United States v. Fishback: A Hiatus in Dealing Does Not Break Relevant Conduct; De Facto Control Supports Drug-Premises/Firearm Enhancements; Pressuring a Co-Defendant to Withdraw a Plea Triggers Obstruction

1. Introduction

United States v. Eugene Laron Fishback arose from a multi-year fentanyl-distribution operation in eastern Kentucky. The Government’s proof centered on (i) repeated, large-quantity purchases of fentanyl-laced pills from supplier Christopher Smith, (ii) multiple law-enforcement encounters yielding significant fentanyl and later carfentanil, and (iii) searches of two apartments tied to Fishback and his girlfriend/co-defendant, Tedi Hawkins, including one “sham” rental arrangement using another name.

A jury convicted Fishback of (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl and 10 grams or more of carfentanil, and (2) four substantive counts of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl (tied to the car stop, a hotel room, and two apartments). The district court imposed a 480-month sentence and applied several Guidelines adjustments: relevant conduct drug-quantity aggregation, maintaining a drug premises, firearm possession, and obstruction of justice.

On appeal, Fishback challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on key counts and the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, focusing on the application of four Guidelines provisions.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The panel’s analysis is largely an application of established Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court standards to an evidence-heavy record. Key citations and their roles:

A. Appellate review and forfeiture

• United States v. Fox, 134 F.4th 348, 372 (6th Cir. 2025) (per curiam): Used to deem forfeited the sufficiency challenges Fishback did not develop in his opening brief. The court treated “nominal” challenges without supporting argument as abandoned on appeal.
• Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979): The controlling sufficiency standard—whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt viewing evidence in the Government’s favor.
• United States v. Fekete, 535 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2008): Reinforces the defendant’s “very heavy burden” on sufficiency review.
• United States v. Underwood, 129 F.4th 912, 939 (6th Cir. 2025): Emphasizes that substantial competent evidence suffices; evidence may be circumstantial; even a single witness can carry the Government’s burden.
• United States v. Hinojosa, 67 F.4th 334, 340 (6th Cir. 2023): Directs appellate courts to resolve credibility disputes in the Government’s favor on sufficiency review.

B. Drug conspiracy elements and proof

• United States v. Matthews, 31 F.4th 436, 446 (6th Cir. 2022): Provides the elements of a drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1).
• United States v. Dado, 759 F.3d 550, 570 (6th Cir. 2014): Requires proof of drug quantity where charged as part of the conspiracy offense.
• United States v. Williams, 998 F.3d 716, 727-28 (6th Cir. 2021): Supports inferring a tacit agreement from recurring large-volume dealings, established payment methods, and ongoing arrangements; also reiterates the jury’s role in resolving credibility and inferences.

C. Possession with intent to distribute; constructive possession

• United States v. Allen, 619 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2010): Sets out the three elements of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
• United States v. Latimer, 16 F.4th 222, 225, 227 (6th Cir. 2021): Confirms possession may be actual or constructive and that only a “minimal” connection to contraband is required when supported by circumstantial evidence.
• United States v. Grogan, 133 F.4th 553, 564 (6th Cir. 2025): Defines constructive possession (dominion/control over contraband or location), and warns proximity alone is insufficient.
• United States v. Fairley, 137 F.4th 503, 512 (6th Cir. 2025): Reinforces the need for “other incriminating evidence” beyond presence.
• United States v. Brown, 856 F. App'x 36, 40 (6th Cir. 2021): Notes constructive possession may be shown when contraband is found in the defendant’s bedroom/personal living space.
• United States v. Trammell, No. 23-5221, 2024 WL 3163403, at *3 (6th Cir. June 25, 2024): Used to reject the notion that lack of formal lease/ownership defeats dominion and constructive possession; control can exist in another’s leased premises if the defendant has access and frequents it.

D. Sentencing—relevant conduct, drug premises, firearms, obstruction

• United States v. Knipp, 138 F.4th 429, 437 (6th Cir. 2025): Links drug-quantity calculation to “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.
• United States v. Florence, 150 F.4th 773, 780, 782 (6th Cir. 2025): Sets the elements for the drug-premises enhancement and articulates the “de facto control” standard and clear-error review.
• United States v. Taylor, 85 F.4th 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2023): “Control need not be exclusive or continuous” for maintaining a premises.
• United States v. Johnson, 737 F.3d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 2013): If the defendant lives on the premises, maintenance is “normally easily proved.”
• United States v. Tripplet, 112 F.4th 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2024): Drug activity need only be “one of” the primary purposes (not the sole purpose) for maintaining the premises.
• United States v. Terry, 83 F.4th 1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 2023): The “evidentiary bar” for applying the drug-premises enhancement is “relatively low.”
• United States v. Simpson, 138 F.4th 438, 457 (6th Cir. 2025): Frames the “primary purpose” inquiry as factual and reviewed for clear error.
• United States v. Brown, 131 F.4th 337, 343-44 (6th Cir. 2025): Sets the Government’s burden and elements for the firearm enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1).
• United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 367 (6th Cir. 2008): Cited for the inference of ownership/possession when the alternative occupant disclaims ownership/knowledge and circumstances link weapons to the defendant.
• United States v. West, 962 F.3d 183, 187 (6th Cir. 2020): Provides the “definite and firm conviction” formulation of clear-error review.
• United States v. French, 976 F.3d 744, 748-49 (6th Cir. 2020): Uses § 3C1.1 commentary to illustrate obstruction through unlawfully influencing a co-defendant/witness, directly or indirectly.
• United States v. Page, 163 F.4th 385, 400 (6th Cir. 2025): Confirms clear-error review for applying obstruction enhancement to a defendant’s conduct.
• United States v. Prater, No. 22-5599, 2024 WL 3634526, at *6 (6th Cir. Aug 2, 2024): Supports treating efforts to coerce/induce plea withdrawal as obstruction.
• United States v. Jackson, 154 F.4th 422, 430 (6th Cir. 2025): Where two permissible views exist, the district court’s choice is not clearly erroneous—used to reject Fishback’s “innocent intent” framing.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Sufficiency of the evidence: agreement, knowledge, and quantity were adequately proved

Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court treated the record as a whole and asked whether a rational juror could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt, while resolving credibility disputes in the Government’s favor (United States v. Hinojosa).

For conspiracy, Fishback challenged only (i) the existence of an agreement and (ii) drug quantity. The panel held the “agreement” could be inferred from repeated large-quantity purchases at a steady cadence (“every other day”), cash transactions, and the scale of dealings—precisely the inference approved in United States v. Williams. It also credited testimony that Hawkins distributed pills obtained from Fishback and sometimes shared proceeds, a classic indicator of coordinated drug activity rather than isolated buyer-seller transactions.

For quantity, the panel emphasized the physical evidence: the 7,000 fentanyl-laced pills from the Stoney Brooke apartment alone weighed 718.93 grams (exceeding the 400-gram fentanyl threshold), and the seized carfentanil from the Raintree apartment and Fishback’s car exceeded the 10-gram charged amount. That combination of laboratory-confirmed weights and testimony satisfied the quantity component described in United States v. Dado.

B. Possession-with-intent counts: knowledge and constructive possession inferred from context

On the Sure Stay Plus count, the court treated the proof as straightforward: Fishback booked the room; surveillance stills showed him wearing the same jeans; fentanyl was found in those jeans left behind. From those facts, a rational juror could infer knowing possession. Fishback’s alternative hypothesis (others might have entered the room) was, in effect, an invitation to reweigh evidence—foreclosed by Jackson v. Virginia.

On Stoney Brooke, Fishback’s argument was that the Government failed to prove constructive possession because the apartment was leased under another name and lacked formal documentation tying him to it. The panel answered with the governing definition from United States v. Grogan and the “other incriminating evidence” requirement from United States v. Fairley. It then itemized corroborating facts showing dominion over the premises and the contraband:

• Hawkins testified the apartment was obtained “for” Fishback and that only she and Fishback had keys.
• Fishback lived there for roughly six weeks; the apartment contained personal photographs and mail addressed to him.
• A large stash (about 7,000 pills) was hidden in a closet beside men’s shoes consistent with Fishback’s spending habits, per testimony.
• Hawkins testified Fishback distributed drugs while living there and that she did not “pick up any pills during” that period.

Critically, the court rejected a formalistic “paperwork” requirement and relied on real-world control, invoking United States v. Trammell to show dominion can exist absent a lease in the defendant’s name. The opinion implicitly cautions against allowing traffickers to immunize themselves by renting through stand-ins.

C. Sentencing: the panel treated each enhancement as a fact-bound application under deferential review

(i) Relevant conduct and “common scheme or plan” despite a year-long gap

Fishback argued that Smith’s move to California “broke the chain,” so transactions before and after the gap should not be aggregated under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). The panel disagreed, focusing on the Guidelines commentary’s connecting factors—common accomplices, common purpose, and similar modus operandi—and finding them unchanged before and after Smith’s return. Under United States v. Knipp, that aggregation drove the drug-quantity calculus and base offense level.

(ii) Drug-premises enhancement: “de facto control” and “one primary purpose”

Applying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), the court followed United States v. Florence on “de facto control,” United States v. Taylor on non-exclusive/non-continuous control, and United States v. Tripplet on the “one of the primary purposes” standard. On clear-error review, the panel concluded it was permissible to find:

• Maintenance: Fishback lived there, had keys, and had exclusive practical access with Hawkins (United States v. Johnson).
• Purpose: the volume of fentanyl (7,000 pills), proximity of firearms, and testimony about distribution activity showed drug distribution was a principal use—meeting the “relatively low” evidentiary bar noted in United States v. Terry.

(iii) Firearm enhancement: constructive possession inferred from co-location and occupant testimony

Under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) and United States v. Brown, the Government had to show Fishback possessed firearms (actually or constructively) during relevant conduct. The panel treated the co-location of four firearms with the 7,000-pill stash—inside a closet in Fishback’s controlled residence—as strong circumstantial evidence of constructive possession, and it highlighted Hawkins’s testimony that she did not own or even know about the guns. Citing United States v. Wheaton, the court reasoned that these circumstances supported attributing possession to Fishback and found no clear error (United States v. West).

(iv) Obstruction enhancement: attempting to induce a co-defendant to withdraw a guilty plea

The obstruction ruling applies U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and its commentary (as discussed in United States v. French) to jail-call conduct aimed at weakening the prosecution: Fishback urged Hawkins to withdraw her plea, coached her on excuses, proposed that she deny seeing drugs, and offered money—then sent money after she moved to withdraw. The panel also noted Hawkins’s hearing testimony that Fishback “coerce[d]” or “convince[d]” her.

Fishback’s defense—that he was merely acting in her best interest—was treated as a competing inference. Under clear-error principles, the district court could choose the inference of willful obstruction, particularly because the contemplated effect was to undermine Hawkins’s plea posture and trial testimony. The panel relied on United States v. Prater and the “two permissible views” doctrine from United States v. Jackson to affirm.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished and not recommended for publication, the opinion is still instructive in several recurring federal criminal contexts:

• “Paper” separation is not dispositive: The court’s analysis reinforces that sham leasing, lack of utility records, and other formal gaps do not defeat constructive possession or drug-premises findings when the Government can show practical dominion (keys, residency, personal effects, exclusive access, stash location).
• Relevant conduct can span interruptions: A significant hiatus—here, about a year—does not necessarily prevent aggregation under § 1B1.3(a)(2) if accomplices, purpose, and modus remain consistent.
• Obstruction reaches “case-shaping” attempts: Efforts to induce a co-defendant to withdraw a plea, coupled with coaching and financial inducements, can qualify as obstruction even if framed as “help,” especially where the likely effect is to blunt the Government’s proof.
• Appellate posture matters: The forfeiture holding underscores that defendants must develop sufficiency arguments in the opening brief or risk abandonment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Sufficiency of the evidence (the “Jackson” test): The appellate court does not decide whether it believes the witnesses. It asks only whether, assuming the jury believed the Government’s evidence, a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Constructive possession: You can “possess” drugs or guns without holding them if you knowingly have the power and intent to control them—often shown through control of the place where they are hidden (keys, residency, exclusive access, personal effects).
• Relevant conduct / common scheme or plan (§ 1B1.3): Sentencing can account for conduct beyond the counts of conviction if it is part of the same overall pattern—linked by common partners, purpose, or method—even if there is a break in time.
• Maintaining a drug premises (§ 2D1.1(b)(12)): The Government need not show the defendant owned the property; it is enough to show real control. Drug distribution must be a primary purpose of using/keeping the place, not necessarily the only purpose.
• Obstruction of justice (§ 3C1.1): Attempts to unlawfully influence a witness or co-defendant—directly or indirectly—can increase the Guidelines range, even if the attempt fails.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Fishback is a fact-driven affirmance that nonetheless clarifies several practical points: (1) large-scale, repeated transactions and cooperating-witness testimony can sustain a fentanyl/carfentanil conspiracy conviction and quantity findings; (2) constructive possession and drug-premises enhancements hinge on actual control rather than formal paperwork; (3) a year-long interruption does not necessarily sever “common scheme or plan” relevant conduct when core features persist; and (4) pressuring and incentivizing a co-defendant to withdraw a guilty plea can constitute obstruction of justice under the Guidelines.