United States v. Jacobs: As-Applied Challenges to § 922(g)(9) Survive Categorical Foreclosure and Require Post-Rahimi Factfinding

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date: January 21, 2026
Citation: United States v. James William Jacobs, No. 24-4287 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) (published)

Core takeaway / emerging rule: The Fourth Circuit (i) applies its intervening Second Amendment precedents to foreclose facial challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(9), and to foreclose all as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) under circuit law; but (ii) declines to extend that categorical foreclosure to § 922(g)(9), instead requiring a post-United States v. Rahimi as-applied analysis supported by a developed factual record and therefore vacating and remanding where the record is insufficient.

1. Introduction

United States v. Jacobs sits at the intersection of the Supreme Court’s “text-and-history” Second Amendment methodology and the federal “prohibited persons” regime in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). James William Jacobs was indicted on two firearm-possession counts: (1) felon-in-possession, § 922(g)(1), and (2) possession after conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, § 922(g)(9).

Jacobs moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing both statutes were unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. The district court accepted Jacobs’ as-applied challenges and dismissed both counts. On appeal, intervening decisions—especially United States v. Rahimi and several Fourth Circuit cases interpreting Bruen—reshaped the governing framework and largely resolved three of the four issues.

Key issues framed by the Fourth Circuit

  • Whether § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional.
  • Whether § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Jacobs.
  • Whether § 922(g)(9) is facially constitutional.
  • Whether § 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to Jacobs.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the § 922(g)(1) count and vacated the dismissal of the § 922(g)(9) count, remanding for additional proceedings.

  • § 922(g)(1): The district court’s as-applied invalidation was error under binding circuit precedent; Jacobs’ facial challenge is likewise foreclosed.
  • § 922(g)(9) facial challenge: Foreclosed by circuit precedent upholding facial constitutionality.
  • § 922(g)(9) as-applied challenge: Not decided on the merits; the court vacated and remanded because (a) the district court lacked the benefit of intervening decisions clarifying the methodology post-Bruen, and (b) the factual record was too thin to evaluate an as-applied challenge.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and how they shaped the result)

Foundational Second Amendment methodology

  • District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): The district court relied on Heller to treat “the People” as including “all Americans,” including non-law-abiding persons, thereby moving the dispute to historical justification. The Fourth Circuit did not directly revisit that framing here; instead, it treated the appeal as controlled by subsequent Second Amendment cases and circuit precedent.
  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Bruen supplies the “text-and-history” test—once the regulated conduct falls within the Second Amendment’s plain text, the government must justify the regulation by demonstrating consistency with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The district court applied this test but did so in a manner the Fourth Circuit suggested is inconsistent with later clarifications.
  • United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): The Fourth Circuit treated Rahimi as a critical clarification that the Second Amendment is not “trapped in amber,” and that the government need not produce a “historical twin.” This undercut the district court’s reasoning, which leaned heavily on the absence of a close historical analogue for Jacobs’ prior offenses and on historical social attitudes toward domestic violence.

Fourth Circuit § 922(g) decisions that effectively decide three issues

  • United States v. Canada, 123 F.4th 159 (4th Cir. 2024): Upheld the facial constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). In Jacobs, this forecloses Jacobs’ facial challenge to the felon-in-possession count.
  • United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024): Adopted a categorical rule in the Fourth Circuit rejecting as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) “without regard to the specific conviction.” This compelled reversal of the district court’s as-applied invalidation of § 922(g)(1). Importantly, Jacobs refuses to automatically generalize Hunt to § 922(g)(9).
  • United States v. Nutter, 137 F.4th 224 (4th Cir. 2025): Upheld the facial constitutionality of § 922(g)(9). This blocks Jacobs’ facial challenge to the domestic-violence-misdemeanant prohibition. Nutter also reflects the Fourth Circuit’s post-Rahimi approach to analogical reasoning under Bruen.

Remand and record-development authorities

  • United States v. Bailey, 74 F.4th 151 (4th Cir. 2023): Cited for the proposition that when a district court’s legal error leads to missing findings, remand is the usual remedy, especially where the record contains material ambiguities. This supports vacatur/remand on the as-applied § 922(g)(9) issue.
  • Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982): Quoted (via Bailey) for the general remand principle when factfinding is incomplete due to an erroneous legal framework.

Horizontal stare decisis within the Fourth Circuit

  • Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 2021): Invoked to emphasize that a later panel must follow earlier panel precedent “as a mechanical mandate.” This explains why Jacobs treats Hunt as binding on § 922(g)(1) even while noting potential tension with other views.

Signals from outside the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court “shadow”

  • Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting): The opinion notes Justice Barrett’s view (as a circuit judge) that disarmament historically targeted “dangerous” persons rather than all felons by status. The Fourth Circuit acknowledges the tension but states it remains bound by Hunt absent Supreme Court intervention.
  • United States v. Simmons, 150 F.4th 126 (2d Cir. 2025): Cited as an example of a court leaving room for as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(9) where a defendant can distinguish himself from other domestic-violence misdemeanants. The Fourth Circuit uses this to justify that it is premature to decide Jacobs’ as-applied § 922(g)(9) claim without a fuller record.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) The “easy” reversals: three issues resolved by binding precedent

The Fourth Circuit’s analysis is structurally straightforward: because Canada, Hunt, and Nutter directly control three of the four questions, the court treats those matters as effectively decided. Consequently:

  • The district court’s as-applied ruling against § 922(g)(1) cannot stand after Hunt, so reversal is required.
  • Jacobs’ facial challenges to § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(9) are foreclosed by Canada and Nutter.

(B) The “live” issue: as-applied constitutionality of § 922(g)(9)

The opinion’s doctrinal significance lies in what it does not do: it does not extend Hunt’s categorical bar to as-applied challenges in the domestic-violence-misdemeanor context. Instead, it takes a cautious, method-driven approach:

  1. Intervening legal clarification: The district court ruled before Rahimi (and the Fourth Circuit’s post-Rahimi cases) clarified how to conduct analogical reasoning and avoid requiring overly exact historical matches. The Fourth Circuit signals that the district court’s approach—particularly its reliance on historical permissiveness of spousal abuse as negating any disarmament tradition—cannot be squared with Rahimi’s instruction that modern regulations may be consistent with historical tradition even without a “historical twin.”
  2. Record insufficiency: The Fourth Circuit identifies specific factual gaps that prevent meaningful as-applied adjudication. It highlights at least five areas needing development:
    • the date and circumstances of Jacobs’ domestic violence misdemeanor conviction;
    • the circumstances surrounding the present § 922(g)(9) charge, including related state proceedings;
    • Jacobs’ conduct between the misdemeanor and the present incident;
    • whether Jacobs sought a pardon or expungement;
    • any other factor relevant under a post-Rahimi inquiry.
    Because as-applied challenges can turn on individualized facts bearing on dangerousness, recency, and the nature of the predicate offense (and potentially remediation), the panel concludes it is “ill-equipped” to decide the question on the existing record.

(C) Remedy choice: “reversed” vs. “vacated”

The court’s remedy tracks the posture of each issue:

  • Reversal on § 922(g)(1) because circuit law (especially Hunt) resolves the issue; the district court’s dismissal is legally wrong as a matter of binding precedent.
  • Vacatur and remand on § 922(g)(9) as-applied because the district court’s analysis needs to be re-run under clarified law and on a developed record; the appellate court is not making a final merits determination.

3.3 Impact

(A) Doctrinal impact inside the Fourth Circuit

  • § 922(g)(1) challenges narrow further: The decision reinforces that, in the Fourth Circuit, as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by Hunt, even for defendants arguing they are nonviolent or otherwise atypical.
  • § 922(g)(9) as-applied challenges remain theoretically available: By declining to “categorically reject all as-applied challenges to Section 922(g)(9),” the court preserves a pathway—at least procedurally—for defendants to attempt individualized challenges. Practically, this pushes litigation toward evidentiary development about the predicate DV conviction, subsequent conduct, and any indicators of present dangerousness or rehabilitation.

(B) Litigation and trial-court practice effects

  • Record-building becomes decisive: Trial courts should expect targeted discovery, evidentiary proffers, and possibly hearings focusing on the nature and recency of domestic violence conduct, compliance with court orders, subsequent violence, and post-conviction relief efforts.
  • Post-Rahimi framing: Parties will likely shift away from demanding near-identical founding-era analogues and toward broader analogical arguments (e.g., historical traditions of disarming those posing threats, surety-style mechanisms, or other risk-based restrictions), consistent with Rahimi’s warnings against overly rigid historical matching.

(C) Broader Second Amendment landscape

  • Potential circuit divergence: The opinion’s citation to United States v. Simmons suggests that courts may converge on a middle position for § 922(g)(9): facial validity is settled (in many jurisdictions), but as-applied challenges may depend on individualized distinctions.
  • Pressure point for Supreme Court review: The panel’s note about Justice Barrett’s dissent in Kanter v. Barr (and the acknowledged tension around categorical felon disarmament) underscores that § 922(g)(1) remains an area where Supreme Court clarification could alter circuit rules; Jacobs nevertheless treats that debate as beyond a panel’s authority to resolve.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Facial vs. as-applied challenges

  • Facial challenge: argues a law is unconstitutional in all (or nearly all) applications—i.e., the statute is invalid on its face.
  • As-applied challenge: argues the law may be valid generally but is unconstitutional when applied to a particular person under particular facts. Jacobs shows why as-applied claims can be record-intensive: individualized facts can matter.

The “text-and-history” test after Bruen and Rahimi

  • Bruen requires courts to assess whether modern firearm regulations are consistent with historical tradition once the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct.
  • Rahimi emphasizes that courts should not demand a “historical twin” and should not treat history as a static checklist; analogies may be broader and principle-based.

What is a “historical analogue” (and what it is not)?

  • An analogue is not an identical founding-era statute addressing the same modern fact pattern.
  • Instead, it is a historically grounded regulatory practice that is “relevantly similar” in purpose and burden—e.g., traditions of restricting arms for those who pose threats, even if the mechanism differs from modern criminal prohibitions.

Why “vacate and remand” instead of “affirm” or “reverse” on § 922(g)(9)?

  • Vacatur wipes away the prior judgment on that point because it was reached under an incomplete/incorrect framework and without sufficient factual findings.
  • Remand instructs the district court to gather facts and apply the updated legal method in the first instance—consistent with ordinary appellate practice when factfinding is lacking.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Jacobs is principally a post-Rahimi housekeeping and methodology decision with a meaningful procedural holding: while the Fourth Circuit’s precedents largely foreclose constitutional attacks on § 922(g)(1) and facial attacks on § 922(g)(9), the court deliberately leaves room for as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(9)—but only on an adequately developed factual record and under the clarified post-Rahimi approach to historical analogy.

The decision’s practical message is clear: in the Fourth Circuit, the constitutional battleground for domestic-violence-misdemeanant prohibitions is not a broad facial attack, but a fact-specific as-applied inquiry—one that trial courts must decide with careful record development and faithful attention to intervening Second Amendment guidance.