United States v. Lazar: Indictment “Predicate Categories” May Support Multiple RICO Acts; No Due-Process Bar for “Manufactured Jurisdiction”; § 3238 Venue Permitted for Overseas Money-Laundering Conspiracy

Introduction

In United States v. Lazar (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions and 300-month sentence of Marius Lazar, a Romanian national associated with the Bucharest charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club. Lazar was extradited and convicted of (I) racketeering conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), (II) an international cocaine-trafficking conspiracy, and (III) money-laundering conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).

The prosecution arose from a cross-border sting in which DEA Agent Diaz (undercover) negotiated a plan to source cocaine, move funds through U.S. accounts, and route drugs through Beaumont, Texas. A parallel “murder-for-hire” solicitation by Lazar became central both to RICO predicate-act litigation and to broader arguments that the United States lacked a legitimate jurisdictional nexus.

On appeal Lazar raised fifteen issues; the opinion’s most practically significant holdings concern (1) constructive amendment and indictment sufficiency in RICO predicate pleading, (2) the Fifth Circuit’s continued resistance to “manufactured jurisdiction” due-process theories, (3) discovery/authentication disputes for ephemeral encrypted messaging (Wickr), and (4) venue for extraterritorial money-laundering conspiracies using 18 U.S.C. § 3238 notwithstanding 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i).

Summary of the Opinion

  • No constructive amendment occurred when the jury was instructed it could treat “Killing While Engaged in Drug Trafficking” under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) as a RICO predicate act, because § 848(e)(1)(A) was listed in the indictment’s drug-trafficking predicate category and RICO permits two predicate acts of the same type.
  • Indictment sufficiency was upheld: under Fifth Circuit standards for RICO conspiracy pleading, the indictment gave adequate notice of the murder-for-hire plot and its linkage to drug trafficking.
  • “Manufactured jurisdiction” was rejected: the Texas nexus was not “solely furnished” by the government because Lazar and co-conspirators knowingly and voluntarily engaged in the Texas-based plan (Beaumont source point; Texas bank deposits).
  • Wickr discovery: Rule 16 did not require producing messages irretrievably deleted and not within the government’s “possession, custody, or control”; photos/videos of messages sufficed. Authentication under Rule 901(a) was satisfied by Agent Diaz’s testimony.
  • Informant identity: denial of disclosure under Roviaro v. United States was affirmed under the Fifth Circuit’s three-factor test.
  • Expert testimony about the Hells Angels’ general structure and worldwide rules was properly admitted under Rule 702 to support the “enterprise” element.
  • Venue for the money-laundering conspiracy was proper under § 3238 because Lazar was first brought to the Eastern District of Texas; § 1956(i) was treated as permissive in light of Whitfield v. United States.
  • Jury-instruction challenges largely failed on the merits or were harmless; sentencing challenges were rejected (including drug quantity attribution under United States v. Carreon) or deemed harmless given the district court’s alternative sentencing statement.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited

A. Constructive amendment, notice, and RICO pleading

The constructive-amendment framework came from United States v. Jara-Favela (de novo review) and the definition articulated in United States v. Sanders (quoting United States v. McMillan): a constructive amendment exists when the conviction rests on a factual basis that effectively modifies an essential element or permits conviction on a materially different theory. Applying that standard, the panel emphasized that the indictment already included 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) within the drug-trafficking predicate list and that nothing in RICO requires the predicates to be drawn from different “categories.”

To illustrate that a “category” can contain multiple distinct racketeering acts, the court cited United States v. Sutherland, where multiple bribe-related events could constitute numerous individual racketeering acts. That analogy supported the district court’s “reversal” on the predicate-instruction question: § 848(e)(1)(A) could be used as one of the two required acts even if the Texas murder predicate fell out.

On indictment sufficiency, the court relied on United States v. Pratt (and its citations to United States v. Ratcliff), and Hamling v. United States for the constitutional baseline: allege each element and enough facts to prepare a defense and plead double jeopardy. Critically, Pratt was also used for the RICO-specific proposition that “the indictment need not contain formal charges of the underlying racketeering activities.” The opinion thus reinforces a practical pleading rule: for RICO conspiracy, detailed evidentiary exposition is unnecessary so long as the defendant is on notice of the racketeering theories.

For the RICO-conspiracy completion argument, the court invoked Salinas v. United States: under § 1962(d) the government need only show that the predicate acts, “if completed,” would satisfy the elements of a substantive RICO offense; the conspiracy can exist even if the contemplated predicate conduct is not completed.

B. Whether 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) is substantive and whether “killing results” is required in a conspiracy setting

Lazar argued § 848(e)(1)(A) is “essentially a sentencing statute.” The panel rejected that, citing United States v. Villarreal, which held the parallel provision § 848(e)(1)(B) created a substantive offense. The court then relied on the Sixth Circuit’s United States v. Snow, where § 848(e)(1)(B) was held to be a proper object of a 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy. Together, these authorities supported treating § 848(e)(1)(A) as a substantive racketeering predicate and rejecting the claim that no conspiracy can exist unless an actual killing occurs.

C. “Manufactured jurisdiction” and due process

The court situated Lazar’s due-process theory in the lineage of United States v. Archer, the Second Circuit’s seminal “manufactured jurisdiction” case. But the Fifth Circuit underscored its own consistent pattern of rejecting such claims, citing:

  • United States v. Clark (no manufactured jurisdiction when the defendant willfully and voluntarily complied with an agent’s interstate request),
  • United States v. Garrett (interstate element not “solely furnished” by agents where defendant knowingly engaged with an out-of-state operation),
  • United States v. Pecora (no contrivance where call request was not designed to create jurisdiction), and
  • United States v. Perrin (warning against unilateral government creation of interstate elements, but upholding jurisdiction where conspirators chose out-of-state involvement).

By analogizing Lazar’s facts to Garrett (preexisting out-of-state operation; defendant awareness) and Clark (voluntary compliance), the panel cemented a practical rule: a sting’s U.S. nexus is typically adequate where the defendant knowingly accepts, negotiates, or performs acts consistent with the U.S.-linked plan.

D. Rule 16, ephemeral data, and evidentiary authentication

Discovery rulings were reviewed under United States v. Ellender (abuse of discretion; reversal requires prejudice), with the “abuse” definition drawn from In re First City Bancorporation of Tex., Inc. (quoting Chaves v. M/V Medina Star). For the proposition that Rule 16 is silent on the form of electronic discovery, the court cited United States v. Warshak. It further relied on United States v. Sarras for the principle that the government has no duty to disclose items it does not possess or to obtain evidence it does not possess.

On authentication, the court invoked United States v. Barnes (authentication “not burdensome,” citing United States v. Jackson) and United States v. Barlow (witness-with-knowledge testimony may authenticate). The court also cited an Eleventh Circuit decision, United States v. Ramirez, as a confirming example that photographs of messages can be authenticated through witness testimony.

E. Informant identity disclosure

The court applied Roviaro v. United States and the Fifth Circuit’s three-factor test from United States v. Ibarra. It relied on United States v. De Los Santos for how to weigh minimal participation and for the proposition that disclosure may still be denied even if one factor favors disclosure. For the defendant’s burden to show helpfulness, it cited United States v. Gonzales and United States v. Orozco (mere conjecture insufficient).

F. Rule 702 gang/enterprise expert testimony

The Rule 702 standards came through United States v. Valencia (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael), with “manifestly erroneous” language supported by United States v. Norris. The relevance/reliability framing relied on United States v. Ebron. The opinion’s key move was approving general enterprise-structure testimony even without granular knowledge of the Romanian charter, because the enterprise theory was worldwide Hells Angels organization and its rules.

G. Hearsay, complete defense, and Rule 803(3)

For hearsay exclusion and appellate review, the opinion cited United States v. Age (quoting United States v. Hankton). It relied on United States v. Shah to illustrate limits of Rule 803(3) where a statement is essentially a belief offered to prove the fact believed. On the constitutional “complete defense” argument, it cited United States v. Skelton (de novo review) and Holmes v. South Carolina (quoting United States v. Scheffer) for the principle that ordinary evidentiary rules generally do not violate the Sixth Amendment unless arbitrary or disproportionate.

H. RICO enterprise commerce nexus and sufficiency

The “minimal nexus” standard was grounded in United States v. McClaren (quoting United States v. Delgado), and the economic-activity principle that drug trafficking affects commerce in the aggregate was also taken from McClaren. For sufficiency review generally, the panel used United States v. Bourrage and its citations to United States v. Mesquias, applying the “rational jury”/deferential lens.

I. Venue in extraterritorial money laundering conspiracies

The statutory-construction instruction review standard came from United States v. Lamartiniere (quoting United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez), with harmless instructional error principles from United States v. Ferris. On the relationship between § 1956(i) and default venue rules, the opinion leaned heavily on Whitfield v. United States, which suggested § 1956(i) is permissive (“may be brought”) and supplements rather than supplants default venue provisions.

J. “Conspiracy to attempt” instruction and harmlessness

The court engaged United States v. Meacham (and its discussion of United States v. Clay) to address the conceptual problem of “conspiracy to attempt.” It then applied United States v. Wilson, which found a “conspiracy to attempt” charge defective but harmless where the government presented no evidence of an agreement merely to attempt (as opposed to an agreement to commit the substantive offense). That reasoning drove the holding that any error in phrasing the money-laundering conspiracy instruction was harmless given evidence of actual wiring/deposit conduct.

K. Sentencing—drug quantity in conspiracies and harmless guidelines error

Drug-quantity findings were reviewed under United States v. Eustice and United States v. Betancourt. On whether pre-joining conduct can be attributed, the court applied United States v. Carreon (quoting United States v. O'Campo): relevant conduct is prospective; the focus is on what distribution the defendant could reasonably foresee after joining. The panel rejected Lazar’s “agreement timing” argument by emphasizing that the 400 kilograms were to be distributed after he joined and were foreseeable.

On harmless guidelines error, the court cited United States v. Ibarra-Luna (high burden to show same sentence and same reasons) and applied United States v. Valdez and United States v. Delgado-Martinez to stress that “could have” is not enough—there must be a clear record indication. It found harmlessness based on the district court’s unequivocal statement that it “would have imposed the same sentence without regard to the applicable guideline range,” echoing reasoning in United States v. Vasquez.

2) Legal Reasoning

A. RICO predicate instruction: why no constructive amendment

The core constructive-amendment dispute turned on how to read the indictment’s predicate section. Lazar treated it as charging three “distinct predicate acts” corresponding to three subparagraphs; the government and district court ultimately treated those subparagraphs as categories containing multiple independently usable racketeering acts. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the latter view.

Doctrinally, the opinion’s reasoning has three steps:

  1. RICO’s statutory requirement is “at least two acts of racketeering activity” (18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)), not “two different categories of acts.”
  2. Notice was adequate because § 848(e)(1)(A) appeared on the indictment’s list of drug predicates and the murder-for-hire plot was alleged factually; Lazar was aware that the government viewed § 848(e)(1)(A) as capturing the murder-for-hire conduct.
  3. No new essential element or materially different theory was introduced at trial; the jury instruction stayed within the indictment’s described conduct and statutes.

The opinion thus endorses a flexible drafting-and-proof model: where an indictment lists multiple predicate statutes, the government may argue that different violations within the listed set constitute separate racketeering acts, even if the indictment’s narrative groups them.

B. RICO conspiracy and “uncompleted” predicates

Lazar’s “killing results” argument attacked the viability of charging § 848(e)(1)(A) as a predicate where no killing occurred. The Fifth Circuit treated this as misconceiving § 1962(d): under Salinas v. United States, the conspiracy offense does not require completion of the predicate; it requires an agreement that, if completed, would satisfy the substantive elements. This resolves an important practical issue in undercover contexts where law enforcement prevents completion of violent objectives.

C. Due process and “manufactured jurisdiction”

The panel’s approach was not to constitutionalize a broad “anti-sting” doctrine, but to ask a narrower question consistent with Fifth Circuit precedent: did the government solely furnish the U.S. jurisdictional element in a way that contrived jurisdiction, or did defendants knowingly and voluntarily adopt conduct tying the scheme to the United States?

Because Lazar negotiated knowing Diaz’s alleged base was in Beaumont, discussed exporting cocaine from Beaumont, and his co-conspirators wired large sums into a Texas account, the U.S. nexus was treated as jointly adopted rather than unilaterally manufactured. The holding is less about geography and more about agency: voluntary, informed participation in the U.S.-linked plan defeats the due-process objection.

D. Wickr: discovery limits and authentication realities for ephemeral encrypted messaging

The court’s Rule 16 reasoning is formal but consequential: Rule 16 compels production of statements within the government’s “possession, custody, or control.” If the platform’s design irretrievably deletes messages and the government captured what it could (videos/photos), Rule 16 does not become a mandate to perform impossible forensic recovery.

On authentication, the court applied a low threshold: a witness with knowledge (Diaz) testified that the photos/videos were what they purported to be. Allegations of missing exculpatory messages went to weight and credibility rather than admissibility under Rule 901(a) on this record.

E. Informant identity: balancing disclosure against safety and speculative utility

The opinion reinforces that Roviaro does not create an automatic right to disclosure upon a claim of “active participation.” Even assuming “Lee” was more than a tipster, Lazar failed the “helpfulness” factor because he did not identify concrete exculpatory facts Lee could supply (beyond speculation about jurisdictional routing or broader conspiracy context), while the government’s safety showing was credited.

F. Venue: § 1956(i) as permissive, not exclusive

The venue holding is anchored in statutory text (“may be brought”) and Whitfield v. United States. The Fifth Circuit treated § 1956(i) as expanding options rather than eliminating defaults like § 3238 for overseas offenses. This matters in extraterritorial conspiracies where “first brought” district can be the most administrable venue anchor.

G. Harmless error as an affirmance engine

Even where Lazar raised arguable concerns (e.g., the “conspiracy to attempt” phrasing), the panel used harmless-error reasoning consistent with United States v. Wilson: if the government’s proof and the case’s logic support only the permissible theory (agreement to launder money), the risk of conviction on an impermissible ground is minimal.

3) Impact

  • RICO charging practice: The opinion supports indictments that list multiple predicate statutes under broad headings, and it reduces the risk that a jury instruction identifying specific predicate statutes (already listed) will be deemed a constructive amendment.
  • Violence-related predicates in undercover operations: By relying on Salinas v. United States, the court affirms that RICO conspiracy can be proven by agreements to commit predicates that law enforcement prevents from being completed—particularly important in murder-for-hire stings tied to drug trafficking.
  • “Manufactured jurisdiction” remains narrow in the Fifth Circuit: The decision continues a strong line limiting Archer-type theories, signaling that defendants’ informed adoption of U.S.-linked logistics (banks, shipment routes, meeting points) will generally defeat due-process objections.
  • Encrypted/ephemeral messaging evidence: The court’s Rule 16 and Rule 901 analysis provides a roadmap for admitting screenshots/videos of disappearing messages while resisting defense demands for nonexistent data—an increasingly common evidentiary fight.
  • Extraterritorial venue: Treating § 1956(i) as nonexclusive confirms the government can rely on § 3238 to try overseas money-laundering conspiracies where the defendant is “first brought” to a U.S. district.

Because the opinion is “not designated for publication,” it does not create binding circuit precedent under 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Nonetheless, it is likely to be cited persuasively in future district court litigation over RICO predicate pleading, venue in extraterritorial financial crimes, and discovery disputes for disappearing-message platforms.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Constructive amendment: When trial proceedings (often jury instructions) effectively change what the grand jury charged—so the defendant might be convicted for something materially different than the indictment alleged.
  • RICO “enterprise”: The organized group (formal or informal) whose affairs are conducted through racketeering. An “association-in-fact” enterprise can be proven by showing how the group functions and what it does.
  • RICO “predicate acts”: The underlying crimes (e.g., drug trafficking, money laundering) that, in a pattern of at least two acts, constitute “racketeering activity.”
  • RICO conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)): An agreement to violate substantive RICO. The government need not prove the racketeering acts were completed—only that the conspirators agreed to pursue them.
  • Manufactured jurisdiction: A due-process argument claiming the government improperly created the only connection to federal jurisdiction (e.g., crossing a border solely to make a call). Fifth Circuit cases generally reject it when defendants voluntarily participate in the interstate/foreign nexus.
  • Rule 16 “possession, custody, or control”: Discovery obligations usually reach only what the government actually has or can obtain; courts typically do not order production of data that no longer exists.
  • Authentication (Rule 901): A low threshold showing that evidence is what it claims to be—often satisfied by a knowledgeable witness’s testimony.
  • Venue (18 U.S.C. § 3238): For crimes committed abroad, venue can be where the defendant is first arrested or first brought in the United States.
  • Harmless error: Even if a mistake occurred, a conviction stands if the court is convinced the mistake did not affect the outcome.

Conclusion

United States v. Lazar affirms a broad, practical approach to proving and instructing RICO predicates when the indictment already lists the relevant statutes; it rejects due-process “manufactured jurisdiction” claims where defendants knowingly embrace U.S.-linked logistics; it validates the use of § 3238 venue for overseas § 1956(h) conspiracies notwithstanding § 1956(i); and it underscores that disappearing-message platforms do not expand Rule 16 discovery beyond what the government possesses. Even as an unpublished decision, Lazar is a compact statement of the Fifth Circuit’s prevailing instincts: defer to indictment notice and trial proof, resist jurisdictional and discovery doctrines that would disable international stings, and rely on harmless error where the verdict is strongly supported by the record.