Date: Apr 5, 2026

United States v. Jackson: Odor of Burnt Marijuana Plus Inconsistent Travel Stories, Extreme Nervousness, and Drug-Trafficking History Can Supply Probable Cause to Search a “Trunk-Equivalent” Area of an SUV

1) Introduction

In United States v. Jackson (10th Cir. Apr. 3, 2026) (nonprecedential order and judgment), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of Cory Lamar Jackson’s motion to suppress cocaine discovered in a rented SUV. The traffic-stop search uncovered approximately five pounds of cocaine hidden in a compartment located in the SUV’s third-row area. The government prosecuted Mr. Jackson for possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii)(II).

The appeal presented a single core question: whether the officer had probable cause to search the area where the cocaine was found. A key doctrinal wrinkle was whether the SUV’s third row should be treated like the passenger compartment (which is often searchable based on certain cues) or like a trunk (which some precedent treats more protectively when the cue is limited to odor of burnt marijuana).

Although the panel assumed (for argument’s sake) that the third row was the equivalent of a trunk, it still held that the totality of circumstances established probable cause.

2) Summary of the Opinion

The court reiterated that probable cause exists when there is a “fair probability” that contraband will be found, citing United States v. Saulsberry.
The court reviewed factual findings for clear error under United States v. Lopez, but reviewed de novo whether those findings amounted to probable cause, citing United States v. Rosborough.
The district court relied on: (1) odor of burnt marijuana, (2) inconsistent travel stories, (3) extreme nervousness, and (4) criminal history involving arrests for trafficking/distribution.
Even assuming the third-row area was a “trunk-equivalent,” the panel held the combined factors gave the officer probable cause to search the third row and affirmed.
Judge Federico concurred in the judgment but would not count “extreme nervousness” because the video evidence did not match the characterization of the testimony; nevertheless, he joined the remainder of the decision.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Probable cause standard and appellate review

United States v. Saulsberry — supplied the governing definition: probable cause exists when a “fair probability” exists that contraband will be found. Jackson applies this definition to a vehicle search, emphasizing probability rather than certainty.
United States v. Lopez — reinforced that underlying factual findings are credited unless clearly erroneous. Jackson uses Lopez to bind the appellant to the district court’s credited testimony-based findings.
United States v. Rosborough — established de novo review for the legal conclusion (whether the found facts constitute probable cause). Jackson follows Rosborough by accepting the facts and independently assessing probable cause.

2) When a district court’s “recitation of testimony” counts as findings

Rep. Tech. Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp. — noted that summarizing testimony ordinarily is not a factual finding.
United States v. White and Kinney ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Int'l Union of Oper. Eng'rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO — supported treating a district court’s summary of testimony as adopted findings when the context shows the court intended to credit that testimony.

This matters in Jackson because the panel treated the district court’s description of the officer’s testimony as the operative factual findings, thereby tightening the appellant’s ability to contest those “facts” on appeal.

3) Odor of burnt marijuana and scope of vehicle search

United States v. Parker — stated that smell of burnt marijuana alone would justify searching the passenger compartment rather than the trunk. Jackson acknowledges Parker but then addresses the harder question: what if the searched area is arguably “trunk-like”?
United States v. Kizart and United States v. McSween — out-of-circuit support for a “plus factors” approach: odor of burnt marijuana plus other suspicious circumstances can establish probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including trunk/hidden areas. Jackson uses these cases to show Parker does not foreclose trunk-equivalent searches when additional indicators exist.

4) Passenger compartment vs. trunk and the shadow of search-incident-to-arrest doctrine

United States v. Olguin-Rivera — relied on by the district court to treat the third row as passenger compartment.
Arizona v. Gant — invoked by Mr. Jackson as having abrogated Olguin-Rivera.

The Tenth Circuit expressly declined to resolve whether Gant abrogated Olguin-Rivera because it assumed the defense-friendly premise that the third row was a “trunk-equivalent” and still found probable cause. This is a notable technique: deciding the case on a narrower ground while leaving a contested doctrinal issue for another day.

5) Totality-of-the-circumstances probable cause and “stacking” facts

United States v. West — central Tenth Circuit authority for combining odor of drugs, extreme nervousness, and criminal record to find probable cause. Jackson closely tracks West’s structure and reasoning.
United States v. Ledesma — emphasized totality-of-the-circumstances analysis and recognized “extraordinary and prolonged nervousness” as significant. Jackson cites Ledesma both for totality and for the evidentiary weight that extreme nervousness can carry.
United States v. Dion — out-of-circuit corroboration that inconsistent travel plans, extreme nervousness, and criminal history together can establish probable cause.

6) Inconsistent travel stories as suspicious circumstances

United States v. Anderson — treated slightly conflicting versions of travel plans as contributing to probable cause.
United States v. Wallace — treated inconsistent travel stories as supporting reasonable suspicion (a lower standard), reinforcing their probative value.
United States v. Romero — prevented the appellant from reversing a litigation position late via supplemental authority. Jackson uses Romero to hold Mr. Jackson to his opening-brief concession that the district court was entitled to view the stories as contradictory/inconsistent.

7) “Implausible” travel plans and judicial notice

Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd of Cnty. Comm'rs — cited for judicial notice of driving distance.
United States v. Simpson — cautioned against treating unusual travel plans as implausible merely because they are unusual.

The panel declined to treat the stories as “implausible” on the record, demonstrating restraint: it relied on “inconsistency” rather than “implausibility” (and explicitly assumed implausibility did not contribute to probable cause).

8) Extreme nervousness

Courtney v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety and United States v. McFarley — illustrated physical cues (shaking, heavy breathing, palpitations) that can support a finding of unusual or extreme nervousness.

Jackson used these authorities to validate the district court’s inference of “extreme nervousness” from testimony about shaking hands and a pronounced neck pulse—while also acknowledging (in footnote) that video might undercut that inference (as Judge Federico believed).

9) Criminal history as a probable cause factor

United States v. Cantu and United States v. Artez — recognized that prior narcotics-related arrests/criminal history can contribute to probable cause when combined with other suspicious circumstances.
United States v. McSween (again) — out-of-circuit support for using prior narcotics arrests plus odor to justify broader vehicle search.

10) Rental vehicles: acknowledged intra-circuit tension (but not resolved)

United States v. Batara-Molina and United States v. Frazier — suggested rental status alone does not contribute to reasonable suspicion absent unusual facts.
United States v. Kitchell and United States v. Patten — suggested rental status can potentially contribute in some circumstances.

Jackson avoided deepening the tension by assuming the rental-car fact did not contribute to probable cause. The opinion thereby signals that the panel’s probable-cause conclusion is not dependent on rental status, reducing the decision’s vulnerability to that contested line of authority.

B. Legal Reasoning

Define the legal standard: Probable cause requires a “fair probability” of finding contraband.
Fix the factual baseline: The panel credited the district court’s adopted account of the officer’s testimony (odor of burnt marijuana; inconsistent travel stories; extreme nervousness; drug-related arrest history).
Neutralize the trunk/passenger-compartment fight: Even if the third row is treated as a trunk-equivalent (a defense-friendly assumption), odor can still support probable cause when combined with other suspicious factors.
Apply totality-of-the-circumstances: The court did not require any single factor (including marijuana odor) to do all the work. Instead, it “stacked” the factors:
- Burnt marijuana odor (baseline indicator of contraband/drug activity);
- Inconsistent travel stories (indicator of deception/evasion);
- Extreme nervousness (indicator of consciousness of guilt);
- Prior arrests for trafficking/distribution (contextual amplifier of suspicion).
Conclude probable cause: Given the combination (and cases such as United States v. West), the officer had probable cause to search the third-row area where the cocaine was found.

A practical doctrinal takeaway is the court’s implicit endorsement of a “marijuana odor plus corroborators” framework for broader vehicle searches—especially when the searched area is not a classic sealed trunk but a concealed compartment within an SUV’s interior architecture.

C. Impact

Vehicle-search litigation in the Tenth Circuit: Although nonprecedential, Jackson will likely be cited persuasively for the proposition that burnt-marijuana odor need not be dispositive on scope when other suspicious factors exist—allowing searches of trunk-equivalent or concealed areas in SUVs.
Defense strategy and issue preservation: The opinion reinforces that appellants cannot pivot late to contradict positions taken in the opening brief (via United States v. Romero). Practically, Jackson encourages careful framing early on: concessions about “inconsistency” may become binding on appeal.
Factfinding and video evidence: Judge Federico’s partial disagreement on “extreme nervousness” hints at a developing friction point: how appellate courts should reconcile officer testimony with video footage. Even though the majority treated nervousness as a valid factor here, the concurrence signals that future litigants may successfully contest “extreme nervousness” when recordings contradict the characterization.
Open questions preserved: By assuming the third row is trunk-equivalent and declining to resolve the Arizona v. Gant abrogation argument against United States v. Olguin-Rivera, Jackson leaves the passenger-compartment classification issue available for future panels to address in a precedential posture.
Rental-car factor remains unsettled: The court acknowledged conflicting lines (Batara-Molina/Frazier vs. Kitchell/Patten) and avoided relying on rental status. The tension persists, but Jackson suggests that strong probable cause can be built without that factor.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable cause: A practical, common-sense standard requiring a “fair probability” that evidence of a crime will be found in the place searched—more than a hunch, less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Totality of the circumstances: Courts do not evaluate each fact in isolation. Multiple modestly suspicious facts can combine into probable cause even if no single fact would suffice alone.
Clearly erroneous vs. de novo review: “Clearly erroneous” is a deferential standard for fact findings (the appellate court generally accepts the trial court’s view of what happened). “De novo” means the appellate court independently decides a legal issue (here, whether the facts add up to probable cause).
Passenger compartment vs. trunk (and “trunk-equivalent” areas): Some search doctrines draw lines between areas readily accessible to occupants (passenger compartment) and more separated storage areas (trunks). SUVs blur this distinction; Jackson treated the third row as trunk-equivalent for argument’s sake but still found probable cause under the combined facts.
Motion to suppress: A defendant’s request to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. If granted, key evidence (like seized drugs) may be unusable at trial.
Nonprecedential “Order and Judgment”: The decision is not binding precedent for future cases (except under doctrines like law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel) but may be cited for persuasive value.

5) Conclusion

United States v. Jackson affirms that, even when a searched SUV area is treated as a trunk-equivalent, the combination of burnt-marijuana odor, inconsistent travel stories, extreme nervousness, and a drug-trafficking arrest history can establish probable cause to search that area under a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. The opinion’s most durable contribution is methodological: it deemphasizes formal compartment labels (passenger area vs. trunk) when independent suspicious indicators collectively create a fair probability of contraband, while also signaling—through Judge Federico’s note—that video evidence may increasingly shape how courts evaluate “nervousness” claims.