United States v. Rembert: Rule 21(b) Transfer Denials, Grand Jury Subpoenaed Bank Records, and the “Bare Rationality” Sufficiency Standard

Introduction

In United States v. Carlton Rembert (3d Cir. Mar. 24, 2026) (non-precedential), the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions of a Virginia defendant tried in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for fraud schemes involving Pennsylvania guardianship “wards.” The case arose from alleged misuse of incapacitated persons’ funds by Gloria Byars (a former office manager at a court-appointed guardianship service) through checks drawn on ward accounts and routed into bank accounts associated with Rembert’s purported medical-billing businesses.

On appeal, Rembert challenged (i) the denial of a discretionary venue transfer under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b), (ii) the denial of suppression of bank records (PNC) obtained via a grand jury subpoena, (iii) the denial of judgment of acquittal for insufficiency of evidence on four counts, and (iv) the denial of a new trial based on admission of a cooperator’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Venue transfer: The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia after balancing the Platt factors.
  • Suppression: No Fourth Amendment suppression remedy applied to PNC records produced in response to a federal grand jury subpoena; defects (if any) in a prior warrant for a third party’s records did not help Rembert.
  • Sufficiency: Under the “bare rationality” standard, evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for conspiracy to commit bank fraud, bank fraud, and two wire fraud counts.
  • New trial: Admission of witness Mitchell’s testimony was not an abuse of discretion under Rule 403; it had probative value and Rembert did not develop a compelling unfair-prejudice showing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Venue and Rule 21(b) Transfers

  • Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 376 U.S. 240 (1964): The controlling framework. The Third Circuit treated the ten Platt factors as the structured guide for discretion and endorsed the District Court’s factor-by-factor assessment (some for transfer, most against).
  • In re United States, 273 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2001): Reinforced that Platt balancing is case-specific and that the Constitution does not entitle a defendant to trial in his home district.
  • United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2009): Supplied the governing appellate standard—denial of venue change is reviewed for abuse of discretion—supporting affirmance absent a clear misbalance or legal error.
  • United States v. Cuevas-Almonte, 156 F.4th 319 (3d Cir. 2025): Cited for the constitutional baseline that trial must occur in the state where the offense occurred (and Rule 18’s venue principle).
  • United States v. Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 457 (2024): Referenced in the court’s discussion of plain-error review and the “begun, continued, or completed” venue statute (18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)).
  • United States v. Turner, 677 F.3d 570 (3d Cir. 2012) and McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984): Used to reject preservation of venue arguments raised only in a pro se filing while represented (no right to hybrid representation).

2) Suppression, Grand Jury Subpoenas, and Fourth Amendment “Standing”

  • United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976): The centerpiece for rejecting suppression—bank records held by a bank and produced via grand jury subpoena do not implicate the depositor’s Fourth Amendment interests.
  • United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)): Deployed to defeat a “fruit of the poisonous tree” theory grounded in alleged violations of a third party’s rights; a defendant cannot suppress evidence solely because the government violated someone else’s Fourth Amendment protections.
  • United States v. Goldstein, 914 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2019): Provided the standard of review for suppression rulings (clear error for facts; de novo for legal conclusions), which the panel applied in affirming the denial.

3) Sufficiency of the Evidence

  • United States v. Kramer, 75 F.4th 339 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005)): Supplied the rule to view evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and ask whether any rational trier of fact could convict.
  • United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650 (2012)): Provided the “bare rationality” threshold; the panel framed its affirmance around this deferential standard.
  • United States v. Whiteford, 676 F.3d 348 (3d Cir. 2012): Cited to rebut Rembert’s mistaken theory that the government had to prove the identity of all named coconspirators; where indictments include “known and unknown” persons, the identity of additional conspirators is not an element.
  • Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014): Informed the bank-fraud analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), emphasizing that intent to defraud a bank is not required—rather, intent to obtain bank property “by means of” false or fraudulent pretenses is.

4) New Trial / Evidentiary Discretion

  • United States v. El-Battouty, 38 F.4th 327 (3d Cir. 2022): Supported the abuse-of-discretion framework for Rule 403 decisions and underwrote deference to the trial judge’s balancing where probative value exists and prejudice is not shown to substantially outweigh it.

Legal Reasoning

1) Rule 21(b) Convenience Transfer: Deferential Platt Balancing

The panel treated the venue-transfer request as discretionary and cabined appellate review to abuse of discretion. The District Court found only two factors (defendant location and expense) favored transfer; most others (witnesses, locus of events, records, counsel, accessibility, docket) favored keeping the case in Pennsylvania. The Third Circuit did not require perfect factor weighting; it asked whether the pro-transfer considerations were so strong that denial was irrational or unjust. They were not—particularly because the scheme and victim impact centered on Pennsylvania wards, and criminal defendants have no entitlement to be tried where they reside.

2) Suppression: Grand Jury Subpoena to a Bank Is Not a Fourth Amendment “Search” of the Depositor

Rembert’s suppression theory attacked probable cause for a 2019 warrant executed on Byars’s bank records, but the records used against him were produced under a 2020 federal grand jury subpoena to PNC for his account. Under United States v. Miller, the depositor has no Fourth Amendment interest in bank records held by the bank, so the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply. The court also closed off a derivative “taint” argument: even if the government had violated Byars’s rights, United States v. Stearn and Rakas v. Illinois bar suppression by a defendant who was not the victim of that constitutional violation.

3) Sufficiency: Circumstantial Proof and the “Bare Rationality” Floor

The panel accepted that direct testimony identifying Rembert as the depositor of each check was absent, but emphasized circumstantial evidence: (i) large numbers of ward-account checks deposited into his business accounts, (ii) his status as the sole authorized user, (iii) ward relatives’ testimony that his businesses provided no services, and (iv) patterns of structured cash withdrawals under $10,000 (supporting consciousness of wrongdoing). For wire fraud, documentary evidence connecting him to obtaining and mailing BayPort checks to Havertown sufficed without needing a live bank witness. Applying Caraballo-Rodriguez/Coleman, the court concluded the verdicts comfortably exceeded “bare rationality.”

4) Rule 403 and New Trial: Probative “Modus Operandi” Evidence

Although Mitchell’s testimony did not directly describe transactions between Mitchell and Rembert, it described a similar Byars-directed pipeline (ward checks in; payments back to Byars; participant keeps a cut). The panel viewed that as probative of Byars’s method and permitted an inference of a similar plan with Rembert. With little developed showing of unfair prejudice substantially outweighing probative value, the court deferred to the District Court’s evidentiary ruling and denied a new trial.

Impact

Even as a non-precedential disposition, the opinion is a practical reminder of four recurring federal-criminal principles:

  • Rule 21(b) transfer motions are hard to win on appeal: meticulous Platt balancing and a plausible rationale generally insulate denial from reversal.
  • Bank-record suppression remains constrained by the third-party doctrine: where records are obtained from a bank via grand jury subpoena, Miller largely forecloses Fourth Amendment suppression arguments by the depositor.
  • Circumstantial evidence is enough under deferential sufficiency review: control of accounts plus deposit/withdrawal patterns and lack of legitimate services can support fraud convictions.
  • Rule 403 challenges must be developed: claiming irrelevance or prejudice in conclusory form is unlikely to overcome trial-court discretion, especially when evidence supports a reasonable inference about scheme structure.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 21(b) transfer: Even if venue is legally proper, a court may (not must) move the case for convenience and justice. Platt supplies a checklist of ten common-sense factors (where the defendant/witnesses/events/records are; cost; access; docket; etc.).
  • Grand jury subpoena vs. search warrant: A warrant authorizes law enforcement to search/seize based on probable cause. A grand jury subpoena compels a third party (like a bank) to produce records. Under Miller, bank-held account records are treated as the bank’s business records for Fourth Amendment purposes, not the customer’s private papers.
  • “Fruit of the poisonous tree” limits: Even if police violated someone else’s rights, you usually cannot suppress that evidence unless your own Fourth Amendment rights were violated (Rakas; Stearn).
  • “Bare rationality” review: Appellate courts do not re-weigh evidence. If a rational juror could convict on the record viewed in the government’s favor, the verdict stands (Caraballo-Rodriguez; Coleman).
  • Rule 403 balancing: Relevant evidence can still be excluded if unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value. But “unfair prejudice” means an improper tendency to decide on emotion or character, not merely that the evidence is damaging.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s affirmance in United States v. Rembert applies settled doctrine to a multi-count fraud prosecution: discretionary venue-transfer denials are upheld absent clear abuse under Platt; bank records produced by a bank pursuant to a grand jury subpoena are not suppressible under the Fourth Amendment per United States v. Miller; sufficiency challenges face the steep “bare rationality” standard; and Rule 403/new-trial arguments require a concrete showing that unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value.