Express ACCA-Predicate Admissions in a Plea Agreement and Colloquy Waive Appellate Challenges to ACCA Sentencing

1. Introduction

Case: United States v. Moreno Jackson, II (Sixth Circuit, Apr. 15, 2026).
Parties: United States (Plaintiff–Appellee) vs. Moreno Lee Jackson, II (Defendant–Appellant).
Posture: Jackson appealed a 212-month, within-Guidelines sentence following a guilty plea to unlawful firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him as an Armed Career Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (ACCA), yielding a 15-year mandatory minimum and an enhanced Guidelines framework under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4.

Core issue on appeal: Whether Jackson could challenge the procedural reasonableness of his sentence—specifically the application of ACCA and related sentencing calculations—after repeatedly affirming in his plea agreement and plea colloquy that he had at least three qualifying predicate convictions triggering § 924(e).

Holding (majority): Jackson waived any appellate challenge to ACCA’s application by expressly and consistently agreeing that he qualified for ACCA; therefore, the court declined to review the sentencing claim and affirmed.
Dissent: The error was invited, not waived; the panel should review to prevent manifest injustice because (in the dissent’s view) ACCA did not apply and Jackson’s sentence exceeded the lawful maximum absent ACCA.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Majority (Batchelder, J.)

  • Jackson’s challenge was framed as a procedural-reasonableness attack (Guidelines calculation/ACCA enhancement).
  • The court emphasized the distinction between forfeiture/plain error review and waiver (no review).
  • Because Jackson “expressly and consistently admitted” ACCA applicability—signing a plea agreement acknowledging § 924(e) and confirming the same under oath—he waived appellate review of that issue.
  • The court reaffirmed a longstanding Sixth Circuit rule: when a defendant agrees with a judge’s proposed course of conduct, he cannot later claim error on appeal (quoting United States v. Sloman).
  • Jackson’s motion for judicial notice regarding a predicate conviction detail was deemed moot.
  • The opinion suggested that any remaining avenue would be an ineffective assistance claim in collateral proceedings.

Dissent (Mathis, J.)

  • ACCA should not have applied because one alleged predicate—Jackson’s 2018 Michigan cocaine offense—was not a “serious drug offense” under the categorical approach given federal/state schedule mismatch (relying on Brown v. United States and United States v. Wilkes).
  • Jackson’s admissions constituted invited error, not waiver; the court should exercise discretion to prevent manifest injustice.
  • Under plain-error review (citing Greer v. United States), the dissent would vacate because the ACCA enhancement raised the statutory range, and Jackson received 212 months—above the non-ACCA maximum of 180 months.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Standards of review: forfeiture vs. waiver vs. invited error

  • United States v. Hawkins, 165 F.4th 442 (6th Cir. 2026): cited for the default rule that an unpreserved procedural-reasonableness challenge is reviewed for plain error. The majority uses this as the baseline—then explains why it does not apply if the claim is waived.
  • United States v. Jackson, 995 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2021): cited for the principle that waived claims are not reviewed at all. It supports the majority’s threshold move: classify the conduct as waiver and end the merits inquiry.
  • United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993): supplies the canonical definition of waiver as “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Both majority and dissent treat Olano as the definitional anchor; they diverge on what the record must show to satisfy it.
  • United States v. Akridge, 62 F.4th 258 (6th Cir. 2023): cited for invited error as a “branch” of waiver doctrine and for the “manifest injustice” safety valve. The majority acknowledges discretion to review invited error but declines (and classifies the case as waiver anyway). The dissent relies on Akridge’s framework to reach and correct the ACCA mistake.
  • United States v. Woods, 61 F.4th 471 (6th Cir. 2023): cited for the proposition that a litigant invites error when he contributes to it “without intentionally relinquishing” rights. The dissent analogizes Jackson to Woods (defendants told court a guideline applied), while the majority distinguishes Jackson’s conduct as something more definitive—waiver via express admission.
  • Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018) (en banc): discussed as recognizing rare discretion to deviate from the general waiver rule. The majority explicitly rejects this as one of those rare cases, emphasizing ACCA’s purpose and the PSR’s depiction of Jackson’s criminal history. The dissent invokes Turner to argue the court could reach the legal issue.
  • United States v. Carter, 89 F.4th 565 (6th Cir. 2023): cited for avoiding the “hazy border” between waiver and invited error when outcome would be the same. Here, the majority uses Carter and related cases to frame why it is choosing to clarify and label Jackson’s conduct as waiver.
  • Walker v. United States, 134 F.4th 437 (6th Cir. 2025): used in the dissent for the proposition that courts look for record signs a party understood the issue and potential arguments, reinforcing the dissent’s claim that “true waiver” is rare.
  • Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 923 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1991): cited in the dissent for the “inviting or provoking” concept.

B. The key intra-circuit conflict: explicit agreement and “labeling error”

  • United States v. Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d 1084 (6th Cir. 2002): the majority’s principal authority. Aparco-Centeno held waiver where the defendant not only failed to object but “explicitly agreed” that prior convictions qualified. The majority reads Aparco-Centeno as correctly applying waiver and treats its “interests of justice” line as extraneous and incorrect dicta.
  • United States v Montgomery, 998 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2021): Jackson’s primary authority and the dissent’s template. Montgomery characterized Aparco-Centeno as better understood as invited error and emphasized that “true waiver will be relatively rare.” The majority responds by reframing Montgomery as the source of later doctrinal “tension,” and it effectively cabins Montgomery’s reinterpretation.
  • United States v. Seuell, 135 F.4th 480 (6th Cir. 2025): used by the majority to reinforce that waiver occurs when a defendant “agree[s] in open court with a judge’s proposed course of conduct” (quoting Aparco-Centeno) and that the defendant need only understand the right “in general.” Seuell also appears in the dissent as an example of “true waiver” where the defendant knowingly chose to proceed without raising a known challenge.
  • United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1990): quoted by the majority as the “longstanding waiver standard”— a party cannot agree with a judge’s course and then charge error for following it. This is the doctrinal “rule statement” the majority elevates into the case’s operative principle.

C. Supporting Sixth Circuit waiver line reaffirmed by the majority

To demonstrate that its approach reflects “decades” of circuit law, the majority cites a long list of cases reading “explicit agreement” as waiver, particularly in the sentencing-enhancement context:

  • United States v. Sherrill, 972 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2020)
  • United States v. Fowler, 819 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2016)
  • United States v. McBride, 826 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 2016)
  • United States v. Ruiz, 777 F.3d 315 (6th Cir. 2015)
  • United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. 2015), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017)
  • United States v. Kennedy, 499 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2007)
  • United States v. Ward, 506 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2007)
  • United States v. Knox, 593 F. App'x 536 (6th Cir. 2015)

D. Sentencing procedure and Guidelines calculation

  • United States v. Cabbage, 91 F.4th 1228 (6th Cir. 2024): cited for the proposition that procedural unreasonableness includes miscalculating the Guidelines range, and for acknowledging the “hazy border” between waiver and invited error. The majority uses Cabbage’s “hazy border” framing but departs from its avoidance strategy.

E. Dissent’s ACCA merits authorities (categorical approach and plain error)

  • Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. 154 (2020): cited for applying the categorical approach to determine “serious drug offense.” It undergirds the dissent’s view that mismatch in drug definitions is dispositive.
  • Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024): the dissent’s centerpiece—state drug counts only if it matches federal schedules at the time of the offense; also identifies [123I]ioflupane as federally legalized in 2015.
  • United States v. Wilkes, 133 F.4th 600 (6th Cir. 2025): used to show Michigan continued to criminalize [123I]ioflupane after federal legalization, creating overbreadth in Michigan’s cocaine definition.
  • People v. Hartuniewicz, 816 N.W.2d 442 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011); People v. Dean, 253 N.W.2d 344 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); People v. Baham, 909 N.W.2d 836 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017) (per curiam): cited to characterize Michigan statutory “exemptions” as affirmative defenses, not elements—thus irrelevant under the categorical approach.
  • Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106 (2013): invoked by analogy for the categorical-approach principle that affirmative defenses do not define elements for matching.
  • Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021); Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009); Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266 (2013): cited for the plain-error framework and timing (plainness assessed at appellate consideration).
  • Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016); Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018): cited to show sentencing errors that increase imprisonment implicate substantial rights and fairness/integrity of proceedings.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The majority’s rule: express agreement to ACCA predicates is waiver, not invited error

The majority’s reasoning is structural: before reaching whether ACCA was properly applied, it decides whether Jackson preserved any right to complain. It labels Jackson’s conduct as waiver, which is dispositive because waived claims are “not reviewable.”

The factual predicate for waiver, as the majority frames it, is unusually strong: Jackson (1) signed a plea agreement expressly “acknowledge[d]” ACCA applicability and the 15-year mandatory minimum; and (2) twice confirmed under oath at the plea hearing that he had at least three qualifying predicates and understood the sentencing consequence. These steps, in the majority’s view, show he did not merely fail to object or make a mistaken recommendation—he affirmatively adopted the legal conclusion and its consequence.

Critically, the majority uses this case to reassert the Aparco-Centeno/Sloman line and to reject the notion that the court should treat express stipulations about predicate status as “invited error” subject to discretionary review. It reads Montgomery’s re-labeling of Aparco-Centeno as the driver of post-2021 doctrinal confusion and responds by “reaffirm[ing]” the older rule: a defendant cannot agree to the judge’s course and later claim error.

B. Knowledge requirement: “in general,” not “magic words”

The majority addresses a predictable objection: even if Jackson agreed, did he “know” what he was relinquishing, as Olano requires? Relying on United States v. Seuell, the majority holds the defendant need only understand the right “in general.” It rejects any “magic words” requirement that a plea agreement must label something as a “waiver” to make it one. On that view, Jackson’s repeated acknowledgments (and his assurance that counsel advised him of sentencing consequences) suffice.

C. The dissent’s counter-framework: invited error + manifest injustice + plain error

The dissent treats Jackson’s admissions as the hallmark of invited error under United States v Montgomery and United States v. Woods: the defendant (and government) induced the district court’s legal mistake but did not intentionally abandon a known, contestable legal argument. For the dissent, that matters because invited error remains reviewable, albeit rarely, where “manifest injustice” would occur.

The dissent then explains why this is such a rare case: if ACCA does not apply, Jackson’s 212-month sentence exceeds the otherwise applicable statutory maximum (180 months), producing unlawful extra imprisonment—manifest injustice in its clearest form.

3.3 Impact

A. Appellate practice in ACCA cases (and beyond)

The majority opinion materially strengthens the government’s ability to defeat sentencing appeals where defendants affirmatively accept enhancement applicability in plea papers and plea colloquies. The decision signals:

  • Express predicate admissions can foreclose merits review, even where subsequent legal developments (or better lawyering) might show the enhancement was wrong.
  • Montgomery’s “invited error” framing is less likely to rescue defendants who stipulate to enhancement status; the court re-centers Aparco-Centeno and Sloman.
  • Defense counsel must preserve enhancement disputes early (or explicitly reserve them), because a plea-stage stipulation risks being treated as an unrebuttable waiver on direct appeal.

B. Collateral review will carry more weight

The majority’s closing note—suggesting ineffective assistance as the remaining route—implicitly shifts some ACCA-correction litigation from direct appeal to post-conviction proceedings. That has practical consequences: higher burdens, procedural barriers, and longer timelines.

C. Doctrinal clarification: “hazy border” becomes sharper (at least for explicit sentencing stipulations)

While recent cases (e.g., United States v. Cabbage, United States v. Carter) sometimes avoided pinning down the waiver/invited-error distinction, this opinion chooses a side and justifies it historically. Future panels may cite United States v. Moreno Jackson, II for the proposition that explicit stipulations to a sentencing enhancement—especially when repeated under oath—are waiver, not merely invited error.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)): A federal law that increases the penalty for a felon-in-possession conviction when the defendant has three prior “violent felony” and/or “serious drug offense” convictions committed on different occasions. It imposes a mandatory minimum of 15 years.
  • Procedural reasonableness: A sentencing appeal claim that the court used the wrong process—commonly, miscalculating the Guidelines range or relying on incorrect legal standards.
  • Waiver vs. forfeiture: Forfeiture is a failure to object (often reviewed for plain error). Waiver is an intentional giving up of a right (usually not reviewed at all).
  • Invited error: When a party causes or contributes to the error (e.g., by urging the court to adopt a mistaken calculation). It is generally unreviewable, but Sixth Circuit cases recognize rare discretionary review to prevent “manifest injustice.”
  • Categorical approach: A method for deciding whether a prior state conviction matches a federal definition by comparing the legal elements, not the defendant’s real-world conduct. Under the dissent’s reading of Brown v. United States and United States v. Wilkes, Michigan’s cocaine definition was broader than the federal definition at the relevant time due to [123I]ioflupane.
  • Presentence Report (PSR): A probation-prepared report that calculates the Guidelines, summarizes history, and identifies enhancements (like ACCA predicates).

5. Conclusion

Key takeaway: The Sixth Circuit held that when a defendant repeatedly and expressly acknowledges ACCA applicability—both in a plea agreement and under oath in a plea colloquy— he waives appellate challenges to ACCA-based sentencing, foreclosing review even when the defendant later alleges the enhancement was legally incorrect.

Broader significance: The decision reasserts the Aparco-Centeno/Sloman “explicit agreement” waiver doctrine and pushes back against a broader invited-error framing associated with United States v Montgomery. The dissent highlights the cost of this approach: potentially leaving uncorrected statutory-range errors on direct appeal, with relief relegated to collateral proceedings.