Date: Jun 12, 2026

United States v. Morilla: Individualized Findings Required for Sophisticated-Laundering Enhancement; Premature Keene Alternative Sentence Cannot Cure Guideline Error

1. Introduction

In United States v. Carlos Alberto Morilla (11th Cir. June 11, 2026), the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a 57-month sentence imposed after Morilla pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Morilla challenged three sentencing determinations: (1) the application of the “sophisticated laundering” enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3), (2) the denial of a minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), and (3) whether the district court’s purported “alternative sentence” statement under United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) insulated any Guidelines error from appellate review.

The underlying conduct was straightforward: across three transactions in March–April 2023, Morilla received cash or a wire from an undercover agent and then wired funds back, keeping a 6% fee. The dispute centered not on the existence of laundering, but on how the Guidelines should treat Morilla’s role and whether the conduct was sufficiently complex to qualify as “sophisticated laundering,” and—critically—whether a sentencing court can neutralize a Guidelines error by announcing an alternative sentence before hearing the parties’ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) arguments and the defendant’s allocution.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Minor-role reduction: Affirmed. The Eleventh Circuit held the record supported denial of a minor-role adjustment under the fact-intensive framework of United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999).
Sophisticated-laundering enhancement: Reversed. The district court erred by applying U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) without individualized findings tying sophisticated conduct to Morilla’s relevant conduct and the scope of his jointly undertaken activity, instead relying on evidence from a co-defendant’s trial and a generalized view that sophistication by the conspiracy sufficed.
Keene harmlessness/alternative sentence: Rejected. A “Keene statement” made before § 3553(a) argument and allocution cannot render a Guidelines error harmless because it precedes the very procedural steps that Keene presupposes must inform the ultimate sentencing decision.

The court therefore affirmed in part, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Standards of review and sentencing framework

United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc): cited for de novo review of Guidelines interpretation/application. This frames the court’s willingness to correct legal errors in applying enhancements and adjustments.
United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2009): cited for clear-error review of factual findings, reinforcing that the “minor role” issue turns heavily on the record.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005): referenced to emphasize post-Booker advisory Guidelines sentencing, which is the context in which alternative-sentence doctrines like Keene operate.

B. Sophisticated laundering: relevant conduct and individualized findings

United States v. Barry, 163 F.4th 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2026): used as a direct statement of principle—“a sentencing judge must make individualized findings”. The Morilla panel employs Barry to reject the district court’s approach of treating conspiracy-wide sophistication as automatically attributable to Morilla.
United States v. Hunter, 323 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Ismond, 993 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1993)): these cases supply the doctrinal machinery for conspiracy sentencing accountability under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3: before attributing others’ acts to a defendant, the district court must make individualized findings as to the scope of the defendant’s agreement to jointly undertake criminal activity.
United States v. Ismond, 993 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th Cir. 1993): also cited for the practical consequence of missing findings—without them, a court cannot justify attributing less than all (or, by implication, more than the defendant personally did) with principled limits.

C. Minor-role reduction: controlling Eleventh Circuit methodology

United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019) and United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2018): cited for the requirement that courts consider all relevant minor-role factors and commit legal error if deciding “based solely on one factor.” Morilla uses these to frame the inquiry as multi-factor and circumstance-driven.
United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999): supplies the two “governing principles”—compare the defendant’s role to (1) his relevant conduct and (2) other participants (where the record permits). The panel relies on De Varon both to uphold the denial and to note that explicit subsidiary findings are not always required.

D. Keene harmlessness: alternative sentence doctrine and procedural sequencing

United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006): the foundational “assumed error harmlessness inquiry.” Morilla reads Keene as requiring confidence that the same sentence would be imposed after the court’s consideration of § 3553(a) factors, not before.
United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020): cited for the two-part test: (1) explicit statement of same sentence absent the error; and (2) substantive reasonableness. Morilla uses Goldman to define what must be shown—and then holds the district court’s statement fails procedurally.
United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2005) (Carnes, J., concurring): invoked via Keene to explain the efficiency rationale (avoiding pointless remands) but not at the expense of meaningful sentencing procedure.
United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1,18 (11th Cir. 20122): cited for the implementation of Keene: assume the defendant’s guideline position, then assess substantive reasonableness under the lower range. Morilla distinguishes the “how” from the “when,” focusing on the timing defect here.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2002): cited to underscore that § 3553(a) argument and allocution are “procedural safeguards” designed to ensure individualized sentencing. These cases help the panel frame a premature Keene statement as undermining core procedure.
United States v. Delgado, 981 F.3d 889, 900 n.8 (11th Cir. 2020): cited for “the better practice” of making the alternative-sentence statement “at the time of pronouncing the sentence,” supporting Morilla’s timing-based holding.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Sophisticated laundering requires sophistication in the defendant’s relevant conduct, supported by individualized findings

The panel begins with the text and commentary of U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3). “Sophisticated laundering” is “complex or intricate offense conduct” as to execution or concealment, and typical hallmarks include shell/fictitious entities, layering (two or more levels), and offshore accounts. On the sentencing record, Morilla’s conduct consisted of one-step transfers from his own account, with no shell entities and no offshore component. Even the government acknowledged that only “layering” could arguably apply—yet the commentary requires “two or more levels,” and a single transfer is not that.

The district court nonetheless applied the enhancement by relying on “offense conduct” proven at co-defendant Gomez’s trial and by adopting the view that, if the conspiracy was sophisticated, “you don’t have to differentiate between individual defendants.” The Eleventh Circuit treats this as a categorical legal mistake in conspiracy sentencing: under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, accountability for others’ acts is limited by the scope of the defendant’s jointly undertaken agreement, requiring individualized findings (United States v. Barry; United States v. Hunter; United States v. Ismond).

Two points sharpen the error:

Temporal limitation: Morilla joined about a year after the conspiracy began, and the Guidelines explicitly exclude pre-joining conduct from his relevant conduct (the opinion quotes U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.3(B); see also United States v. Hunter).
Scope limitation: Even during Morilla’s period, the court made no findings identifying what “sophisticated” conduct existed, whether it occurred during Morilla’s participation, and whether Morilla agreed to jointly undertake it.

The result is not merely that the evidence was thin; it is that the district court used the wrong attribution method—treating conspiracy-wide proof as automatically transferable—contrary to the individualized, scope-based approach mandated by § 1B1.3 and Eleventh Circuit precedent.

B. Minor role is denied where the defendant’s own relevant conduct is substantial, even if participation is brief

For § 3B1.2, the panel applies the “totality of the circumstances” and multi-factor framework referenced in the commentary and reinforced by United States v. Valois and United States v. Presendieu. But the controlling comparison is from United States v. Rodriguez De Varon: the defendant’s role is measured primarily against the relevant conduct for which he is held accountable.

The panel stresses record facts unfavorable to minor role: Morilla personally laundered $550,000—nearly half of the conspiracy total—over three transactions in about a month, knowing the money derived from drug trafficking, and earning roughly $39,000 in fees. Brief participation did not equate to lesser culpability in the conduct attributed to him.

Morilla argued the district court failed to make specific scope findings. The panel responds with De Varon’s rule that the sentencing judge need not make subsidiary findings so long as the conclusion is supported by the record and the court’s statement suffices. Thus, the minor-role denial is affirmed.

C. A Keene alternative sentence must follow meaningful § 3553(a) consideration and allocution; a premature statement cannot establish harmlessness

The opinion’s most consequential procedural holding is its limitation on the protective reach of United States v. Keene. While Keene and United States v. Goldman allow appellate courts to treat some Guidelines errors as harmless, Morilla focuses on the sequencing implied by Keene itself: the doctrine exists to avoid “do-overs” when the Guidelines dispute “does not matter” to the sentence after the § 3553(a) factors are considered.

Here, the district court’s alternative-sentence statement was made immediately after resolving Guidelines objections—before hearing the parties’ § 3553(a) arguments and before allocution. The panel holds that such timing defeats the reliability required for harmlessness because it either: (1) suggests the sentencing outcome was effectively fixed before the procedural safeguards, or (2) shows the holistic § 3553(a) analysis had not yet been completed. Relying on United States v. Rosales-Bruno, United States v. Prouty, and the “better practice” guidance from United States v. Delgado, the panel treats allocution and adversarial argument as substantive components of sentencing, not formalities that can be retroactively declared irrelevant.

The court also rejects two attempted “cures”:

Defendant’s later chance to speak: Morilla declined allocution only after the judge said the sentence would be the same regardless of appellate outcomes—undermining confidence that the opportunity to speak could meaningfully affect the decision.
Overlap with the PSI: Even if the PSI contained similar information, Keene is about whether the sentence would be imposed after the required adversarial presentation and allocution, not whether the judge had written access to facts.

Because the sophisticated-laundering enhancement was erroneous and the Keene statement was procedurally ineffective, the sentence had to be vacated and remanded.

3.3. Impact

A. Sentencing courts must tether § 2S1.1(b)(3) to the defendant’s scope-based relevant conduct

Morilla reinforces that “sophisticated laundering” is not a label that follows the conspiracy; it is an enhancement that must be supported by findings showing (i) what made the laundering complex or intricate and (ii) why that complexity is attributable to the defendant under § 1B1.3’s scope limitations. Particularly in undercover “cash in / wire out” cases, the opinion signals that routine transfers—without layering, shell entities, or offshore mechanisms—will not satisfy § 2S1.1(b)(3) absent additional complexity.

B. The decision constrains strategic use of Keene statements

The opinion meaningfully narrows how district courts can rely on Keene to insulate Guidelines rulings. An alternative sentence must be anchored in a completed sentencing process, not announced as a prophylactic measure before the required hearing components. Practically, this encourages courts to (1) conduct the § 3553(a) discussion and allocution first, and then (2) if desired, state an alternative sentence contemporaneously with pronouncement, consistent with United States v. Delgado.

C. Appellate review becomes more robust for procedural sentencing errors

By refusing to treat a premature alternative-sentence statement as harmlessness-proof, Morilla preserves meaningful appellate correction where Guidelines errors may have influenced the framing of the sentencing hearing itself—what arguments counsel makes, what the defendant chooses to say, and how the judge understands the stakes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Sophisticated laundering (U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3)): A two-level increase for laundering that is materially more complex than ordinary transactions—typically involving multiple layers of transfers, shell/fictitious entities, or offshore accounts. A single transfer from a defendant’s own account usually lacks these hallmarks.
Relevant conduct (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3): The set of actions that can be attributed to a defendant for Guidelines purposes, including certain acts of others only if they were within the scope of the defendant’s jointly undertaken agreement, were in furtherance of it, and were reasonably foreseeable. In conspiracies, this is narrower than “everything the conspiracy did.”
Individualized findings: Specific determinations about what the defendant agreed to do and what conduct is fairly attributable to him. They prevent automatic “conspiracy-wide” attribution.
Minor-role reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): A reduction for defendants substantially less culpable than the average participant. The key comparison is usually between the defendant’s role and the conduct he is held accountable for. Brief involvement does not automatically mean minor role.
Keene alternative sentence / assumed error harmlessness: A doctrine allowing appellate courts to affirm despite a potential Guidelines error if the district court clearly states it would impose the same sentence absent the error and the sentence is reasonable. Morilla clarifies that the statement must come after meaningful § 3553(a) consideration and allocution to be reliable.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Carlos Alberto Morilla delivers two connected procedural safeguards in federal sentencing. First, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirms that the “sophisticated laundering” enhancement cannot be imposed based on generalized conspiracy evidence; it requires individualized, scope-based relevant-conduct findings linking sophistication to the defendant. Second, it holds that a premature Keene alternative sentence—announced before § 3553(a) argument and allocution—cannot render a Guidelines error harmless. The decision preserves the functional importance of adversarial sentencing presentations and allocution, while tightening the analytical discipline required to apply laundering enhancements in conspiracy cases.