United States v. Nademus: No Sua Sponte Competency Hearing Without Bona Fide Doubt; Guilty Plea Waives Indictment Defects; Sentencing Continuance Requires Specific Prejudice

A. Precedents Cited

1) Competency: “reasonable cause” and “bona fide doubt”

• United States v. Wingo, 789 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015): Provided the governing framework: due process requires competence; the court must hold a hearing sua sponte if it has “reasonable cause” to believe the defendant “may” be incompetent. The opinion also emphasized the “aggregate” evaluation of evidence and the absence of “fixed or immutable signs.”
• Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575 (11th Cir. 1990): Supplied the “bona fide doubt” standard and the three-factor test: (1) irrational behavior; (2) demeanor; (3) prior medical opinion.
• United States v. Lewis, 40 F.4th 1229 (11th Cir. 2022): Supported deference to the district court’s on-the-scene ability to assess demeanor and credibility.
• Williams, 468 F.2d at 820 (as cited by the panel): Cited as additional support for the conclusion that the facts did not compel a competency inquiry.

2) Guilty plea waiver of nonjurisdictional defects

• United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703 (11th Cir. 1993): Stated the ordinary standard for reviewing denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment (abuse of discretion), which the panel treated as largely academic because the guilty plea waiver controlled.
• United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2003): Set out the baseline rule that a voluntary, unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects.
• United States v. Williams, 29 F.4th 1306 (11th Cir. 2022): Identified the “narrow class” of post-plea challenges that remain available (e.g., voluntariness, constitutionality of the statute, or subject-matter jurisdiction).
• United States v. Betancourth, 554 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2009): Reinforced that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.
• Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018): Provided the key limitation: a valid guilty plea relinquishes claims that contradict the admissions necessarily made by the plea. The panel used this principle to reject Nademus’s attempt to recharacterize “victims” as culpable “loan sharks.”
• United States v. Salman, 378 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2004): Cited in a footnote to explain that courts generally assess indictment sufficiency from its face and cannot dismiss based on a pretrial examination of evidence outside the indictment.

3) Continuances, due process, and prejudice

• United States v. Bowe, 221 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2000): Recognized a due-process right to a fair and reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense, and supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for continuance denials.
• United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2005): Confirmed that in some circumstances denial of a continuance can violate due process.
• Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964): Provided the Supreme Court’s caution that not every denial of more time violates due process; no mechanical test applies.
• United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984): Emphasized case-by-case analysis focusing on reasons presented to the trial court at the time of denial.
• United States v. Verderame, 51 F.3d 249 (11th Cir. 1995): Required a showing of “specific substantial prejudice” to obtain reversal.
• United States v. Garmany, 762 F.2d 929 (11th Cir. 1985): Listed factors relevant to preparation-time continuances (time available, likely prejudice, defendant’s role in shortening time, complexity, discovery availability) and, for witness-related continuances, diligence and specificity of expected testimony.
• United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2005): Cited to support the panel’s assumption (without deciding) that an appeal waiver may not bar a genuine constitutional challenge to post-plea proceedings, because such waivers presuppose constitutionally compliant proceedings.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Competency: confusion is not enough without evidence of incapacity

The panel applied Wingo and Tiller v. Esposito to decide whether information before the district court created a “bona fide doubt” about competence. Nademus’s argument effectively rested on the second factor (demeanor) and her statements at the October 30 hearing that she was “having a hard time being cognizant,” had been in a medical unit, experienced blackouts/dizziness, and did not understand events “100 percent.”

The court found these facts insufficient in context. Critically:

• There was no evidence of irrational behavior (factor one), which Nademus conceded.
• There was no prior medical opinion questioning competence (factor three).
• Her confusion was described as situational—focused on why the hearing was occurring despite her health concerns and her instruction to withdraw the motion— and she repeatedly articulated a consistent, coherent choice: withdrawing her motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
• She consulted with counsel repeatedly, supporting the conclusion she could understand, communicate, and make decisions about the proceeding.

Leaning on United States v. Lewis, the panel emphasized deference: the district court was “in the best position” to evaluate demeanor and found her withdrawal decision knowing and voluntary with close assistance of counsel. In short, the record did not show impaired capacity to understand the proceeding or assist counsel, so the court had no obligation to initiate a competency hearing on its own.

2) Indictment challenge: the guilty plea foreclosed the theory

Nademus argued that some promissory-note-like arrangements allegedly carried unlawfully high interest under state law, thus investors were “criminal loan shark[s],” and the indictment should have been dismissed. The panel did not reach the merits because, under United States v. Patti, a voluntary unconditional guilty plea waives nonjurisdictional defects.

Using Class v. United States, the court also framed the argument as one that contradicted the plea’s admissions: Nademus stipulated she solicited investments in “false and fraudulent” programs, made false representations, and used proceeds for personal enrichment and to perpetuate the scheme. That factual basis is incompatible with an appellate reframing that purported “victims” were the wrongdoers in a way that would absolve her. Under United States v. Williams (29 F.4th 1306), she also did not meaningfully argue the plea was involuntary, the statutes unconstitutional, or the court lacked jurisdiction—i.e., the narrow class of surviving claims.

The footnote citing United States v. Salman further signals a structural problem with her pre-plea dismissal theory: federal courts generally do not dismiss indictments based on evidence outside the four corners of the indictment.

3) Sentencing continuance: no constitutional violation without specific prejudice

The panel assumed (without deciding) that the appeal waiver did not bar a true due-process continuance claim, referencing United States v. Blick. It then rejected the due-process claim under the continuance standards.

Applying Ungar v. Sarafite and United States v. Darby, the court treated the inquiry as contextual and focused on reasons given at the time. Under United States v. Verderame, Nademus also had to show “specific substantial prejudice.” The panel found she did not:

• The health issue arose about 10 days earlier, but was presented as a continuance basis only one day before sentencing, undermining diligence.
• Under United States v. Garmany, the defense did not explain with specificity how the missing in-person meeting would change the expert’s offset analysis or what precise favorable evidence would be lost.
• Victims had traveled to testify, giving the court strong scheduling/administrative reasons to proceed.
• The district court accommodated the defense by continuing sentencing for two days, and the expert ultimately testified; the judge even reduced loss by $547,468.75 after sustaining several objections.

Given the expert testimony was heard and some loss issues were resolved favorably, the court found no concrete showing that additional time would have produced a materially different outcome—thus no “specific substantial prejudice.”

C. Impact

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is instructive within Eleventh Circuit practice in three ways:

• Competency: The opinion underscores that transient confusion, delayed responses, or health complaints—without irrational behavior, prior competency opinions, or demonstrable inability to understand/consult/assist—will often be insufficient to trigger a mandatory sua sponte competency hearing.
• Guilty plea finality: It reinforces that creative post-plea theories attacking the factual premise of guilt (or recasting victims as culpable) will typically be foreclosed by the plea’s admissions under Class and the nonjurisdictional-waiver rule.
• Continuances at sentencing: The decision reiterates that due process is not a generalized entitlement to more preparation time; reversal requires diligence and a specific, non-speculative showing of substantial prejudice—especially where the court offers a pragmatic accommodation and the evidence is ultimately presented.