United States v. Myrie: Equal-Protection Challenges to 8 U.S.C. § 1326 Must Prove Discriminatory Intent in the 1952 Enactment (No “Duty to Repudiate” 1929 Racism)

I. Introduction

David Myrie appealed his conviction for unlawful reentry after removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). He argued that § 1326—though facially race-neutral—violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal-protection component because it allegedly perpetuates the discriminatory intent attributed to its predecessor, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929. His theory was that Congress’s 1952 enactment of § 1326 (as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)) and later amendments did not “repudiate” the 1929 statute’s alleged racism and therefore inherited its constitutional taint.

The district court denied Myrie’s motion to dismiss the indictment, relying in part on the Ninth Circuit’s “exhaustive analysis” in United States v. Carrillo-Lopez. After a 51-month sentence, Myrie appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, joining every other circuit to reach the issue in rejecting similar constitutional attacks on § 1326.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that Myrie’s equal-protection claim fails even assuming the Arlington Heights framework applies to § 1326. Myrie did not supply evidence that Congress enacted § 1326 in 1952 (or later amendments) with discriminatory purpose. He instead relied on an unsupported “simple recodification” theory—that § 1326 merely carried forward the 1929 Act’s intent.

The court rejected that approach for three principal reasons:

• No imputation of intent across distinct enactments: The legislative history of the 1929 Act is not the legislative history of § 1326, which was enacted as part of a broader 1952 immigration overhaul and drew from multiple statutes.
• No duty to repudiate: Under Supreme Court precedent, later legislatures are not required to “purge” a predecessor’s discriminatory intent; challengers must prove discriminatory purpose for the law being challenged.
• Disparate impact is not enough: Even if Latinos are overrepresented among those arrested/charged under immigration laws, geographic and demographic realities undermine any inference that the disparity proves discriminatory purpose.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

• Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
  The opinion uses Arlington Heights as the assumed governing test for facially neutral laws alleged to have discriminatory purpose and disparate impact. It lists the canonical intent factors (historical background, sequence of events, procedural/substantive departures, and legislative/administrative history). Critically, the court faulted Myrie for not applying these factors to the 1952 enactment of § 1326 (or its amendments), focusing instead on 1929.
• Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
  Cited for the Fifth Amendment’s equal-protection component and the baseline rule: disparate impact alone does not establish a constitutional violation without proof of discriminatory purpose.
• Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
  Used to contrast strict scrutiny (express racial classifications) with the more demanding intent requirement for facially neutral statutes like § 1326.
• Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (quoting Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1984))
  Supplies the burden formulation: challengers must prove by a preponderance that racial discrimination was a “substantial or motivating factor” in adoption. The Sixth Circuit applies that allocation of burden to Myrie—and finds it unmet as to § 1326.
• Pers. Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
  Provides the intent specificity requirement: the legislature must act “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” adverse effects. This undercuts Myrie’s reliance on disparate outcomes without evidence of purpose tied to § 1326’s enactment.
• Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) and Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579 (2018)
  Establish and reinforce the presumption of legislative good faith. Abbott is central: it states a later legislature has no duty to “purge” a predecessor’s discriminatory intent—directly refuting Myrie’s “repudiate the 1929 Act” theory.
• City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion)
  Supports the proposition that past discrimination does not, “in the manner of original sin,” condemn later governmental action that is not itself unlawful. The Sixth Circuit uses this to reject automatic taint transfer from 1929 to 1952.
• Brnovich v. DNC, 594 U.S. 647 (2021); Abbott v. Perez (again); and Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)
  These cases frame appellate review: the Sixth Circuit reviews the constitutional question de novo but reviews the district court’s factual finding on discriminatory purpose for clear error. The court concludes there is no “definite and firm conviction” of mistake.
• Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957)
  Myrie cited Fourco Glass to argue that “recodification” should not be understood to change a statute’s effect absent clear expression. The Sixth Circuit distinguishes it: the 1952 INA was not a mere recodification project but a “broad reformulation,” and § 1326 materially differed from the 1929 Act and was repeatedly amended.
• Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1 (2020) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.)
  Used to neutralize the “disparate impact” inference: where Latinos comprise a large share of the unauthorized population, they predictably comprise a large share of recipients (or targets) of immigration policies. That demographic/geographic fact, without more, does not imply discriminatory purpose.
• Key circuit authorities relied upon: United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, 68 F.4th 1133 (9th Cir. 2023); United States v. Ferretiz-Hernandez, 139 F.4th 1286 (11th Cir. 2025); and the Seventh Circuit’s “odor” line via United States v. Viveros- Chavez, 114 F.4th 618 (7th Cir. 2024), as well as United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 98 F.4th 90 (4th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Barcenas-Rumualdo, 53 F.4th 859 (5th Cir. 2022).
  The Sixth Circuit aligns with the nationwide consensus rejecting § 1326 equal-protection challenges premised on 1929-era animus. It quotes Ferretiz-Hernandez for the decisive distinction: “the statute before us is not the unlawful reentry provision in the 1929 Act; it is § 1326.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court assumes (without deciding) the applicable framework—and still affirms.
The opinion acknowledges a recurring doctrinal dispute: whether immigration-related enactments should receive only rational-basis review under Congress’s plenary immigration power, or whether § 1326—because it is a domestic criminal statute—should receive “ordinary” equal-protection analysis. The Sixth Circuit does not resolve the question; it holds Myrie loses even under Arlington Heights, which is the more favorable framework for challengers because it allows discriminatory-purpose inquiries into circumstantial evidence.

2. The “recodification equals inherited intent” theory is rejected as a category error.
Myrie’s appeal rested on the premise that § 1326 is a “simple recodification” of the 1929 Act and therefore retains its discriminatory intent unless Congress affirmatively repudiated that intent. The Sixth Circuit rejects this as “a misunderstanding of how legislative intent works” (quoting Ferretiz-Hernandez), emphasizing:

• Presumption of good faith: Courts presume legislatures act in good faith (Miller v. Johnson; Abbott v. Perez).
• No “original sin” theory: Prior discrimination does not automatically invalidate later action (City of Mobile v. Bolden).
• No duty to purge: A later legislature has no duty to cleanse earlier discriminatory intent (Abbott v. Perez).
• Non-probativeness of earlier legislature’s views: Earlier legislative views are generally not probative of later intent, especially with major membership turnover (here, noted as over 96% turnover between 1929 and 1952, via Carrillo-Lopez).

3. The 1952 INA is treated as a substantive legislative act, not an editorial one.
Distinguishing Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., the court adopts Carrillo-Lopez’s characterization: the 1952 INA was a broad reformulation; § 1326 drew from multiple statutes and made substantial revisions and additions. The repeated post-1952 amendments further weaken any inference that § 1326 is merely the 1929 Act “in disguise.”

4. Disparate impact—especially explainable by geography—is insufficient absent proof of purpose.
The district court found Myrie failed to show disproportionate representation in § 1326 convictions; on appeal he referenced border-arrest statistics. The Sixth Circuit holds that—even if disproportionality exists—immigration enforcement predictably affects groups that constitute a large share of the unauthorized population and border crossers. Under Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. and Carrillo-Lopez, that fact does not plausibly establish discriminatory purpose.

5. Failure of proof under Arlington Heights is dispositive.
The court stresses Myrie provided essentially no Arlington Heights evidence as to § 1326: no relevant historical background of 1952, no legislative sequence evidence, no procedural/substantive departure evidence, and no legislative history indicating discriminatory motives for § 1326’s enactment or amendments. Without that, the equal-protection challenge fails.

C. Impact

• Sixth Circuit alignment with a nationwide consensus: The decision adds precedential Sixth Circuit authority to the uniform circuit trend (Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh) rejecting equal-protection attacks on § 1326 premised on the 1929 Act’s alleged racism.
• Clarifies the evidentiary target: Litigants must direct discriminatory-purpose proof at the enactment being challenged—here, the 1952 Congress (and potentially later amending Congresses)—not at predecessor statutes alone.
• Reinforces “no duty to repudiate” doctrine in this context: By grounding its analysis in Abbott v. Perez, the Sixth Circuit strengthens an argument the government has advanced across circuits: that courts should not require Congress to make explicit disavowals when reenacting or revising statutory regimes.
• Disparate-impact arguments face an added hurdle in immigration enforcement: The opinion adopts the logic that demographic/geographic explanations (e.g., proximity to borders; composition of the unauthorized population) can undercut inferences of discriminatory purpose, raising the bar for challengers relying primarily on statistical disproportionality.
• Practical litigation consequence: Motions to dismiss § 1326 indictments on equal-protection grounds in the Sixth Circuit will likely fail unless supported by robust, enactment-specific legislative history and intent evidence tied to 1952 or later amendments (not merely 1929-era history).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Equal protection component” of the Fifth Amendment: Although the Equal Protection Clause is in the Fourteenth Amendment (binding states), the Supreme Court recognizes that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes similar equal-protection limits on the federal government.
• Facially neutral vs. facial classification: A law that explicitly sorts people by race triggers strict scrutiny. A law that does not mention race can still be unconstitutional if it was adopted with discriminatory purpose and causes disparate impact.
• Arlington Heights factors: Courts infer discriminatory intent by looking at context—history, legislative timeline, unusual procedures, unexplained deviations from typical criteria, and legislative records (committee reports, statements, drafting history).
• “Because of” vs. “in spite of” (Feeney): Knowing a law will affect a group is not enough; the challenger must show the lawmakers chose the policy at least partly to bring about that adverse effect.
• “No duty to purge” (Abbott): If an earlier law was enacted for bad reasons, a later legislature is not required to publicly denounce those reasons to pass a similar or related law. The question is the later legislature’s intent.
• Standards of review on appeal: Legal questions are reviewed “de novo” (fresh). But factual findings—like whether there was discriminatory intent—are reviewed for “clear error,” a deferential standard.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Myrie establishes Sixth Circuit precedent that equal-protection challenges to § 1326 cannot succeed by treating the 1952 unlawful-reentry statute as constitutionally “tainted” by the 1929 Act absent proof that the 1952 Congress (or later amending Congresses) acted with discriminatory purpose. Anchored in Arlington Heights, Feeney, and especially Abbott v. Perez, the decision rejects a “duty to repudiate” theory and reinforces that disparate impact—particularly where explainable by geography and population composition—does not substitute for evidence of discriminatory intent. The ruling both harmonizes the Sixth Circuit with the unanimous circuit landscape and sharply clarifies what future challengers must prove (and where they must look) to mount a viable constitutional attack on § 1326.