Rule 12(c)(3) Good-Cause Requirement Bars Untimely Suppression Challenges on Direct Appeal (Anders Disposition)

Introduction

In United States v. Cooks (10th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026) (unpublished “Order and Judgment”), the Tenth Circuit dismissed Donald Eugene Cooks’s direct criminal appeal after appointed counsel filed an Anders brief and moved to withdraw. The case arose from a suspected mail-theft scheme centered on an Oklahoma City post office, a Motel 6 room used to store packages, and later alleged witness tampering. The appeal’s central potential issue was whether evidence should have been suppressed due to an officer’s warrantless entry into Cooks’s motel room—an issue that trial counsel raised only mid-trial, after the pretrial motion deadline.

The key appellate questions were procedural rather than merits-based: (1) whether the district court erred in rejecting the late suppression attempt under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12; (2) whether an ineffective-assistance claim could be reached on direct appeal; and (3) whether any other arguable issues existed, including the validity of Cooks’s post-trial waiver of counsel at sentencing.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying the independent review required by Anders v. California, the panel found no non-frivolous grounds for appeal. It held that the suppression issue was not preserved because trial counsel failed to file a timely pretrial motion to suppress and did not show “good cause” for the delay as required by Rule 12(c)(3). The court declined to entertain an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal because the claim was not raised and ruled upon below and the record was insufficient. It also found no colorable challenges to the indictment, jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, sentence reasonableness, or the district court’s Faretta colloquy allowing self-representation at sentencing. The court therefore granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)

    Anders supplies the procedural framework for counsel’s withdrawal in a direct criminal appeal when counsel concludes the appeal is frivolous. The opinion closely tracks Anders: counsel must identify anything that might arguably support an appeal; the defendant may respond; and the court must conduct an independent review. Here, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that it performed that independent review and, finding no “arguable ground,” dismissed the appeal.

  • Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)

    Faretta governs a defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation if the waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary. The panel relied on the district court’s Faretta hearing to reject any arguable claim that Cooks’s waiver of counsel for sentencing was invalid.

  • United States v. Dunbar, 718 F.3d 1268, 1278 (10th Cir. 2013)

    The court cited Dunbar for the rule that a represented defendant has no right to “hybrid representation” (i.e., filing pro se motions while represented by counsel). This mattered because Cooks had filed a pro se motion to suppress months before trial, but the district court denied it on that basis. The panel deemed that denial unarguable on appeal, foreclosing any attempt to treat the earlier pro se motion as preservation.

  • United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir.1995) (en banc)

    Galloway provides the Tenth Circuit’s strong presumption that ineffective-assistance claims should be raised in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not on direct appeal. The panel used Galloway to characterize Cooks’s ineffective-assistance argument as “presumptively dismissible.”

  • United States v. Flood, 635 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2011)

    Flood sets a narrow exception: ineffective-assistance may be considered on direct appeal only where the issue was raised and ruled upon by the district court and a sufficient factual record exists. The panel found neither condition satisfied, so Flood foreclosed direct review of counsel’s alleged failure to file a timely suppression motion.

  • United States v. Pemberton, 94 F.4th 1130, 1143 (10th Cir.)

    Pemberton was cited for the Tenth Circuit’s articulation of “four requirements” to grant a request to waive counsel and for the proposition that a “contemporaneous and comprehensive Faretta hearing” is generally sufficient to ensure a knowing waiver. The panel used Pemberton to conclude that the record would not support a challenge to the self-representation decision at sentencing.

Legal Reasoning

1) The suppression issue failed on timeliness and “good cause,” not on Fourth Amendment merits

The opinion treats the Fourth Amendment question (warrantless entry into a motel room) as potentially significant—defense counsel even conceded it “appears to involve a straightforward Fourth Amendment violation.” But the court did not reach the merits because the procedural default was dispositive.

Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C), suppression motions must be made before trial if the basis is reasonably available and resolvable without a trial on the merits. Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3), missing the deadline makes the motion untimely, and the court may consider it only if the party shows good cause.

The district court asked whether counsel knew the factual basis before the deadline, and counsel admitted he did. With that admission and no articulated reason for delay, the panel found “no colorable argument” that the district court erred in denying the late suppression attempt. In other words, the appeal failed because Rule 12(c)(3) makes “good cause” a mandatory gateway, and the record contained no basis to satisfy it.

2) The earlier pro se motion to suppress could not preserve the issue

Cooks’s prior pro se suppression motion did not help him on appeal because, while represented, he had no right to file it independently. By invoking United States v. Dunbar, the panel treated the district court’s refusal to entertain the pro se motion as unassailable under established anti-hybrid-representation doctrine. This matters in practice: defendants cannot “backstop” counsel’s omissions by filing pro se motions when counsel remains of record.

3) Ineffective assistance was routed to collateral review

Cooks attempted to reframe counsel’s missed Rule 12 deadline as ineffective assistance. The panel applied the usual Tenth Circuit pathway: such claims almost always belong in a § 2255 proceeding, where a fuller record can be developed (e.g., counsel’s reasons, strategy, investigation, and client communications).

Under United States v. Flood, the Tenth Circuit will consider ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal only if the issue was raised and ruled upon below and the record is adequate. Because neither was true, the court concluded the claim was not arguable in this direct appeal.

4) No other arguable issues, including sentencing and waiver of counsel

The panel agreed with counsel’s assessment that other typical appellate targets—indictment defects, jury instruction errors, sufficiency challenges, and procedural/substantive reasonableness of the sentence—did not present non-frivolous arguments on this record.

It also addressed (briefly but pointedly) the post-trial waiver of counsel, relying on the district court’s Faretta hearing and the framework described in United States v. Pemberton to conclude there was no arguable basis to claim the waiver was unknowing or involuntary.

Impact

  • Rule 12 enforcement is outcome-determinative: Even where a potential Fourth Amendment problem looks substantial, failing to file a timely suppression motion—and failing to demonstrate “good cause”— can prevent any merits review.
  • Limits of pro se “insurance filings”: The reaffirmation of anti-hybrid-representation principles underscores that represented defendants generally cannot preserve issues by filing pro se motions.
  • Channeling IAC claims to § 2255: The decision exemplifies the Tenth Circuit’s continued insistence that ineffective-assistance claims ordinarily be litigated collaterally, where an evidentiary record can be developed.
  • Practical significance in Anders cases: The opinion shows how procedural defaults and record constraints often drive the “no arguable issues” conclusion in Anders dispositions.

Because the order is expressly “not binding precedent” (except under law-of-the-case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), its formal precedential impact is limited; nonetheless, its reasoning is a clear, usable illustration of how the Tenth Circuit applies Rule 12(c)(3) and its direct-appeal ineffective-assistance doctrine.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Anders brief
A filing by appointed appellate counsel stating that, after careful review, counsel cannot find a non-frivolous appellate issue—paired with a motion to withdraw. The court must independently review the record before allowing withdrawal and dismissing/affirming.
Motion to suppress
A request to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution (commonly the Fourth Amendment). If granted, the jury typically will not see or hear that evidence.
Rule 12(b)(3)(C) / Rule 12(c)(3)
These rules impose a deadline: suppression issues must be raised before trial when feasible. If missed, the defendant must show “good cause” for the late filing; otherwise the court can deny the motion as untimely without deciding whether the search was unlawful.
Hybrid representation
Trying to proceed both with a lawyer and pro se at the same time. Federal courts generally do not allow a represented defendant to file motions independently.
Faretta hearing
A colloquy where the judge ensures the defendant understands the risks of self-representation and is knowingly and voluntarily waiving the right to counsel.
Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC)
A claim that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and prejudicial. Appellate courts often require such claims to be brought in a later § 2255 proceeding so facts outside the trial record can be developed.

Conclusion

United States v. Cooks reinforces a procedural lesson with substantive consequences: suppression arguments must be timely under Rule 12, and without a showing of “good cause” under Rule 12(c)(3), even potentially strong Fourth Amendment issues may never be reached on the merits. The decision also follows entrenched Tenth Circuit doctrine that ineffective-assistance claims belong in § 2255 proceedings absent a developed record and a ruling below, and it confirms that a comprehensive Faretta hearing will generally defeat appellate challenges to self-representation. In the broader criminal appellate landscape, the opinion exemplifies how procedural preservation and record development often determine whether any “arguable issue” exists—especially in Anders cases.