United States v. Price — No Sua Sponte Rule 32.1 Balancing Required Absent a Confrontation/Hearsay Objection at Supervised-Release Revocation

1. Introduction

In United States v. Price (10th Cir. May 5, 2026) (Order and Judgment), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the revocation of Anthony Steven Price’s supervised release after the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he committed new criminal conduct (assault and battery with a dangerous weapon) and possessed a dangerous weapon. The revocation findings rested primarily on a police report and related testimony from a probation officer summarizing information obtained from law enforcement and a family member.

The key appellate issues were (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the revocation findings under the applicable standard of review, and (2) whether revocation could rest on hearsay evidence when the defendant did not object or invoke his right under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) to question adverse witnesses.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court’s findings were supported by record evidence—most notably the police report and the probation officer’s testimony—and that credibility determinations rejecting the defendant’s contrary testimony were within the district court’s fact-finding province.

On the hearsay/confrontation argument, the court rejected the claim that revocation could not be based on hearsay alone. Because Mr. Price did not object to hearsay or assert a confrontation right at the hearing, the panel reviewed only for plain error and found none—emphasizing that the Tenth Circuit has not required district courts to conduct the Rule 32.1 balancing test sua sponte.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• United States v. Disney, 253 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001)
  Cited for the standard that supervised-release revocations are reviewed for abuse of discretion. This frames the appellate lens as deferential, particularly where the district court’s decision rests on factual findings.
• United States v. Battle, 706 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 2013)
  Supplies the abuse-of-discretion definition: reliance on an incorrect legal conclusion or clearly erroneous factual finding. This is the doctrinal bridge between “revocation discretion” and “reviewable error.”
• United States v. Cortes-Gomez, 926 F.3d 699, 708 (10th Cir. 2019)
  Provides the “clearly erroneous” factual-findings standard: findings are clearly erroneous only if unsupported by the record or if the appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction of mistake. The panel uses this to reject Price’s sufficiency attack because the police report and supporting testimony constituted record support.
• United States v. Rodebaugh, 798 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 2015)
  Reinforces that witness credibility determinations are within the district court’s province as fact-finder. This undercuts Price’s attempt to re-litigate the district court’s decision to credit the police report over his and his mother-in-law’s testimony.
• United States v. Williams, 106 F.4th 1040, 1045 (10th Cir. 2024)
  Quoted for the proposition that revocation hearings are flexible and may consider letters, affidavits, and other materials inadmissible at trial—supporting the general permissibility of hearsay-type evidence in the revocation context.
• United States v. McGehee, 672 F.3d 860, 876 (10th Cir. 2012)
  Used to route Price’s hearsay/confrontation claim into plain-error review because he did not object below. This is critical: the panel does not decide the full merits of a preserved Rule 32.1 confrontation claim; it instead evaluates only whether any unpreserved error was “plain.”
• United States v. Jones, 818 F.3d 1091, 1098 (10th Cir. 2016)
  Establishes that the Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) balancing test governs whether hearsay evidence may be used to revoke supervised release (i.e., confrontation interest versus government good cause). Price leverages this concept, but the panel distinguishes the case posture: he did not invoke Rule 32.1 at all.
• United States v. Hernandez, 104 F.4th 755, 767 (10th Cir. 2024)
  Defines plain error’s “plainness” requirement: the error must be clear or obvious under current law. The panel relies on this to conclude that even if the district court should have conducted balancing, it was not plainly required because the Tenth Circuit has never imposed a sua sponte obligation.
• United States v. Body, 791 F. App'x 807, 809 (11th Cir. 2019)
  Discussed only to distinguish: the Eleventh Circuit case involved a preserved confrontation/hearsay issue, unlike Price’s failure to object. The panel uses it to explain why that authority does not help Price.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Revocation burden and evidentiary sufficiency
   The governing burden is a preponderance of the evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel therefore asks whether the district court’s findings lacked factual support or were clearly erroneous. Because the police report described injuries consistent with being struck by an object and the probation officer’s testimony further corroborated the event through conversations with others, the court found record support for both “new crime” and “dangerous weapon” findings.
2. Deference to credibility determinations
   Price and his mother-in-law denied that he used an object and denied seeing blood. The district court found them not credible. On appeal, the panel treated that as quintessential fact-finding protected by deference, citing United States v. Rodebaugh.
3. Hearsay, confrontation, and forfeiture
   Price argued revocation cannot rest on hearsay alone. The panel responded in two steps:
   • Revocation hearings allow flexible evidence: citing United States v. Williams, the court noted revocation proceedings are not governed by the same evidentiary strictures as trials.
   • Unpreserved Rule 32.1 claim triggers plain-error review: because Price did not object to the police report or the probation officer’s hearsay testimony, he forfeited the argument and the court reviewed only for plain error under United States v. McGehee.
   Although United States v. Jones recognizes a balancing test under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) when a releasee asserts a right to question adverse witnesses, the panel emphasized a key doctrinal limit: it had “never held that a district court must sua sponte conduct” that balancing test. Under United States v. Hernandez, the absence of such controlling law defeats “plainness,” so no plain error could be shown.

C. Impact

Although labeled a non-precedential “Order and Judgment,” Price has practical persuasive force in the Tenth Circuit on revocation litigation strategy and error preservation:

• Preservation is decisive in Rule 32.1 disputes: Defendants who want Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) balancing must timely object to hearsay and request the opportunity to question adverse witnesses. Absent that, appellate review will likely be confined to plain error, where the lack of a sua sponte requirement makes reversal difficult.
• Police reports can carry significant weight: The decision illustrates that, under the preponderance standard and deferential review, a police report—especially when accompanied by testimony that ties it to other sources—may suffice to support revocation findings even when the defendant offers contradictory testimony.
• Credibility rulings are hard to overturn: The panel’s reliance on deference signals that factual disputes at revocation hearings are often won or lost at the district court level.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised-release revocation

A post-incarceration proceeding where the court decides whether a defendant violated release conditions and, if so, whether to impose additional imprisonment.

Preponderance of the evidence

The government must show it is more likely than not that a violation occurred—lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Abuse of discretion

A deferential appellate standard: reversal generally requires legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding.

Clearly erroneous

A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if there is some support in the record, even if other evidence points the other way.

Hearsay

Statements offered for their truth made outside of court (e.g., a police report recounting what witnesses said). Hearsay is often restricted at trial, but revocation hearings are more flexible.

Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) and the balancing test

At a final revocation hearing, the defendant is entitled to question adverse witnesses unless the court finds the “interest of justice” does not require their appearance. When properly raised, courts balance the defendant’s confrontation interest against the government’s good cause for not producing the witness.

Plain error

A demanding appellate standard applied when an issue was not preserved. Even if something was wrong, the error must be clear under existing law; unclear or unsettled legal duties (like an asserted sua sponte requirement) usually do not qualify.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Price affirms a revocation where the district court relied heavily on a police report and related testimony and made credibility determinations against the defendant. Its most consequential takeaway is procedural: in the Tenth Circuit, a defendant who does not object to hearsay or invoke Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) will face plain-error review on appeal, and the court will not treat the absence of a sua sponte Rule 32.1 balancing analysis as “plain” error. Practically, the opinion underscores that confrontation-based challenges in revocation proceedings must be asserted in real time to meaningfully constrain the government’s use of hearsay.