No Sua Sponte Duty to Solicit Defendant Testimony at a Sell Hearing; Uncontroverted Expert Evidence Supports Involuntary Medication

1. Introduction

In United States v. Shawn Michael Chalifoux (11th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed an interlocutory order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to restore a criminal defendant’s competency under Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

The defendant, Shawn Michael Chalifoux, was indicted for serious drug offenses, pleaded guilty to a methamphetamine conspiracy count, and later sought to withdraw his plea. As sentencing approached, competency concerns surfaced for the first time. A psychological evaluation found him incompetent due to delusional/paranoid thinking, leading to commitment for restoration treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). After further Bureau of Prisons reporting indicated persistent incompetence but a substantial likelihood of restoration with antipsychotic medication, the government moved for a Sell hearing.

The key issues on appeal were: (1) whether the Sell factors were satisfied (including whether important governmental interests justified forced medication and whether medication was necessary and medically appropriate), and (2) whether it was reversible error that Chalifoux did not testify at the Sell hearing when he had not requested to testify until after the magistrate judge issued an R&R.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Applying United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2011), it reviewed the first Sell factor de novo and the remaining three factors for clear error.

• Factor 1 (important governmental interests): Chalifoux did not meaningfully challenge this on appeal; the court treated the issue as abandoned under Eleventh Circuit briefing rules. In any event, the court agreed that the charged conduct was serious and that no “special circumstances” lessened the government’s interest.
• Factors 2–4 (efficacy, necessity, medical appropriateness): The court found no clear error where the expert testimony was detailed and “uncontroverted” that antipsychotic medication was substantially likely to restore competency, less intrusive treatments were unlikely to work, and the plan was medically appropriate.
• Defendant testimony complaint: The court rejected Chalifoux’s argument that he was not permitted to testify, reasoning that nothing prevented him from testifying and he did not request to do so until after the R&R. He cited no authority imposing a sua sponte duty on the magistrate judge to ask whether he wanted to testify, and he did not show prejudice.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)

Sell is the constitutional anchor for involuntary medication orders aimed at restoring competency for criminal proceedings. The opinion reiterates Sell’s four-part test: (1) important governmental interests; (2) medication will significantly further those interests; (3) medication is necessary (less intrusive alternatives unlikely to achieve substantially the same results); and (4) medical appropriateness (patient’s best medical interest). The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance turns on straightforward application of these factors to an evidentiary record dominated by consistent expert testimony.

United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2011)

Diaz supplies both the governing standard of review (de novo for factor one; clear error for factors two through four) and confirms collateral-order jurisdiction over Sell orders. The panel’s disposition is structurally “Diaz-driven”: it emphasizes appellate deference on fact-intensive medical findings and focuses its energy on whether the record compels a “definite and firm conviction” of mistake—ultimately concluding it does not.

Clear error framework: United States v. Isaac, 987 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 2010); OHI Asset (VA) Martinsville SNF, LLC v. Wagner (In re Wagner), 115 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir. 2024); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)

These cases are cited to define and reinforce the high bar of clear-error review: an appellate court does not reweigh evidence and reverses only when left with a “definite and firm conviction” of mistake. Anderson, echoed by In re Wagner, is particularly important for the principle that where there are “two permissible views of the evidence,” choosing between them is not clear error. The panel uses this framework to stress that the trial-level findings—especially where expert evidence is uncontroverted—are exceptionally difficult to overturn.

Deference to factfinding even with competing inferences: United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949)

Yellow Cab Co. is invoked to underscore that when evidence could support either conclusion, the factfinder’s choice controls. The panel goes further: it characterizes the evidence here as not even balanced, but “detailed and uncontroverted” in favor of medication—making reversal even less plausible.

Issue abandonment for inadequate briefing: United States v. Esformes, 60 F.4th 621 (11th Cir. 2023); Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014)

These authorities drive a practical, appellate-procedure holding: a litigant who makes only passing references or offers perfunctory assertions without developed argument and authority abandons the issue. The panel applies that doctrine to Chalifoux’s failure to meaningfully contest the first Sell factor. Substantively, this matters because factor one is reviewed de novo; abandoning it eliminates what might otherwise be the most legally contestable part of the test.

Burden to show reversible error: Murphy v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1963); Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)

Murphy supplies the basic appellate premise that the appellant bears the burden of showing error, and Bonner explains why former Fifth Circuit precedent binds the Eleventh Circuit. The panel uses these citations to highlight the insufficiency of Chalifoux’s unsupported assertion that he should have been invited to testify.

Arguments not presented to the magistrate judge: Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2009)

Williams is central to the testimony issue. The district court (and then the Eleventh Circuit) relied on the principle that a district court has discretion to decline consideration of arguments not first presented to the magistrate judge. That doctrine supported rejecting Chalifoux’s after-the-fact claim that he “was not able” to testify when he had not requested to testify during the hearing.

Harmless error: FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)

Even if there had been a procedural irregularity, Rule 52(a) requires disregard of errors not affecting substantial rights. The panel notes Chalifoux did not explain what he would have said or how it would have changed the outcome, reinforcing the conclusion that no reversible error was shown.

Out-of-circuit Sell seriousness/special-circumstances discussions (referenced but not endorsed)

The opinion notes the magistrate judge discussed multiple circuit decisions on factor one, including: United States v. Mackey, 717 F.3d 569 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Gutierrez, 704 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Velanzuela-Puentes, 479 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010). The panel expressly declines to “address or endorse” those cases because the result would be the same regardless of inter-circuit methodological differences. Their practical influence, however, is that they illustrate a broader appellate pattern: courts weigh offense seriousness (often via statutory maxima and guidelines exposure) and ask whether special circumstances (time served, likely civil commitment, trial defenses affected by medication) reduce the prosecution interest.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction and posture: The court confirmed interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, citing Diaz and Sell. This is important because forced-medication orders implicate bodily integrity and cannot effectively be reviewed after final judgment.
2. Factor 1 and abandonment doctrine: Although factor one is de novo, the panel effectively removes it as a live issue by applying abandonment rules (Esformes, Sapuppo) to the thin appellate briefing. The court nevertheless signals that, on the merits, the prosecution interest remained important because (a) the offenses were serious and (b) no special circumstances diminished the interest (limited pretrial detention relative to anticipated sentence, no showing of civil confinement, no identified interference with an insanity defense).
3. Factors 2–4 and deference to record-based findings: The panel emphasizes the clear-error standard and then points to the evidentiary posture: two government experts diagnosed delusional disorder, persecutory type; testified medication was first-line treatment; and explained why talk therapy/education would not dislodge fixed delusional beliefs. Chalifoux’s expert largely agreed but could not complete an interview because Chalifoux refused. This produced a record in which the factfinder’s conclusions were not merely “permissible,” but strongly supported and effectively unrebutted.
4. No sua sponte duty to solicit testimony; no prejudice shown: On Chalifoux’s principal procedural complaint, the panel adopts the district court’s view: he was not barred from testifying; he simply did not request to testify until after the R&R. The court treats the argument as unsupported (no authority cited) and incomplete (no proffer of testimony or showing of prejudice), invoking Williams and Rule 52(a).

C. Impact

Although unpublished and “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is still informative within the Eleventh Circuit’s Sell practice in three ways:

• Procedural discipline in Sell appeals: The opinion underscores that factor-one challenges (the principal legal component) can be lost through inadequate briefing, leaving appellants with only clear-error attacks on medical and factual findings—a steep uphill climb.
• Evidence presentation at the hearing stage is decisive: Where expert testimony is consistent and unrefuted—and where the defense expert cannot meaningfully contradict it—the court will be reluctant to find clear error on efficacy, necessity, and medical appropriateness.
• Testimony participation must be timely requested and supported: The ruling signals that a defendant cannot generally convert a post-R&R complaint into reversible error absent a timely request to testify, supporting authority, and a concrete showing of prejudice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Sell hearing

A court proceeding to decide whether the government may forcibly medicate a defendant with antipsychotic drugs solely to restore competency to proceed in the criminal case, applying the four-factor test from Sell v. United States.

Competency vs. guilt

Competency concerns whether a defendant can understand the proceedings and assist counsel; it is distinct from whether the defendant committed the charged crime.

Report and Recommendation (R&R)

A magistrate judge’s written recommendation to the district judge. Parties must raise objections; but courts may decline to consider new arguments raised only after the R&R.

Interlocutory appeal / collateral order doctrine

An appeal taken before the case ends. Some orders—like forced medication—are immediately appealable because delaying review would effectively deny meaningful appellate relief.

Standards of review: de novo vs. clear error

“De novo” means the appellate court decides the issue anew. “Clear error” means the appellate court defers to the trial court’s factfinding unless a serious, obvious mistake is shown.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Chalifoux affirms a forced-medication order under Sell largely because the evidentiary record was one-sided: experts agreed antipsychotic medication was the medically appropriate, necessary, and substantially likely means to restore competency, and the defendant offered no developed appellate challenge to the government’s prosecution interest. The decision also rejects, on preservation and prejudice grounds, an attempt to recast a defendant’s failure to request testimony at the hearing into reversible procedural error.

The broader takeaway is practical: Sell litigation is won (or lost) in the hearing record and in disciplined issue preservation—particularly because appellate review of factors two through four is highly deferential.