United States v. Leonard: Imminence Limits the Necessity Defense in § 922(g) Cases and Bruen/Rahimi Challenges Remain Foreclosed by Circuit Precedent

I. Introduction

In United States v. Stephen Daniel Leonard (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Leonard’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The case arose after Leonard sent threatening emails to a local police chief and a U.S. Attorney, prompting an FBI investigation and a voluntary meeting at a Starbucks. Leonard texted an agent upon arrival: “I’m armed, so don’t overreact.” Knowing Leonard was a felon, agents seized the firearm and arrested him.

On appeal, Leonard raised five issues: (1) whether his waiver of counsel was valid under the Sixth Amendment; (2) whether he should have been permitted to present a necessity defense; (3) whether admitting a redacted detention-hearing transcript was improper; (4) whether the government proved the interstate-commerce nexus; and (5) whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional after Bruen and Rahimi.

The panel also granted defense counsel’s motion to withdraw due to incompatibility under 11th Cir. R. 27-1(a)(8) and 46-10(c), with new counsel to be appointed to assess further action (referencing Fed. R. App. P. 40).

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Self-representation: The court held Leonard knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel, applying the multi-factor test from United States v. Owen.
  • Necessity defense: The court upheld the district court’s motion-in-limine ruling barring necessity because Leonard failed to show a “present, imminent, and impending” threat as required by United States v. Moore and related imminence precedent.
  • Detention-hearing transcript: Any error was unreviewable because Leonard affirmatively stated he had “no objections,” triggering invited error under United States v. Maradiaga.
  • Interstate nexus: Evidence that the firearm was made in Germany and imported into New Hampshire sufficed under United States v. Edwards.
  • Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1): The court rejected the Bruen/Rahimi challenge as foreclosed by United States v. Dubois under the prior-precedent rule of United States v. Hanna.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Waiver of Counsel and Self-Representation

  • Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975):

    The constitutional foundation for self-representation. The Leonard panel treated Faretta as establishing that the Sixth Amendment protects not only the right to counsel but also the defendant’s autonomy to proceed pro se—so long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary.

  • United States v. Hakim, 30 F.4th 1310 (11th Cir. 2022):

    Provided the standard of review—waiver validity is a mixed question reviewed de novo. This framed the appellate posture: the panel independently assessed the record of Leonard’s waiver colloquies.

  • United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633 (11th Cir. 2014):

    Reinforced that the government bears the burden of showing a valid waiver on appeal. The panel then measured the record against the governing factors.

  • United States v. Owen, 963 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 2020):

    Supplied the eight-factor framework. The panel emphasized that a waiver may be valid when “most” factors support it, and it found multiple factors strongly favored validity: Leonard’s age (49), claimed educational credential in legal writing and analysis, asserted familiarity with federal rules, prior pro se experience, and the absence of coercion.

2. Necessity Defense in Felon-in-Possession Cases

  • United States v. Dicks, 338 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2003):

    Provided the de novo review standard for whether the defendant’s proffer is sufficient to present necessity to a jury. This is significant because it confirms that exclusion via motion in limine is not insulated by deference when the proffer fails as a matter of law.

  • United States v. Moore, 76 F.4th 1355 (11th Cir. 2023):

    Set out the necessity elements (imminent threat; no reckless creation of the situation; no reasonable legal alternative; direct causal relationship). Leonard turns primarily on the first element: “present, imminent, and impending” threat.

  • United States v. Bell, 214 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rice, 214 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2009):

    These cases anchored the “imminence” requirement, particularly the principle that when a “significant period of time has lapsed” since the danger, the threat is not imminent. The panel applied this line strictly: even taking Leonard’s account as true, it involved vague, week-old observations (hand movements that “looke[d] like” loading a gun) rather than an immediate emergency at the Starbucks meeting.

3. Invited Error and Appellate Review

  • United States v. Maradiaga, 987 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2021):

    The panel relied on Maradiaga for the rule that invited error precludes appellate review. Leonard’s explicit statement that he had “no objections” to admission of the redacted transcript was treated as an inducement of the alleged error.

  • United States v. Duldulao, 87 F.4th 1239 (11th Cir. 2023):

    Supplied the policy rationale—preventing “sandbagging.” The panel used it to justify the hard bar on review once the record shows affirmative acquiescence.

4. Interstate-Commerce Nexus

  • United States v. Edwards, 142 F.4th 1270 (11th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-5998 (2025):

    The court applied Edwards to reaffirm the modest nexus showing required in § 922(g) prosecutions: it is enough that the firearm or ammunition was manufactured outside the state of possession. The testimony that the firearm was made in Germany, imported into New Hampshire, and recovered in Florida satisfied this element.

5. Second Amendment Challenges After Bruen and Rahimi

  • United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010):

    Gruezo supplied the general de novo standard for constitutional review; Wright limited review to plain error when the constitutional claim is raised for the first time on appeal, tightening Leonard’s pathway to relief.

  • N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024):

    Leonard invoked these Supreme Court decisions to argue § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. The panel did not re-litigate the historical analysis itself, because circuit precedent controlled.

  • United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6281, 2026 WL 135685 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026):

    The operative merits precedent: the Eleventh Circuit had already rejected a post-Bruen and post-Rahimi challenge to § 922(g)(1). Leonard’s panel treated Dubois as dispositive.

  • United States v. Hanna, 153 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 1998):

    The “prior precedent rule” that binds later panels to earlier panel decisions unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc. The panel’s constitutional holding is thus primarily institutional: it confirms that, in this circuit, § 922(g)(1) remains enforceable notwithstanding Bruen/Rahimi, absent a qualifying overruling.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Faretta Waiver Was Adequately Supported by the Record

The court focused on the cumulative record of multiple hearings: Leonard was repeatedly told he had a right to counsel, warned that statements could be used against him, and offered (and later rejected) standby counsel. Applying United States v. Owen, the court credited Leonard’s demonstrated familiarity with the Faretta inquiry, claimed legal training, professed knowledge of federal rules, and prior pro se experience. The core reasoning is pragmatic: the Constitution requires a knowing and voluntary waiver, not a ritualistic script, and the multi-hearing record made it unreasonable to conclude Leonard did not understand the consequences.

2. Necessity Was Properly Excluded Because Imminence Was Missing

The panel treated imminence as the decisive defect. Leonard’s proffer was both (a) factually thin—he described ambiguous hand movements rather than a visible weapon or direct confrontation—and (b) temporally attenuated—his alleged threat occurred the week before the charged possession at Starbucks. Under United States v. Bell and the supporting cases, time lapse negates imminence. The court thus held there was “no reasonable basis” to present the defense to the jury, and the motion in limine properly prevented the jury from being exposed to a legally unavailable justification narrative.

3. Invited Error Barred Review of the Detention-Transcript Complaint

The court’s reasoning here was categorical. Because Leonard affirmatively stated he had “no objections” to admission, he could not later claim reversible error. Under United States v. Maradiaga, this is not merely forfeiture (which might be reviewed for plain error) but invitation (which is unreviewable on appeal). The decision underscores that clear on-the-record agreement to an evidentiary step is treated as a strategic choice binding on the litigant.

4. The Interstate-Nexus Element Was Satisfied by Manufacturing Origin

The panel applied United States v. Edwards straightforwardly: proof that the firearm was manufactured outside Florida establishes the necessary interstate-commerce connection. Testimony that the firearm was made in Germany and imported into New Hampshire— and recovered in Florida—met that standard, as did out-of-state ammunition manufacture.

5. The Second Amendment Challenge Failed Under Circuit Stare Decisis

Two independent constraints drove the outcome: (1) Leonard raised the issue for the first time on appeal, triggering plain error review under United States v. Wright; and (2) more importantly, United States v. Dubois had already rejected the same kind of challenge in light of N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. Under United States v. Hanna, the panel could not revisit that holding.

C. Impact

  • Necessity in § 922(g) cases remains exceptionally narrow: Leonard reinforces that defendants must show a truly immediate emergency—recent fear or generalized danger, especially with time lapse, will not open the door to necessity evidence at trial in the Eleventh Circuit.
  • Trial courts may use motions in limine to police legally unavailable defenses: By affirming exclusion before trial, the decision supports proactive gatekeeping where the proffer fails an element as a matter of law, limiting jury confusion and collateral mini-trials about motive.
  • Faretta waivers will be upheld when the record shows repeated advisements and informed persistence: Multiple hearings, offers of standby counsel, and a defendant’s demonstrated familiarity with legal process collectively strengthen waiver findings against Sixth Amendment attacks.
  • Invited error is a hard stop: Leonard underscores that defendants—even pro se—should treat on-the-record “no objection” statements as binding; later appellate review may be entirely foreclosed, not merely narrowed.
  • Bruen/Rahimi litigation in the Eleventh Circuit remains constrained by Dubois: Unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc changes course, panels will continue to reject § 922(g)(1) Second Amendment challenges under the prior-precedent rule.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Knowing and voluntary waiver” (of counsel): A defendant can represent himself only if he understands what he is giving up (trained counsel) and the general consequences and risks of proceeding alone.
  • “Faretta inquiry”: The court’s questioning to ensure the defendant’s choice to proceed pro se is informed and not coerced, rooted in Faretta v. California.
  • “Necessity defense”: A narrow justification: the defendant admits the act but claims it was the only way to avoid a greater, immediate harm. It fails if the threat is not imminent or if lawful alternatives existed.
  • “Imminent threat”: Not a past threat or generalized fear; it must be immediate and impending—something that leaves no time to pursue legal options.
  • “Motion in limine”: A pretrial request asking the judge to exclude certain topics or evidence from trial—often to prevent the jury from hearing irrelevant or legally improper material.
  • “Invited error”: When a party affirmatively agrees to or causes the alleged mistake at trial, the appellate court will not review that mistake.
  • “Interstate nexus” (for § 922(g)): The prosecution must link the firearm/ammunition to interstate commerce; in this circuit, it is generally enough to show it was made outside the state of possession.
  • “Prior precedent rule”: A three-judge panel must follow earlier published Eleventh Circuit panel decisions unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc overrules them.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Leonard is a doctrinally conservative but practically important Eleventh Circuit decision. It (1) reaffirms that a persistent, informed choice to proceed pro se—documented across multiple hearings—will satisfy the Sixth Amendment; (2) tightens the operational boundary of the necessity defense in felon-in-possession prosecutions by emphasizing strict imminence; (3) demonstrates the preclusive power of invited error; (4) confirms the low threshold for proving the § 922(g) interstate-commerce element; and (5) underscores that, in this circuit, post-Bruen/Rahimi attacks on § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed by United States v. Dubois under the prior-precedent rule of United States v. Hanna.