United States v. Ducksworth: Driver’s Hidden Firearm and Deception Can Help Create Reasonable Suspicion to Frisk a Passenger

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date: March 3, 2026
Case: United States v. Ducksworth, No. 24-60473 (substituted opinion withdrawing United States v. Ducksworth, 159 F.4th 965 (5th Cir. 2025))

Introduction

This appeal arises from a nighttime traffic stop in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, initiated for a defective tag light. During the stop, an officer discovered that the driver lacked identification and proof of insurance, and—critically—was carrying a concealed firearm and initially lied about it. The officer then ordered the passenger, Andrew Ducksworth, out of the vehicle; Ducksworth stated he was paralyzed from the waist down. The officer conducted a pat-down and found a loaded firearm on Ducksworth. Ducksworth, a convicted felon, was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

On appeal, Ducksworth challenged: (1) the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm (arguing the pat-down lacked individualized reasonable suspicion); (2) the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment (arguing § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment facially and as applied); and (3) for the first time, the sufficiency of the evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. It held:

  • The frisk of Ducksworth was supported by reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances—particularly the driver’s concealed gun and deception, combined with additional contextual factors (nighttime stop, high-crime area, officer outnumbered, and Ducksworth’s movements/interaction).
  • The evidence was sufficient for § 922(g)(1) because Ducksworth stipulated—using the statute’s language—that he had a prior conviction punishable by more than one year; neither § 922(g)(1) nor United States v. Diaz requires the Government to prove a specific predicate felony in a sufficiency posture.
  • Ducksworth’s Second Amendment challenges were foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent: facially by United States v. Diaz and as applied (given his parole status) by United States v. Kimble.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited

Fourth Amendment: Terry frisks, individualized suspicion, and “association” evidence

  • Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2001): The court applied the two-step framework—whether the stop was justified at inception and whether the frisk was reasonably related in scope. Here, the stop’s legality was not contested; the dispute centered on whether the officer had reasonable suspicion that Ducksworth was armed and dangerous.
  • United States v. Baker, 47 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1995), United States v. Darrell, 945 F.3d 929 (5th Cir. 2019), United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1986), and Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990): These cases supplied the controlling standard: reasonable suspicion must be objective and “to some extent, individualized,” and the inquiry asks whether a reasonably prudent officer would fear danger.
  • Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979): Ducksworth’s principal authority. The court read Ybarra narrowly: it rejects “guilt-by-association” as sufficient by itself, but does not render companionship/propinquity irrelevant to reasonable suspicion.
  • Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999): Used to distinguish Ybarra. Houghton recognized that vehicle passengers often share a “common enterprise” with the driver—making association more probative in traffic-stop contexts than in a public tavern.
  • United States v. Wilson, 143 F.4th 647 (5th Cir. 2025), United States v. Thomas, 997 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1992): These cases anchored the Fifth Circuit’s articulation that companionship/propinquity to criminal activity is a permissible factor in the reasonable-suspicion calculus, though not dispositive.
  • United States v. Tiru-Plaza, 766 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2014): The Fifth Circuit found persuasive the First Circuit’s conclusion that discovery of a driver’s firearm, coupled with other circumstances (officer safety, darkness, being outnumbered), can justify frisking a passenger.
  • Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000): Cited for the proposition that reasonable suspicion is assessed based on what officers knew before initiating the pat-down.
  • United States v. Rodriguez, 33 F.4th 807 (5th Cir. 2022), United States v. Berry, 664 F. App'x 413 (5th Cir. 2016), United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1992), United States v. Garza, 727 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2013), United States v. Rose, 48 F.4th 297 (5th Cir. 2022), and United States v. McKinney, 980 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2020): These cases supplied supporting “behavioral” indicators—door-opening/movements, inconsistent statements, quick exiting, nervous/erratic behavior, and furtive movements—that can contribute to reasonable suspicion.
  • Rucker v. Marshall, 119 F.4th 395 (5th Cir. 2024), United States v. Hill, 752 F.3d 1029 (5th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Flowers, 6 F.4th 651 (5th Cir. 2021): These supported acceptance of officer testimony that an area is “high crime,” reviewed deferentially on factual findings.
  • Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984), and United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 1999): Cited for general Fourth Amendment principles: warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable absent exceptions; unlawful search fruits are generally excluded.

§ 922(g)(1): sufficiency, stipulations, and limits of constitutional holdings

  • United States v. Johnson, 990 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2021): Provided the elements of § 922(g)(1), including the knowledge requirement.
  • Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) and United States v. Johnson, 880 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 2018): Controlled the court’s rejection of Ducksworth’s argument that the Government must prove the specific prior felony; Old Chief holds such specificity is not required (and stipulations to felony status are commonly used).
  • McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993): Invoked for the principle that courts cannot rewrite statutory text—used to explain why United States v. Diaz could not add a “specific predicate felony” element to § 922(g)(1).
  • United States v. Broadnax, 601 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2010): Central to the sufficiency holding: a stipulation that tracks the statutory language of the prior-felony element satisfies that element “as a matter of law.”
  • United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024): The court treated Diaz as addressing Second Amendment challenges (and leaving space for as-applied challenges), not as modifying what the Government must prove for sufficiency under § 922(g)(1).

Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1)

  • United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024): Foreclosed Ducksworth’s facial challenge.
  • United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025): Foreclosed the as-applied challenge because Ducksworth admitted he was on parole at the time of possession; Kimble states that an as-applied challenge fails when the defendant is caught with a gun while on supervised release for a prior felony sentence.

Standards of review and procedural posture

  • United States v. Rangel-Portillo, 586 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Coleman, 609 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 2010): Set the clear-error/de novo framework for suppression review and emphasized deference to plausible district-court factual findings.
  • United States v. Jubert, 139 F.4th 484 (5th Cir. 2025): Supplied de novo review for dismissal and constitutionality of statutes.
  • United States v. Suarez, 879 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 2018): Required plain-error review for an unpreserved sufficiency challenge.

2) Legal Reasoning

A. The frisk: integrating “association” with individualized suspicion

The key doctrinal move is the court’s reconciliation of Ybarra v. Illinois with traffic-stop realities described in Wyoming v. Houghton. The opinion rejects Ducksworth’s framing that the driver’s gun-and-lie could not “count” at all against a passenger. Instead, the court treats the driver’s hidden firearm—especially paired with deception—as a highly relevant officer-safety signal that may contribute to reasonable suspicion about the passenger when combined with other particularized circumstances.

The Fifth Circuit emphasized the totality of the circumstances:

  • Nighttime stop and the officer being outnumbered;
  • The driver lacked identification and proof of insurance;
  • The driver possessed a hidden firearm and lied about it;
  • The area was found (based on officer testimony credited by the district court) to be “high crime”;
  • Ducksworth’s interaction and movements (opening the door as if to exit, then stating he could not because he was paralyzed) were treated as additional factors supporting suspicion.

In this way, the court characterizes the suspicion as “reasonable” and “individualized” to Ducksworth—not because passengers are automatically suspect when a driver is armed, but because driver armament plus deception created a volatile scenario in which other facts tied to Ducksworth made it reasonable to fear he too might be armed.

B. Sufficiency: rejecting a “Diaz adds an element” theory

Ducksworth’s sufficiency argument attempted to transform United States v. Diaz (a Second Amendment decision discussing possible as-applied limits) into an evidentiary requirement for conviction: proof of a particular felony that warrants “permanent lifetime disarmament.” The court refused for two reasons.

  • Statutory elements are fixed by Congress. Citing McNeil v. United States, the panel stated courts cannot rewrite statutory text; Diaz could not add a “specific predicate felony” requirement to § 922(g)(1).
  • Stipulation suffices. Under United States v. Broadnax, when a defendant stipulates in the statute’s words that he has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of one year,” the element is satisfied as a matter of law. The court also relied on Old Chief v. United States in rejecting any requirement that the Government allege or prove a specific prior felony to establish the status element.

Because the challenge was unpreserved, the court reviewed only for plain error and found none.

C. Second Amendment: challenges foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit law

The court disposed of the constitutional arguments as a matter of binding precedent. Ducksworth conceded his facial challenge was foreclosed by United States v. Diaz. He also admitted he was on parole at the time, which (under United States v. Kimble) defeats an as-applied challenge in this circuit.

3) Impact

  • Expanded clarity for passenger frisks after a driver’s gun discovery. The opinion squarely endorses the proposition—previously not addressed directly by the Fifth Circuit—that discovery of a driver’s concealed firearm (especially coupled with deception) may contribute to reasonable suspicion to frisk a passenger, so long as other circumstances provide the needed individualized basis. Litigants should expect district courts to treat a driver’s weapon discovery as a significant officer-safety fact rather than an impermissible “imputation,” and to focus on what additional passenger-specific or situational facts are present.
  • Reinforcement of “totality” analysis and deference to factfinding. The panel’s acceptance of “high crime area” testimony (absent clear error) and its accumulation of small behavioral indicators continue a trend toward holistic, fact-intensive reasonableness assessments in suppression litigation.
  • Limits on “Diaz-based” sufficiency attacks. Defendants cannot recast United States v. Diaz into a new trial element for § 922(g)(1). The decision draws a line between (i) constitutional as-applied challenges and (ii) what must be proved to satisfy statutory elements—especially when the defendant stipulates to those elements.
  • Second Amendment litigation channeling. By relying on United States v. Kimble, the opinion signals that as-applied challenges are unlikely to succeed for defendants who possessed firearms while under ongoing criminal-justice supervision (parole/supervised release), narrowing the practical set of viable challengers.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Terry stop / Terry frisk: A brief detention (stop) and a limited pat-down for weapons (frisk) permitted without a warrant when an officer has reasonable suspicion of crime (stop) and reasonable suspicion the person is armed and dangerous (frisk).
  • Reasonable suspicion vs. probable cause: Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold than probable cause and can rest on specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences under the totality of circumstances.
  • “Individualized suspicion” and “guilt by association”: Ybarra v. Illinois prevents searching someone solely because they are near or associated with a suspect. This opinion explains association can still be a factor—particularly in vehicles—if combined with other facts pointing to risk.
  • Facial vs. as-applied challenges: A facial challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in all applications; an as-applied challenge argues the law is unconstitutional as applied to a specific person’s circumstances.
  • Stipulation: An agreement to treat an element as proven. Under United States v. Broadnax, stipulating in the statutory language to the prior-felony element satisfies that element “as a matter of law.”
  • Plain-error review: A demanding appellate standard applied when an argument was not preserved below; the appellant must show an obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of proceedings.
  • Substituted opinion after panel rehearing: The court granted panel rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and issued a new controlling opinion in its place; the withdrawn opinion no longer governs.

Conclusion

United States v. Ducksworth establishes a clear Fifth Circuit rule for traffic-stop safety encounters: a driver’s concealed firearm—especially when paired with deception—can meaningfully contribute to reasonable suspicion to frisk a passenger when other situational and passenger-linked facts support an individualized inference of danger. The court also rebuffs efforts to convert United States v. Diaz into a new evidentiary requirement for § 922(g)(1) convictions, reaffirming that statutory elements (often satisfied by stipulation under United States v. Broadnax and consistent with Old Chief v. United States) are distinct from the separate question whether the statute may be unconstitutional as applied in some circumstances.