin Raimundo’s testimony about a confidential informant’s out-of-court statements.

The Court rejected every claim and affirmed both defendants’ convictions and Shavers’s 192-month sentence. The decision’s most significant doctrinal contribution lies in its application of Erlinger error analysis: the panel held that where a defendant admits the “separate occasions” facts through an un-objected-to Presentence Report (PSR), any Erlinger violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  1. The district court’s finding—rather than the jury’s—of three qualifying prior drug felonies on different occasions violated the Sixth Amendment under Erlinger. However, the error was harmless because Shavers admitted the factual predicates by failing to object to the PSR, and no reasonable juror could find otherwise.
  2. Binding Eleventh Circuit precedent (Scott) foreclosed Shavers’s Commerce Clause attack on §922(g)(1).
  3. Likewise, precedent (Rozier; reaffirmed in Dubois) foreclosed his post-Bruen/Rahimi Second Amendment challenge.
  4. Jones’s Confrontation Clause claim, reviewed only for plain error, failed because he could not show that any alleged testimonial hearsay affected the verdict in light of overwhelming corroborative evidence.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024) – Held that the “separate occasions” determination under §924(e)(1) is an element requiring jury proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Shavers invoked Erlinger to claim procedural error.
  • United States v. Rivers, 134 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2025) – Applied Erlinger and declared such errors non-structural, subject to harmless-error review. The Shavers panel followed Rivers in adopting harmless-error analysis.
  • Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) – Limits the documentary evidence a judge may consult when determining the fact of a prior conviction. The panel reiterated that Shepard documents cannot establish whether offenses occurred on different occasions.
  • Scott (11th Cir. 2001) – Upheld §922(g) under the Commerce Clause; remains binding.
  • Rozier (11th Cir. 2010), Dubois (11th Cir. 2025), Bruen (2022), Rahimi (2024) – Framework for Second Amendment analysis of felon-in-possession bans. Dubois recently reaffirmed the presumptive lawfulness of §922(g)(1).
  • Crawford / Davis line (Confrontation Clause) – Informs the “testimonial” inquiry applied to Jones’s evidentiary complaint.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds in three logical stages.

  1. Identifying the constitutional error. The panel agreed that, under Erlinger, the district court’s judicial fact-finding on “separate occasions” was erroneous.
  2. Applying the Rivers harmless-error standard. The Court emphasized that Shavers (a) did not object to PSR paragraphs specifying the dates of the three drug felonies (2008, 2009, 2012), and (b) tacitly conceded the prosecutor’s statement that the convictions occurred on separate dates. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent (Beckles), failure to object constitutes admission of those facts. Because no juror could reasonably find otherwise, the panel found the Erlinger error harmless.
  3. Confirming sentence legitimacy. Once the ACCA enhancement survived harmless-error scrutiny, the Guideline §4B1.4 designation and the resulting 192-month sentence remained procedurally sound. The panel also noted that the same total sentence could have been imposed on Shavers’s 21 U.S.C. §841 count even without ACCA, further undercutting prejudice.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

  • Clarifies the evidentiary path for harmless-error findings post-Erlinger. The decision stands for the proposition that an unobjected-to PSR can substitute for a jury finding where the defendant implicitly admits the “different occasions” element, thereby curing an Erlinger violation.
  • Practical guidance for defense counsel. Defense lawyers must object to PSR paragraphs regarding the timing and separateness of prior felonies if they hope to preserve Erlinger claims—silence equals admission.
  • Second Amendment jurisprudence stabilized. By relying on Dubois, the panel signals that felon-in-possession challenges remain foreclosed in the Eleventh Circuit despite the evolving Supreme Court landscape.
  • Confrontation Clause application narrowed. The opinion reinforces that, on plain-error review, even concededly testimonial hearsay will not warrant reversal absent a reasonable probability of changing the verdict.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). A federal statute (18 U.S.C. §924(e)) that mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a §922(g) offender with three prior “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses” committed on different occasions.
  • Erlinger Error. After Erlinger (2024), a judge may no longer decide whether prior felonies were committed on separate occasions; that fact must be admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Presentence Report (PSR). A detailed report prepared by the U.S. Probation Office summarizing the defendant’s criminal history and offense conduct. Failing to object to any factual statement in the PSR is deemed an admission of that fact in the Eleventh Circuit.
  • Harmless-Error Review. An appellate doctrine: even if constitutional error occurred, the conviction/sentence is affirmed if the government shows the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Confrontation Clause (Testimonial Hearsay). The Sixth Amendment bars prosecutors from introducing out-of-court testimonial statements unless the witness is present for cross-examination. But if the statement is offered for a non-hearsay purpose (e.g., explaining investigative steps), or if overwhelming other evidence makes the error harmless, reversal is unnecessary.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Shavers & Jones offers a roadmap for post-Erlinger sentencing litigation in the Eleventh Circuit. The Court crystallizes three key lessons:

  1. Erlinger violations are not self-executing grounds for relief; harmless-error analysis applies, and unchallenged PSR facts can render the error innocuous.
  2. Long-standing Eleventh Circuit precedent continues to insulate §922(g)(1) from Commerce Clause and Second Amendment attacks—even after Bruen and Rahimi.
  3. On plain-error review, Confrontation Clause claims will rarely succeed where the evidentiary record is otherwise overwhelming.

Collectively, the ruling preserves prosecutorial reliance on ACCA enhancements, reinforces the necessity for defense objections at sentencing, and underscores the Eleventh Circuit’s fidelity to its own precedent absent direct Supreme Court reversal. Practitioners should view the case as a potent reminder that procedural vigilance—not merely substantive constitutional doctrine—often determines appellate outcomes.