United States v. Mullings: No “Fair and Just Reason” to Withdraw a Guilty Plea Absent Credible Coercion—and No Pre-Plea Duty to Disclose a Cooperator; Sentencing Enhancements Sustained for Loss Attribution, Role, “Business of Laundering,” Perjury-Based Obstruction, and Denied Acceptance Credit

1. Introduction

In United States v. Mullings (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2026), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed (1) the denial of Malachi Mullings’s post-plea, pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea and (2) a 120-month prison sentence imposed for conspiracy to commit money laundering and substantive money-laundering counts tied to a multi-million-dollar fraud-proceeds laundering pipeline.

The case arose from Mullings’s use of numerous bank accounts—opened through a Georgia entity, “The Mullings Group, LLC”—to receive, move, and “clean” proceeds from romance scams, business e-mail compromises, and related fraud, and then convert funds to Bitcoin for transfer to Africa. Mullings also recruited and directed a co-participant, “C.J.,” to set up a similar “trucking company” front and bank accounts.

After pleading guilty, Mullings’s bond was revoked following a domestic violence incident. While in custody, he sought to withdraw his plea, contending that counsel bullied him and that the government failed to disclose that C.J. was cooperating. He also challenged multiple Guidelines determinations (loss amount; aggravating role; “business of laundering” enhancement; obstruction; denial of acceptance reduction) and claimed substantive unreasonableness.

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is significant for its integrated treatment of (a) Rule 11 plea-withdrawal standards and credibility findings, (b) the constitutional limits on pre-plea disclosure of impeachment material concerning a cooperating witness, and (c) the evidentiary sufficiency for several money-laundering sentencing enhancements, including perjury-based obstruction when a defendant’s sworn accounts are irreconcilably contradictory.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Plea withdrawal denied: The district court did not abuse its discretion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). Applying United States v. Buckles, the court found (i) close assistance of counsel (two attorneys, substantial consultation), and (ii) a knowing and voluntary plea (careful colloquy, time to reflect, break to confer). Given these findings, the remaining Buckles factors (judicial resources and government prejudice) were not decisive under United States v. Gonzales-Mercado.
  • No pre-plea duty to disclose cooperator status: The government had no obligation to disclose C.J.’s cooperation before the plea, under United States v. Ruiz.
  • Procedural reasonableness affirmed: The Guidelines calculations were upheld:
    • Loss amount exceeded $3.5 million based on a fraud auditor’s bank-record analysis and inclusion of C.J.’s laundering as jointly undertaken conduct.
    • Two-level aggravating-role enhancement affirmed for supervising/recruiting C.J.
    • Four-level “in the business of laundering funds” enhancement affirmed based on regularity, duration, multiple fraud streams/victims, and commissions.
    • Two-level obstruction enhancement affirmed where Mullings’s sworn statements at the plea colloquy and later withdrawal hearing were incompatible, satisfying perjury principles.
    • Acceptance-of-responsibility reduction properly denied; obstruction ordinarily defeats acceptance absent an “extraordinary case.”
  • Substantive reasonableness affirmed: A 120-month sentence—well below the 188–235 month range and far below the aggregate statutory maximum—was upheld under Gall v. United States, with adequate consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and no unwarranted disparity shown.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Guilty plea withdrawal: framework, credibility, and timing

  • United States v. Buckles:
    • Rule: A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing only upon showing a “fair and just reason,” assessed under a totality-of-circumstances test with four factors: (1) close assistance of counsel; (2) knowing and voluntary plea; (3) conservation of judicial resources; (4) prejudice to the government.
    • Use here: The panel treated Buckles as the controlling checklist and deferred to the district court’s credibility determinations, consistent with Buckles’s admonition that such findings are entitled to deference.
    • Coercion point: The opinion also relied on Buckles to reject the notion that an attorney’s professional recommendation to plead guilty equals coercion.
  • United States v. Gonzales-Mercado:
    • Rule: If close assistance and a knowing/voluntary plea are established, courts need not give significant weight to judicial-resources and prejudice factors.
    • Use here: Once factors (1) and (2) were resolved against Mullings, the panel effectively treated the remaining factors as non-dispositive. Gonzales-Mercado also supplied the “delay” logic: a late withdrawal motion demands stronger reasons, and post-bond-revocation timing can suggest strategic motive.
  • United States v. McCarty:
    • Rule: Close assistance asks whether counsel was “ably and professionally represented” and whether counsel was available and utilized.
    • Use here: Supported affirmance where the district court credited counsel’s extensive communications and preparation, and where Mullings had two lawyers at the plea.
  • United States v. Medlock:
    • Rule: Strong presumption that statements made during a plea colloquy are true.
    • Use here: The panel used Medlock to reinforce the district court’s choice to credit plea-colloquy admissions over later contrary testimony alleging coercion and dissatisfaction.

B. Disclosure obligations before pleading guilty

  • United States v. Ruiz:
    • Rule: The Constitution does not require disclosure of material impeachment evidence before a plea.
    • Use here: The panel treated C.J.’s cooperation status as quintessential impeachment-type information and held there was no pre-plea disclosure duty on this record, defeating Mullings’s “unknowing plea” argument.

C. Procedural reasonableness and Guidelines factfinding

  • United States v. Isaac and United States v. Rothenberg:
    • Rule: Guidelines legal issues are reviewed de novo; factual findings for clear error; and application with due deference (tantamount to clear error).
    • Use here: Anchored the deference given to district court loss, role, and enhancement findings.
  • United States v. Bradley:
    • Rule: Government must prove loss by a preponderance; loss need not be calculated with precision—reasonable estimates suffice.
    • Use here: Validated reliance on the auditor’s methodology and allowed for some inability to recall transaction-level categorization live at hearing.
  • United States v. Stein and United States v. Snyder:
    • Rule: Courts may use a variety of methods to derive a reasonable estimate of loss.
    • Use here: Supported acceptance of a manual, line-by-line bank review to estimate laundered-funds value.
  • United States v. Ghertler:
    • Rule: Sentencing courts may consider hearsay if it bears sufficient indicia of reliability.
    • Use here: Underwrote use of agent testimony and corroborated text messages to attribute co-conspirator conduct and support role findings.

D. Role enhancement

  • United States v. Grushko:
    • Rule: Control over even one participant can support a § 3B1.1(c) enhancement.
    • Use here: The panel deemed Mullings’s recruiting and directing of C.J. sufficient, based largely on the text-message record.
  • United States v. Barrington:
    • Rule: A defendant need not be the sole leader for the enhancement to apply.
    • Use here: Defeated Mullings’s argument that others (the African fraud ring) were “more in charge,” because Mullings still supervised C.J.

E. “In the business of money laundering” and commentary after Dupree

  • United States v. Dupree:
    • Rule: Courts may not defer to Guidelines commentary if the guideline text is unambiguous.
    • Use here: The panel noted Dupree but declined to resolve ambiguity because both parties relied on the commentary.
  • United States v. Jews:
    • Rule: Where no party contests commentary validity, the court may proceed using it without deciding the Dupree question.
    • Use here: Provided procedural footing to apply the application-note factors for “business of laundering” in § 2S1.1.

F. Obstruction (perjury) based on contradictory sworn accounts

  • United States v. Singh and United States v. Dunnigan:
    • Rule: Perjury is false testimony on a material matter with willful intent, not confusion or mistake.
    • Use here: Supplied the governing definition for determining that Mullings’s later sworn repudiation was willfully false, given the district court’s credibility findings.
  • United States v. Freixas:
    • Rule: When a defendant gives sworn plea-colloquy admissions and later offers sworn testimony contradicting them, “one of these accounts necessarily was dishonest,” and crediting the former can support a § 3C1.1 enhancement.
    • Use here: This was the centerpiece precedent: Mullings’s plea-colloquy admissions (guilt; voluntariness; satisfaction with counsel) and later withdrawal-hearing testimony (innocence; coercion; dissatisfaction) were treated as irreconcilable; the district court credited the plea colloquy; obstruction enhancement followed.

G. Acceptance of responsibility and its interaction with obstruction

  • United States v. Wade:
    • Rule: A guilty plea is significant evidence of acceptance, but the defendant bears the burden.
    • Use here: Supported the district court’s authority to find that later inconsistent conduct outweighed the plea.
  • United States v. Mathews:
    • Rule: Acceptance evidence may be outweighed by inconsistent conduct.
    • Use here: Justified denial where Mullings later minimized culpability and denied guilt under oath.
  • United States v. Sammour:
    • Rule: Downplaying culpability can defeat acceptance credit.
    • Use here: Reinforced that Mullings’s minimization (“simply provided” accounts) was inconsistent with genuine acceptance.
  • United States v. Henry:
    • Rule: § 3E1.1 does not violate due process by “punishing” exercise of trial rights.
    • Use here: Foreclosed Mullings’s constitutional challenge to the denial of acceptance credit.

H. Substantive reasonableness and disparities

  • Gall v. United States:
    • Rule: Substantive reasonableness reviewed for abuse of discretion, considering totality.
    • Use here: Framed the appellate deference and holistic review.
  • United States v. Irey:
    • Rule: Defines abuse-of-discretion pathways and the “definite and firm conviction” standard for substantive unreasonableness.
    • Use here: Set the demanding standard Mullings failed to meet.
  • United States v. Rosales-Bruno:
    • Rule: Substantial deference to sentencing courts; challenger bears burden.
    • Use here: Reinforced deference in weighing § 3553(a) factors.
  • United States v. Hunt and United States v. Gonzalez:
    • Rule: Guideline-range sentences are ordinarily expected to be reasonable (without a presumption); sentences below statutory maxima suggest reasonableness.
    • Use here: The panel highlighted that 120 months was far below the guideline range and below statutory maxima, signaling reasonableness.
  • United States v. Turner:
    • Rule: District court need not recite each § 3553(a) factor; acknowledgment suffices.
    • Use here: Supported the adequacy of the sentencing explanation.
  • United States v. Butler:
    • Rule: Weight given to each § 3553(a) factor lies within district court discretion.
    • Use here: Defeated Mullings’s claim that personal history was underweighted.
  • United States v. Jayyousi:
    • Rule: Disparity analysis requires similarly situated defendants; significant distinctions matter.
    • Use here: Helped reject Mullings’s co-conspirator comparisons due to differences in criminal history and cooperation benefits.
  • United States v. Williams:
    • Rule: Defendants are not similarly situated for disparity purposes when one provides substantial assistance and the other does not.
    • Use here: Supported discounting comparators who received U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 reductions.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why the plea-withdrawal motion failed

The Eleventh Circuit’s plea-withdrawal analysis turned on two pillars: (1) credibility findings and (2) the sufficiency of Rule 11 safeguards. The district court credited both attorneys and rejected Mullings’s “bullied and coerced” account of the hallway conversation. Appellate review under Buckles is highly deferential where the denial rests on credibility.

On “knowing and voluntary,” the record was unusually robust for the government: the district court had already postponed a prior plea attempt, explicitly telling Mullings there was “no reason” to do it that day; at the eventual plea hearing, the court repeatedly paused to ensure understanding; and when Mullings equivocated on knowledge (an element of money laundering), the judge provided a break to consult counsel. These features undercut any claim of haste or confusion.

The “cooperator disclosure” theory was rejected on a legal ground: even if C.J.’s cooperation would have been useful to the defense in evaluating risks, Ruiz forecloses a constitutional entitlement to pre-plea impeachment disclosure, and Mullings identified no other duty requiring it.

Finally, timing mattered. The panel treated the more-than-month delay—combined with the intervening bond revocation—as supporting an inference of strategic withdrawal rather than a genuine “swift change of heart,” as discussed in Gonzales-Mercado.

B. Why the loss amount and inclusion of C.J.’s conduct were upheld

The Guidelines required the offense level to increase based on “the value of the laundered funds,” cross-referencing the § 2B1.1 table. The district court’s loss/laundered-funds estimate cleared the Bradley/Stein standard of “reasonable estimate” supported by reliable evidence.

The auditor’s method—manual, line-by-line review; exclusion rules to avoid double counting; use of experienced fraud indicators; and conscious “benefit of the doubt” choices—was treated as a reliable methodology, even though the auditor could not recall every transaction’s categorization without backup notes.

Attributing C.J.’s laundering to Mullings depended on relevant conduct rules for jointly undertaken activity (scope, furtherance, foreseeability). The text messages, agent testimony, and corroboration by bank records supported the finding that Mullings recruited, directed, and supervised C.J.’s laundering—making C.J.’s conduct reasonably foreseeable and within the jointly undertaken activity.

C. Why the role and “business of laundering” enhancements were upheld

For the two-level role enhancement, the Eleventh Circuit applied Grushko’s minimal-control principle: supervision of a single participant suffices. The record showed Mullings instructing C.J. on opening accounts, depositing/withdrawing, and operational precautions. Barrington disposed of the “others were bigger leaders” defense.

For the four-level “business of laundering” enhancement, the court applied the application-note “totality of the circumstances” factors (without resolving Dupree), noting (i) regular laundering through numerous accounts, (ii) duration exceeding a year and a half, (iii) multiple fraud modalities and many victims (even if routed through one overarching ring), and (iv) substantial revenue via a 10% commission. The enhancement was framed as targeting professionalized laundering behavior rather than one-off facilitation.

D. Why obstruction and denial of acceptance were upheld

The obstruction enhancement rested on the Freixas logic: Mullings gave sworn admissions at the plea colloquy and later gave sworn, materially contradictory testimony in the plea-withdrawal hearing. If the district court credits the earlier sworn account and finds the later account willfully false, the Singh/Dunnigan definition of perjury is met. The panel also rejected an attempted narrowing that obstruction requires “more than” a general denial of guilt, and in any event found Mullings’s statements went beyond a bare denial.

The denial of acceptance of responsibility followed from both (i) the later sworn denial/minimization and (ii) the Guidelines’ general rule that obstruction “ordinarily” signals lack of acceptance absent an extraordinary case. The court treated Mullings’s case as ordinary: he attempted to withdraw his plea, denied guilt under oath, and minimized culpability.

E. Why 120 months was substantively reasonable

The panel emphasized three considerations: the sentence’s distance below the guideline range; the district court’s stated purposes (seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public); and the court’s explicit recognition of Mullings’s particular role (money launderer, not direct fraudster) while still accounting for victim harm as a foreseeable and central feature of laundering fraud proceeds.

On disparity, the court treated cooperation-based reductions and lower criminal history categories as legally meaningful differences under Jayyousi and Williams, making comparators not “similarly situated” for § 3553(a)(6) purposes.

3.3. Impact

  • Plea withdrawals in the Eleventh Circuit: The decision reinforces that a defendant faces steep odds when (i) the Rule 11 colloquy is careful, (ii) the judge provides time and breaks to consult counsel, and (iii) the district court makes supported credibility findings rejecting coercion claims. It also underscores the strategic-inference risk when a withdrawal motion follows adverse post-plea events (e.g., bond revocation).
  • Pre-plea disclosure disputes: The opinion extends Ruiz’s practical reach in plea litigation by treating a co-defendant’s cooperation status as impeachment-type information that does not render a plea “unknowing” when undisclosed.
  • Money-laundering sentencing:
    • Affirms that well-documented bank-record analytics by experienced auditors can support multi-million-dollar laundered-funds findings as “reasonable estimates,” even if testimony cannot recall every categorization detail.
    • Highlights how digital communications (texts) can both expand relevant-conduct attribution to co-participants and support supervisory-role enhancements.
    • Provides a fact pattern for applying the “business of laundering” enhancement to defendants who operate account networks, take commissions, and launder repeatedly over time, even without prior laundering convictions.
    • Signals that contradictory sworn plea/withdrawal testimony is high-risk: it can support obstruction and simultaneously defeat acceptance of responsibility.
  • Post-Dupree commentary practice: Without resolving ambiguity, the opinion indicates that where parties do not contest commentary validity, panels may proceed using application notes under Jews—suggesting litigants must squarely raise Dupree arguments to preserve them.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 11(d)(2)(B) “fair and just reason”: After a court accepts a guilty plea but before sentencing, a defendant cannot withdraw it merely because he regrets it; he must show a genuinely fair reason (e.g., plea was not voluntary, or he lacked meaningful counsel assistance).
  • Plea colloquy: The in-court Q&A where the judge confirms the defendant understands the charges, rights waived, penalties, and that the plea is voluntary. Statements made there are presumed true (Medlock).
  • Impeachment evidence: Information used to challenge a witness’s credibility (e.g., that a witness is cooperating). Ruiz holds it need not be disclosed before a plea as a constitutional matter.
  • Relevant conduct / jointly undertaken activity (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3): At sentencing, defendants can be held responsible not only for what they personally did, but also for certain acts of co-participants if those acts were within the agreed scope, furthered the activity, and were reasonably foreseeable.
  • Loss amount / value of laundered funds: In money laundering, the Guidelines often key punishment to how much money was laundered; courts may estimate using reliable methods rather than demanding perfect accounting.
  • Aggravating-role enhancement: A defendant gets more time if he managed or supervised someone else in the crime. Supervising even one person can be enough (Grushko).
  • “In the business of laundering funds”: A specialized enhancement for defendants whose laundering looks like a recurring service or enterprise—regular activity, extended period, multiple sources, and earning substantial revenue.
  • Obstruction of justice via perjury: If a defendant willfully lies under oath about a material matter, his sentence can increase. Contradictory sworn accounts (plea colloquy vs. withdrawal hearing) can support a finding that one was perjury (Freixas).
  • Acceptance of responsibility: A reduction for defendants who genuinely admit wrongdoing. A guilty plea helps, but later denial, minimization, or obstruction usually eliminates it.
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: “Procedural” asks whether the court correctly calculated the Guidelines and explained the sentence; “substantive” asks whether the sentence is reasonable in light of § 3553(a) goals.
  • Unwarranted disparities: Courts seek to avoid different sentences for similar defendants, but differences like cooperation reductions or criminal history can justify different outcomes.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Mullings affirms a cohesive set of principles: (1) a detailed Rule 11 process, coupled with credible counsel testimony, will defeat post-plea coercion claims under Buckles; (2) the government’s non-disclosure of a cooperator’s status before a plea does not, without more, undermine the plea’s validity under Ruiz; and (3) in complex money-laundering cases, reliable financial analysis and corroborated communications can sustain high-end loss findings and multiple enhancements, while contradictory sworn testimony can simultaneously trigger obstruction and foreclose acceptance credit. The decision thus serves as a roadmap—both for district courts building a defensible plea and sentencing record, and for litigants assessing which arguments can realistically overcome deference on appeal.