Date: Jan 17, 2026

United States v. Charmaine Brown: Rule 29 Forfeiture, Necessity as a Jury Question, and Plain-Error Limits on Out-of-Circuit Theories

Introduction

In United States v. Charmaine Brown (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit affirmed Charmaine Miesha Brown’s jury convictions for: (1) conspiracy to commit passport fraud (18 U.S.C. § 371), (2) conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349), (3) bankruptcy fraud (18 U.S.C. § 157(1)), and (4) false statements in bankruptcy (18 U.S.C. § 152(3)).

The prosecution’s theory centered on a multi-part fraud scheme: Brown and her husband/codefendant, Andrews Oduro Brown (“Oduro”), allegedly (a) sought U.S. passports for Oduro’s Ghanaian children by falsely claiming Brown was their biological mother, (b) used another man’s identity to obtain childcare subsidies and credit, and (c) used bankruptcy to discharge resulting debts. Oduro pleaded guilty; Brown went to trial and received a 30-month sentence.

On appeal, Brown challenged (i) the denial of her Rule 29 motion grounded in a necessity defense, (ii) the sufficiency of evidence on several elements not raised in her Rule 29 motion, (iii) a newly raised argument that her bankruptcy fraud conviction rested on an invalid “trustee-victim” theory, and (iv) the substantive reasonableness of her sentence based on an asserted codefendant disparity.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that:

The district court properly instructed the jury on Brown’s necessity defense rather than granting acquittal as a matter of law, because Brown did not conclusively establish necessity and the jury could reject it.
Brown’s additional sufficiency arguments (not specifically raised in her Rule 29 motion) were forfeited and failed under the “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard.
Brown’s newly raised “trustee-victim” theory challenge failed under plain-error review because out-of-circuit precedent cannot make an alleged error “plain” in the Fourth Circuit absent settled Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit law.
Her below-Guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable; the district court adequately addressed § 3553(a) factors and explained why the small disparity with Oduro’s 28-month sentence was not unwarranted.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Although unpublished and non-binding, the decision is built from a set of doctrinal “building blocks” the Fourth Circuit routinely applies in criminal appeals:

1) Rule 29 sufficiency review and deference to the verdict

United States v. Burfoot, 899 F.3d 326, 334 (4th Cir. 2018): supplied the governing standard—de novo review of Rule 29 denials, but affirmance if “substantial evidence” supports the verdict when evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
United States v. Wolf, 860 F.3d 175, 194 (4th Cir. 2017): underscored that reversal for insufficiency is “rare,” reinforcing the high hurdle a defendant faces on appeal.

2) Forfeiture of unraised Rule 29 grounds and the “manifest miscarriage of justice” backstop

United States v. Duroseau, 26 F.4th 674, 678 (4th Cir. 2022): established that when a defendant raises specific Rule 29 grounds, other grounds not raised are treated as waived/forfeited on appeal absent a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” The panel used Duroseau to narrow the scope of Brown’s sufficiency review to what she actually argued below.
United States v. Rao, 123 F.4th 270, 276 (5th Cir. 2024): provided a definition of the “manifest miscarriage” threshold (record “devoid” of guilt evidence, or evidence on a key element so tenuous a conviction is “shocking”). While out-of-circuit, it was cited for articulation of the standard rather than to create Fourth Circuit law.

3) Necessity defense: legal alternatives defeat the defense; jury usually decides

United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1994): emphasized necessity (and affirmative defenses generally) is typically a fact issue for the jury; courts “rarely” resolve it as a matter of law.
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980): stated a core necessity principle—if a reasonable legal alternative exists, the defense fails. The panel relied on Bailey to reject Brown’s claim that necessity compelled acquittal.

4) Plain error: out-of-circuit decisions cannot make an error “plain” in the Fourth Circuit

Davis v. United States, 589 U.S. 345, 346-47 (2020): supplied the baseline for applying plain-error review to issues raised for the first time on appeal.
United States v. McCabe, 103 F.4th 259, 279 (4th Cir. 2024): set out the four-part plain error framework, including the discretionary final step (fairness/integrity/public reputation).
United States v. Comer, 5 F.4th 535, 549 (4th Cir. 2021): provided the key limiting rule—an error is “plain” only if “settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit” establishes it. The panel used Comer to dispose of Brown’s trustee-victim theory because she relied on out-of-circuit precedent.

5) Sentencing review: procedural screen, substantive presumption, and codefendant disparity

United States v. Lewis, 18 F.4th 743, 748 (4th Cir. 2021): confirmed deferential abuse-of-discretion review for sentencing.
United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019): required appellate confirmation of procedural reasonableness even if not challenged.
United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020): framed substantive review as a totality-of-the- circumstances inquiry tied to § 3553(a).
United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2021): provided the presumption of substantive reasonableness for within- or below-Guidelines sentences, rebuttable only by showing unreasonableness under § 3553(a).

Legal Reasoning

A. Necessity as a basis for Rule 29 acquittal

Brown’s core preserved Rule 29 claim was that her necessity defense required acquittal on the passport- and wire-fraud conspiracy charges. The panel rejected this for two linked reasons:

Necessity rarely resolves as a matter of law. Citing United States v. Sarno, the court treated necessity as a jury question unless the defense is established so clearly that no reasonable jury could reject it.
Reasonable legal alternatives defeat necessity. Citing United States v. Bailey, the panel concluded Brown had not shown—“beyond any doubt,” in the panel’s phrasing—that there were no reasonable lawful alternatives. Accordingly, the district court acted properly by instructing the jury rather than acquitting.

The practical upshot is that Brown’s necessity defense functioned as a trial issue for juror resolution; once the jury rejected it, the appellate court asked only whether substantial evidence supported that rejection and the convictions.

B. Narrowing appellate sufficiency review to preserved Rule 29 grounds

Brown attempted to challenge the sufficiency of proof on additional elements (wire fraud conspiracy proof, specific intent and good faith for bankruptcy crimes, and materiality for § 152(3)). Because these were not specifically raised in her Rule 29 motion, the panel applied United States v. Duroseau to treat them as forfeited, reviewable only for “manifest miscarriage of justice.”

Applying that exceptionally defendant-unfriendly standard (as articulated with help from United States v. Rao), the court concluded the record contained substantial evidence supporting the challenged convictions, so there was no “shockingly” tenuous proof and no basis for reversal.

C. The “trustee-victim” bankruptcy fraud theory under plain-error review

Brown’s new appellate argument targeted the indictment/jury instruction language that she schemed to defraud “her creditors and the bankruptcy trustee.” She asserted a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 157 cannot rest on defrauding the trustee.

The panel did not decide the abstract merits of that proposition. Instead, it resolved the issue through the gateway doctrine of plain error:

Under Davis v. United States and United States v. McCabe, Brown had to show a clear and obvious error affecting substantial rights (and then satisfy the discretionary fourth prong).
Under United States v. Comer, an error is not “plain” unless settled Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit law establishes it.

Because Brown’s support was out-of-circuit precedent, she could not meet Comer’s “plainness” requirement; the claim failed at prong two without the panel needing to reach deeper statutory interpretation.

D. Substantive reasonableness and codefendant disparity

Brown argued her 30-month sentence was substantively unreasonable compared to Oduro’s 28-month sentence. The panel applied the standard framework:

Under United States v. Provance, the court confirmed no procedural error.
Under United States v. Bennett, a below-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable.
Under United States v. Nance and United States v. Lewis, the question is whether the district court abused its discretion in weighing § 3553(a).

The panel emphasized the district court’s disparity analysis: Oduro pleaded guilty and accepted responsibility, did not litigate a necessity defense, and had no criminal history; Brown went to trial and did not accept responsibility. On that record, the court found no unwarranted disparity and no abuse of discretion.

Impact

Even as an unpublished opinion, the decision is a useful “practice signal” in three recurring areas:

Rule 29 preservation is outcome-determinative for appellate review scope. By applying United States v. Duroseau, the panel reinforced that defendants must specifically enumerate sufficiency grounds in their Rule 29 motions or face the near-insurmountable “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard on appeal.
Necessity defenses rarely yield acquittal as a matter of law. The reliance on United States v. Sarno and United States v. Bailey underscores that necessity typically goes to the jury, and “legal alternatives” remain the defense’s most common failure point.
Plain error in the Fourth Circuit is tethered to Fourth Circuit/Supreme Court authority. The use of United States v. Comer signals that novel statutory arguments supported only by out-of-circuit precedent will often fail at “plainness,” encouraging litigants to raise such issues early (in district court) rather than banking on plain-error relief.

On sentencing, the opinion also reflects a durable trend: small codefendant disparities generally do not rebut the presumption of reasonableness for a below-Guidelines sentence, especially where plea/acceptance-of-responsibility and criminal history differences explain the gap.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 29 motion (judgment of acquittal): A request for the judge to overturn the jury’s ability to convict because the evidence is legally insufficient—i.e., no rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the record presented.
“Substantial evidence”: Enough evidence that a reasonable factfinder could accept it as sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the prosecution’s favor.
Affirmative defense (necessity): A defense that can excuse otherwise criminal conduct if strict conditions are met. Under United States v. Bailey, necessity fails if the defendant had a reasonable lawful alternative to breaking the law.
Forfeiture/waiver in Rule 29 practice: If a defendant specifies only certain insufficiency grounds in a Rule 29 motion, other grounds may not be fully available on appeal. Under United States v. Duroseau, unraised grounds are reviewed only to prevent a “manifest miscarriage of justice.”
Plain error: A demanding standard used when an issue was not raised in the trial court. The error must be clear and obvious under settled Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit law (per United States v. Comer), must affect substantial rights, and must be serious enough to warrant correction.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness concerns the method (correct Guidelines calculation, consideration of § 3553(a), explanation). Substantive reasonableness concerns the length/type of sentence in light of the § 3553(a) factors.

Conclusion

United States v. Charmaine Brown affirms convictions and a below-Guidelines sentence while crystallizing three appellate lessons: (1) necessity defenses ordinarily remain for the jury unless indisputably established; (2) defendants must preserve each sufficiency theory in a Rule 29 motion or face sharply limited review; and (3) under plain-error doctrine, out-of- circuit authority generally cannot make an alleged error “plain” in the Fourth Circuit absent settled Supreme Court or circuit precedent. In sentencing, the opinion also reaffirms that explained differences—plea posture, acceptance of responsibility, and criminal history—can justify modest codefendant sentence gaps without creating an “unwarranted disparity.”