United States v. Golobic: Pre‑Investigation Obstruction Supports §3C1.1 Enhancement; Interrogatory “No” Is Not an Acquittal; §1591(d) Obstruction Triggers SORNA

1. Introduction

In United States v. Andrew Golobic (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2026), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and 144-month sentence of an Immigration and Customs Enforcement Alternatives-to-Detention agent who abused his supervisory authority to coerce and exploit women under supervision, then impeded detection by tampering with witnesses and destroying evidence. The appeal presented three clusters of issues: (1) whether the district court had “good cause” to excuse an ill deliberating juror and proceed with eleven jurors under Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)(3); (2) whether several obstruction-related counts were multiplicitous in violation of double jeopardy principles; and (3) whether multiple sentencing rulings were erroneous—including the reach of the U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement before a formal investigation began, the use of an “abduction” enhancement, alleged double counting, statutory-maximum arguments, and the requirement that Golobic register as a sex offender based on a § 1591(d) obstruction conviction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court (Sutton, C.J.) held that the district court acted within its discretion in excusing a juror who became ill and was hospitalized during deliberations, that no plain error occurred from submitting the challenged counts to the jury because each offense required proof of distinct elements (and occurred at distinct times), and that Golobic’s sentencing challenges failed—including because (i) post-2006 Guidelines text permits applying § 3C1.1 to pre-investigation conduct that obstructs justice “with respect to” an investigation, (ii) the verdict-form “kidnapping” interrogatory response was not an “acquittal” barring an abduction enhancement, (iii) the alleged “double counting” targeted distinct harms, (iv) the Guidelines did not override statutory maximums due to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 and grouping mechanics, and (v) the statute’s text required SORNA registration for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. De Oleo, 697 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2012): Set the abuse-of-discretion standard for excusing a deliberating juror under Rule 23(b)(3).
  • United States v. Ramos, 861 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1988): Defined “good cause” broadly and emphasized trial-judge discretion at the “particularly sensitive stage” of deliberations.
  • United States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Casey, 2000 WL 1721055 (6th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Simpson, 1999 WL 777348 (6th Cir. 1999): Recognized juror illness as a paradigmatic basis for “good cause.”
  • United States v. Spence, 163 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Patterson, 26 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Araujo, 62 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 1995): Distinguished as non-binding and factually different (expected immediate return; lack of inquiry into duration; mere car trouble).
  • United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1996): Established plain-error review for unpreserved multiplicity claims.
  • United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 2008): Framed multiplicity as charging one offense in multiple counts and linked it to double jeopardy concerns.
  • Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932): Supplied the core “distinct elements” test used to reject multiplicity when each statute requires proof the other does not.
  • United States v. DeCarlo, 434 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2006): Reinforced that using overlapping evidence does not create double jeopardy where elements differ.
  • United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2015): Used to reject plain-error claims where the defendant identifies no precedent establishing the alleged error.
  • United States v. Ehle, 640 F.3d 689 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985)): Clarified that plain error can be found where Supreme Court precedent squarely controls (e.g., receive/possess overlap in certain contexts), but did not supply an analogous multiplicity rule here.
  • United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2000): Provided the plain-error framework and the “substantial rights” requirement that Golobic failed to meaningfully address.
  • United States v. Baggett, 342 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Boyd, 312 F.3d 213 (6th Cir. 2002): Represented pre-2006 Sixth Circuit limitations on §3C1.1 tied to “during the course of the investigation” language.
  • United States v. Vysniauskas, 593 F. App'x 518 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Fisher, 824 F. App'x 347 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Elliott, 521 F. App'x 513 (6th Cir. 2013): Recognized that the post-2006 amendment broadens §3C1.1 to reach qualifying pre-investigation conduct.
  • United States v. Bazazpour, 690 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Walker, 399 F. App'x 75 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Wallace, 600 F. App'x 322 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Rudra, No. 25-3040, 2026 WL 75323 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026): Addressed to explain why scattered references to older formulations do not create contrary holdings post-amendment.
  • United States v. Diaz, 90 F.4th 335 (5th Cir. 2024); United States v. Montanari, 863 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2017): Cited to show other circuits likewise expanded §3C1.1 after the 2006 amendment.
  • United States v. Bailey, 973 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2020): Supplied the standard of review for Guidelines factfinding (clear error) and legal conclusions (de novo).
  • Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013): Defined “acquittal” as a ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense.
  • United States v. Clark, 11 F.4th 491 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Volkman, 797 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. McCoy, 480 F. App'x 366 (6th Cir. 2012): Structured the “double counting” analysis and supported applying multiple enhancements that reflect distinct aspects of the offense.
  • United States v. Barnes, 822 F.3d 914 (6th Cir. 2016): Reinforced plain-error burdens for unpreserved challenges to Guideline legality/statutory-max theories.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Excusing a deliberating juror for illness (Rule 23(b)(3))

The court applied an abuse-of-discretion lens (United States v. De Oleo) and framed “good cause” broadly (United States v. Ramos). It emphasized pragmatic trial management: the juror went to the emergency room, had abnormal lab results, anticipated extended testing, and was admitted. Given nearly five days of prior deliberations and the uncertainty of delay, excusal was reasonable. The opinion distinguishes cases where a return was expected quickly (United States v. Spence), where the judge failed to inquire about the duration (United States v. Patterson), or where the issue was far less serious (United States v. Araujo).

B. Multiplicity and double jeopardy (Counts 2, 5, and 6)

Because Golobic did not preserve the issue, the court required plain error (United States v. Branham). It applied the classic “distinct elements” test (Gavieres v. United States; Blockburger v. United States) and reiterated that overlap in evidence does not itself create a double jeopardy problem (United States v. DeCarlo). Two independent reasons defeated the claim:

  1. No plainly established law: Golobic offered no supporting precedent, which is fatal under United States v. Al-Maliki.
  2. Distinct elements and distinct conduct: The court contrasted the statutory targets and temporal predicates. Count 2 (18 U.S.C. § 1591(d)) required interference with enforcement of the sex-trafficking statute during a later window and via false/misleading statements; Count 5 (18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3)) required misleading conduct intended to prevent information reaching law enforcement and arose months earlier; Count 6 (18 U.S.C. § 1519) required destruction/alteration/concealment of records, without requiring a sex-trafficking nexus.

The court also cabined United States v. Ehle to its setting (where controlling precedent made the overlap clear), concluding there was no analogous double-jeopardy rule here.

C. Sentencing: §3C1.1 obstruction enhancement for pre-investigation conduct

The court treated the challenge as unpreserved and required plain error and a showing of effect on substantial rights (United States v. Koeberlein; United States v. Page). It then addressed the merits: the earlier Sixth Circuit limitation in United States v. Baggett and United States v. Boyd depended on pre-2006 Guideline text (“during the course of the investigation”). The 2006 amendment replaced that with “with respect to the investigation” and added application-note language allowing coverage of conduct “prior to the start of the investigation of the instant offense.” The court read this as expanding §3C1.1’s temporal reach and relied on post-amendment Sixth Circuit applications (United States v. Vysniauskas, United States v. Fisher, United States v. Elliott) and aligned circuits (United States v. Diaz, United States v. Montanari). On the facts, Golobic reduced Evelin’s supervision to deter reporting and thereby obstruct detection “with respect to” the eventual investigation.

D. Abduction enhancement and the meaning of “acquittal” after the acquitted-conduct change

Golobic invoked U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) (effective Nov. 1, 2024), which excludes “relevant conduct” that was “criminally charged and acquitted.” The court’s core move was definitional and procedural: an “acquittal” requires a determination of insufficient proof of criminal liability (Evans v. Michigan), and federal acquittals must be unanimous (Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a)). Here, kidnapping/abduction was not a charged offense; the “kidnapping” item appeared only as a special interrogatory tied to the § 242 count. A “no” answer could simply mean the jury did not unanimously agree “yes,” not that it unanimously found the government failed to prove kidnapping. Additionally, “kidnapping” as instructed (seize/confine/detain for sexual gratification) differs from Guideline “abduction” (forced accompaniment to a different location, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(a)). Finally, the court found the issue non-prejudicial in any event because removing the enhancement would not change the advisory range (still 360-to-life), and the court imposed a substantial downward variance to 144 months while expressly considering the policy arguments.

E. “Double counting” of enhancements

Applying de novo review (United States v. Clark), the court reaffirmed that double counting is prohibited only when “precisely the same aspect” of conduct is counted twice (United States v. Battaglia), and that multiple enhancements may apply when they measure different harms, as in United States v. Volkman. It upheld three enhancements on the § 242-based Guidelines calculation as addressing distinct wrongs: abuse of governmental authority (U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(b)(1)), exploitation of supervisory control (U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(3)), and victim vulnerability (U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1)), consistent with United States v. McCoy.

F. Statutory maximums and grouping mechanics

Treating the challenge as unpreserved and subject to plain error (United States v. Barnes), the court rejected the claim that the Sentencing Commission allowed a 12-month-max count to yield life. It emphasized that U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b) and its application note cap each count’s sentence at its statutory maximum and that the overall advisory range arose from grouping multiple counts, not from Count 4 alone. The court also underscored that the imposed sentence for each count fell at or below that count’s statutory maximum.

G. SORNA registration for §1591(d) obstruction

On the sex-offender-registration issue, the court applied straightforward textual reasoning: SORNA defines “sex offender” to include those convicted of a federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (34 U.S.C. § 20911(1), (5)(A)(iii)). Because Golobic was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d) (obstruction of enforcement of § 1591), the statute “unmistakabl[y]” required registration (34 U.S.C. § 20913(a)), regardless of whether the conviction itself involved a sexual-contact element.

3.3. Impact

  • Rule 23(b)(3) practice: The decision reinforces that documented medical uncertainty and hospitalization constitute “good cause” to proceed with eleven jurors, especially after lengthy deliberations, and that a judge’s active efforts to obtain updates will insulate the ruling on appeal.
  • Multiplicity claims on appeal: The opinion underscores the steep practical burden of plain-error review for unpreserved multiplicity challenges, particularly the Sixth Circuit’s insistence (via United States v. Al-Maliki) on identifying precedent that makes the supposed error “plain.”
  • Expanded reach of §3C1.1 after 2006: In a published, recommended-for-publication opinion, the Sixth Circuit consolidates the view that U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 now reaches obstructive conduct occurring before a formal investigation begins—so long as it obstructs justice “with respect to” the investigation.
  • Acquitted-conduct limitations post-2024: The court’s treatment of the “kidnapping” interrogatory signals careful policing of what qualifies as an “acquittal” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c). Litigants invoking the acquitted-conduct rule will need to show an actual charged offense and a true acquittal, not merely a negative special finding or non-unanimous “no.”
  • SORNA scope for §1591(d): The ruling supports a broad, text-driven reading that obstruction under §1591(d) itself triggers sex-offender registration, a consequence that may matter significantly in charging decisions and plea negotiations in sex-trafficking-adjacent investigations.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Good cause” to excuse a juror (Rule 23(b)(3)): If a juror becomes unable to continue (e.g., serious illness), the judge may allow the remaining 11 jurors to return a verdict—so long as the judge reasonably finds a legitimate reason (“good cause”) and manages the decision carefully.
  • Multiplicity: An indictment is “multiplicitous” when it charges the same crime more than once in different counts. The main test asks whether each statute requires proof of at least one element the other does not (Blockburger v. United States).
  • Plain-error review: If a defendant didn’t object in the trial court, the appellate court reverses only for obvious (plain) error that likely affected the outcome—especially at sentencing, where the defendant must show the alleged error probably changed the sentence (United States v. Page).
  • Obstruction “with respect to” an investigation (Guidelines): After 2006, the Guidelines do not require the investigation to have formally started; what matters is whether the defendant’s act was aimed at hindering the investigation that would (or did) occur.
  • “Acquittal” vs. “no” on a special interrogatory: An acquittal is a legal determination that the government failed to prove a charged offense. A “no” answer to a verdict-form question can reflect lack of unanimity rather than a unanimous finding of “not proven,” and may not carry the legal force of an acquittal.
  • Kidnapping vs. abduction (Guidelines): “Kidnapping” often requires detention/confinement for a specified purpose; the abduction enhancement can apply more broadly where a victim is forced to accompany the defendant to another location.
  • Statutory maximums and grouping: Even if the advisory Guidelines range is high, each individual count’s sentence cannot exceed its statutory maximum; courts structure sentences across multiple counts (grouping/stacking rules) to reach the total punishment within those caps.
  • SORNA registration: Registration obligations attach based on the statute of conviction as defined by Congress, not solely on whether the offense includes physical sexual contact as an element.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Golobic is a wide-ranging affirmance that meaningfully clarifies several practical and doctrinal points for Sixth Circuit litigation: trial judges retain broad discretion to excuse a seriously ill deliberating juror under Rule 23(b)(3); multiplicity challenges face formidable barriers on plain-error review when statutes have distinct elements and defendants cannot cite controlling precedent; the post-2006 text of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 supports applying an obstruction enhancement to pre-investigation conduct aimed at thwarting detection; a “no” response to a special interrogatory is not necessarily an “acquittal” for purposes of the Guidelines’ acquitted-conduct limitation; and conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d) triggers SORNA registration by the statute’s terms. Collectively, the opinion strengthens text-centered and element-focused analysis across trial administration, double jeopardy doctrine, and federal sentencing.