United States v. Peterson & Lohden: Opening-Statement “Door-Opening” as Good Cause to Excuse Rule 404(b) Notice for Rebuttal Other-Acts Evidence

Introduction

In United States v. Dayton Peterson and United States v. John E. Lohden, Jr. (6th Cir. Mar. 13, 2026), the Sixth Circuit affirmed sweeping convictions and lengthy sentences arising from two violent, law-enforcement-impersonation kidnappings and related drug, firearm, and money-laundering offenses.

Key parties. The United States prosecuted: (1) John E. Lohden, Jr., a long-time confidential informant who possessed law-enforcement gear and orchestrated kidnappings while posing as a U.S. Marshal; and (2) Dayton Peterson, who participated in the later kidnapping and was linked to stolen contraband and drug trafficking.

Key appellate issues. The appeals raised numerous claims, but the opinion’s most broadly instructive rulings address: (i) admission of “other-acts” text messages under Rules 404(b) and 403 notwithstanding allegedly inadequate pretrial notice; (ii) Fourth Amendment abandonment of an impounded vehicle (and thus no privacy interest in a phone found inside); (iii) competency-to-be-sentenced procedure and the proper statute (§ 4241 vs. § 4244); (iv) constitutionality of a “contingent” plea offer conditioned on both co-defendants pleading; (v) joinder of defendants and counts; (vi) sufficiency of evidence; and (vii) substantive reasonableness of sentence.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting messages found on a phone recovered from Lohden’s impounded car, even where the defense argued the government’s Rule 404(b) notice was too general. The court treated the defense opening statements as “opening the door,” supplying “good cause” to excuse any notice deficiency and allowing the government to use the messages to rebut claimed lack of knowledge or intent.

As to Lohden individually, the court rejected suppression (no reasonable expectation of privacy due to abandonment), upheld the competency finding under § 4241, and found no due-process violation in the government’s withdrawal of a plea deal contingent on a co-defendant’s agreement.

As to Peterson individually, the court found no plain error in joinder, held the evidence sufficient on all challenged counts, and upheld as substantively reasonable a below-guidelines 360-month sentence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Johnson, 79 F.4th 684, 698 (6th Cir. 2023): Provided the abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary admission rulings, framing the deferential posture used to uphold the Rule 404(b)/403 decision.
  • United States v. France, 611 F. App'x 847, 850 (6th Cir. 2015) (unpublished): Supported the “door-opening” logic—when a defendant claims in opening that he was duped or lacked culpable knowledge, the government may introduce otherwise-excludable evidence to show he “knew what he was doing.” The panel used France as the conceptual bridge to “good cause” excusing notice.
  • United States v. Harvey, 653 F.3d 388, 394 (6th Cir. 2011): Supplied the general doctrine that excluded or suppressed evidence may become admissible once the defense “opens the door,” which the court applied to justify the timing and scope of the other-acts messages after the defense theory was previewed to the jury.
  • United States v. Fairley, 137 F.4th 503, 517 (6th Cir. 2025): Clarified review standards—de novo review for whether evidence fits a permitted Rule 404(b)(2) use, and abuse-of-discretion review for Rule 403 balancing. The panel followed that bifurcated approach to affirm admission for knowledge/intent and to reject unfair-prejudice arguments.
  • United States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 2019): Provided the suppression-review framework (clear error for facts, de novo for law, and evidence viewed favorably to the district court’s ruling).
  • United States v. Rogers, 97 F.4th 1038, 1041 (6th Cir. 2024): Restated the threshold requirement of a “legitimate expectation of privacy” before a defendant can invoke Fourth Amendment protection—an inquiry the panel resolved against Lohden.
  • United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 1986) and United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 873-74 (6th Cir. 2004): Anchored the abandonment analysis. The panel treated Lohden’s flight, lengthy non-possession, and counsel’s “No, we don't want it” statement as negating any subjective expectation of privacy in the vehicle.
  • United States v. Dubrule, 822 F.3d 866, 875 (6th Cir. 2016): Supplied clear-error review for competency determinations where the district court finds competence, and reinforced deference to trial-court credibility calls between competing experts.
  • United States v. Allen, 954 F.2d 1160, 1165 (6th Cir. 1992): Provided de novo review for the due-process claim about plea bargaining.
  • Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148-49 (2012): Furnished the foundational principle that there is no constitutional right to a plea bargain—central to rejecting Lohden’s argument that he was “forced” to trial when the contingent deal was withdrawn.
  • United States v. Usher, 703 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1983): Supported prosecutorial latitude to make plea offers contingent on treatment of third parties, emphasizing the Supreme Court’s reserved judgment on outer constitutional limits while endorsing the permissibility of such contingency in practice.
  • United States v. Dedman, 527 F.3d 577, 591 (6th Cir. 2008): Set the plain-error standard for unpreserved joinder objections, making reversal difficult absent obvious and outcome-determinative error.
  • United States v. Johnson, 763 F.2d 773, 777 (6th Cir. 1985), United States v. Tisdale, 980 F.3d 1089, 1094 (6th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 884-85 (6th Cir. 2012): Reinforced the pro-joinder baseline (“Joint trials are favored”) and the Rule 8(b) notion that charges are properly joined if “logically interrelated,” even if every defendant is not charged in every count.
  • United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2011): Provided the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard: viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 449 (6th Cir. 2010): Foreclosed appellate re-weighing of witness credibility and rejected the notion that convictions require physical evidence—key to rejecting Peterson’s attacks on the government’s proof.
  • United States v. Smith-Kilpatrick, 942 F.3d 734, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) and United States v. Pyles, 904 F.3d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 2018): Established (i) a presumption of reasonableness for below-guidelines sentences and (ii) the appellate court’s refusal to reweigh mitigating factors already considered by the district court.

Legal Reasoning

1) Rule 404(b) Notice, “Good Cause,” and Door-Opening Through Opening Statements

Rule 404(b)(3) requires “reasonable notice” of other-acts evidence, unless the court excuses lack of notice for “good cause.” The government’s pretrial notice described “text messages” showing surveillance and target research. At trial, it sought to introduce messages specifically discussing another planned robbery.

The district court admitted the messages after the defense openings “disavowed any knowing participation,” treating the messages as rebuttal of claimed naivete/mistake. On appeal, the panel characterized the district court’s rationale as a “good cause” determination under Rule 404(b)(3)(C): once the defense previewed an innocence-by-ignorance theory, the probative value of rebuttal intent/knowledge evidence crystallized, and the timing problem could be excused.

The Sixth Circuit then independently confirmed that the messages fit a permitted Rule 404(b)(2) use—knowledge and intent—because they depicted Lohden proposing a “search with papers” ruse and Peterson agreeing (“Shit I'm wit it”), which tended to show both defendants understood and embraced the tactic of using law-enforcement pretense to commit violent theft/kidnapping.

Finally, the panel upheld the district court’s Rule 403 balancing: the court limited prejudice by refusing to litigate whether the planned robbery occurred and by cutting off the line of proof immediately after the last message.

2) Fourth Amendment: Abandonment Eliminates a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

The suppression issue turned on standing: whether Lohden retained a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in the impounded vehicle where the phone was found. The panel held he did not because he abandoned it—leaving it after a chase, being arrested elsewhere, allowing it to sit for six months, and (critically) having counsel disclaim any desire to reclaim it (“No, we don't want it”). Those facts, under Sixth Circuit abandonment doctrine, negated any subjective expectation of privacy and therefore barred the Fourth Amendment claim.

3) Competency at Sentencing: § 4241 vs. § 4244

The panel treated this as a straightforward competency-to-be-sentenced inquiry. The district court ordered evaluation, heard competing experts, credited the Bureau of Prisons psychiatrist (who opined Lohden was malingering), and found competence. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit deferred under clear-error review and rejected the statutory reframing: § 4241 governs competence; § 4244 concerns hospitalization in lieu of imprisonment, a different question than the one posed.

4) Contingent Plea Offers Conditioned on Co-Defendant Pleas

Lohden argued due process was violated because the government offered a plea deal only if both defendants pleaded guilty. The panel rejected this on the premise that Lohden remained free to plead guilty; he simply lacked any entitlement to the offered bargain. Citing Missouri v. Frye, the court reiterated that there is no constitutional right to a plea bargain, and—consistent with United States v. Usher—the government could lawfully condition leniency on a global resolution.

5) Joinder and Plain Error

Peterson’s joinder attack failed mainly because it was unpreserved (plain-error review) and because the two kidnapping episodes were “logically interrelated”: both involved Lohden impersonating law enforcement, making joinder permissible under Rule 8(b) even though Peterson was not charged in the earlier kidnapping.

6) Sufficiency and Sentencing

The court applied orthodox sufficiency principles: no credibility re-weighing, no “physical evidence required” rule, and deference to the jury’s ability to draw inferences (including distribution intent from the theft of 80 pounds of cocaine/heroin). For sentencing, the court emphasized the presumption of reasonableness for below-guidelines sentences and refused to reweigh mitigation the district court expressly considered.

Impact

  • Rule 404(b) practice in the Sixth Circuit: The decision reinforces that a defense opening statement can materially alter the admissibility calculus for other-acts evidence—both by supporting “good cause” to excuse notice issues and by sharpening the non-propensity purpose (knowledge/intent rebuttal). Defense counsel must weigh whether broad “I didn’t know / I was naïve” themes will invite otherwise contestable other-acts proof.
  • Trial-management signal under Rule 403: The opinion endorses a pragmatic middle path—admit intent/knowledge texts while limiting prejudice by excluding downstream proof about whether the uncharged plan occurred.
  • Abandonment doctrine and post-impound searches: The combination of flight, long impoundment, and an explicit disclaimer through counsel strengthens the government’s standing argument in future vehicle-related suppression disputes.
  • Plea bargaining leverage: The ruling underscores the constitutional permissibility (at least under existing Sixth Circuit law) of package/contingent deals, preserving prosecutorial flexibility to demand global pleas.
  • Joinder stability: By deeming similar modus operandi kidnappings “logically interrelated,” the decision may encourage joinder where a central actor links episodes, particularly when defendants fail to timely object.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 404(b) (“other-acts” evidence): Generally bars using past bad acts to show “he’s the type who would do this,” but allows such evidence for limited purposes like proving intent, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
  • Rule 404(b)(3) notice and “good cause”: Prosecutors usually must warn the defense before trial that they plan to use other-acts evidence. A judge can excuse inadequate notice if a good reason arises—here, the defense openings made the rebuttal need more concrete.
  • “Opening the door”: When one side introduces a theme or claim (e.g., “I was naïve”), the court may allow the other side to respond with evidence that might otherwise be excluded, to prevent the jury from being misled.
  • Rule 403 unfair prejudice: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if it risks provoking an improper emotional reaction or distracting the jury more than it helps prove a fact in dispute. Limiting details (as the district court did) is a common cure.
  • Abandonment (Fourth Amendment): If you truly give up property (objectively shown by words and actions), you typically lose privacy protections in it—so you cannot challenge later searches of it.
  • Competency to be sentenced (§ 4241): Focuses on whether the defendant can understand proceedings and assist counsel. Section 4244 is about a different question: whether a defendant should be hospitalized rather than imprisoned.
  • Plain-error review: If you don’t object at trial, you usually must show an obvious error that affected the outcome—an intentionally steep hurdle.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms severe sentences for impersonation-based kidnappings and related offenses, but its broader significance lies in procedure: (1) defense opening statements can justify excusing Rule 404(b) notice deficiencies and support admission of other-acts evidence to rebut claimed ignorance; (2) abandonment, reinforced by an express disclaimer of interest, defeats Fourth Amendment standing in an impounded vehicle; (3) competency-to-be-sentenced properly proceeds under § 4241; and (4) contingent, co-defendant-dependent plea offers do not violate due process absent a denied right to plead guilty.